The readings for the course are separated into the following two categories:

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "The readings for the course are separated into the following two categories:"

Transcription

1 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (5AANB012) Tutor: Dr. Matthew Parrott Office: 603 Philosophy Building Consultation Hours: Thursday 1:30-2:30 pm & 4-5 pm Lecture Hours: Thursday 3-4 pm, Kings Building COURSE DESCRIPTION This course focuses on questions in the philosophy of mind. We will approach this topic by thinking through some problems that arise from reflecting on the metaphysics and epistemology of the mind. What is the mind? How does the mind relate to the brain? What is consciousness? How do we know about our own thoughts, feelings, and desires and how do we know about those of other people? In addressing these questions, we will cover topics central to contemporary philosophical discussions of the mind, including consciousness, intentional content, mental causation, and self-knowledge. OBJECTIVES 1) Understand key issues in the philosophy of mind. 2) Develop the ability to think carefully and critically about philosophical questions. 3) Develop skills in critical reading, writing, analytical thinking and in written and oral communication. READING The readings for the course are separated into the following two categories: : reading that everyone who wants proper coverage of the subject must read. Further Reading: additional readings to help further develop your views on a particular subject. Many of the readings for the course can be found either online or in the following collection of essays: D. Chalmers (ed.): Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Another useful collection is: David Rosenthal (ed.): The Nature of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The following are good introductory texts: T. Crane: The Elements of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1

2 J. Kim: Philosophy of Mind (3rd edition). Boulder: Westview Press. SCHEDULE Week 1: The Mark of Mentality J. Kim: 'Is there a "Mark of the Mental"?' from Chapter 1 of his Philosophy of Mind pp R. Rorty: Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Chapter 1. Princeton: Princeton University Press. F. Brentano: 'The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomenon', in Chalmers. Further Reading T. Crane: 'Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental', in Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. C. McGinn: The Character of Mind, Chapter 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Week 2: Mind-Brain Identity J.J.C. Smart: 'Sensations and Brain Processes', in Chalmers. S. Kripke: Naming and Necessity, Lecture 3. London: Blackwell. F. Jackson: 'A priori physicalism', in B. McLaughlin and J. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind. London: Blackwell. P. Churchland: Matter and Consciousness, from Chapter 2, pp Cambridge: MIT Press. J. Kim: Philosophy of Mind, Chapter. 4. D. Stoljar: 'Physicalism', in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ( P. Churchland: 'Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes', in Chalmers. W. V. O. Quine: 'States of Mind', in Rosenthal. D. Papineau: Thinking about Consciousness, Chapter 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Week 3: Functionalism D. Armstrong: 'The Causal Theory of the Mind', in Chalmers. H. Putnam: 'The Nature of Mental States', in Chalmers. D. Lewis: 'Psycho-physical and Theoretical Identifications', in Chalmers. N. Block: 'Troubles with Functionalism', in his Readings in Philosophy of Psychology. Vol. 1. London: Methuen. Excerpt reprinted in Chalmers. D. Lewis: 'Reduction of Mind', in S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. London: Blackwell. 2

3 R. Van Gulick: 'Functionalism', in B. McLaughlin, et. al., (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. H. Putnam: 'Philosophy and Our Mental Life', in his Mind, Language and Reality, Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. J. McDowell: 'Functionalism and Anomalous Monism', in his Mind, Value and Reality. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Week 4: Mental Causation K. Bennett: 'Mental Causation', Philosophy Compass, 2, no. 2 (2007): J. Kim: 'The Many Problems of Mental Causation (Excerpt)', in Chalmers. S. Yablo: 'Mental Causation', in Chalmers. T. Crane: 'The Mental Causation Debate', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Suppl. Vol., 69 (1995): J. Campbell: 'Intelligible Causation', in J. Bridges, et. al., (eds.), The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding. Oxford: Oxford University Press. D. Davidson: 'Mental Events', in Chalmers. J. Kim: 'Mental Causation', in B. McLaughlin, et. al., (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. B Loewer: 'Mental Causation, or Something near Enough', in B. McLaughlin and J. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell. S. Shoemaker: 'Realization and Mental Causation', in C. Gillett and B. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Week 5: Consciousness T. Crane: The Elements of Mind, Chapter 3. N. Block: 'On a Confusion about the Concept of Consciousness', in Chalmers. T. Nagel: 'What it is Like to Be a Bat?' in Chalmers. D. Chalmers: 'Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness', Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 2, no 3 (1995). D. Chalmers: The Conscious Mind, Chapter 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press. D. Dennett: 'Quining Qualia', in Chalmers. D. Rosenthal: 'Two Concepts of Consciousness', in Rosenthal. S. Shoemaker: 'Qualia and Consciousness', Mind, 100 (1991): Week 6: Consciousness F. Jackson: 'Epiphenomenal Qualia', in Chalmers. D. Lewis: 'What Experience Teaches', in Chalmers. J. Levine: 'Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap', in Chalmers. 3

4 C. McGinn: 'Can we Solve the Mind-Body Problem?' in Chalmers. B. Loar: 'Phenomenal States', in Chalmers. J. Levine: 'The Explanatory Gap', in B. McLaughlin, et. al., (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. D. Chalmers: The Conscious Mind, Chapter 3. D. Papineau: Thinking about Consciousness, Chapter 2. Week 7: Intentionality T. Crane, The Elements of Mind, Chapter 1 J. Fodor: 'A Theory of Content (I)', in his A Theory of Content and Other Essays. Cambridge: MIT Press. K. Sterelny: The Representational Mind, Chapter 6. London: Blackwell. D. Dennett: 'Intentional Systems', Journal of Philosophy, 68 (1971): R. Milliken: 'Biosemantics', in Chalmers. F. Dretske: 'A Recipe for Thought', in Chalmers. H. Field: 'Mental Representation', Erkenntnis, 13 (1978): J. Fodor: Psychosemantics, Chapter 4. Cambridge: MIT Press. R. Wedgewood: 'The Normativity of the Intentional', in B. McLaughlin, et. al., (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Week 8: Intentionality J. Fodor: Psychosemantics, Chapter 2. T. Burge: 'Individualism and the Mental', Studies in Metaphysics, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 4 (1979): Excerpt reprinted in Chalmers. H. Putnam: 'The Meaning of Meaning', in his Mind, Language and Reality, Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Excerpt reprinted in Chalmers. A. Clark and D. Chalmers: 'The Extended Mind' in Chalmers. K. Farkas: 'What Is Externalism?', Philosophical Studies, 112 (2003). J. McDowell and P. Pettit: 'Introduction', in their Subject, Thought and Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press. G. Segal: 'Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Attributions', in B. McLaughlin and J. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind. London: Blackwell. Week 9: Self-Knowledge D. Finkelstein: Expression and the Inner, Chapter 1. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 4

5 R. Moran: Authority and Estrangement, Chapter 1. Princeton: Princeton University Press. J. Heal: 'On First-Person Authority', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (102): G. Ryle: The Concept of Mind, Chapter 6. London: Penguin Books. Further Reading S. Shoemaker: Self-Knowledge and 'Inner Sense', in his The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. M. Boyle: 'Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2009). A. Byrne: 'Introspection', Philosophical Topics, 33: C. Wright: 'Self-Knowledge: The Wittgensteinian Legacy', in C. Wright, et. al., (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford: OUP. Week 10: Knowledge of others' minds F. Dretske: 'Perception and Other Minds', Nous 7(1973): A. Avramides: 'Other Minds', in B. McLaughlin, et. al., (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. A. Gomes: 'Testimony and Other Minds', forthcoming in Erkenntnis. B. Russell: 'Analogy' in Rosenthal. J. L. Austin: 'Other Minds', Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 20: R. Pargetter: 'The Scientific Inference to Other Minds', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (1984). J. Smith: 'The Phenomenology of Face-to-face Mindreading', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2013). J. McDowell: 'Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge', in Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Perceptual Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. QUESTIONS FOR FORMATIVE ESSAYS Essay 1 1) 'Having an experience is surely one good way, and surely the only practical way, of coming to know what that experience is like. Can we say, flatly, that it is the only possible way? Probably not.' (Lewis) Discuss. 2) What reason, if any, is there to think that the term 'mental state' picks out a unified category? 3) If every physical event has a sufficient physical cause, how can a functionalist account for mental causation? 4) 'Even if every behavioral and cognitive function related to consciousness were explained, there would still remain a further mystery.' (Chalmers) Discuss. 5

6 5) Is the fact that mental states are causally efficacious a good reason to think that they must be identical to physical states? Essay 2 6) If a neuroscientist can stimulate the brain in such a manner as to generate thoughts, can an externalist account of mental content be correct? 7) In what ways is my knowledge of my own mental states fundamentally different from my knowledge of others' mental states? In what ways is it similar? 8) What is the most plausible framework for giving a naturalistic account of intentional content? 9) What does the claim that the mental supervenes on the physical tell us about the nature of the mind? 10) Can we acquire perceptual knowledge of what another person is thinking or feeling? 6

Formative Assessment: 2 x 1,500 word essays First essay due 16:00 on Friday 30 October 2015 Second essay due: 16:00 on Friday 11 December 2015

Formative Assessment: 2 x 1,500 word essays First essay due 16:00 on Friday 30 October 2015 Second essay due: 16:00 on Friday 11 December 2015 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND: FALL 2015 (5AANB012) Credits: 15 units Tutor: Dr. Matthew Parrott Office: 603 Philosophy Building Email: matthew.parrott@kcl.ac.uk Consultation Hours: Tuesday 5-6 & Wednesday 3:30-4:30

More information

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (7AAN2061) SYLLABUS: SEMESTER 1

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (7AAN2061) SYLLABUS: SEMESTER 1 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (7AAN2061) SYLLABUS: 2016-17 SEMESTER 1 Tutor: Prof Matthew Soteriou Office: 604 Email: matthew.soteriou@kcl.ac.uk Consultations Hours: Tuesdays 11am to 12pm, and Thursdays 3-4pm. Lecture

More information

THE NATURE OF MIND Oxford University Press. Table of Contents

THE NATURE OF MIND Oxford University Press. Table of Contents THE NATURE OF MIND Oxford University Press Table of Contents General I. Problems about Mind A. Mind as Consciousness 1. Descartes, Meditation II, selections from Meditations VI and Fourth Objections and

More information

Philosophy of Mind (104) Comprehensive Reading List Robert L. Frazier 27/11/2013

Philosophy of Mind (104) Comprehensive Reading List Robert L. Frazier 27/11/2013 Philosophy of Mind (104) Comprehensive List Robert L. Frazier 27/11/2013 The Explanation of Action by Reasons [White, 1968], introduction. [Davidson, 1980b]. [Davidson, 1980a]. [Hornsby, 1993]. [Goldman,

More information

WEEK 1: WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE?

WEEK 1: WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE? General Philosophy Tutor: James Openshaw 1 WEEK 1: WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE? Edmund Gettier (1963), Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, Analysis 23: 121 123. Linda Zagzebski (1994), The Inescapability of Gettier

More information

Chalmers, "Consciousness and Its Place in Nature"

Chalmers, Consciousness and Its Place in Nature http://www.protevi.com/john/philmind Classroom use only. Chalmers, "Consciousness and Its Place in Nature" 1. Intro 2. The easy problem and the hard problem 3. The typology a. Reductive Materialism i.

More information

Philosophy of Logic and Language (108) Comprehensive Reading List Robert L. Frazier 24/10/2009

Philosophy of Logic and Language (108) Comprehensive Reading List Robert L. Frazier 24/10/2009 Philosophy of Logic and Language (108) Comprehensive List Robert L. Frazier 24/10/2009 Descriptions [Russell, 1905]. [Russell, 1919]. [Strawson, 1950a]. [Donnellan, 1966]. [Evans, 1979]. [McCulloch, 1989],

More information

M.A. PROSEMINAR, PHIL 5850 PHILOSOPHICAL NATURALISM Fall 2018 Tuesdays 2:35-5:25 p.m. Paterson Hall 3A36

M.A. PROSEMINAR, PHIL 5850 PHILOSOPHICAL NATURALISM Fall 2018 Tuesdays 2:35-5:25 p.m. Paterson Hall 3A36 M.A. PROSEMINAR, PHIL 5850 PHILOSOPHICAL NATURALISM Fall 2018 Tuesdays 2:35-5:25 p.m. Paterson Hall 3A36 Instructor information Dr. David Matheson Department of Philosophy 3A48 Paterson Hall 613-520-2600

More information

Qualia Ain't in the Head Review of Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind by Michael Tye

Qualia Ain't in the Head Review of Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind by Michael Tye Qualia Ain't in the Head Review of Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind by Michael Tye D.M. Armstrong Department of Philosophy (T&M) Sydney University SYDNEY

More information

(1982a). Other Bodies, in Woodfield (1982). (1982b). Two Thought Experiments Reviewed, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 23: Burge, T.

(1982a). Other Bodies, in Woodfield (1982). (1982b). Two Thought Experiments Reviewed, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 23: Burge, T. Works Cited Adams, E. (1970). Subjunctive and Indicative Conditionals, Foundations of Language 6: 89-94. Almog, J., Perry, J., and Wettstein, H., eds. (1989). Themes from Kaplan (Oxford University Armour-Garb,

More information

PHIL 4800/5800/5801 Fall Core Theoretical Philosophy I and II

PHIL 4800/5800/5801 Fall Core Theoretical Philosophy I and II PHIL 4800/5800/5801 Fall 2008 2009 Core Theoretical Philosophy I and II Course Directors: C. Verheggen M. A. Khalidi cverheg@yorku.ca khalidi@yorku.ca Ross S436 Ross S438 This course offers an advanced

More information

24.09 Minds and Machines spring an inconsistent tetrad. argument for (1) argument for (2) argument for (3) argument for (4)

24.09 Minds and Machines spring an inconsistent tetrad. argument for (1) argument for (2) argument for (3) argument for (4) 24.09 Minds and Machines spring 2006 more handouts shortly on website Stoljar, contd. evaluations, final exam questions an inconsistent tetrad 1) if physicalism is, a priori physicalism is 2) a priori

More information

Consciousness, Theories of

Consciousness, Theories of Philosophy Compass 1/1 (2006): 58 64, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00008.x Consciousness, Theories of Uriah Kriegel University of Arizona/University of Sydney Abstract Phenomenal consciousness is the property

More information

*Please note that tutorial times and venues will be organised independently with your teaching tutor.

*Please note that tutorial times and venues will be organised independently with your teaching tutor. 4AANA004 METAPHYSICS Syllabus Academic year 2016/17. Basic information Credits: 15 Module tutor: Jessica Leech Office: 707 Consultation time: Monday 1-2, Wednesday 11-12. Semester: 2 Lecture time and venue*:

More information

4AANA004 Metaphysics I Syllabus Academic year 2015/16

4AANA004 Metaphysics I Syllabus Academic year 2015/16 School of Arts & Humanities Department of Philosophy 4AANA004 Metaphysics I Syllabus Academic year 2015/16 Basic information Credits: 15 Module Tutor: Robyn Repko Waller Office: 707 Philosophy Building

More information

SCEPTICISM ABOUT OTHER MINDS

SCEPTICISM ABOUT OTHER MINDS SCEPTICISM ABOUT OTHER MINDS Anil Gomes Trinity College, University of Oxford To appear in D. Machuca & B. Reed (eds.) Skepticism: From Antiquity to Present [submitted 2013] In this paper I distinguish

More information

The knowledge argument purports to show that there are non-physical facts facts that cannot be expressed in

The knowledge argument purports to show that there are non-physical facts facts that cannot be expressed in The Knowledge Argument Adam Vinueza Department of Philosophy, University of Colorado vinueza@colorado.edu Keywords: acquaintance, fact, physicalism, proposition, qualia. The Knowledge Argument and Its

More information

Please remember to sign-in by scanning your badge Department of Psychiatry Grand Rounds

Please remember to sign-in by scanning your badge Department of Psychiatry Grand Rounds AS A COURTESY TO OUR SPEAKER AND AUDIENCE MEMBERS, PLEASE SILENCE ALL PAGERS AND CELL PHONES Please remember to sign-in by scanning your badge Department of Psychiatry Grand Rounds James M. Stedman, PhD.

More information

Philosophy of Mind for Honours, Masters, and PhD Students

Philosophy of Mind for Honours, Masters, and PhD Students Philosophy of Mind for Honours, Masters, and PhD Students This course focuses on three interconnected problem areas related to conscious experiences, that have each been the focus of significant recent

More information

Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness

Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness The MIT Faculty has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters. Citation As Published Publisher Levine, Joseph.

More information

BOOK REVIEWS. The Philosophical Review, Vol. 111, No. 4 (October 2002)

BOOK REVIEWS. The Philosophical Review, Vol. 111, No. 4 (October 2002) The Philosophical Review, Vol. 111, No. 4 (October 2002) John Perry, Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001. Pp. xvi, 221. In this lucid, deep, and entertaining book (based

More information

3. Campos de conocimiento en los que podría ser anunciado (máximo dos):

3. Campos de conocimiento en los que podría ser anunciado (máximo dos): Propuesta de curso o seminario 1. Nombre del profesor: Martin Glazier 2. Nombre del curso o seminario: Explanation and ground 3. Campos de conocimiento en los que podría ser anunciado (máximo dos): Metafísica

More information

Philosophy 1760 Philosophy of Language

Philosophy 1760 Philosophy of Language Philosophy 1760 Philosophy of Language Instructor: Richard Heck Office: 205 Gerard House Office hours: M1-2, W12-1 Email: rgheck@brown.edu Web site: http://frege.brown.edu/heck/ Office phone:(401)863-3217

More information

Cosmic Hermeneutics vs. Emergence: The Challenge of the Explanatory Gap*

Cosmic Hermeneutics vs. Emergence: The Challenge of the Explanatory Gap* Donald chap02.tex V1 - November 19, 2009 7:06pm Page 22 2 Cosmic Hermeneutics vs. Emergence: The Challenge of the Explanatory Gap* Tim Crane 1. THE EXPLANATORY GAP FN:1 Joseph Levine is generally credited

More information

Machine Consciousness, Mind & Consciousness

Machine Consciousness, Mind & Consciousness Machine Consciousness, Mind & Consciousness Rajakishore Nath 1 Abstract. The problem of consciousness is one of the most important problems in science as well as in philosophy. There are different philosophers

More information

CURRICULUM VITAE. Date and place of birth: 27th December 1945, Liverpool, England

CURRICULUM VITAE. Date and place of birth: 27th December 1945, Liverpool, England CURRICULUM VITAE Name: Andre Norman GALLOIS Nationality: British. Date and place of birth: 27th December 1945, Liverpool, England Marital Status: married with two children. Address: University of Syracuse

More information

History (101) Comprehensive Reading List Robert L. Frazier 24/10/2009

History (101) Comprehensive Reading List Robert L. Frazier 24/10/2009 History (101) Comprehensive List Robert L. Frazier 24/10/2009 Primary and Secondary Qualities [Locke, 1964], II.1 8. [Berkeley, 1970], 9 15. [Reid, 1895a], V.II.. [Mackie, 1976], ch. 1. [Bennett, 1971],

More information

Tony Chadwick Essay Prize 2006 Winner Can we Save Qualia? (Thomas Nagel and the Psychophysical Nexus ) By Eileen Walker

Tony Chadwick Essay Prize 2006 Winner Can we Save Qualia? (Thomas Nagel and the Psychophysical Nexus ) By Eileen Walker Tony Chadwick Essay Prize 2006 Winner Can we Save Qualia? (Thomas Nagel and the Psychophysical Nexus ) By Eileen Walker 1. Introduction: The problem of causal exclusion If our minds are part of the physical

More information

Ph.D. Philosophy, Princeton University 2007 Colgate University 2001, magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa, High Honors in Philosophy

Ph.D. Philosophy, Princeton University 2007 Colgate University 2001, magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa, High Honors in Philosophy PAUL AUDI Department of Philosophy University of Rochester Box 270078 Rochester, NY 14627-0078 paul.audi@rochester.edu http://www.paulaudi.net Education Ph.D. Philosophy, Princeton University 2007 B.A.

More information

Realism and instrumentalism

Realism and instrumentalism Published in H. Pashler (Ed.) The Encyclopedia of the Mind (2013), Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, pp. 633 636 doi:10.4135/9781452257044 mark.sprevak@ed.ac.uk Realism and instrumentalism Mark Sprevak

More information

CAUSAL-RECOGNITIONAL ACCOUNT OF PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS: AN ALTERNATIVE PHYSICALIST ATTEMPT TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS

CAUSAL-RECOGNITIONAL ACCOUNT OF PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS: AN ALTERNATIVE PHYSICALIST ATTEMPT TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS CAUSAL-RECOGNITIONAL ACCOUNT OF PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS: AN ALTERNATIVE PHYSICALIST ATTEMPT TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS Adeyanju Olanshile Muideen Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife Abstract This

More information

David Chalmers on Mind and Consciousness Richard Brown Forthcoming in Andrew Bailey (ed) Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers.

David Chalmers on Mind and Consciousness Richard Brown Forthcoming in Andrew Bailey (ed) Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers. David Chalmers on Mind and Consciousness Richard Brown Forthcoming in Andrew Bailey (ed) Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers. Continuum Press David Chalmers is perhaps best known for his argument against

More information

Karen Bennett Princeton University not very successful early draft, March 2005

Karen Bennett Princeton University not very successful early draft, March 2005 WHY I AM NOT A DUALIST 1 Karen Bennett Princeton University not very successful early draft, March 2005 Dualists think that not all the facts are physical facts. They think that there are facts about phenomenal

More information

Led by Armstrong (1978, 1983, 1991, 1993), Fred Dretske (1977), and Michael Tooley (1977, 1987

Led by Armstrong (1978, 1983, 1991, 1993), Fred Dretske (1977), and Michael Tooley (1977, 1987 Albahari, M. Forthcoming. Beyond Cosmopsychism and the Great I Am: How the World might be Grounded in Universal Advaitic Consciousness, in W. Seager (Ed.) Routledge Handbook on Panpsychism. Led by Armstrong

More information

Experiences Don t Sum

Experiences Don t Sum Philip Goff Experiences Don t Sum According to Galen Strawson, there could be no such thing as brute emergence. If weallow thatcertain x s can emergefromcertain y s in a way that is unintelligible, even

More information

THE TWO-DIMENSIONAL ARGUMENT AGAINST MATERIALISM AND ITS SEMANTIC PREMISE

THE TWO-DIMENSIONAL ARGUMENT AGAINST MATERIALISM AND ITS SEMANTIC PREMISE Diametros nr 29 (wrzesień 2011): 80-92 THE TWO-DIMENSIONAL ARGUMENT AGAINST MATERIALISM AND ITS SEMANTIC PREMISE Karol Polcyn 1. PRELIMINARIES Chalmers articulates his argument in terms of two-dimensional

More information

4AANB007 - Epistemology I Syllabus Academic year 2014/15

4AANB007 - Epistemology I Syllabus Academic year 2014/15 School of Arts & Humanities Department of Philosophy 4AANB007 - Epistemology I Syllabus Academic year 2014/15 Basic information Credits: 15 Module Tutor: Clayton Littlejohn Office: Philosophy Building

More information

BRIE GERTLER RESEARCH

BRIE GERTLER RESEARCH BRIE GERTLER Commonwealth Professor and Chair Corcoran Department of Philosophy University of Virginia 120 Cocke Hall, P.O. Box 400780, Charlottesville, VA 22904 gertler@virginia.edu http://pages.shanti.virginia.edu/bg8y

More information

Review of Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind

Review of Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind Volume 10 Issue 1 Dirty Hands Article 1 1-2009 Review of Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind Candace L. Shelby University of Colorado, Denver Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.pacificu.edu/eip

More information

Chapter 11 CHALMERS' THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS. and yet non-reductive approach to consciousness. First, we will present the hard problem

Chapter 11 CHALMERS' THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS. and yet non-reductive approach to consciousness. First, we will present the hard problem Chapter 11 CHALMERS' THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 1. Introduction: In this chapter we will discuss David Chalmers' attempts to formulate a scientific and yet non-reductive approach to consciousness. First,

More information

IN THIS PAPER I will examine and criticize the arguments David

IN THIS PAPER I will examine and criticize the arguments David A MATERIALIST RESPONSE TO DAVID CHALMERS THE CONSCIOUS MIND PAUL RAYMORE Stanford University IN THIS PAPER I will examine and criticize the arguments David Chalmers gives for rejecting a materialistic

More information

Review of Torin Alter and Sven Walter (eds.) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism

Review of Torin Alter and Sven Walter (eds.) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism Review of Torin Alter and Sven Walter (eds.) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism James Trafford University of East London jamestrafford1@googlemail.com

More information

Externalism and Norms *

Externalism and Norms * Externalism and Norms * CYNTHIA MACDONALD We think that certain of our mental states represent the world around us, and represent it in determinate ways. My perception that there is salt in the pot before

More information

Thomas Nagel, "What is it Like to Be a Bat?", The Philosophical Review 83 (1974),

Thomas Nagel, What is it Like to Be a Bat?, The Philosophical Review 83 (1974), Bats, Brain Scientists, and the Limitations of Introspection Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (1994), pp. 315-329 Derk Pereboom, University of Vermont Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson have advanced

More information

General Philosophy. Stephen Wright. Office: XVI.3, Jesus College. Michaelmas Overview 2. 2 Course Website 2. 3 Readings 2. 4 Study Questions 3

General Philosophy. Stephen Wright. Office: XVI.3, Jesus College. Michaelmas Overview 2. 2 Course Website 2. 3 Readings 2. 4 Study Questions 3 General Philosophy Stephen Wright Office: XVI.3, Jesus College Michaelmas 2014 Contents 1 Overview 2 2 Course Website 2 3 Readings 2 4 Study Questions 3 5 Doing Philosophy 3 6 Tutorial 1 Scepticism 5 6.1

More information

Philosophy of Mind (MIND) CTY Course Syllabus

Philosophy of Mind (MIND) CTY Course Syllabus Course Description: Philosophy of Mind (MIND) CTY Course Syllabus What is the nature of mind? How is the mind related to the brain? What is consciousness? What is pain? How can we be certain that others

More information

Naturalism Fall Winter 2004

Naturalism Fall Winter 2004 Naturalism Fall 2003 - Winter 2004 This course will trace the history and examine the present of naturalistic philosophy. Along the way, I ll lay out my own pet version, Second Philosophy, and use it as

More information

On An Alleged Non-Equivalence Between Dispositions And Disjunctive Properties

On An Alleged Non-Equivalence Between Dispositions And Disjunctive Properties On An Alleged Non-Equivalence Between Dispositions And Disjunctive Properties Jonathan Cohen Abstract: This paper shows that grounded dispositions are necessarily coextensive with disjunctive properties.

More information

There are two explanatory gaps. Dr Tom McClelland University of Glasgow

There are two explanatory gaps. Dr Tom McClelland University of Glasgow There are two explanatory gaps Dr Tom McClelland University of Glasgow 1 THERE ARE TWO EXPLANATORY GAPS ABSTRACT The explanatory gap between the physical and the phenomenal is at the heart of the Problem

More information

DECONSTRUCTING NEW WAVE MATERIALISM

DECONSTRUCTING NEW WAVE MATERIALISM In C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds., Physicalism and Its Discontents (Cambridge University Press, 2001) DECONSTRUCTING NEW WAVE MATERIALISM Terence Horgan and John Tienson University of Memphis. In the first

More information

Theories of the mind have been celebrating their new-found freedom to study

Theories of the mind have been celebrating their new-found freedom to study The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates edited by Ned Block, Owen Flanagan and Güven Güzeldere Cambridge: Mass.: MIT Press 1997 pp.xxix + 843 Theories of the mind have been celebrating their

More information

COULD WE EXPERIENCE THE PASSAGE OF TIME? Simon Prosser

COULD WE EXPERIENCE THE PASSAGE OF TIME? Simon Prosser Ratio, 20.1 (2007), 75-90. Reprinted in L. Nathan Oaklander (ed.), Philosophy of Time: Critical Concepts in Philosophy. New York/London: Routledge, 2008. COULD WE EXPERIENCE THE PASSAGE OF TIME? Simon

More information

BRIE GERTLER. RESEARCH INTERESTS Philosophy of Mind especially self-knowledge, mental content, and consciousness.

BRIE GERTLER. RESEARCH INTERESTS Philosophy of Mind especially self-knowledge, mental content, and consciousness. BRIE GERTLER Corcoran Department of Philosophy University of Virginia 120 Cocke Hall, P.O. Box 400780 Charlottesville, VA 22904 gertler@virginia.edu http://pages.shanti.virginia.edu/bg8y RESEARCH INTERESTS

More information

CHAPTER 11. There is no Exclusion Problem

CHAPTER 11. There is no Exclusion Problem CHAPTER 11 There is no Exclusion Problem STEINVÖR THÖLL ΆRNADΌTTIR & TIM CRANE 0. Introduction Many philosophers want to say both that everything is determined by the physical and subject to physical laws

More information

Elements of Mind (EM) has two themes, one major and one minor. The major theme is

Elements of Mind (EM) has two themes, one major and one minor. The major theme is Summary of Elements of Mind Tim Crane Elements of Mind (EM) has two themes, one major and one minor. The major theme is intentionality, the mind s direction upon its objects; the other is the mind-body

More information

This is, of course, quite correct; one cannot argue for narrow states of mind simply from the existence of error. Descombes goes on:

This is, of course, quite correct; one cannot argue for narrow states of mind simply from the existence of error. Descombes goes on: The Mind s Provisions: A Critique of Cognitivism, by Vincent Descombes, trans. Stephen Adam Schwartz. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001, 304 pp. ISBN 0-691-00131-6 hb 24.95 The grand opposition

More information

Lecture 8 Property Dualism. Frank Jackson Epiphenomenal Qualia and What Mary Didn t Know

Lecture 8 Property Dualism. Frank Jackson Epiphenomenal Qualia and What Mary Didn t Know Lecture 8 Property Dualism Frank Jackson Epiphenomenal Qualia and What Mary Didn t Know 1 Agenda 1. Physicalism, Qualia, and Epiphenomenalism 2. Property Dualism 3. Thought Experiment 1: Fred 4. Thought

More information

Excluding the Problem: Bennett on Counterfactual Tests and Backtracking

Excluding the Problem: Bennett on Counterfactual Tests and Backtracking Florida Philosophical Review Volume XVI, Issue 1, Winter 2016 41 Excluding the Problem: Bennett on Counterfactual Tests and Backtracking Winner of the Gerritt and Edith Schipper Undergraduate Award for

More information

Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind

Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind Contemporary Debates in Philosophy In teaching and research, philosophy makes progress through argumentation and debate. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy presents

More information

The Zombies Among Us. Eric T. Olson To appear in Nous.

The Zombies Among Us. Eric T. Olson To appear in Nous. The Zombies Among Us Eric T. Olson To appear in Nous. abstract Philosophers disagree about whether there could be zombies : beings physically identical to normal human people but lacking consciousness.

More information

Curriculum Vitae. Other Areas of Interest: Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind, and History of Philosophy.

Curriculum Vitae. Other Areas of Interest: Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind, and History of Philosophy. Curriculum Vitae Name: Gary Sol Rosenkrantz Address: Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 216 Foust, 1010 Administration Drive, Greensboro, North Carolina 27412 Telephone:

More information

Outline Syllabus for Seminar G9658 on Subjects of Consciousness (Advanced Topics in the Philosophy of Mind)

Outline Syllabus for Seminar G9658 on Subjects of Consciousness (Advanced Topics in the Philosophy of Mind) Outline Syllabus for Seminar G9658 on Subjects of Consciousness (Advanced Topics in the Philosophy of Mind) The Seminar will meet on Fridays 11.00am -12.50pm (location to be announced). This Seminar is

More information

Summary of Sensorama: A Phenomenalist Analysis of Spacetime and Its Contents

Summary of Sensorama: A Phenomenalist Analysis of Spacetime and Its Contents Forthcoming in Analysis Reviews Summary of Sensorama: A Phenomenalist Analysis of Spacetime and Its Contents Michael Pelczar National University of Singapore What is time? Time is the measure of motion.

More information

Metaphysics I: The Nature of Being

Metaphysics I: The Nature of Being Metaphysics I: The Nature of Being J. Chandler BA Cantab, MA, PhD Overview: As the Mind/Body/Spirit sections of our bookshops testify, the term metaphysics has, in recent popular culture, come to be associated

More information

The Reality of Appearances

The Reality of Appearances M any philosophers find the following principle compelling: (IND) If two perceptual experiences are indistinguishable for the subject of them then the two experiences are of the same conscious character

More information

ZOMBIES, EPIPHENOMENALISM, AND PERSONAL EXPLANATIONS: A TENSION IN MORELAND S ARGUMENT FROM CONSCIOUSNESS

ZOMBIES, EPIPHENOMENALISM, AND PERSONAL EXPLANATIONS: A TENSION IN MORELAND S ARGUMENT FROM CONSCIOUSNESS ZOMBIES, EPIPHENOMENALISM, AND PERSONAL EXPLANATIONS: A TENSION IN MORELAND S ARGUMENT FROM CONSCIOUSNESS University of Cambridge Abstract. In his so-called Argument from Consciousness (AC), J.P. Moreland

More information

Philosophical Zombies Don t Share Our Epistemic Situation. John Curtis Wright

Philosophical Zombies Don t Share Our Epistemic Situation. John Curtis Wright Philosophical Zombies Don t Share Our Epistemic Situation John Curtis Wright Thesis submitted to the faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements

More information

BEYOND CONCEPTUAL DUALISM Ontology of Consciousness, Mental Causation, and Holism in John R. Searle s Philosophy of Mind

BEYOND CONCEPTUAL DUALISM Ontology of Consciousness, Mental Causation, and Holism in John R. Searle s Philosophy of Mind BEYOND CONCEPTUAL DUALISM Ontology of Consciousness, Mental Causation, and Holism in John R. Searle s Philosophy of Mind Giuseppe Vicari Guest Foreword by John R. Searle Editorial Foreword by Francesc

More information

Knowledge and Reality

Knowledge and Reality Knowledge and Reality Stephen Wright Jesus College, Oxford Trinity College, Oxford stephen.wright@jesus.ox.ac.uk Michaelmas 2015 Contents 1 Course Content 3 1.1 Course Overview.................................

More information

Thinking About Consciousness

Thinking About Consciousness 774 Book Reviews rates most efficiently from each other the complexity of what there is in Jean- Jacques Rousseau s text, and the process by which the reader has encountered it. In a most original and

More information

Annotated Bibliography. seeking to keep the possibility of dualism alive in academic study. In this book,

Annotated Bibliography. seeking to keep the possibility of dualism alive in academic study. In this book, Warren 1 Koby Warren PHIL 400 Dr. Alfino 10/30/2010 Annotated Bibliography Chalmers, David John. The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory.! New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. Print.!

More information

Philosophy 370: Problems in Analytic Philosophy

Philosophy 370: Problems in Analytic Philosophy Philosophy 370: Problems in Analytic Philosophy Instructor: Professor Michael Blome-Tillmann Office: 940 Leacock Office Hours: Tuesday 8:50-9:50, Thursday 8:50-9:50 Email: michael.blome@mcgill.ca Course

More information

NB: Presentations will be assigned on the second week. Suggested essay topics will be distributed in May.

NB: Presentations will be assigned on the second week. Suggested essay topics will be distributed in May. PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC Time and Place: Thursdays 14:15-15:45, 23.02/U1.61 Instructor: Dr. Ioannis Votsis E-mail: votsis@phil-fak.uni-duesseldorf.de Office hours (Room Geb. 23.21/04.86): Thursdays 11:00-12:00

More information

Minds and Machines spring The explanatory gap and Kripke s argument revisited spring 03

Minds and Machines spring The explanatory gap and Kripke s argument revisited spring 03 Minds and Machines spring 2003 The explanatory gap and Kripke s argument revisited 1 preliminaries handouts on the knowledge argument and qualia on the website 2 Materialism and qualia: the explanatory

More information

PULP NATURALISM. Il Cannocchiale, Rivista di Studi Filosofici, 2 [special issue on Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science], 1997:

PULP NATURALISM. Il Cannocchiale, Rivista di Studi Filosofici, 2 [special issue on Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science], 1997: 1 PULP NATURALISM Il Cannocchiale, Rivista di Studi Filosofici, 2 [special issue on Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science], 1997: 185-195. Josefa Toribio Department of Philosophy Washington University

More information

Consciousness and explanation

Consciousness and explanation 01-Weiskrantz-Chap01 7/8/08 11:17 AM Page 1 Chapter 1 Consciousness and explanation Martin Davies 1.1 Two questions about consciousness: what? and why? Many aspects of our mental lives are conscious an

More information

general information Times Instructor Office hours Course Description Goals Requirements MWF 9:30-11:45, Gilman 17 Tammo Lossau

general information Times Instructor Office hours Course Description Goals Requirements MWF 9:30-11:45, Gilman 17 Tammo Lossau P H I L O S O P H I C A L I N T U I T I O N S Times Instructor Office hours MWF 9:30-11:45, Gilman 17 Tammo Lossau (jlossau1@jhu.edu) MF 12:00-12:45, room tba general information Course Description Goals

More information

University of International Business and Economics International Summer Sessions. PHI 110: Introduction to Philosophy

University of International Business and Economics International Summer Sessions. PHI 110: Introduction to Philosophy University of International Business and Economics International Summer Sessions PHI 110: Introduction to Philosophy Term: May 29 June 29, 2017 Instructor: Haiming Wen Home Institution: Renmin University

More information

Supervenience & Emergentism: A Critical Study in Philosophy of Mind. Rajakishore Nath, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, India

Supervenience & Emergentism: A Critical Study in Philosophy of Mind. Rajakishore Nath, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, India Supervenience & Emergentism: A Critical Study in Philosophy of Mind Rajakishore Nath, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, India Abstract: The paper intends to clarify whether the supervenience theory

More information

Something is phenomenally conscious if and only if there is something that it s like to be it.

Something is phenomenally conscious if and only if there is something that it s like to be it. Is Realism about Consciousness Compatible with a Scientifically Respectable World View? A response to Keith Frankish s Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness Illusionism is the view that the apparent

More information

Armstrong et al. on inner sense

Armstrong et al. on inner sense H4 (v1), 24.805 F15, Byrne and Paul Armstrong et al. on inner sense 1: Recap: infallibility, self-intimation, and inner sense Infallibility: In A Necessarily, if S avows, with sincerity and understanding,

More information

The Zimboic Hunch By Damir Mladić

The Zimboic Hunch By Damir Mladić The Zimboic Hunch By Damir Mladić Hollywood producers are not the only ones who think that zombies exist. Some philosophers think that too. But there is a tiny difference. The philosophers zombie is not

More information

Franz Brentano s attempt to distinguish mental from physical phenomena by

Franz Brentano s attempt to distinguish mental from physical phenomena by Brentano s concept of intentional inexistence Tim Crane University College London Franz Brentano s attempt to distinguish mental from physical phenomena by employing the scholastic concept of intentional

More information

Areas of Specialization Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology, Metaphysics Areas of Competence Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Religion

Areas of Specialization Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology, Metaphysics Areas of Competence Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Religion Robert J. Howell Department of Philosophy Southern Methodist University P.O. Box 750333 Dallas TX 75275 (214) 415-8241 rhowell@mail.smu.edu www.rjhjr.com Employment Southern Methodist University, Full

More information

The Knowledge Argument and Phenomenal Concepts

The Knowledge Argument and Phenomenal Concepts The Knowledge Argument and Phenomenal Concepts The Knowledge Argument and Phenomenal Concepts By Luca Malatesti The Knowledge Argument and Phenomenal Concepts, by Luca Malatesti This book first published

More information

Professor David-Hillel Ruben, Professor of Philosophy, Birkbeck, University of London

Professor David-Hillel Ruben, Professor of Philosophy, Birkbeck, University of London Professor David-Hillel Ruben, Professor of Philosophy, Birkbeck, University of London D.-H. Ruben - curriculum vitae Personal Data e-mail: david.ruben1@yahoo.co.uk also at: d.ruben@bbk.ac.uk ACADEMIC POSITIONS:

More information

The origins of qualia 1

The origins of qualia 1 From Tim Crane & Sarah Patterson (eds.) The History of the Mind-Body Problem (London: Routledge 2000) The origins of qualia 1 Tim Crane 1. The contemporary mind-body problem The mind-body problem in contemporary

More information

The knowledge argument

The knowledge argument Michael Lacewing The knowledge argument PROPERTY DUALISM Property dualism is the view that, although there is just one kind of substance, physical substance, there are two fundamentally different kinds

More information

What is consciousness? Although it is possible to offer

What is consciousness? Although it is possible to offer Aporia vol. 26 no. 2 2016 Objects of Perception and Dependence Introduction What is consciousness? Although it is possible to offer explanations of consciousness in terms of the physical, some of the important

More information

7AAN2027 Greek Philosophy II: Aristotle Syllabus Academic year 2015/16

7AAN2027 Greek Philosophy II: Aristotle Syllabus Academic year 2015/16 School of Arts & Humanities Department of Philosophy 7AAN2027 Greek Philosophy II: Aristotle Syllabus Academic year 2015/16 Basic information Credits: 20 Module Tutor: Dr Joachim Aufderheide Office: Room

More information

Curriculum Vitae. Joseph Mendola

Curriculum Vitae. Joseph Mendola Curriculum Vitae Joseph Mendola Work Address: Department of Philosophy 1010 Oldfather Hall University of Nebraska Lincoln, NE 68588-0321 (402) 472-0528 email: jmendola1@unl.edu Employment: Professor of

More information

Property Dualism and the Knowledge Argument: Are Qualia Really a Problem for Physicalism? Ronald Planer Rutgers Univerity

Property Dualism and the Knowledge Argument: Are Qualia Really a Problem for Physicalism? Ronald Planer Rutgers Univerity Property Dualism and the Knowledge Argument: Are Qualia Really a Problem for Physicalism? Ronald Planer Rutgers Univerity Abstract: Where does the mind fit into the physical world? Not surprisingly, philosophers

More information

Mind the Gap. David Papineau - King's College London. 1. Introduction

Mind the Gap. David Papineau - King's College London. 1. Introduction Mind the Gap David Papineau - King's College London 1. Introduction On the first page of The Problem of Consciousness (1991), Colin McGinn asks "How is it possible for conscious states to depend on brain

More information

Panpsychism Forthcoming in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Panpsychism Forthcoming in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Panpsychism Forthcoming in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Panpsychism is the view that consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the natural world. When Timothy Sprigge wrote the first

More information

Session One: Identity Theory And Why It Won t Work Marianne Talbot University of Oxford 26/27th November 2011

Session One: Identity Theory And Why It Won t Work Marianne Talbot University of Oxford 26/27th November 2011 A Romp Through the Philosophy of Mind Session One: Identity Theory And Why It Won t Work Marianne Talbot University of Oxford 26/27th November 2011 1 Session One: Identity Theory And Why It Won t Work

More information

DO TROPES RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF MENTAL CAUSATION?

DO TROPES RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF MENTAL CAUSATION? DO TROPES RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF MENTAL CAUSATION? 221 DO TROPES RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF MENTAL CAUSATION? BY PAUL NOORDHOF One of the reasons why the problem of mental causation appears so intractable

More information

CLASS PARTICIPATION IS A REQUIREMENT

CLASS PARTICIPATION IS A REQUIREMENT Metaphysics Phil 245, Spring 2009 Course Description: Metaphysics is the study of what there is, i.e., what sorts of things exist and what is their nature. Broadly speaking philosophers interested in metaphysics

More information

Department of Philosophy

Department of Philosophy Department of Philosophy Module descriptions 2018/19 Level I (i.e. normally 2 nd Yr.) Modules Please be aware that all modules are subject to availability. If you have any questions about the modules,

More information

DUALISM VS. MATERIALISM I

DUALISM VS. MATERIALISM I DUALISM VS. MATERIALISM I The Ontology of E. J. Lowe's Substance Dualism Alex Carruth, Philosophy, Durham Emergence Project, Durham, UNITED KINGDOM Sophie Gibb, Durham University, Durham, UNITED KINGDOM

More information

7AAN4021 General Philosophy

7AAN4021 General Philosophy School of Arts & Humanities Department of Philosophy 7AAN4021 General Philosophy Academic year 2014/15 Semesters 1 & 2 Basic information Credits: 40 Module Lecturers: - Semester 1: David Galloway (Epistemology);

More information