POWERS, NECESSITY, AND DETERMINISM
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1 POWERS, NECESSITY, AND DETERMINISM Thought 3:3 (2014): ~Penultimate Draft~ The final publication is available at Abstract: Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum have argued that a theory of free will that appeals to a powers-based ontology is incompatible with causal determinism. This is a surprising conclusion since much recent work on the intersection of the metaphysics of powers and free will has consisted of attempts to defend compatibilism by appealing to a powers-based ontology. In response I show that their argument turns on an equivocation of all events are necessitated. Keywords: free will; determinism; compatibilism; incompatibilism; powers Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum (2014) have argued that a theory of free will that appeals to a powers-based ontology is incompatible with causal determinism. This is a surprising conclusion since much recent work on the intersection of the metaphysics of powers and free will has consisted of attempts to defend compatibilism by appealing to a powers-based ontology (e.g. Vihvelin 2004, 2013; Fara 2008). If Mumford and Anjum are correct, this work is deeply misguided. Their argument is simple: 1. If causal determinism is true, all events are necessitated. 2. If all events are necessitated, there are no powers. 3. Free will consists in the exercise of an agent s causal powers. Therefore, if causal determinism is true, there is no free will. (Mumford and Anjum 2014: 21) The problem with their argument is equally simple: it turns on an equivocation between (1) and (2). The equivocation is not obvious since the sentence all events are necessitated fails to state what these events are necessitated by (necessitation is, after all, a relation). 1
2 Accordingly, there are two importantly different readings. On the first reading the sentence means for all events E, there is some event E* that causes E and every possible world in which E* occurs, E* causes E, and on the second reading it means for all events E, there is some event E* that causes E and in every possible world with the same past and laws of nature, E* causes E. The difference between these readings turns on the scope of necessitation. On the first reading causal determinism entails that in every world in which the cause occurs it causes its effect. On the second reading causal determinism entails something weaker: namely every world with the same past and laws in which the cause occurs it causes its effect. If all events are necessitated is given the latter reading, then (1) is true but (2) false, and if it is given the former reading, (2) is true (at least if we assume Mumford and Anjum s theory of powers (Mumford and Anjum 2011), but (1) is false. Thus, there is no univocal reading of all events are necessitated under which all the premises come out true. Let us begin with the second reading, where (1) is to be read: If causal determinism is true, then for all events E, there is some event E* that causes E and in every possible world with the same past and laws of nature, E* causes E. The following exhausts Mumford and Anjum s characterization of determinism: Determinism brings with it necessity. We find articulations of determinism like this in authorities such as Watson (1982: 2), who speaks of determinism meaning that every state or event is causally necessitated by preceding states or events, and Kane (1996: 8) who says similarly that an event is determined just in case there are conditions whose joint occurrence is sufficient for the occurrence of that event. (Mumford and Anjum 2014: 21) Mumford and Anjum restrict their attention to the notion of causal determinism and readily 2
3 concede that a powers-based solution to the problem of free will may be compatible with other, non-causal conceptions of determinism (Mumford and Anjum 2014: 21-2). But a more precise definition of causal determinism is required if we are to be able to assess their argument. Following Clarke (2003), I define causal determinism as follows: Causal determinism obtains in possible world W if and only if for any event E that occurs at time t in W (except perhaps those beginning at the first moment of time, if there be such a moment), there is an event E* such that, E* causes E in W and E* causes E in every possible world W* that shares the same past until t and the same laws of nature as W. (Clarke 2003: 4-5) While most philosophers working on free will focus exclusively on logical determinism (a point I will return to below), when they are concerned with causal determinism Clarke s definition, or something more or less like it, is widely accepted (cf. Sobel 1998: 98; Balaguer 2010: 1; Pereboom 2014: 1). As should be clear, this definition does not imply that E* necessitates E simpliciter, but merely that, holding fixed the past and laws, E* necessitates E. Thus (1) is clearly true. But what about (2)? Mumford and Anjum defend (2) by appealing to their controversial theory of causal dispositionalism (Mumford and Anjum 2011). The relevance of their theory for our purposes can be boiled down to two claims. First, on their theory all causation is the manifestation of powers: every cause is a power and causation consists in the manifestation of powers. Moreover, they argue cases of necessity are never cases of dispositionality (Mumford and Anjum 2011: 177). That is, a disposition never, by itself, necessitates its manifestation. Their point is not that powers require stimulus conditions to be manifested (they actually reject this claim (Mumford and Anjum 2011: 36)). Rather their point is that even when a power is in its manifestation conditions, the power never necessitates its 3
4 manifestation. Their argument for this claim appeals to the ever present possibility of prevention or interference. Suppose that an object o is disposed to A in conditions C. o s being disposed to A in C will never, they argue, necessitate A (even when in conditions C), since it is always possible that something prevents the disposition s manifesting. Suppose that in world W a match is disposed to light when struck, is struck, and lights. Even though the match s being struck causes the lighting of the match in W, it does not necessitate the match s lighting because there is a world W* in which the match is struck and fails to light. This is because, we can suppose, in W* someone throws water on the match just prior to striking it (Mumford and Anjum 2014: 22; cf. Mumford and Anjum 2011: 55). They argue: it is the thought that causal powers are essentially capable of prevention and interference [that] shows that they do not necessitate their effects or manifestations (Mumford and Anjum 2014: 22). So dispositions never necessitate their manifestations (even when the dispositions manifestation conditions obtain) because it is always possible that dispositions (even actually causally productive dispositions) are interfered with and thus fail to manifest. More would need to be said to defend these controversial claims, but rather than disputing the details of Mumford and Anjum s theory of dispositions, I want to show that even if both these claims are true that is, even if all causes are powers and no power necessitates its manifestation their arguments still fails. The problem is that these claims fail to entail (2), at least on the second reading. Suppose causal determinism obtains in world W: a world in which the match s being disposed to light when struck causes the match to light. Causal determinism entails that the match s being so disposed necessitates the match s lighting in the sense that every possible world with the same past and laws of nature is a world in which the match lights. But this is compatible with the possibility of prevention, since this 4
5 possibility always involves a change in the past. In our example above we considered some world W* in which, unlike W, the match is wet. What this shows is that the match s disposition does not, by itself, necessitate the match s lighting: it is not the case that every possible world in which the match is struck the match lights. After all there are some worlds in which the match is struck but does not light due to its being wet. What this does not show is that holding fixed the past and laws (which requires us to hold fixed the match s being dry), the match s disposition does not necessitate the match s lighting. But it is only the latter claim that causal determinism entails. Thus, the possibility of interference or prevention does nothing to establish (2). Many have argued that it is simply obvious that powers can exist and be manifested in causally deterministic worlds (Wallace 1994; Vihvelin 2004, 2013; Fara 2008). Given the weakness of the claim that causal determinism is compatible with powers (its truth only requires a single world in which there are powers and causal determinism obtains), and given that it seems that there is such a world, we have defeasible justification for believing they are compatible. Mumford and Anjum s argument does nothing to defeat this justification. Let us now consider the first reading: where all events are necessitated means for all events E, there is some event E* that causes E and every possible world in which E* occurs, E* causes E. As we have seen, Mumford and Anjum argue that powers never necessitate their manifestations. But, according to the first reading, if causal determinism is true, causes always necessitate their effects. Therefore, if causal determinism is true, there are no powers. 1 This framework is of course controversial and one might reject Mumford and Anjum s claim that causal determinism is incompatible with powers by rejecting their 1 Actually all this establishes is that no events are the manifestation of powers, not that there are no powers. But this qualification need not detain us. 5
6 broader theory of powers. But as before, I want to show that even if their underlying assumptions about the nature of powers and causation are correct, their argument is unsound. Let us then grant that under this reading (2) is true. The problem is that (1) is false. From the mere fact that possible world W is causally deterministic, it does not follow that all events are necessitated simply by their causes: it does not follow that for any event E, if E* causes E in world W, then E* causes E in every possible world where E* occurs. Mumford and Anjum are correct that determinism brings with it necessity (2014: 21), but, on this reading, are mistaken to think this entails that all effects are necessitated simply by their causes. The form of necessitation that causal determinism brings with it is conditioned on the past and laws of nature. Change the past or change the laws of nature and the effect will not follow with necessity. There is, therefore, no univocal reading of all events are necessitated on which (1) and (2) are true. Mumford and Anjum s failure to distinguish these two readings may stem from their failure to formulate a precise definition of causal determinism. In fairness to them, philosophers of action rarely offer precise definitions of causal determinism, usually resting content with defining logical determinism. 2 In response Mumford and Anjum might define causal determinism in such a way that it does entail that effects are necessitated simply by their causes. Would this move salvage their argument? I doubt it and the reason is that such a definition is far from the minds of those working on free will. To appreciate this we would do best to consider, not the general thesis 2 At this point one might worry that Mumford and Anjum s focus on causal determinism prevents them from engaging the free will literature, which focuses nearly exclusively on logical determinism. For example, van Inwagen (1983: 65) explicitly refuses to invoke the notion of cause in his definition of determinism and the idea of causal determinism is also absent from Ginet (1990) and Fischer (1994). This is significant since van Inwagen, Ginet, and Fischer offer the most influential statements of the Consequence Argument. Indeed the idea of causal determinism that Mumford and Anjum invoke is so rarely discussed that Fischer (1994: 9), Ekstrom (2000: 100), O Connor (2000: 3), and Vihvelin (2011) all define causal determinism without making any reference to the idea of causation. 6
7 of causal determinism, but philosophers of action s characterization of nondeterministic causation, since here we find both explicitness and unanimity of opinion. According to this consensus, if E* nondeterministically causes E at time t in possible world W, then there is a possible world W* with the same past until t and with the same laws of nature as W and yet E* fails to cause E at t in W* (cf. Ekstrom 2000: 100; Clarke 2003: 33). It follows that if E* deterministically causes E at time t in possible world W, then E* causes E at t in every possible world that shares the same past up until t and the same laws of nature as W. Crucially, given these definitions, an effect E may fail to be necessitated simply by its cause E* and yet it still be the case that E* deterministically causes E. This is because whether a cause deterministically causes its effect depends not just on the cause, but also on the past and laws. Accordingly, any attempted definition of causal determinism that drops this dependence is ipso facto not a definition of causal determinism. The problem for Mumford and Anjum is that their argument requires just such a definition of causal determinism. Therefore, compatibilists who are attracted to a powersbased solution to the problem of free will have little to fear from Mumford and Anjum s argument. 3 3 I am grateful to John Fischer and an anonymous referee of this journal their helpful comments. 7
8 Bibliography Balaguer, Mark Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem. Cambridge: MIT Press. Clarke, Randolph Libertarian Accounts of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press. Ekstrom, Laura Waddell Free Will: A Philosophical Study. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Fara, Michael Masked Abilities and Compatibilism, Mind. 117, pp Fischer, John Martin The Metaphysics of Free Will. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Ginet, Carl On Action. New York: Oxford University Press. Kane, Robert The Significance of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press. Mumford, Stephen and Rani Lill Anjum Getting Causes From Powers. New York: Oxford University Press A New argument Against Compatibilism, Analysis 74: O Connor, Timothy Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press. Pereboom, Derk Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sobel, John Howard Puzzles for the Will: Fatalism, Newcomb and Samarra, Determinism and Omniscience. Toronto: Toronto University Press. van Inwagen, Peter An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press. Vihvelin, Kadri Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account. Philosophical Topics. 32, pp Arguments for Incompatibilism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = < Causes, Laws, and Free Will: Why Determinism Does Not Matter. New York: Oxford University Press. Wallace, R. Jay Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Watson Gary ed. Free Fill. New York: Oxford University Press. 8
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