Philosophy of Mind (104) Comprehensive Reading List Robert L. Frazier 27/11/2013

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1 Philosophy of Mind (104) Comprehensive List Robert L. Frazier 27/11/2013 The Explanation of Action by Reasons [White, 1968], introduction. [Davidson, 1980b]. [Davidson, 1980a]. [Hornsby, 1993]. [Goldman, 1970], ch. III. [Pears, 1975], ch. 5. [Armstrong, 1968], pp [Goldman, 1994]. [Davis, 1994]. When is a bodily movement an action? What is the general form of explanation of action in terms of reasons? Is it a different kind of explanation from those we give of physical events? Evaluate the claim that reasons are causes of actions. Behaviourism [Block, 1980a], introduction. [Savin, 1980]. [Byrne, 1994] [Armstrong, 1968], ch. 5. [Lycan, 1990], introduction. [Ryle, 1949], ch. 1. [Putnam, 1963]. [Dennett, 1978d]. [Foster, 1991], ch. 2, 4 and 5. [Smith and Jones, 1986], ch. X. [Fodor, 1975], pp. 1 9.aa What is behaviourism (a) in psychology? (See [Lycan, 1990, Dennett, 1978d, Block, 1980a, Savin, 1980].) (b) as a philosophical thesis about the analysis of mental concepts? (See [Armstrong, 1968, Lycan, 1990, Ryle, 1949, Fodor, 1975, Putnam, 1963].) How, if at all, are they connected? Explain the difference between behaviouristic explanations of behaviour and ones which employ intentional vocabulary. Do the former have any advantage over the latter? Is there any chance of achieving them? 1

2 27/11/ Functionalism [Byrne, 1994]. [Churchland, 1984], ch [Fodor, 1981a] [Armstrong, 1970]. [Nagel, 1970]. [Smith and Jones, 1986], chs. 10,11,12. [Block, 1980b]. [Heal, 1986]. [Foster, 1991], chs. 2,3 and 4 1,2. [Lewis, 1972]. [Block, 1980a], introduction to part 3. How does functionalism differ from behaviorism? In what ways, if any, is it superior to behaviourism? Is it a satisfactory account of the mind? Physicalism [Campbell, 1970], ch. 5. [McGinn, 1982a], chs. 1, 2. [Horgan, 1994]. [Crane, 1994]. [Armstrong, 1968], ch. 6, 17. [Davidson, 1970]. [Putnam, 1975a]. [Nagel, 1965]. [Nagel, 1974]. [Foster, 1991], ch What does Davidson mean by the disparate commitments of mental and physical language? Does this rule out the possibility of any lawlike connections between mental and physical predicates, including type identities? What is the difference between type and token identity theories? Can there be any grounds for asserting token identity which don t imply the existence of type identities? To what extent is the relation of mental to physical a conceptual question to be resolved by analysis, and to what extent do empirical findings bear on it? Consciousness [Searle, 1992], chs. 5,6. [Lycan, 1987],. [Davies and Humphreys, 1993], introduction. [Davidson, 1980a]. [Dennett, 1982]. [Matthews, 1978]. [McGinn, 1983]. [Nagel, 1986], chs [Block, 1994] [Dennett, 1969], chs. 5 and Must consciousness be preserved as a concept of psychological science? 2. How far is self-consciousness a matter of grammer? 3. Can consciousness be reduced to the obtaining of some physiological state?

3 27/11/ Externalism About Content [McGinn, 1982a], ch. 3. [McGinn, 1982b]. [Putnam, 1982a], esp. pp [Putnam, 1982b], ch. 1. [Strawson, 1959], pp [Burge, 1986]. [Dennett, 1978a]. [Evans, 1982], pp [Fodor, 1981b], ch. 9. [McDowell, 1986]. [Nagel, 1986], ch What reasons do we have for believing that the content of one s mental states depend upon the character of one s environment? Are these reasons adequate? Must people in qualitatively identical brain states have the same thoughts? The Status of Commonsense Psychology [Dennett, 1978e]. [Churchland, 1984], ch [Stich, 1983], chs. 10,11. [Churchland, 1981]. [McGinn, 1989], part 2 1,2. [Putnam, 1983a]. [Churchland, 1980]. [Horgan and Woodword, 1985]. [Kitcher, 1984]. In what sense, if any, is folk psychology a theory? Is instrumentalism the only other possible view of the status of our commonsense conception of the mental? Is it possible that future research into the the nature of the computational processes in the brain will reveal our commonsense conception of ourselves as enjoyers of mental states to be radically defective or false? The Foundations of Cognitive Science The modularity thesis [Fodor, 1963]. [Dennett, 1969], ch. III. [Churchland, 1986], ch. 10. [Stich, 1983], ch. 8. The computational Metaphor [Fodor, 1980]. [Dennett, 1978b], chs 7, 11. [Pylyshyn, 1984]. [Haugeland, 1981], pp [Boden, 1987], ch. 14. [Fodor, 1975].

4 27/11/ The modularity thesis 1. Is the transfer of the concept of remembering from the whole person to a memory module consistent with the maintenance of its meaning? 2. Can personal identity be preserved in a thorough-going modular analysis of human psychology? The computational Metaphor 1. What is the role of the computational analogy in psychological explanation? 2. How can artificial intelligence contribute to the understanding of natural man? 3. What is the formality condition and to what, if anything, does it apply? Psychology and Physiology [Dennett, 1978c], chs 2 4 [Stich, 1981] [Feyerabend, 1963] [Churchland, 1981] [Churchland and Sejnowski, 1989] [Bechtel, 1989] [Churchland, 1984], ch. 7 [Fodor, 1974] [Macdonald, 1992] [Millikan, 1993] What is the relation between physiology and psychology? The Private Language Argument LW P hilosophical SB S preading.ch.3, 1 4. SK W ittgenstein.chs1 3.JM W ittgenstein. EC M eaning. What is Wittgenstein s sceptical paradox about meaning? paradox? What is Wittgenstein s solution to the The Causal Theory of Perception [Ayer, 1977]. [Grice and White, 1961]. [Snowdon, 1981]. [Audi, 1998], ch. 1. [McDowell, 1983]. [Pears, 1976]. [Strawson, 1979]. [Dancy, 1985], chs 10,11. [Strawson, 1962], ch. 4. [Ayer, 1956], ch. 3.

5 27/11/ What role should the concept of cause play in an account of perception? Does the causal theory of perception require the existence of sense data? Memory [Hume, 1978], I.1.3, I.3.5. [Ayer, 1956], ch. 4. [Martin and Deutscher, 1966]. [Edwards, 1967b]. [Parfit, 1971]. [Locke, 1971], chs. 3, 7, 9. [Russell, 1921], ch. 9. [Evans, 1982], ch 7 5. [Holland, 1954] [Squires, 1969]. What is the connection between your present memories of what you did in the past and your past experiences of doing those things? Could you remember others experiences? Do we have any knowledge of the past that isn t based on memory? References [Armstrong, 1968] Armstrong, D. M. (1968). A Materialist Theory of the Mind. Humanities Press, New York. [Armstrong, 1970] Armstrong, D. M. (1970). The nature of mind. In [Borst, 1970], pages Also in [Block, 1980a]. [Audi, 1998] Audi, R. (1998). Epistemology. Routledge, London. [Ayer, 1956] Ayer, A. J. (1956). The Problem of Knowledge. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth. [Ayer, 1977] Ayer, A. J. & Cohen, L. J. (1977). The causal theory of perception. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 51:? [Bechtel, 1989] Bechtel, W. (1989). Connectionism and the philosophy of mind: an overview. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 26: Also in [Lycan, 1990]. [Bedau and Humphreys, 2008] Bedau, M. A. and Humphreys, P. (2008). Emergence: Contemporary s in Philosophy and Science. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. [Bernecker and Dretske, 2000] Bernecker, S. and Dretske, F., editors (2000). Knowledge: s in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press, Oxford. [Block, 1980a] Block, N., editor (1980a). s in Philosophy of Psychology, volume 1. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. [Block, 1980b] Block, N. (1980b). Troubles with functionalism. In [Block, 1980a], pages [Block, 1994] Block, N. (1994). Consciousness. In [Guttenplan, 1994], pages [Boden, 1987] Boden, M. A. (1987). Artificial Intelligence and Natural Man. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, second edition.

6 27/11/ [Borst, 1970] Borst, C. V., editor (1970). The Mind-Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan, London. [Burge, 1986] Burge, T. (1986). Cartesian error and the objectivity of perception. In [Pettit and McDowell, 1986], pages [Butler, 1965] Butler, R. J., editor (1965). Analytical Philosophy, volume 2. Basil Blackwell, Oxford. [Byrne, 1994] Byrne, A. (1994). Behaviourism. In [Guttenplan, 1994], pages [Campbell, 1970] Campbell, K. (1970). Body and Mind. Macmillan, London. [Charles and Lennon, 1992] Charles, D. and Lennon, K., editors (1992). Realism. Clarendon Press, Oxford. Reduction, Explanation and [Churchland, 1981] Churchland, P. M. (1981). Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes. The Journal of Philosophy, 78: Also in [Lycan, 1990]. [Churchland, 1984] Churchland, P. M. (1984). Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. [Churchland, 1980] Churchland, P. S. (1980). A perspective on mind-brain research. The Journal of Philosophy, 78: [Churchland, 1986] Churchland, P. S. (1986). Neurophilosophy. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. [Churchland and Sejnowski, 1989] Churchland, P. S. and Sejnowski, T. J. (1989). Neural representation and neural computation. In [Nadel et al., 1989], page? Also in [Lycan, 1990]. [Crane, 1994] Crane, T. (1994). Physicalism(2): against physicalism. In [Guttenplan, 1994], pages [Dancy, 1985] Dancy, J. (1985). An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology. Basil Blackwell, Oxford. [Dancy, 1988] Dancy, J., editor (1988). Perceptual Knowledge. Oxford s in Philosophy. Oxford University Press, Oxford. [Davidson, 1970] Davidson, D. (1970). Mental events. In [Foster and Swanson, 1970], pages Also in [Davidson, 1980a, Block, 1980a]. [Davidson, 1980a] Davidson, D. (1980a). Actions, reasons, and causes. In [Davidson, 1980c], pages [Davidson, 1980b] Davidson, D. (1980b). Agency. In [Davidson, 1980c], pages [Davidson, 1980c] Davidson, D. (1980c). s on Actions and Events. Clarendon Press, Oxford. [Davies and Humphreys, 1993] Davies, M. and Humphreys, G. H., editors (1993). Consciousness. Basil Blackwell, Oxford. [Davies and Stone, 1995] Davies, M. and Stone, T., editors (1995). Folk Psychology. Blackwell, Oxford. [Davis, 1994] Davis, L. H. (1994). Action(1). In [Guttenplan, 1994], pages [Dennett, 1969] Dennett, D. C. (1969). Content and Consciousness. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. [Dennett, 1978a] Dennett, D. C. (1978a). Beyond belief. In [Dennett, 1978c], pages Also in [Woodfield, 1982]. [Dennett, 1978b] Dennett, D. C. (1978b). Brainstorms: Philosophical s on Mind and Psychology. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

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10 27/11/ [Searle, 1992] Searle, J. R. (1992). The Rediscovery of the Mind. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. [Smith and Jones, 1986] Smith, P. and Jones, O. R. (1986). The Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. [Snowdon, 1981] Snowdon, P. ( ). Perception, vision and causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 81: Also in [Dancy, 1988]. [Squires, 1969] Squires, R. (1969). Memory. The Philosophical Review, 78: [Stich, 1981] Stich, S. P. (1981). Dennett on intentional systems. Philosophical Topics, 12: Also in [Lycan, 1990]. [Stich, 1983] Stich, S. P. (1983). From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. [Strawson, 1962] Strawson, P. (1962). 48:1 25. Also in [Watson, 1982]. Freedom and resentment. Proceedings of the British Academy, [Strawson, 1959] Strawson, P. F. (1959). Individuals. Methuen, London. [Strawson, 1967] Strawson, P. F., editor (1967). Philosophical Logic. Oxford University Press, Oxford. [Strawson, 1979] Strawson, P. F. (1979). Perception and its objects. In MacDonald, G. F., editor, Perception and identity, pages Macmillian, London. (Also in [Dancy, 1988], and [Bernecker and Dretske, 2000].). [Warnock, 1967] Warnock, G. J., editor (1967). The Philosophy of Perception. Oxford s in Philosophy. Oxford University Press, Oxford. [Watson, 1982] Watson, G., editor (1982). Free Will. Oxford University Press, Oxford, first edition. [White, 1968] White, A. R., editor (1968). The Philosophy of Action. Oxford University Press, Oxford. [Woodfield, 1982] Woodfield, A., editor (1982). Thought and Object. Oxford University Press, Oxford.