PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (7AAN2061) SYLLABUS: SEMESTER 1

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1 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (7AAN2061) SYLLABUS: SEMESTER 1 Tutor: Prof Matthew Soteriou Office: matthew.soteriou@kcl.ac.uk Consultations Hours: Tuesdays 11am to 12pm, and Thursdays 3-4pm. Lecture Hours: Thursday 9-10am COURSE DESCRIPTION This course focuses on questions in the philosophy of mind. We will approach this topic by thinking through some problems that arise from reflecting on the metaphysics and epistemology of the mind. What is the mind? How does the mind relate to the brain? What is consciousness? How do we know about our own thoughts, feelings, and desires and how do we know about those of other people? In addressing these questions, we will cover topics central to contemporary philosophical discussions of the mind, including physicalism, consciousness, mental causation, and self-knowledge. READING The readings for the course are separated into the following two categories: reading that everyone who wants proper coverage of the subject must read. additional readings to help further develop your views on a particular subject. Many of the readings for the course can be found either online or in the following collection of essays: D. Chalmers (ed.): Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Another useful collection is: David Rosenthal (ed.): The Nature of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The following are good introductory texts: T. Crane: The Elements of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. J. Kim: Philosophy of Mind (3rd edition). Boulder: Westview Press. J. Heil: Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction

2 SCHEDULE Week 1: Type Identity Physicalism D. Lewis, An Argument for the Identity Theory, Journal of Philosophy 1966, (available on JSTOR), repr. in his Philosophical Papers Volume I Putnam, H The Nature of Mental States, in Mind Language and Reality. Philosophical Papers, Vol.2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Lycan ed. Mind and Cognition. (Also in Chalmers ed.) Heil, J. Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction Ch. 5: The Identity Theory Further reading: Lewis, D Reduction of Mind, in S. Guttenplan, ed., A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Reprinted in D. Lewis. Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology. Armstrong, D.M The Causal Theory of Mind. Reprinted in Rosenhtal ed. The Nature of Mind (Also in Chalmers ed.) Place, U. T Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology 47: Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) Mind and Cognition (Blackwell, 1990). Also in Chalmers ed. Smart, J. J. C Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review 68: (Also in Chalmers ed.) Alyssa Ney (2008). Physicalism as an Attitude. Philosophical Studies 138 (1):1-15. Week 2: Anomalous Monism Mental Events, by Davidson, in his Essays on Actions and Events. Also in Chalmers ed. Evnine, S Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Polity. Ch.4. Philosophy as Psychology, by Davidson, in his Essays on Actions and Events Anomalous Monism and the Irreducability of the Mental, by McLaughlin, in Lepore and McLaughlin ed. Actions and Events Psychophysical Laws, by Kim, in Lepore and McLaughlin ed. Julie Yoo (2009). Anomalous Monism. In Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. OUP Oxford Louise M. Antony (1989). Anomalous Monism and the Problem of Explanatory Force. Philosophical Review 98 (April):

3 Week 3: Functionalism Core Reading H. Putnam: 'The Nature of Mental States', in Chalmers. D. Lewis: 'Psycho-physical and Theoretical Identifications', in Chalmers. N. Block: 'Troubles with Functionalism', in his Readings in Philosophy of Psychology. Vol. 1. London: Methuen. Excerpt reprinted in Chalmers. S. Shoemaker, Some Varieties of Functionalism, and Functionalism and Qualia in his Identity, Cause and Mind Further reading R. Van Gulick: 'Functionalism', in B. McLaughlin, et. al., (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. H. Putnam: 'Philosophy and Our Mental Life', in his Mind, Language and Reality, Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. J. McDowell: 'Functionalism and Anomalous Monism', in his Mind, Value and Reality. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Week 4: Mental Causation Core Reading T. Crane: 'The Mental Causation Debate', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Suppl. Vol., 69 (1995): K. Bennett: 'Mental Causation', Philosophy Compass, 2, no. 2 (2007): J. Kim: 'The Many Problems of Mental Causation (Excerpt)', in Chalmers. S. Yablo: 'Mental Causation', in Chalmers. Further reading J. Campbell: 'Intelligible Causation', in J. Bridges, et. al., (eds.), The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding. Oxford: Oxford University Press. J. Kim: 'Mental Causation', in B. McLaughlin, et. al., (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. B Loewer: 'Mental Causation, or Something near Enough', in B. McLaughlin and J. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell. S. Shoemaker: 'Realization and Mental Causation', in C. Gillett and B. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

4 Week 5: Consciousness Core Reading T. Crane: The Elements of Mind, Chapter 3. N. Block: 'On a Confusion about the Concept of Consciousness', in Chalmers. T. Nagel: 'What it is Like to Be a Bat?' in Chalmers. F. Jackson: 'Epiphenomenal Qualia', in Chalmers. D. Lewis: 'What Experience Teaches', in Chalmers. Further reading Jackson, F What Mary didn t Know, Journal of Philosophy 83: Reprinted in Rosenthal ed., The Nature of Mind D. Chalmers: 'Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness', Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 2, no 3 (1995). D. Chalmers: The Conscious Mind, Chapter 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press. D. Dennett: 'Quining Qualia', in Chalmers. D. Rosenthal: 'Two Concepts of Consciousness', in Rosenthal. S. Shoemaker: 'Qualia and Consciousness', Mind, 100 (1991): Week 6: Modal Arguments for Dualism Kripke, S. Naming and Necessity, Lecture 3, repr. In Rosenthal ed. The Nature of Mind. (Also in Chalmers ed.) Hill, C. Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility and the Mind-Body Problem, Philosophical Studies 1997 (Also in Chalmers ed.) Chalmers, D. J Does conceivability entail possibility? In (T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne, eds) Conceivability and Possibility. (See also, Chalmers, Natrualistic Dualism in his The Conscious Mind) Gendler and Hawthrone, Introduction., Conceivability and Possibility Yablo, S. Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1993 Week 7: Self-Knowledge and the Metaphysics of Mind

5 Cassam, Q. (1984), Self-Knowledge, Introduction. Oxford University Press. Gertler, Brie. (2008) Self-Knowledge (Sections 1-2). SEP online: Moran, R., (2001), Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge, Ch. 1. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Ryle, G. (1949). Self-Knowledge, in Concept of Mind (Ch. VI), and reprinted in Cassam ed. Armstrong, D. (1963). Is introspective knowledge incorrigible? Philosophical Review 62: M. Boyle: 'Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2009). Williamson, T., (2000). Knowledge and Its Limits, Ch. 4. Oxford: Oxford University Press. OR Cognitive homelessness, The Journal of Philosophy 93, 11 (1996): Week 8: Introspection and First-Person Authority Alston, W., (1971), Varieties of Privileged Access, American Philosophical Quarterly, 8: Byrne, A., (2005). Introspection, Philosophical Topics. Dretske, F., (1994), Introspection, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94: , (1999), The Mind's Awareness of Itself, Philosophical Studies 95: J. Heal: 'On First-Person Authority', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (102): Shomaker, S. (1994), Self-Knowledge and Inner Sense, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: Heil, J., 1988, Privileged Access, Mind 97: Shoemaker, S. (1989). First-Person Access, in Tomberlin, ed., Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory. Philosophical Perspectives 3. Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview. Reprinted in his First Person Perspective and Other Essays. Shoemaker, S. (1987). Knowing One s Own Mind, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60: Reprinted in Cassam ed.

6 Evans, G. (1982). The Varieties of Reference. J. McDowell., ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press. See pp , reprinted in Cassam ed. Week 9: Other Minds and the Metaphysics of Mind Avramides, A., (2001), Other Minds, Overview. London: Routledge. Nagel, T. (1986). The View from Nowhere. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch.II. McGinn, C.,1984 What is the Problem of Other Minds? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary vol. 58: Putnam, H. (1979). Other Minds, reprinted in Putnam, H. Mind, Language & Reality. Kripke, S.A., 1982, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Postscript. Oxford: Blackwell. Week 10: The Epistemological Problem of Other Minds Ayer, A.J. (1954). The Problem of Other Minds, in Philosophical Essays. London: Macmillan. Hyslop, A., (1976) Other Minds as Theoretical Entities, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 54: Melnyk, A., (1994), Inference to the Best Explanation and Other Minds, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72: McDowell,J., (1982), Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge, Proceedings of the British Academy, 68: Reprinted in McDowell, J. Meaning, Knowledge and Reality. Hyslop, A and Jackson, F. C., 1972, The Analogical Inference to Other Minds, American Philosophical Quarterly, 9: J. L. Austin: 'Other Minds', Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 20: R. Pargetter: 'The Scientific Inference to Other Minds', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (1984). F. Dretske: 'Perception and Other Minds', Nous 7(1973):

7 SUGGESTED TITLES FOR FORMATIVE ESSAYS Are all mental states multiply realisable? If so, should this lead us to reject type identity physicalist theories? Are there any good reasons for thinking that there can be no strict psycho-physical laws? Is Davidson s anomalous monism an objectionable form of epiphenomenalism? Explain what you take to be the best version of an identity theory, justifying your choice against competitors. Are functionalist theories improvements on identity theories, and if so why? What are the most powerful objections to Functionalist accounts of the mental? Are there any adequate responses to them? Can functionalism account for the qualitative character of mental states, and if not does this mean that we should reject functionalism? Is the fact that mental states are causally efficacious a good reason to think that they must be identical to physical states? Critically assess what you take to be the best argument for property dualism. The fact that our conscious experiences and sensations have phenomenal properties should lead us to reject all physicalist accounts of the mental. Discuss. Critically assess Kripke s argument against type-identity physicalist theories. Do we have privileged access to our own states of mind? If so, what explains this? Can we acquire perceptual knowledge of what another person is thinking or feeling?

8 Is our knowledge of other minds best understood as involving inference to the best explanation? What is the conceptual problem of other minds, and what is the best solution to it?