The Many Problems of Memory Knowledge (Short Version)

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1 The Many Problems of Memory Knowledge (Short Version) Prepared For: The 13 th Annual Jakobsen Conference Abstract: Michael Huemer attempts to answer the question of when S remembers that P, what kind of justification does S have for believing that P? Huemer argues that the justification of memorial belief is dependent on the justification one has when adopting the belief and the justification one has from retaining the belief. I argue that Huemer's analysis is at best inconsistent and at worst misguided.

2 The Many Problems of Memory Knowledge (Short Version) Abstract: Michael Huemer attempts to answer the question of when S remembers that P, what kind of justification does S have for believing that P? Huemer argues that the justification of memorial belief is dependent on the justification one has when adopting the belief and the justification one has from retaining the belief. I argue that Huemer's analysis is at best inconsistent and at worst misguided. It seems as if we know a great many things by way of memory. I know that the Moon is about two and a half hundred thousand miles from the Earth from reading it in a textbook in high school. I know that the high school I graduated from was in Long Beach, California. I also know many other things by way of memory as well. But how, one might ask, is one justified in their belief that P when one remembers that P? In "The Problem of Memory Knowledge." 1 Michael Huemer offers a 2-part answer to this question: the justification of a memory belief is a product of both the justified acquisition of the belief and the justified retention of the belief. In what follows I will argue that Huemer's account of memory knowledge is unacceptable. I will show that on one interpretation Huemer s analysis is inconsistent. I will also argue that on another interpretation of Huemer s view, he may be mistakenly arguing for a view he thought he had refuted. Either way, Huemer s project fails. 1. The Natural Theories of Memorial Justification Huemer motivates his project with the following general question, when S remembers that P, what kind of justification does S have for believing that P? 2 The severity of the problem of memory knowledge is immediately apparent given Huemer s 1 Huemer, Michael. "The Problem of Memory Knowledge." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1999) Ibid., 347.

3 claimed refutation of the three natural answers to the problem: the Inferential Theory, the Foundational Theory, and the Preservation Theory. The Inferential Theory construes the justification of memorial beliefs as inferential in character: Premise 1 Premise 2 Conclusion I seem to remember that P In the past, when I seem to remember, I have been right Therefore, probably, the belief that P is right Huemer rightly notices two devastating problems for the Inferential Theory. First, the view suffers from a kind of vicious circularity. Clearly the second premise of the Inferential Theorist s argument is an instance of memorial belief, thus one would first need to know how such a belief is itself reliable if the argument is to successful. 3 Second, the Inferential Theorist s argument would be required each time I had a justified memorial belief, which (given the previous problem) seems very unlikely. In contrast to the Inferential Theory, the Foundational Theory construes the justification of memorial belief as being non-inferential: 4 Premise 1 Premise 2 Conclusion I have the experience of seeming to remember that P Having the experience of seeming to remember that P makes one prima facie justified in believing that P. Therefore, the belief that P is prima facie justified 3 Huemer also contends that if the Inferential Theory is to be successful then the argument for a particular memory belief would have to consist of premises that rely solely on present experience or a priori insights, but Huemer says he would have no idea how such an argument would go (see Ibid., 347). However, I am convinced that the Inferential Theory best describes Descartes attempts to justify memory belief. It is my contention that such a reading makes the most sense of Descartes treatment of skepticism in the Meditations. 4 For a contemporary defense of the Foundational Theory, see: Pollock, John. Contemporary Theories of Knowledge. Rowman & Littlefield, 1986.

4 While the Foundational Theory avoids the problems that faced the Inferential Theory Huemer argues that the Foundational Theory faces its own counter-intuitive results. Imagine the case of a subject S, who has a non-conclusive a priori proof of P. S allows the proof to slip out of his mind, but still seems to remember that P. If S entertains the proof again while still remembering that P, S will have two justifications for P. Thus, S is more justified with the passage of time. Or, consider the case of another subject S that adopted the belief that P on Monday due to wishful thinking. But, on Tuesday, the motivation for adopting the belief that P is forgotten. On Wednesday S seems to remember that P. Thus, on Wednesday the belief that P is justified for S, even though on Monday it was not. Huemer argues that the lesson to learn from these kinds of cases is that there is an intuitive constraint on theories of memorial justification, the justification for a belief cannot be increased by its passing into memory; it can only be lowered. 5 The Preservation Theory, like the Foundational Theory, avoids the problems that threatened the Inferential Theory. 6 Additionally, the Preservation Theory is able to account for the constraint on memorial justification that resulted in the rejection of the Foundational Theory. The Preservation Theory can be construed as: Premise 1 Premise 2 Premise 3 Conclusion When I remember that P, my justification for believing that P is whatever it was to begin with I remember that P The belief that P was justified at time T1 in virtue of evidence E Therefore, the belief that P is justified Huemer argues that like the Foundational Theory, the Preservation Theory faces counterintuitive results (albeit the counter-intuitive results rely on different cases than those that 5 Ibid., For a defense of the Preservation Theory, see: Malcolm, Norman. Knowledge and Certainty. Prentice Hall, 1963.

5 threatened the Foundation Theory). Huemer imagines the case of a Newly-Created- Person: a subject S is created, complete with false memories, five-minutes ago. It would seem, Huemer contends, that S is justified in believing what he had for breakfast (on the assumption that S remember what she had for breakfast), and that S s justification for his memorial belief is the same as the justification I have for my memorial belief about what I ate for breakfast. However, According to the present view, memory merely preserves one s initial justification, if any, for a belief. 7 Since S s memorial belief was created unjustified it gains no justification with the passage of time even though we can imagine that the phenomenal character of S s belief is indistinguishable from my justified memorial belief. From this kind of case Huemer concludes that the lesson to learn is that, the past history of belief is irrelevant to its present justification Huemer's Refined Theory of Memorial Justification: The Dualistic Theory Huemer argues that his Dualistic Theory accommodates our intuitions from the previous cases while also maintaining the positive features of the Foundational Theory and the Preservation Theory. The Dualistic Theory requires for justified memorial belief both the justified acquisition of that belief and the justified retention of that belief, On this view, a belief is justified full stop if and only if one had an adequate justification for adopting it at some point, and thenceforward one was justified in retaining it. 9 Huemer contends that the Dualistic Theory can successfully handle the cases that were problematic for the Foundational Theory and the Preservation Theory. Consider the Wishful Thinking Case: the belief that P was formed as a result of wishful thinking, and 7 Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., 351.

6 even though the belief that P is retained in memory, the subject forgets the source of the belief. In this case, since the Dualistic Theory requires of justified memorial belief adequate justification when the belief was adopted, the Wishful Thinking Case does not count as justified. Thus, Huemer contends that the Dualistic Theory avoids the fundamental problem that face Foundational Theory: irrational belief (like in the Wishful Thinking Case) cannot become rational by passing into memory. In the Newly-Created-Person Case, the Dualistic Theory can also account for why the newly-created-person has a justified belief: coming to believe something by seeming to remember it is an epistemically rational way of acquiring belief. 10 As a result, in this case, even the newly-created-person has a justified belief as long as the belief is based on what he seems to remember (even though, on the final analysis, his belief is false). 3. Huemer's Theory Rejected While it would seem that Huemer has successfully refuted the Foundational Theory and the Preservation Theory I will argue that Huemer's account of memory knowledge is unacceptable. I will show that Huemer faces a dilemma: either his analysis of memorial knowledge is inconsistent or he is mistakenly arguing for a view he meant to refute. The problem for Huemer s theory results from his analysis of the problematic cases that threatened the Foundational Theory and the Preservation Theory. First, consider Huemer s treatment of the Newly-Created-Person Case. On Huemer s view a person created 5 minutes ago with apparent memories who seems to remember having 10 Ibid., 351. Huemer introduces this explanation as a posit and does not argue for its truth.

7 breakfast is justified. The essential feature of Huemer s response is that, since [the newly-created-person] acquired his belief [about breakfast] this morning by seeming to remember it, he is rational in accepting it. 11 The essence of Huemer s point can be put another way: if a subject S acquires the belief that P from apparent memory then in the absence of defeaters 12 P is justified for S. The proposed problem surfaces when we consider Huemer s treatment of the cases that threatened the Foundational Theory: the A Priori Proof Case and the Wishful Thinking Case. In the A Priori Proof Case, you consider an a priori proof and gain from it some defeasible justification for some proposition. You forget the proof, but continue to believe the proposition. At some later time, you reconsider the a priori proof and remember your belief, thus you have two justifiers for the same belief. In the Wishful Thinking case, you form a belief by way of wishful thinking. You forget that the basis of the belief was wishful thinking, but remember the belief. By forgetting how your belief was acquired, the belief has gone from being irrational to being rational. Huemer argues that there is something wrong with both of these cases. However, Huemer s presentation of these cases seems uncharitable to the view he is attempting to critique: the Foundational Theory. Recall the structure of the Foundational Theory: Premise 1 Premise 2 Conclusion I have the experience of seeming to remember that P Having the experience of seeming to remember that P makes one prima facie justified in believing that P. Therefore, the belief that P is prima facie justified Now consider, again, the A Priori Proof Case and the Wishful Thinking Case: 11 Ibid., I take Huemer to be introducing a no-defeaters clause when he says, The normal functioning of memory, in the absence of specific reasons for revising a belief, constitutes an epistemically acceptable manner of retaining belief. Ibid., 351.

8 A Priori Proof Case: Claim 1-I have the experience of seeming to remember that P Claim 2-I entertain the proof that P On the Foundational Theory I have prima facie justification for the belief that P (given P2 from the Foundational Theory and claim 1 from the A Priori Proof Case). But given this case I also have additional justification for my belief that P (from claim 2). According to the Foundational Theory I have two different justifiers: 1 and 2. Wishful Thinking Case: Claim 3-I have the experience of seeming to remember that P On the Foundational Theory I have prima facie justification for the belief that P (given P2 from the Foundational Theory and claim 3 from the Wishful Thinking Case). When Huemer diagnoses each of these cases he argues that one cannot have a belief that is made rational (or more rational) by its passing into memory. However, this diagnosis runs afoul of Newly-Created-Person Case. In his explanation of the Newly- Created-Person Case Huemer contends that the newly-created-person has a justified belief because: Claim 4-I have the experience of seeming to remember that P In both the A Priori Proof Case and the Wishful Thinking Case as long as claims 1 and 3 are seemings (which is required by the Foundational Thoery) then they should be able to serve as rational acquisition methods of belief just as claim 4 does in the Newly-Created- Person Case. Huemer can either maintain that the A Priori Proof Case and the Wishful Thinking Case are still problematic or he can argue that they are not. If Huemer maintains that the A Priori Proof Case and the Wishful Thinking Case cases are problematic, then his analysis of memorial knowledge is inconsistent. This is

9 because he argues the same problem does not apply to his solution to the Newly-Created- Person case. If Huemer contends that the A Priori Proof Case and the Wishful Thinking Case cases are not problematic then he seems to come very close to mistakenly arguing for a view that he meant to refute. After all, on a charitable interpretation of the Foundational Theory, it is the experience of seeming to remember some proposition that leads to the prima facie justification. The question of whether one actually is remembering is a tangential issue. Just as in the case of the Newly-Created-Person, that the person did not actually have breakfast is irrelevant, as long as, the seeming to remember is acting as the acquisition method. What is essential to the Foundational Theory is that the experience of seeming memory serves as a rational acquisition method (just as it does in the Dualistic Theory). It would seem as if Huemer endorses the Foundational Theory in what he considers is the Dualistic Theories explanation of the Newly-Created-Person Case. 4. Conclusion I have attempted to show that Huemer fails to adequately answer the problem of memory knowledge. On my view, if Huemer s critique of the Foundational Theory is correct, then he fails to account for the Newly-Created-Person Case. Alternatively, if his solution to the Newly-Created-Person Case works, than the same solution should be open to the advocate of the Foundational Theory. Thus, it seems, Huemer s account of memory knowledge is unacceptable either his analysis is inconsistent or his account is compatible with a theory he thought he refuted.

10 References: Huemer, Michael. "The Problem of Memory Knowledge." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1999) Huemer, Michael. Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. Rowman & Littlefield, Malcolm, Norman. Knowledge and Certainty. Prentice Hall, McGrath, Matthew. Memory and Epistemic Conservatism. Synthese 157 (2007): Pollock, John. Contemporary Theories of Knowledge. Rowman & Littlefield, 1986.

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