Anaximenes (c. 585 c. 528) possibly believes that psyche holds a living thing together and rules or controls it.

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1 Chronology Obviously this is a bit idiosyncratic, but the hope is to provide a useful desk reference for philosophers of mind who require speedy access to a date or title as well as a bit of context for it. There are a few lines of explanation for each entry I tried to encapsulate as much of what matters most in a sentence. Obviously this almost never works, but a narrative structure really does help think things through. The narrative ends in 1949 with Ryle s Concept of Mind. My excuse for stopping there is that it s difficult to say what the impact or meaning of these books and papers might be, because we are too close in time to know. Forgive omissions it is very hard to know which books and events should be included early on or during unfamiliar centuries, and it gets extremely difficult as we approach the present. 800 BCE Homeric poems taking shape between the late 9 th and early 8 th century they characterise the soul thinly, as something lost at death, something which then howls off to Hades. 600 BCE Thales (fl. 600) might view psyche as a mover, force, or impetus, something which initiates the movement of moving things, from animals and people to magnets. Anaximenes (c. 585 c. 528) possibly believes that psyche holds a living thing together and rules or controls it. Pythagoras (fl. 530) accepts metempsychosis, possibly first to locate the soul in the head. 500 Anaxagoras (c. 500 c. 428) seems to argue for a materialist world actuated by a cosmic intelligence, Mind or Nous. Heraclitus (fl.500) might believe that psyche is fire, somehow responsible for the changes attending waking, sleeping and death. Parmenides (early to mid 5 th C) distinguishes between false appearances and reality as revealed by reason, might flirt with idealism. 400 Empedocles (c. 495 c. 435) probably formulates the first theory of perception; his talk of the cosmic psychological principles Love and Strife suggest panpsychism to some. Democritus (c. 460 c. 370) elaborates the atomism of Leucippus, including materialist conceptions of perception and the soul, might be first to tie soul to intelligence.

2 Socrates (c.469 c. 399), the man not the mouthpiece, might conceive of soul as the bearer of moral qualities. Plato (c. 427 c. 347) distinguishes soul from body, argues for immortality of the soul, ties soul to reason, Phaedo; divides the soul into three parts: reason, spirit and appetite, Republic. Aristotle (c. 384 c. 322) offers an extended, systematic discussion of psychological phenomena, De Anima and Parva Naturalia (c. 350); soul characterised as the form of a living thing. Epicurus (c. 341 c. 271) argues for a radical materialism and for the impossibility of the soul surviving death. 300 BCE Zeno of Citium (c. 335 c. 263) founds Stoic School, active until c. 520, which perpetuates a variety of materialist notions of soul, typically conceived as a breathlike substance diffused throughout the body. 200 BCE The Septuagint produced between 3 rd and 1 st centuries BCE; conceptions of the soul and mental phenomena as depicted in the Hebrew Bible translated into Greek. 100 Lucretius (c. 98 c. 51) propounds and expands the philosophy of Epicurus, producing the first philosophical treatment of mind in Latin, De Rerum Natura. BCE / CE Philo (c. 20 BCE c. 50 CE) blends Greek philosophy and Hebrew thought about the soul. 100 The Church Fathers (end of 1 st century to as late as 749 CE) subordinate philosophical accounts of mind to scriptural ones, raise religious questions, and shape the intellectual agenda accordingly. Tertullian (c. 160 c. 225) advocates traducianism, argues that soul must be somehow corporeal if it can be tormented in Hell, On the Soul. 200 Origen (c. 185 c. 254) holds that souls were created by God for contemplation but, falling away in distraction, became enveloped in bodies, On First Principles.

3 Plotinus (204/5 270/1) founds Neo-Platonism, articulates a conception of soul as part divine and part entwined with body, as well as an intricate theory of perception, The Six Enneads. 300 Augustine ( ) offers a detailed description of and reflection on introspected mental life, Confessions; has thoughts on action theory, On Free Will; might argue by analogy for other minds, anticipate the cogito, and influence the Cartesian conception of mind, On the Trinity and City of God. 400 Boethius (c. 480 c. 524) translates Aristotle and Plato into Latin, emphasizes rational nature of the soul, Contra Eutychen Avicenna (c ) integrates Islamic philosophy and Greek thought about mind and soul, formulates Floating Man thought experiment, On the Soul Averroes ( ) Latin translations of his commentaries on Aristotle bring Greek views on mind, through Islamic lenses, back to the West; also develops his own complex psychology and metaphysics of the soul, Long Commentary on De Anima. Vespasian Homilies (c. 1150) contain possibly the first use in English of a variation on the word soul (sawle), meaning life or life-force William of Moerbeke (c ) undertakes a complete translation of Aristotle into Latin (c. 1250). Aquinas (c ) reinterprets Aristotle in the light of Christian teaching, articulates full-blooded conceptions of mind, soul, intellect, memory, appetite, selfknowledge, imagination, perception, etc, Summa Theologiae. 1300

4 William of Shoreham (fl 1330) writes religious poems containing a forerunner of mind (mende), which might be the first use in English tied to cognition Marsilio Ficiono ( ) is the first to translate all of Plato into Latin, and the Platonic conceptions of soul and mind are rekindled, Theologia Platonica de Immortalitate Animae, (1474). Pomponazzi ( ) might anticipate property dualism, On the Immortality of the Soul Shakespeare ( ) writes Hamlet (c. 1600), some detect Cartesian presuppositions in certain soliloquies; others hear Hamlet s repressed desires Descartes ( ) articulates Cartesian Dualism, disentangles new thoughts on mind from Aristotelian, Platonic and Scholastic thinking, thereby ushers in modern philosophical reflection on the mental, Meditations on First Philosophy (1641). Hobbes ( ) defends a causal, empiricist, mechanistic and materialist conception of mental phenomena, Leviathan (1651). Geulincx ( ) (and Géraud de Cordemoy [ ]) follows Descartes, argues for pre-established harmony before Leibniz, Opera Philosophica (c. 1668). Spinoza ( ) rejects Cartesian Dualism in favour of dual-aspect monism: there is one substance, God, Ethics (1677). Locke ( ) formulates modern conception of self, raises questions about personal identity, claims that experience is the source of ideas, sets out limits to understanding, Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). Malebranche ( ) largely follows Descartes, but argues for occasionalism, Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion (1688) Leibniz ( ) argues for pre-established harmony, Discourse on Metaphysics (1686). Berkeley ( ) writes an account of perception, Essay Towards A New Theory of Vision (1709) and argues that to be is to be perceived, Principles of Human Knowledge (1710). Hartley ( ) founds associationist school of psychology, Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty, and his Expectations (1749).

5 Hume ( ) brings the experimental method to bear on mind, follows the sceptical implications of empiricism through, propounds the bundle theory of self, Treatise of Human Nature (1739), Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748). Adam Smith ( ) considers the nature of sympathy, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759). Kant ( ) argues that the structuring activity of the mind makes possible a world of experience; gives an account of reason, perception, judgement, the understanding, imagination, etc a Copernican Revolution in the conception of mind, Critique of Pure Reason (1781), Critique of Practical Reason (1788), Critique of Judgement (1790). Reid ( ) brings common sense to an account of sensation, conception, and perception; uses memory to inform a notion of self, An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense (1764), Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785). Bentham ( ) articulates modern psychological hedonism, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), 1800 Hegel ( ) gives an account of the evolution of consciousness as it plays out in human history, The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). Schopenhauer ( ) sees blind craving, will, at the depressing centre of human action; our inner experience of it points to the hidden nature of all things, The World as Will and Representation (1819). J. S. Mill ( ) elaborates on the connection between right and wrong and pleasure and pain; connects social and political reform to psychology, A System of Logic (1843) Kierkegaard ( ) claims that subjectivity is truth, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments (1846). Brentano ( ) reintroduces the Scholastic conception of intentionality as the mark of the mental, and his elevation of introspection paves the way for the phenomenological movement, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874). Nietzsche ( ) calls the subject a grammatical fiction, On the Genealogy of Morals (1887). James ( ) largely sets the agenda for both the philosophy of mind and psychology by advancing influential accounts of the brain, the mind-body relation, the stream of consciousness, memory, sensation, imagination, will, and emotions all peppered with compelling introspective reports, The Principles of Psychology (1890).

6 Bradley ( ) leads the turn towards idealism in the English-speaking world, rejects empiricist psychology, The Principles of Logic (1883), Appearance and Reality (1893). Husserl ( ) rejects psychologism and formulates the phenomenological method, Logical Investigations (1900/1); the method of epoché and transcendental phenomenology itself appear, Ideas (1913). Wundt ( ) investigates the self-examination of experience, Principles of Physiological Psychology (1873/4), establishes a laboratory of experimental psychology in Bergson ( ) offers an alternative to phenomenology, finds multiplicity in consciousness, regards intuition as method, Time and Free Will (1889), Matter and Memory (1896). T. H. Huxley ( ) memorably couches a version of epiphenomenalism in terms of whistles and steam engines, On the hypothesis that animals are automata, and its history (1874). Peirce ( ) raises objections to Cartesian methods and suggests panpsychism, along with further thoughts on signs and representation, The Fixation of Belief (1877), The Monist series ( ) Freud ( ), father of psychoanalysis, formulates such concepts as repression, psychosexual motivation, unconscious desire, as well as the id, ego and super ego, The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), The Ego and the Id (1923), Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis Moore ( ) brings commonsense realism to metaphysics and epistemology, Refutation of Idealism (1903), Proof of an External World (1939). Watson ( ) gives the boot to consciousness in general and introspection in particular, Psychology as a Behaviorist Views It (1913). Whitehead rejects materialism for the view that nature is a structure of evolving processes, Process and Reality (1929). Russell ( ) champions analytic method, moves from reflection on sense data to neutral monism, rejects idealism and psychologism, Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description, (1910), The Analysis of Matter (1927), The Analysis of Mind (1929). Broad ( ) argues for emergent vitalism, considers the possibility of survival after death, The Mind and Its Place in Nature (1925). Wittgenstein ( ) early picture theory of meaning gives way to therapeutic treatments of problems associated with mental phenomena; private language argument makes trouble for Cartesian reflection and solipsism, Tractatus Logico-

7 Philosophicus (1922), Philosophical Investigations (1953), The Blue and Brown Books (1958), On Certainty (1969) Dewey ( ) brings pragmatism to bear on mind, rejects dualisms in favour of naturalism and evolution; mind emerges socially; founds the functional approach to psychology, The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology (1896), Experience and Nature (1925). Heidegger ( ) urges reflection on Dasein, instead of a misunderstood conception of Being, reorients numerous mental concepts, Being and Time (1927). Carnap ( ) ties meaning to phenomenalistic language, argues that metaphysics is meaningless, The Logical Structure of the World (1928), Pseudoproblems in Philosophy (1928). Price ( ) reflects on perceptual consciousness, sense data, and the role of concepts in thought, Perception (1932), Thinking and Experience (1953). Merleau-Ponty ( ) perception takes centre stage, phenomenology meets scientific psychology, The Structure of Behavior (1942), Phenomenology of Perception (1945), The Visible and the Invisible, (1964). Sartre ( ) the father of existentialism distinguishes between being-in-itself and being-for-itself; we re both, The Psychology of Imagination (1940), Being and Nothingness (1943), Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960) Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions. Ayer ( ) applies the verification principle to claims about the mind, offers an analysis of sense data, Language, Truth and Logic (1936), The Problem of Knowledge (1956), The Concept of a Person and Other Essays (1963). Ryle ( ) ushers in contemporary philosophy of mind, arguing against Descartes ghost in the machine and for logical behaviourism, The Concept of Mind (1949). Turing ( ) Computing Machinery and Intelligence (1950). Quine ( ) Two Dogmas of Empiricism (1951), Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes, (1956), Epistemology Naturalized, (1969), Word and Object (1960) Sellars ( ) Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (1956), Science and Metaphysics (1968), Meaning as Functional Classification (1974) Place ( ) Is Consciousness a Brian Process? (1956). Anscombe ( ) Intention (1957), The First Person (1975), Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind (1981).

8 Chisholm ( ) Perceiving (1957), Person and Object (1976), The First Person (1981), Brentano and Intrinsic Value (1986). Chomsky (1928) Syntactic Structures (1957), Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (1965). Geach (1916) Mental Acts (1957). Malcolm ( ) Our Knowledge of Other Minds (1958). Feigl ( ) The Mental and the Physical (1958, as a book with Postscript and Preface, 1967). Smart (1920) Sensations and Brain Processes (1959), Philosophy and Scientific Realism (1963) Strawson ( ) Individuals (1959), Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays (1974) Scepticism and Naturalism (1985). Austin ( ) Sense and Sensibilia (1959) Armstrong (1926) Perception and the Physical World (1961), Bodily Sensations (1962), A Materialist Theory of the Mind (1968), The Nature of Mind and Other Essays (1980), Consciousness and Causality (1984), The Mind-Body Problem (1999). Davidson ( ) Actions, Reasons and Causes (1963), Mental Events (1970), Essays on Actions and Events (1980). Shoemaker (1931) Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity (1963), Identity, Cause and Mind: Philosophical Essays (1984), The First-Person Perspective, and other Essays (1996). Lewis ( ) An Argument for Identity Theory (1966), Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications (1972), Mad Pain and Martian Pain (1980), Philosophical Papers, Volume II (1986) Putnam (1926) The Nature of Mental States (1967), Mind, Language and Reality (1975) The Meaning of Meaning (1975) Dretske (1932) Seeing and Knowing (1969), Knowledge and the Flow of Information (1981), Naturalising the Mind (1995), Perception, Knowledge and Belief (2000) Kripke (1940) Naming and Necessity (1972), Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982). Williams ( ) Problems of the Self (1973). Nagel (1937) What is it Like to be a Bat? (1974), Mortal Questions (1979), View from Nowhere (1986)

9 Fodor (1935) The Language of Thought (1975), Propositional Attitudes (1978), Representations (1979), The Modularity of Mind (1983), Psychosemantics (1987), A Theory of Content (1990). Jackson (1943) Perception (1977), Epiphenomenal Qualia (1982), What Mary Didn t Know (1986). Rorty ( ) Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, (1979). Paul Churchland (1942) Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (1979), Matter and Consciousness (1988), A Neurocomputational Perspective (1989) Burge (1946) Individualism and the Mental (1979), Foundations of Mind (2007) O Shaughnessy (?) The Will (1980), Consciousness and the World (2000). Searle (1932) Minds, Brains and Programs (1980), Intentionality (1983), Minds, Brains and Science (1984), The Rediscovery of the Mind (1992). Block (1942) Psychologism and Behaviorism (1981), On a Confusion about the Function of Consciousness (1995), Consciousness, Function and Representation (2007) Dennett (1942) Brainstorms (1981), Content and Consciousness (1986), The Intentional Stance (1989), Consciousness Explained (1992), Kinds of Minds (1996), Brainchildren (1998), Sweet Dreams (2005), Neuroscience and Philosophy (2007) McGinn (1950) The Character of Mind (1982), Mental Content (1989), The Problem of Consciousness (1991), The Mysterious Flame (1999), Consciousness and Its Objects (2004) Jackson (1943) Epiphenomenal Qualia (1982), What Mary Did Not Know (1986) Peacocke (1950) Sense and Content (1983), A Study of Concepts (1992), Truly Understood (2008). Parfit (1942) Reasons and Persons (1984) Millikan (1933) Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories (1984), White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice (1993) Patricia Churchland (1943) Neurophilosophy (1986), The Computational Brain (1992), Brain-Wise (2002) Honderich (1933) A Theory of Determinism (1988), On Consciousness (2004). Kim (1934) Supervenience and Mind (1993) Rosenthal (1939) Two Concepts of Consciousness (1986), Consciousness and Mind (2005), Consciousness and Its Function (2008)

10 Papineau (1947) Philosophical Naturalism (1993), Thinking About Consciousness (2002) McDowell (1941) Mind and World (1994), Mind, Value and Reality (1998). McCulloch ( ) The Mind and It s World (1995), The Life of the Mind (2003) Tye (1950) Ten Problems of Consciousness (1995), Consciousness, Color and Content (2000), Consciousness and Persons (2003). Chalmers (1966) The Conscious Mind (1996) Clark (1957) Being There (1997), Supersizing the Mind (2008)