WEEK 1: WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE?

Transcription

1 General Philosophy Tutor: James Openshaw 1 WEEK 1: WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE? Edmund Gettier (1963), Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, Analysis 23: Linda Zagzebski (1994), The Inescapability of Gettier Problems, Philosophical Quarterly 44: Alvin Goldman (1967), A Causal Theory of Knowing, The Journal of Philosophy 64: Essay question: It s not possible to provide an analysis of knowledge. Evaluate this claim with reference to one such attempt. Laurence BonJour (1980), Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5: Reprinted in Bernecker and Dretske (eds.) Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology (OUP 2000). D. M. Armstrong, The Thermometer Model of Knowledge, in Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology, ed. Bernecker and Dretske (2000): Ernest Sosa (1999), How to Defeat Opposition to Moore, Philosophical Perspectives 13: Robert Nozick (1981), Knowledge and Skepticism, in his Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press): Reprinted in Epistemology: An Anthology, 1st edition, ed. Sosa and Kim (2000); or 2nd edition, ed. Sosa, Kim, Fantl, and McGrath (2008); and also in Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology, ed. Bernecker and Dretske (2000); and in ed. DeRose and Warfield, Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader (1999): Timothy Williamson (2000), Knowledge and its Limits, Ch. 1. Michael Blome-Tillmann (2007), The Folly of Trying to Define Knowledge, Analysis 67: Stephen Kearns (2007), In Praise of Folly: A Reply to Blome-Tillmann, Analysis 67:

2 General Philosophy Tutor: James Openshaw 2 WEEK 2: SCEPTICISM AND THE POSSIBILITY OF KNOWLEDGE René Descartes: Meditations on First Philosophy (Meditation 1). David Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Section XII). G. E. Moore (1939), Proceedings of the British Academy 25: ; reprinted as Proof of an External World, in Huemer (ed.) Epistemology: Contemporary Readings (Routledge, 2002), Ch. 9: Also in Moore, Philosophical Papers, (Allen & Unwin, 1959), Ch. 7: Robert Nozick (1981), Knowledge and Skepticism, in his Philosophical Explanations, pp Reprinted in Epistemology: An Anthology, 1st edition, ed. Sosa and Kim (2000); or 2nd edition, ed. Sosa, Kim, Fantl, and McGrath (2008); and also in Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology, ed. Bernecker and Dretske (2000); and in ed. DeRose and Warfield, Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader (1999): Essay question: Does Descartes evil demon thought experiment show that we do not have knowledge of the external world? Laurence BonJour (1980), Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5, pp Reprinted in Bernecker and Dretske (eds.) Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology (Oxford: OUP, 2000). David Lewis (1996), Elusive Knowledge, Australian Journal of Philosophy, 74: Barry Stroud (1984), The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, (Oxford: Clarendon Press). J. Vogel (2014), The Refutation of Skepticism, in Sosa, Steup, and Turri (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, (West Sussex: John Wiley and Sons): Timothy Williamson (2000), Knowledge and its Limits, Ch. 8.

3 General Philosophy Tutor: James Openshaw 3 WEEK 3: THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, Sections IV V. Bertrand Russell (1912), The Problems of Philosophy, (Oxford: OUP), Ch. 6: James van Cleve (1984), Reliability, Justification, and the Problem of Induction, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 9(1), Essay question: Are any of our inductive beliefs justified? David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1, Part III, Section 6. Wesley Salmon (2008), An Encounter with David Hume, in Joel Feinberg et al. (eds.), Reason and Responsibility: Readings in Some Basic Problems of Philosophy, 13 th edition (Wadsworth): Also in earlier editions of this volume. Nelson Goodman (1983), Fact, Fiction and Forecast, 4th edition (Harvard University Press), Chs Reprinted in Bernecker and Dretske (eds.) Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology (OUP 2000). Laurence BonJour (1998), In Defense of Pure Reason (Cambridge: CUP), Ch. 7. Sydney Shoemaker (1980), Properties, Causation and Projectibility, in Cohen and Hesse (eds.), Applications of Inductive Logic (OUP): P. F. Strawson (1952), Introduction to Logical Theory (London: Methuen), Ch. 9, pp Karl Popper (1979), Objective Knowledge, revised edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press), Ch. 1.

4 General Philosophy Tutor: James Openshaw 4 WEEK 4: THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS David Chalmers (2010), Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness, in The Character of Consciousness, (Oxford: OUP), pp Read sections 1 6 only. Frank Jackson (1982), Epiphenomenal Qualia, The Philosophical Quarterly 32: David Lewis, (1999), What Experience Teaches, in Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp Reprinted in ed. Ludlow et al., There s Something about Mary: Essays on Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004). Terence Horgan (1984), Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia, Philosophical Quarterly 34: Essay question: Is it true that someone could know all physical facts without knowing what it is like to see red? If so, would physicalism be refuted? Brie Gertler (2005), The Knowledge Argument, The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (London: MacMillan). The paper can also be found online: Qualia: The Knowledge Argument, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Brian Loar (1990), Phenomenal States, Philosophical Perspectives 4: Michael Tye, (1986), The Subjective Qualities of Experience, Mind 95: Michael Tye (2000), Knowing What It Is Like: The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge Argument, in his Consciousness, Color, and Content (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). Torin Alter (1998), A Limited Defence of the Knowledge Argument, Philosophical Studies 90:

5 General Philosophy Tutor: James Openshaw 5 WEEK 5: PERSONAL IDENTITY John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Book II, Chapter XXVII). Derek Parfit (1984), Reasons and Persons (Oxford: OUP), Ch. 12: Reprinted as Why our identity is not what matters, in Martin and Barresi (eds.), Personal Identity (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003). Eric Olson (2003), An Argument for Animalism, in Martin and Barresi (eds.), Personal Identity, (Oxford: Blackwell). Reprinted in Kim, Sosa, and Korman (eds.), Metaphysics: an Anthology, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2011). Essay question: What, if anything, does the possibility of fission tell us about personal identity? Eric Olson, Personal Identity, The Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy. Bernard Williams (1970), The Self and the Future, Philosophical Review 79: pp Reprinted in Kim, Sosa, and Korman (eds.), Metaphysics: an Anthology, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2011). David Lewis (1976), Survival and Identity, in Rorty, The Identities of Persons, (University of California Press): Reprinted in his Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1 (OUP, 1983): Theodore Sider (2001), Four Dimensionalism (Oxford: OUP): Bernard Williams (1956-7), Personal Identity and Individuation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57: Reprinted in B. Williams, Problems of the Self (Cambridge: CUP, 1973). Paul Snowdon (1990), Persons, Animals, and Ourselves, in Gill (ed.), The Person and the Human Mind (Oxford: OUP), Ch. 4: Reprinted in Crane and Farkas (eds.) Metaphysics: a Guide and Anthology (Oxford: OUP, 2004): Sydney Shoemaker (1970), Persons and their Pasts, American Philosophical Quarterly, 7(4): Reprinted in Kim, Sosa, and Korman (eds.), Metaphysics: an Anthology, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2011).

6 General Philosophy Tutor: James Openshaw 6 WEEK 6: FREE WILL David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section VIII. A. J. Ayer (1954), Freedom and Necessity, in his Philosophical Essays (London: Macmillan): Reprinted in Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will, 1st edition, (Oxford: OUP, 1982). Peter van Inwagen (1975), The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism, Philosophical Studies, 27: pp Reprinted in Watson (ed.), Free Will, 1st edition, (OUP, 1982); and also in Robert Kane (ed.), Free Will (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002). Essay question: Every event in the physical world is determined by the laws of nature. Since we cannot act in a different way than we actually do, free will is an illusion. Do you agree? Harry Frankfurt (1969), Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, Journal of Philosophy 66: Reprinted in Gary Watson (ed.) Free Will, 2nd edition (Oxford: OUP, 2002): Roderick Chisholm (1964), Human Freedom and the Self, reprinted in Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will, 1 st and 2 nd editions (Oxford: OUP, 2003); and in Robert Kane (ed.), Free Will (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002). Jonathan Bennett (1980), Accountability, in Zak van Straaten (ed.), Philosophical Subjects (Oxford: OUP).