The Mind-Body Problem

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1 The Mind-Body Problem

2 What is it for something to be real? Ontology Monism Idealism What is the nature of existence? What is the difference between appearance and reality? What exists in the universe?

3 What is it for something to be real? Ontology Monism Idealism What is the nature of existence? What is the difference between appearance and reality? Physicalism/materialism Dualism Pluralism What exists in the universe?

4 Rene Descartes and substance dualism Biography Systematic doubt/ rationalist epistemology

5 Systematic doubt The world known to the senses - including the body Illusions Dreams

6 The world known to the senses, including the body Illusions Dreams

7 Next! Mathematics The Evil Genius

8 Mathematics The Evil Genius

9 ...Is everything in doubt?! I think it might be

10 But wait, that s it! Just for a moment, try to doubt that you are thinking.

11 I can t, therefore, I am!

12 The Cogito - I think, therefore I am Unshakeable, even by evil demons!

13 From this basis, Descartes reasons existence of God Material things The mathematical basis of the universe

14 The world known to the senses - Illusions The world known by mathematics The physical world Dreams God Mathematics Innate ideas The evil genius The Cogito - I think, therefore I am

15 Descartes Ontological argument for the existence of God [1] But if the mere fact that I can produce from my thought the idea of something entails that everything which I clearly and distinctly perceive to belong to that thing really does belong to it, is not this a possible basis for another argument to prove the existence of God? Certainly, the idea of God, or a supremely perfect being, is one that I find within me just as surely as the idea of any shape or number. And my understanding that it belongs to his nature that he always exists is no less clear and distinct than is the case when I prove of any shape or number that some property belongs to its nature (AT 7:65; CSM 2:45).

16 Descartes ontological Argument 1.God, by definition, has all perfections 2.Necessary existence is a perfection 3.Therefore: God necessarily exists

17 Substance dualism Minds and bodies are fundamentally different things, but each is real

18 Arguments for substance dualism Conceivability 1.I cannot doubt my mind exists (Systematic doubt) 2.I can doubt my body exists 3.If two things are identical, everything true of one is true of the other (Leibniz law) 4.There is something that is true of my mind that is not true of my body Therefore: My mind and my body are not the same thing

19 Arguments for substance dualism Intentionality 1.Some mental states are intentional 2.No physical states (bodies) are intentional 3.If two things are identical, everything true of one is true of the other (Leibniz law) 4.There is something that is true of my mind that is not true of my body Therefore: My mind and my body are not the same thing

20 Arguments for substance dualism Disembodied Pain (Gertler) 1. I can conceive of experiencing this very pain without its physical features 2.If I can conceive of a scenario then it is possible 3.It is possible that this very pain occurs in a disembodied being 4.If this very pain was identical to a physical state, it could not occur in a disembodied being 5.This very pain is not identical to a physical state (b/c it occurs w/o physical stimulation) Conclusion: The argument that every mental state is identical to some physical state is false and dualism must be true

21 Implications Humans are composed of both a body and a mind Bodies exist in space and are subject to physical laws Bodies are public Minds do not exist in space and are not subject to physical laws Minds are private Minds and bodies exert causal influence over one another

22 The appeal of dualism Problems with Descartes Model The problem of interaction

23 Law of Conservation of Energy Energy can be converted from one form to another (potential energy can be converted to kinetic energy) but the total energy within the domain remains fixed. Accessed on at

24 The appeal of dualism Problems with Descartes Model The problem of interaction Occam s Razor

25 William of Occam ( )

26 The appeal of dualism Problems with Descartes Model The problem of interaction Occam s Razor Solipsism/the problem of other minds

27 The problem of other minds is the problem of how to justify the almost universal belief that others have minds very like our own. (Accessed on at

28 The appeal of dualism Problems with Descartes Model The problem of interaction Occam s Razor Solipsism/the problem of other minds Category errors

29 Gilbert Ryle ( ) There is a doctrine about the nature and place of the mind which is prevalent among theorists, to which most philosophers, psychologists and religious teachers subscribe with minor reservations. Although they admit certain theoretical difficulties in it, they tend to assume that these can be overcome without serious modifications being made to the architecture of the theory... [the doctrine states that] with the doubtful exceptions of the mentally-incompetent and infants-in-arms, every human being has both a body and a mind.... The body and the mind are ordinarily harnessed together, but after the death of the body the mind may continue to exist and function. Such in outline is the official theory. I shall often speak of it, with deliberate abusiveness, as "the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine." I hope to prove that it is entirely false, and false not in detail but in principle. It is not merely an assemblage of particular mistakes. It is one big mistake and a mistake of a special kind. It is, namely, a category mistake. (Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, 1949)

30 A category Mistake from Alice in Wonderland "Four thousand two hundred and seven, that's the exact number," the King said, referring to his book. "I couldn't sent all the horses... And I haven't sent the two Messengers, either. They're both gone to the town. Just look along the road, and tell me if you can see either of them." "I see nobody on the road," said Alice. "I only wish I had such eyes," the king remarked in a fretful tone. "To be able to see Nobody! And at that distance too! Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people, by this light!"

31 Frank C. Jackson and the Qualia Argument Jackson s thought experiments related to qualia: Fred Mary Accessed on at

32 Materialist theories of mind Life is but a motion of the limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principle part within; why, may we not say that all automata (engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the heart, but a spring; and the nerves, but so many strings, and the joints, but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the artificer. (Thomas Hobbes - Leviathan 1649)

33 The Basis for The Logical Basis Behaviorism for Logical Behaviorism Suppose everyone has a box with something in it: we call it a beetle. No one can look into anyone else s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box...the thing in the box has no place in the language game at all Ludwig Wittgenstein

34 Logical Behaviorism Only the observable can be studied Minds = linguistic fiction Mental language = shorthand for behavior Behavior results from external conditioning (BF Skinner) The concept of mind is thus eliminated

35 Strengths of Behaviorism No problem of interaction! The theory is based entirely upon evidence (behaviors) that is observable and measurable and thus subject to scientific inquiry

36 Problems of Behaviorism What about mental language that doesn t refer to observable behavior? What about deceptive behavior? Chomsky s novel verbal behavior argument Endless qualifications Consciousness?

37 Mind-Brain Identity JC Smart

38 Mind-Brain Identity Phineas Gage

39 Reduction not elimination Mind - Brain Water - H2O Lightning - Electrical discharge between clouds Chemistry - physics

40 Strengths of identity theory No problem of interaction. It solves the problem of interaction without the problems associated with behaviorism Identity theory fits neatly into the scientific model of investigating the mind empirically.

41 Criticisms of Identity Theory Correlation is not identity No brain, no mind Chauvinism/moral hazard objection Consciousness The eliminative objection

42 Mental language = Folk psychology (Paul and Patricia Churchland) This theory is not reductionist but eliminative Demonic possession = Hallucinatory Psychosis Mind = Brain Likewise, what we now call consciousness will someday be explained by clearer, more precise, and less mysterious language

43 Problems with eliminative materialism The theory offers no explanation for why we have experience (the problem of consciousness). If consciousness is merely a folk psychology words describing a neurological event, this suggests that our experience of consciousness is an illusion. How can this be so (think of the cogito) If so, why do we have experience?

44 Functionalism Accessed on at

45 Stuff concepts v. functional concepts What makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Any physical system that is complex enough to re-create the functional interactions between the neurons in our brain can have a mind (Rauhut 233).

46 A functionalist theory might characterize pain as a state that tends to be caused by bodily injury, to produce the belief that something is wrong with the body and the desire to be out of that state, to produce anxiety, and, in the absence of any stronger, conflicting desires, to cause wincing or moaning. According to this theory, all and only creatures with internal states that meet these conditions, or play these roles, are capable of being in pain. Suppose that, in humans, there is some distinctive kind of neural activity (C-fiber stimulation, for example) that meets these conditions. If so, then according to this functionalist theory, humans can be in pain simply by undergoing C-fiber stimulation. But the theory permits creatures with very different physical constitutions to have mental states as well: if there are silicon-based states of hypothetical Martians or inorganic states of hypothetical androids that also meet these conditions, then these creatures, too, can be in pain. As functionalists often put it, pain can be realized by different types of physical states in different kinds of creatures, or multiply realized. (accessed on at

47 What is the function of a mind? (Brainstorm with your group)

48 Strengths of functionalism Functionalism eliminates the problem of interaction The problem of chauvinism/moral hazard is eliminated It acknowledges the potential for AI All minds do not have to function identically (this is reflective of modern neuro science)

49 Problems of functionalism John Searle s Chinese room (Rauhut 236)

50 Problems of functionalism Rules v. procedures

51 Problems of functionalism How does consciousness arise from the functions of a mind?

52 The Problem of Consciousness What is consciousness? Easy and hard problems of consciousness

53 Approaches to the easy problems Accessed on athttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/christof_koch Koch and Crick: A Neuro-science based explanation Accessed on at Accessed on athttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/francis_crick

54 Roger Penrose and Quantum mechanics Accessed on https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_Penrose Accessed on 9.15.at

55 The HOT theory Consciousness is a thus a functional concept that is defined in terms of relationships between mental events. Consciousness is not a thing. Thought - Eating meat is not good for the environment, so I should skip biscuits and gravy (T2) Thought A thought alone is not conscious A thought (T1) becomes conscious only when it is the target of another higher order (T2) thought (Thought) Biscuits and gravy (T1)

56 The Hard Problem of Consciousness Thomas Nagel Accessed on at. David Chalmers Accessed on Accessed on https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_Penrose

57 Key Concepts in Nagel Phenomenology - (from SEP) Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view. Accessed on at Reductionist theories - Theories that explain phenomena by breaking them down and explaining their underlying basis. Objective - Something that can be understood from an external point of view Subjective - Something that can be understood only from one point of view

58 What does Nagel mean in paragraph 1 about the recent wave of reductionist euphoria? What does Nagel mean when he says "Philosophers share the general human weakness for explanations of what is in comprehensible in terms suited for what is familiar and well understood? Do you agree that our imaginations are limited by our experience? How does Nagel suggest the problem of consciousness will be solved? Do you agree?

59 Daniel Dennett Speak, Dennett! Dennett s ideas There is no hard problem. Consciousness is the collection of solvable easy problems The myth of the hard problem arises out of a misconception of how the brain generates our sense of self

60 Dennett claims that the myth of the hard problem arises from the Cartesian theater approach to consciousness Cartesian materialism is the view that there is a crucial finish line or boundary somewhere in the brain, marking a place where the order of arrival equals the order of "presentation" in experience because what happens there is what you are conscious of.... But... the persuasive imagery of the Cartesian Theater keeps coming back to haunt us laypeople and scientists alike even after its ghostly dualism has been denounced and exorcized. Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained

61 Problems with the Cartesian theater model It requires a viewer, which requires a mind, which opens up all the problems associated with Descartes and interaction It misunderstands how the brain works

62 Serial v. Parallel Processing The Cartesian theater model sees the brain as a serial processor - processing one thing at a time in a series.

63 Serial v. Parallel Processing Dennett argues that the brain is a massively parallel processor - that it processes many things simultaneously.

64 Serial v. Parallel Processing What we believe is our unified first person experience is really an illusion that arises from the brain s effort to sew together many inputs into a coherent whole. Dennett calls this theory the multiple drafts model, and argues that it is entirely explicable by empirical (scientific) means

65

66

67 Dennett s Problem Dennett ignores the hard problem by stating it doesn t exist

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