Julius & Aleks 03/27/2014
|
|
- Clyde Harvey
- 6 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 03/27/2014 1/41
2 2/41
3 The Overall Argument For any x: (1) If x morally ought to φ, then x ought to φ regardless of whether he cares to, regardless of whether φ-ing satisfies any of his desires or furthers his interests. (2) If x morally ought to φ, then x has a reason for φ-ing. (3) Therefore, if x morally ought to φ, then x has a reason for φ-ing regardless of whether φ-ing serves his desires or furthers his interests. (4) But there is no sense to be made of such reasons. (5) Therefore, x is never under a moral obligation. [Joyce][p. 42] 3/41
4 Harman s Harman s idea is to save ordinary moral discourse by interpreting our moral judgments as elliptical for the agent-relative judgments (stemming from some instrumental reasons). Motion discourse as a paradigm. What holds of motion discourse, should hold of morality as well. 4/41
5 Harman s Harman s idea is to save ordinary moral discourse by interpreting our moral judgments as elliptical for the agent-relative judgments (stemming from some instrumental reasons). Motion discourse as a paradigm. What holds of motion discourse, should hold of morality as well. Joyce: the analogy does not hold, since (1) there is no new discovery in the case of morality, and.. (2) moral discourse is essentially (or unnegotiably) non-relative. 5/41
6 The Aims of the Chapter William s main argument: Any theory that supports non-instrumental reasons necessarily makes a mistake. No non-instrumental account of practical rationality Moral error theory. Joyce s aims: (1) describe the theory, (2) cricize the opposition. 6/41
7 A Little Bit of Reasonology (1) Objective rational reasons (2) Subjective rational reasons (3) Irrational reasons (4) William s-style reasons 7/41
8 A Little Bit of Reasonology (1) Objective rational reasons (2) Subjective rational reasons (3) Irrational reasons (4) William s-style reasons Definition (Williams) One has a reason to φ if and only if one would be motivated to φ after the process of fully informed [and] correct deliberation. (1) = (4)? Of course, Joyce goes for (2) [= normative reasons]. [..T]here are many different normative systems, and therefore many different kinds of normative reasons. [..] However, with Smith I will use normative reason in restricted sense, to mean something that is justified according to practical rationality. [Joyce][p. 70, fn. 21] 8/41
9 Joyce s real interest William s argument against external reasons. Definition (External Reason) An external reason claim is one that is applied to the subject of the ascription regardless of what his desires are. 9/41
10 Joyce s real interest William s argument against external reasons. Definition (External Reason) An external reason claim is one that is applied to the subject of the ascription regardless of what his desires are. For Williams smth. is a reason only if its consideration could (potentially) motivate the agent. Joyce: this is OK, as lons as we focus on normative reasons; all normative reasons are internal. 10/41
11 The Argument How does an internal reason explain an action?.. one can tell a story about psychological causation a certain desire + a certain belief cause a certain action. 11/41
12 The Argument How does an internal reason explain an action?.. one can tell a story about psychological causation a certain desire + a certain belief cause a certain action. Now, suppose that I have a (external) reason not to drink coffee because it is tapu. How can this reason explain my action? 12/41
13 The Argument How does an internal reason explain an action?.. one can tell a story about psychological causation a certain desire + a certain belief cause a certain action. Now, suppose that I have a (external) reason not to drink coffee because it is tapu. How can this reason explain my action?.. clearly, I must have internalized it in some way, i.e., I must believe that the coffee is tapu, 13/41
14 The Argument How does an internal reason explain an action?.. one can tell a story about psychological causation a certain desire + a certain belief cause a certain action. Now, suppose that I have a (external) reason not to drink coffee because it is tapu. How can this reason explain my action?.. clearly, I must have internalized it in some way, i.e., I must believe that the coffee is tapu,.. but this alone doesn t seem to be enough. 14/41
15 Humean conception of action (orthodoxy) In a nutshell: action requires beliefs & desires. Virtues: simplicity, explanatory breadth, and apparent intuitiveness. 15/41
16 Humean conception of action (orthodoxy) In a nutshell: action requires beliefs & desires. Virtues: simplicity, explanatory breadth, and apparent intuitiveness. The opposing view is commited to besires. Direction of fit against the naive besire theorist. Against the more subtle besire theorist.. all we have to is to imagine the desire element and the belief element of some given besire coming apart. 16/41
17 Millgram s Against Williams presupposition: Millgram describes a case in which (purportedly) S has a reason to φ, but φ cannot explain any of S s actions: 17/41
18 Millgram s Against Williams presupposition: Millgram describes a case in which (purportedly) S has a reason to φ, but φ cannot explain any of S s actions: Archie is insensitive towards people around him. This insensitivity deprives him of certain satisfactions (say, fulfilling friendships), but due to being insensitive Archie cannot appreciate their values. 18/41
19 Millgram s Against Williams presupposition: Millgram describes a case in which (purportedly) S has a reason to φ, but φ cannot explain any of S s actions: Archie is insensitive towards people around him. This insensitivity deprives him of certain satisfactions (say, fulfilling friendships), but due to being insensitive Archie cannot appreciate their values. Joyce considers: (1) Archie s reason for fulfilling friendships, and (2) his reason to go to counseling. 19/41
20 Millgram s Against Williams presupposition: Millgram describes a case in which (purportedly) S has a reason to φ, but φ cannot explain any of S s actions: Archie is insensitive towards people around him. This insensitivity deprives him of certain satisfactions (say, fulfilling friendships), but due to being insensitive Archie cannot appreciate their values. Joyce considers: (1) Archie s reason for fulfilling friendships, and (2) his reason to go to counseling. Archie 1, Archie 2,..., Archie n, Archie+ in the background: (a) Archie 1 isn t stuck, (b) Williams-style reasons Importantly, Archie+ is not the exemplar, but the advice-giver. 20/41
21 Hampton s Williams style internalism: Internal reasons =... correct deliberation... 21/41
22 Hampton s Williams style internalism: Internal reasons =... correct deliberation... Hampton s challenge: Explicating correct deliberation leads to a dilemma First Horn - Circularity: Correct deliberation =... internal reasons... 22/41
23 Hampton s Williams style internalism: Internal reasons =... correct deliberation... Hampton s challenge: Explicating correct deliberation leads to a dilemma First Horn - Circularity: Correct deliberation =... internal reasons... Second Horn - Self-undermining: Correct deliberation =... external reasons... 23/41
24 The first horn - Cicularity Joyce argues: Internal reasons are involved in correct deliberation, but correct deliberation is not defined in terms of internal reasons. Therefore, there is no circularity. 24/41
25 The first horn - Cicularity Joyce argues: Internal reasons are involved in correct deliberation, but correct deliberation is not defined in terms of internal reasons. Therefore, there is no circularity. But might there be further circularity problems with regard to when and how we ought to deliberate? For instance: When I am in calmer circumstances, then I may have reason to deliberate because doing so is conducive to the satisfaction of my desires. Not just my actual desires, but those that I would have after correctly deliberating under conditions of full information. Isn t that circular? 25/41
26 The first horn - Cicularity Joyce argues: Internal reasons are involved in correct deliberation, but correct deliberation is not defined in terms of internal reasons. Therefore, there is no circularity. But might there be further circularity problems with regard to when and how we ought to deliberate? For instance: When I am in calmer circumstances, then I may have reason to deliberate because doing so is conducive to the satisfaction of my desires. Not just my actual desires, but those that I would have after correctly deliberating under conditions of full information. Isn t that circular? Joyce s answer: No, because here nothing is defined. 26/41
27 The second horn - the self-undermining objection The objection: Correct deliberation=... external reasons... First interpretation: correct deliberation is the kind of deliberation that we ought to partake in. Joyce: We ought always to act in accoradance with correct deliberation, but not always deliberate correctly. 27/41
28 The second horn - the self-undermining objection The objection: Correct deliberation=... external reasons... First interpretation: correct deliberation is the kind of deliberation that we ought to partake in. Joyce: We ought always to act in accoradance with correct deliberation, but not always deliberate correctly. Second interpretation: Instrumental normative requirements can be formulated wide scope and narrow scope. The wide scope reading entails external reasons. narrow scope: If A has desire D, then A has a reason to take the means to satisfy D. wide scope: A has a reason such that: if she has a desire D, then take the means to satisfy D. 28/41
29 The second horn - the self-undermining objection The objection: Correct deliberation=... external reasons... First interpretation: correct deliberation is the kind of deliberation that we ought to partake in. Joyce: We ought always to act in accoradance with correct deliberation, but not always deliberate correctly. Second interpretation: Instrumental normative requirements can be formulated wide scope and narrow scope. The wide scope reading entails external reasons. narrow scope: If A has desire D, then A has a reason to take the means to satisfy D. wide scope: A has a reason such that: if she has a desire D, then take the means to satisfy D. 29/41
30 The self-undermining objection II Joyce: there are no wide scope normative requirements, because that would lead to an implausible proilferation of reasons. 30/41
31 The self-undermining objection II Joyce: there are no wide scope normative requirements, because that would lead to an implausible proilferation of reasons. How bad would this proliferation of reasons be? Maybe not so bad, after all. Wide scope instrumental requirements have the advantage that, if we have some devious end, we can satisfy the requirement by giving up the end. 31/41
32 The self-undermining objection II Joyce: there are no wide scope normative requirements, because that would lead to an implausible proilferation of reasons. How bad would this proliferation of reasons be? Maybe not so bad, after all. Wide scope instrumental requirements have the advantage that, if we have some devious end, we can satisfy the requirement by giving up the end. Third interpretation: Even if we accept the narrow scope formulation we can ask for a reason to follow this (narrow scope) principle. In even asking th second question the questioner is evincing an allegince to instrumentalism (123) the questioner does not properly understand what the word reason means. (123) 32/41
33 Korsgaard s Korsgaard s idea: After a process of correct deliberation all agents will converge on th esame moral desires. 33/41
34 Korsgaard s Korsgaard s idea: After a process of correct deliberation all agents will converge on th esame moral desires. Joyce s reply: Korsgaard needs to explain the relevant cases. And she can t. let him consider Harman s Mafia hit man, and tell us exactly what deliberative defects this imaginary agent is suffering from. (124) 34/41
35 Korsgaard s Korsgaard s idea: After a process of correct deliberation all agents will converge on th esame moral desires. Joyce s reply: Korsgaard needs to explain the relevant cases. And she can t. let him consider Harman s Mafia hit man, and tell us exactly what deliberative defects this imaginary agent is suffering from. (124) Korsgaard s first argument: An action must be in line with one s self-conception. Joyce: The mafia man s actions are in line with his self-conception as member of the family. 35/41
36 Korsgaard s Korsgaard s second argument: An action must be in line with one s self-conception as a human. 36/41
37 Korsgaard s Korsgaard s second argument: An action must be in line with one s self-conception as a human. Joyce s reply: Valuing one s conception as a human does not imply valuing everybody s humanity. At least, one would need an extra argument to make that transition. 37/41
38 Korsgaard s Korsgaard s second argument: An action must be in line with one s self-conception as a human. Joyce s reply: Valuing one s conception as a human does not imply valuing everybody s humanity. At least, one would need an extra argument to make that transition. Korsgaard s third argument: reasons need to be communicable. Therefore, they cannot be agent relative. Joyce: Agent relative reasons are communicable. Just as a I can communicate that this piece of property belongs to me and not to you I can communicate that this reason is mine an not yours. 38/41
39 Korsgaard s (continued) Korsgaard s fourth argument: reasons must be justifiable to everyone. Therefore, they can t be agent relative. 39/41
40 Korsgaard s (continued) Korsgaard s fourth argument: reasons must be justifiable to everyone. Therefore, they can t be agent relative. Joyce s reply I: In one sense, agent relative reasons are justifiable to others. Ortcutt well-understands that A1 has a very good reason to kill him, and no particular reason to refrain. But that, of course, doesn t mean that Ortcutt has to like it. 129) 40/41
41 Korsgaard s (continued) Korsgaard s fourth argument: reasons must be justifiable to everyone. Therefore, they can t be agent relative. Joyce s reply I: In one sense, agent relative reasons are justifiable to others. Ortcutt well-understands that A1 has a very good reason to kill him, and no particular reason to refrain. But that, of course, doesn t mean that Ortcutt has to like it. 129) Joyce s reply II: Not even the moral reasons favored by Korsgaard are sharable and justiable to all: Perhaps A1 and his family think that ordinary law-abiders are naive fools. (131) 41/41
CRUCIAL TOPICS IN THE DEBATE ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL REASONS
CRUCIAL TOPICS IN THE DEBATE ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL REASONS By MARANATHA JOY HAYES A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
More information8 Internal and external reasons
ioo Rawls and Pascal's wager out how under-powered the supposed rational choice under ignorance is. Rawls' theory tries, in effect, to link politics with morality, and morality (or at least the relevant
More informationNOTES ON WILLIAMSON: CHAPTER 11 ASSERTION Constitutive Rules
NOTES ON WILLIAMSON: CHAPTER 11 ASSERTION 11.1 Constitutive Rules Chapter 11 is not a general scrutiny of all of the norms governing assertion. Assertions may be subject to many different norms. Some norms
More informationJudith Jarvis Thomson s Normativity
Judith Jarvis Thomson s Normativity Gilbert Harman June 28, 2010 Normativity is a careful, rigorous account of the meanings of basic normative terms like good, virtue, correct, ought, should, and must.
More informationThe Kant vs. Hume debate in Contemporary Ethics : A Different Perspective. Amy Wang Junior Paper Advisor : Hans Lottenbach due Wednesday,1/5/00
The Kant vs. Hume debate in Contemporary Ethics : A Different Perspective Amy Wang Junior Paper Advisor : Hans Lottenbach due Wednesday,1/5/00 0 The Kant vs. Hume debate in Contemporary Ethics : A Different
More informationPractical Rationality and Ethics. Basic Terms and Positions
Practical Rationality and Ethics Basic Terms and Positions Practical reasons and moral ought Reasons are given in answer to the sorts of questions ethics seeks to answer: What should I do? How should I
More informationBuck-Passers Negative Thesis
Mark Schroeder November 27, 2006 University of Southern California Buck-Passers Negative Thesis [B]eing valuable is not a property that provides us with reasons. Rather, to call something valuable is to
More informationTWO ACCOUNTS OF THE NORMATIVITY OF RATIONALITY
DISCUSSION NOTE BY JONATHAN WAY JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY DISCUSSION NOTE DECEMBER 2009 URL: WWW.JESP.ORG COPYRIGHT JONATHAN WAY 2009 Two Accounts of the Normativity of Rationality RATIONALITY
More informationA DEFENSE OF REASONS-INTERNALISM. Ryan Stringer A THESIS
A DEFENSE OF REASONS-INTERNALISM By Ryan Stringer A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Philosophy 2011 ABSTRACT A
More informationREASON AND PRACTICAL-REGRET. Nate Wahrenberger, College of William and Mary
1 REASON AND PRACTICAL-REGRET Nate Wahrenberger, College of William and Mary Abstract: Christine Korsgaard argues that a practical reason (that is, a reason that counts in favor of an action) must motivate
More informationChoosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly *
Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly * Ralph Wedgwood 1 Two views of practical reason Suppose that you are faced with several different options (that is, several ways in which you might act in a
More informationIntroduction to Cognitivism; Motivational Externalism; Naturalist Cognitivism
Introduction to Cognitivism; Motivational Externalism; Naturalist Cognitivism Felix Pinkert 103 Ethics: Metaethics, University of Oxford, Hilary Term 2015 Cognitivism, Non-cognitivism, and the Humean Argument
More informationAre There Reasons to Be Rational?
Are There Reasons to Be Rational? Olav Gjelsvik, University of Oslo The thesis. Among people writing about rationality, few people are more rational than Wlodek Rabinowicz. But are there reasons for being
More informationIn his paper Internal Reasons, Michael Smith argues that the internalism
Aporia vol. 18 no. 1 2008 Why Prefer a System of Desires? Ja s o n A. Hills In his paper Internal Reasons, Michael Smith argues that the internalism requirement on a theory of reasons involves what a fully
More informationWhy there is no such thing as a motivating reason
Why there is no such thing as a motivating reason Benjamin Kiesewetter, ENN Meeting in Oslo, 03.11.2016 (ERS) Explanatory reason statement: R is the reason why p. (NRS) Normative reason statement: R is
More informationInstrumental Normativity: In Defense of the Transmission Principle Benjamin Kiesewetter
Instrumental Normativity: In Defense of the Transmission Principle Benjamin Kiesewetter This is the penultimate draft of an article forthcoming in: Ethics (July 2015) Abstract: If you ought to perform
More informationA Rational Solution to the Problem of Moral Error Theory? Benjamin Scott Harrison
A Rational Solution to the Problem of Moral Error Theory? Benjamin Scott Harrison In his Ethics, John Mackie (1977) argues for moral error theory, the claim that all moral discourse is false. In this paper,
More informationMark Schroeder. Slaves of the Passions. Melissa Barry Hume Studies Volume 36, Number 2 (2010), 225-228. Your use of the HUME STUDIES archive indicates your acceptance of HUME STUDIES Terms and Conditions
More informationWhy reason internalism does not support moral internalism
Why reason internalism does not support moral internalism Chung-Hung Chang Department of Philosophy National Chung Cheng University Abstract Moral internalism and reason internalism are two distinct but
More informationIn Defense of The Wide-Scope Instrumental Principle. Simon Rippon
In Defense of The Wide-Scope Instrumental Principle Simon Rippon Suppose that people always have reason to take the means to the ends that they intend. 1 Then it would appear that people s intentions to
More informationThe view that all of our actions are done in self-interest is called psychological egoism.
Egoism For the last two classes, we have been discussing the question of whether any actions are really objectively right or wrong, independently of the standards of any person or group, and whether any
More informationPractical reasons and rationality. A critique of the desire-based reasons model
Practical reasons and rationality A critique of the desire-based reasons model Thesis for the degree of Master in Philosophy Alf Andreas Bø University of Oslo, November 2007 Acknowledgements I would like
More informationAction in Special Contexts
Part III Action in Special Contexts c36.indd 283 c36.indd 284 36 Rationality john broome Rationality as a Property and Rationality as a Source of Requirements The word rationality often refers to a property
More informationBayesian Probability
Bayesian Probability Patrick Maher University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign November 24, 2007 ABSTRACT. Bayesian probability here means the concept of probability used in Bayesian decision theory. It
More informationIs Truth the Primary Epistemic Goal? Joseph Barnes
Is Truth the Primary Epistemic Goal? Joseph Barnes I. Motivation: what hangs on this question? II. How Primary? III. Kvanvig's argument that truth isn't the primary epistemic goal IV. David's argument
More informationUtilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp Reprinted in Moral Luck (CUP, 1981).
Draft of 3-21- 13 PHIL 202: Core Ethics; Winter 2013 Core Sequence in the History of Ethics, 2011-2013 IV: 19 th and 20 th Century Moral Philosophy David O. Brink Handout #14: Williams, Internalism, and
More informationINTENTION, PLANS, AND ETHICAL RATIONALISM
INTENTION, PLANS, AND ETHICAL RATIONALISM Kieran Setiya University of Pittsburgh June 27, 2011 (Draft; please do not cite without permission) According to Michael Bratman's influential theory of intending,
More informationHarman s Moral Relativism
Harman s Moral Relativism Jordan Wolf March 17, 2010 Word Count: 2179 (including body, footnotes, and title) 1 1 Introduction In What is Moral Relativism? and Moral Relativism Defended, 1 Gilbert Harman,
More informationSEPARATING REASONS. David Dexter. Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts
SEPARATING REASONS by David Dexter Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts at Dalhousie University Halifax, Nova Scotia August 2013 Copyright by David Dexter,
More informationThe form of relativism that says that whether an agent s actions are right or wrong depends on the moral principles accepted in her own society.
Glossary of Terms: Act-consequentialism Actual Duty Actual Value Agency Condition Agent Relativism Amoralist Appraisal Relativism A form of direct consequentialism according to which the rightness and
More informationReasons With Rationalism After All MICHAEL SMITH
book symposium 521 Bratman, M.E. Forthcoming a. Intention, belief, practical, theoretical. In Spheres of Reason: New Essays on the Philosophy of Normativity, ed. Simon Robertson. Oxford: Oxford University
More informationThis handout follows the handout on The nature of the sceptic s challenge. You should read that handout first.
Michael Lacewing Three responses to scepticism This handout follows the handout on The nature of the sceptic s challenge. You should read that handout first. MITIGATED SCEPTICISM The term mitigated scepticism
More informationThe Greatest Mistake: A Case for the Failure of Hegel s Idealism
The Greatest Mistake: A Case for the Failure of Hegel s Idealism What is a great mistake? Nietzsche once said that a great error is worth more than a multitude of trivial truths. A truly great mistake
More informationThe Possibility of Love Independent Reasons
Essays in Philosophy Volume 12 Issue 1 Love and Reasons Article 4 January 2011 The Possibility of Love Independent Reasons Jussi Suikkanen University of Birmingham, J.V.Suikkanen@bham.ac.uk Follow this
More informationThe Rightness Error: An Evaluation of Normative Ethics in the Absence of Moral Realism
An Evaluation of Normative Ethics in the Absence of Moral Realism Mathais Sarrazin J.L. Mackie s Error Theory postulates that all normative claims are false. It does this based upon his denial of moral
More informationReasons as Premises of Good Reasoning. Jonathan Way. University of Southampton. Forthcoming in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning Jonathan Way University of Southampton Forthcoming in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly A compelling thought is that there is an intimate connection between normative
More informationTheoretical Virtues in Science
manuscript, September 11, 2017 Samuel K. Schindler Theoretical Virtues in Science Uncovering Reality Through Theory Table of contents Table of Figures... iii Introduction... 1 1 Theoretical virtues, truth,
More informationScanlon on Double Effect
Scanlon on Double Effect RALPH WEDGWOOD Merton College, University of Oxford In this new book Moral Dimensions, T. M. Scanlon (2008) explores the ethical significance of the intentions and motives with
More informationNozick and Scepticism (Weekly supervision essay; written February 16 th 2005)
Nozick and Scepticism (Weekly supervision essay; written February 16 th 2005) Outline This essay presents Nozick s theory of knowledge; demonstrates how it responds to a sceptical argument; presents an
More informationActualism, Possibilism, and Beyond 1
Jacob Ross Actualism, Possibilism, and Beyond 1 How is what an agent ought to do related to what an agent ought to prefer that she does? More precisely, suppose we know what an agent s preference ordering
More informationTWO APPROACHES TO INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY
TWO APPROACHES TO INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY AND BELIEF CONSISTENCY BY JOHN BRUNERO JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY VOL. 1, NO. 1 APRIL 2005 URL: WWW.JESP.ORG COPYRIGHT JOHN BRUNERO 2005 I N SPEAKING
More informationObjective Normative Reasons (Draft)
Objective Normative Reasons (Draft) Carolyn Mason, University of Canterbury, New Zealand Introduction Accounts of objective normative reasons are usually accounts of reasons that produce the right results
More informationDeontological Perspectivism: A Reply to Lockie Hamid Vahid, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences, Tehran
Deontological Perspectivism: A Reply to Lockie Hamid Vahid, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences, Tehran Abstract In his (2015) paper, Robert Lockie seeks to add a contextualized, relativist
More informationON PROMOTING THE DEAD CERTAIN: A REPLY TO BEHRENDS, DIPAOLO AND SHARADIN
DISCUSSION NOTE ON PROMOTING THE DEAD CERTAIN: A REPLY TO BEHRENDS, DIPAOLO AND SHARADIN BY STEFAN FISCHER JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY DISCUSSION NOTE APRIL 2017 URL: WWW.JESP.ORG COPYRIGHT STEFAN
More informationHow Problematic for Morality Is Internalism about Reasons? Simon Robertson
Philosophy Science Scientific Philosophy Proceedings of GAP.5, Bielefeld 22. 26.09.2003 1. How Problematic for Morality Is Internalism about Reasons? Simon Robertson One of the unifying themes of Bernard
More informationCitation for the original published paper (version of record):
http://www.diva-portal.org Postprint This is the accepted version of a paper published in Utilitas. This paper has been peerreviewed but does not include the final publisher proof-corrections or journal
More informationEvidential Support and Instrumental Rationality
Evidential Support and Instrumental Rationality Peter Brössel, Anna-Maria A. Eder, and Franz Huber Formal Epistemology Research Group Zukunftskolleg and Department of Philosophy University of Konstanz
More informationClass 4 - The Myth of the Given
2 3 Philosophy 2 3 : Intuitions and Philosophy Fall 2011 Hamilton College Russell Marcus Class 4 - The Myth of the Given I. Atomism and Analysis In our last class, on logical empiricism, we saw that Wittgenstein
More informationHarry Frankfurt Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person
Harry Frankfurt Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person Up to this point we have been discussing the compatibility of determinism and what we might call free action. Our question has been: if determinism
More informationTHE NATURE OF NORMATIVITY IN KANT S PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC REBECCA V. MILLSOP S
THE NATURE OF NORMATIVITY IN KANT S PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC REBECCA V. MILLSOP S I. INTRODUCTION Immanuel Kant claims that logic is constitutive of thought: without [the laws of logic] we would not think at
More informationWide and narrow scope
Philos Stud DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9841-z Wide and narrow scope Sam Shpall Ó Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011 Abstract In this paper I present an original and relatively conciliatory solution
More informationINSTRUMENTAL MYTHOLOGY
BY MARK SCHROEDER JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY SYMPOSIUM I DECEMBER 2005 URL: WWW.JESP.ORG COPYRIGHT MARK SCHROEDER 2005 By AMONG STANDARD VIEWS about instrumental reasons and rationality, as
More informationOxford Scholarship Online Abstracts and Keywords
Oxford Scholarship Online Abstracts and Keywords ISBN 9780198802693 Title The Value of Rationality Author(s) Ralph Wedgwood Book abstract Book keywords Rationality is a central concept for epistemology,
More information4 Liberty, Rationality, and Agency in Hobbes s Leviathan
1 Introduction Thomas Hobbes, at first glance, provides a coherent and easily identifiable concept of liberty. He seems to argue that agents are free to the extent that they are unimpeded in their actions
More information[Forthcoming in The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. Hugh LaFollette. (Oxford: Blackwell), 2012] Imperatives, Categorical and Hypothetical
[Forthcoming in The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. Hugh LaFollette. (Oxford: Blackwell), 2012] Imperatives, Categorical and Hypothetical Samuel J. Kerstein Ethicists distinguish between categorical
More informationSome proposals for understanding narrow content
Some proposals for understanding narrow content February 3, 2004 1 What should we require of explanations of narrow content?......... 1 2 Narrow psychology as whatever is shared by intrinsic duplicates......
More informationOn the Incompatibility of Reasons Internalism and the Practical Rationality of Moral Action
1 On the Incompatibility of Reasons Internalism and the Practical Rationality of Moral Action Lane DesAutels Abstract: In what follows, I explore the relationship between two widely held theses in moral
More information(A fully correct plan is again one that is not constrained by ignorance or uncertainty (pp ); which seems to be just the same as an ideal plan.
COMMENTS ON RALPH WEDGWOOD S e Nature of Normativity RICHARD HOLTON, MIT Ralph Wedgwood has written a big book: not in terms of pages (though there are plenty) but in terms of scope and ambition. Scope,
More informationIs rationality normative?
Is rationality normative? Corpus Christi College, University of Oxford Abstract Rationality requires various things of you. For example, it requires you not to have contradictory beliefs, and to intend
More informationPARFIT'S MISTAKEN METAETHICS Michael Smith
PARFIT'S MISTAKEN METAETHICS Michael Smith In the first volume of On What Matters, Derek Parfit defends a distinctive metaethical view, a view that specifies the relationships he sees between reasons,
More informationTwo Kinds of Ends in Themselves in Kant s Moral Theory
Western University Scholarship@Western 2015 Undergraduate Awards The Undergraduate Awards 2015 Two Kinds of Ends in Themselves in Kant s Moral Theory David Hakim Western University, davidhakim266@gmail.com
More informationAboutness and Justification
For a symposium on Imogen Dickie s book Fixing Reference to be published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Aboutness and Justification Dilip Ninan dilip.ninan@tufts.edu September 2016 Al believes
More informationWhat should I believe? What should I believe when people disagree with me?
What should I believe? What should I believe when people disagree with me? Imagine that you are at a horse track with a friend. Two horses, Whitey and Blacky, are competing for the lead down the stretch.
More informationWhy Is Epistemic Evaluation Prescriptive?
Why Is Epistemic Evaluation Prescriptive? Kate Nolfi UNC Chapel Hill (Forthcoming in Inquiry, Special Issue on the Nature of Belief, edited by Susanna Siegel) Abstract Epistemic evaluation is often appropriately
More informationNormative reasons. A survey of internalism
Normative reasons A survey of internalism Thesis for the degree of Master in Philosophy Åsmund Alvik University of Oslo, November 2008 1 Acknowledgements I would like to thank my supervisor professor Panos
More informationEXERCISES, QUESTIONS, AND ACTIVITIES
1 EXERCISES, QUESTIONS, AND ACTIVITIES Exercises From the Text 1) In the text, we diagrammed Example 7 as follows: Whatever you do, don t vote for Joan! An action is ethical only if it stems from the right
More informationBERNARD WILLIAMS S INTERNALISM: A NEW INTERPRETATION. Micah J Baize
BERNARD WILLIAMS S INTERNALISM: A NEW INTERPRETATION By Copyright 2012 Micah J Baize Submitted to the graduate degree program in Philosophy and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial
More informationDOES BELIEF HAVE AN AIM?
DAVID JOHN OWENS DOES BELIEF HAVE AN AIM? ABSTRACT. The hypothesis that belief aims at the truth has been used to explain three features of belief: (1) the fact that correct beliefs are true beliefs, (2)
More informationCan Rationality Be Naturalistically Explained? Jeffrey Dunn. Abstract: Dan Chiappe and John Vervaeke (1997) conclude their article, Fodor,
Can Rationality Be Naturalistically Explained? Jeffrey Dunn Abstract: Dan Chiappe and John Vervaeke (1997) conclude their article, Fodor, Cherniak and the Naturalization of Rationality, with an argument
More informationHuman Rationality: A Defense of Subjective Deliberation
Louisiana State University LSU Digital Commons LSU Master's Theses Graduate School 2013 Human Rationality: A Defense of Subjective Deliberation Paul Edward Cynar Louisiana State University and Agricultural
More informationCan the lottery paradox be solved by identifying epistemic justification with epistemic permissibility? Benjamin Kiesewetter
Can the lottery paradox be solved by identifying epistemic justification with epistemic permissibility? Benjamin Kiesewetter Abstract: Thomas Kroedel argues that the lottery paradox can be solved by identifying
More informationReason Papers Vol. 36, no. 1
Gotthelf, Allan, and James B. Lennox, eds. Metaethics, Egoism, and Virtue: Studies in Ayn Rand s Normative Theory. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011. Ayn Rand now counts as a figure
More informationBayesian Probability
Bayesian Probability Patrick Maher September 4, 2008 ABSTRACT. Bayesian decision theory is here construed as explicating a particular concept of rational choice and Bayesian probability is taken to be
More informationDeontology, Rationality, and Agent-Centered Restrictions
Florida Philosophical Review Volume X, Issue 1, Summer 2010 75 Deontology, Rationality, and Agent-Centered Restrictions Brandon Hogan, University of Pittsburgh I. Introduction Deontological ethical theories
More informationFrom the Categorical Imperative to the Moral Law
From the Categorical Imperative to the Moral Law Marianne Vahl Master Thesis in Philosophy Supervisor Olav Gjelsvik Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Arts and Ideas UNIVERSITY OF OSLO May
More informationBoghossian & Harman on the analytic theory of the a priori
Boghossian & Harman on the analytic theory of the a priori PHIL 83104 November 2, 2011 Both Boghossian and Harman address themselves to the question of whether our a priori knowledge can be explained in
More informationMORAL CONCEPTS AND MOTIVATION 1. Mark Greenberg UCLA
Philosophical Perspectives, 23, Ethics, 2009 MORAL CONCEPTS AND MOTIVATION 1 Mark Greenberg UCLA 1. Introduction Abner s mother works for a regulatory agency. Abner overhears her talking with a colleague
More informationCHECKING THE NEIGHBORHOOD: A REPLY TO DIPAOLO AND BEHRENDS ON PROMOTION
DISCUSSION NOTE CHECKING THE NEIGHBORHOOD: A REPLY TO DIPAOLO AND BEHRENDS ON PROMOTION BY NATHANIEL SHARADIN JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY DISCUSSION NOTE FEBRUARY 2016 Checking the Neighborhood:
More informationExplanatory Indispensability and Deliberative Indispensability: Against Enoch s Analogy Alex Worsnip University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Explanatory Indispensability and Deliberative Indispensability: Against Enoch s Analogy Alex Worsnip University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Forthcoming in Thought please cite published version In
More informationMoral requirements are still not rational requirements
ANALYSIS 59.3 JULY 1999 Moral requirements are still not rational requirements Paul Noordhof According to Michael Smith, the Rationalist makes the following conceptual claim. If it is right for agents
More informationFeeling Pain for the Very First Time: The Normative Knowledge Argument
Penultimate draft, forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Feeling Pain for the Very First Time: The Normative Knowledge Argument Guy Kahane, University of Oxford Abstract. In this paper
More informationVirtue Ethics without Character Traits
Virtue Ethics without Character Traits Gilbert Harman Princeton University August 18, 1999 Presumed parts of normative moral philosophy Normative moral philosophy is often thought to be concerned with
More informationA UNIFIED MORAL TERRAIN?
BY STEPHEN EVERSON JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY VOL. 2, NO. 1 JULY 2007 URL: WWW.JESP.ORG COPYRIGHT STEPHEN EVERSON 2007 1 IN HIS BOOK What We Owe to Each Other, Thomas Scanlon offers what he
More informationSKEPTICISM AND VARIETIES OF TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT
SKEPTICISM AND VARIETIES OF TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT Hamid VAHID ABSTRACT: Transcendental arguments have been described as disclosing the necessary conditions of the possibility of phenomena as diverse
More informationAgainst All Reason? Skepticism about the Instrumental Norm 1
Against All Reason? Skepticism about the Instrumental Norm 1 Stephen Finlay A naturalistic project descended from Hume seeks to explain ought and normativity as a product of motivational states such as
More informationEvolution and the Possibility of Moral Realism
Evolution and the Possibility of Moral Realism PETER CARRUTHERS 1 University of Maryland SCOTT M. JAMES University of Kentucky Richard Joyce covers a great deal of ground in his well-informed, insightful,
More informationReasons: A Puzzling Duality?
10 Reasons: A Puzzling Duality? T. M. Scanlon It would seem that our choices can avect the reasons we have. If I adopt a certain end, then it would seem that I have reason to do what is required to pursue
More informationREASON, REASONS, AND REASONING. Jared. J. R. Keddy. Dalhousie University Halifax, Nova Scotia September Copyright by Jared J. R.
REASON, REASONS, AND REASONING by Jared. J. R. Keddy Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts at Dalhousie University Halifax, Nova Scotia September 2010 Copyright
More informationREASONS AND RATIONALITY. Jonathan Dancy
REASONS AND RATIONALITY Jonathan Dancy One topic that exercises those who think about the interrelations between different normative concepts is the question whether one of these concepts is somehow basic,
More informationThe Many Faces of Besire Theory
Georgia State University ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University Philosophy Theses Department of Philosophy Summer 8-1-2011 The Many Faces of Besire Theory Gary Edwards Follow this and additional works
More informationWhat should I believe? Only what I have evidence for.
What should I believe? Only what I have evidence for. We closed last time by considering an objection to Moore s proof of an external world. The objection was that Moore does not know the premises of his
More informationThe Simple Desire-Fulfillment Theory
NOÛS 33:2 ~1999! 247 272 The Simple Desire-Fulfillment Theory Mark C. Murphy Georgetown University An account of well-being that Parfit labels the desire-fulfillment theory ~1984, 493! has gained a great
More informationHenrik Ahlenius Department of Philosophy ETHICS & RESEARCH
Henrik Ahlenius Department of Philosophy henrik.ahlenius@philosophy.su.se ETHICS & RESEARCH Why a course like this? Tell you what the rules are Tell you to follow these rules Tell you to follow some other
More informationTwo Standpoints and the Problem of Moral Anthropology
Two Standpoints and the Problem of Moral Anthropology Patrick R. Frierson * Kant s theory of freedom is famously described as a compatibilism of compatibilism and incompatibilism (Wood 1984: 74). On the
More informationBelief, Rationality and Psychophysical Laws. blurring the distinction between two of these ways. Indeed, it will be argued here that no
Belief, Rationality and Psychophysical Laws Davidson has argued 1 that the connection between belief and the constitutive ideal of rationality 2 precludes the possibility of their being any type-type identities
More informationLaw and Authority. An unjust law is not a law
Law and Authority An unjust law is not a law The statement an unjust law is not a law is often treated as a summary of how natural law theorists approach the question of whether a law is valid or not.
More informationBeyond Objectivism and Subjectivism. Derek Parfit s two volume work On What Matters is, as many philosophers
Beyond Objectivism and Subjectivism Derek Parfit s two volume work On What Matters is, as many philosophers attest, a significant contribution to ethical theory and metaethics. Peter Singer has described
More informationThe unity of the normative
The unity of the normative The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Scanlon, T. M. 2011. The Unity of the Normative.
More informationInternal to what? A critique of the distinction between internal and external reasons for action (*)
Internal to what? A critique of the distinction between internal and external reasons for action (*) Roberto Mordacci Università «Vita & Salute S. Raffaele», Dipartimento di Psicologia Abstract The distinction
More information