The Mystery of Free Will

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1 The Mystery of Free Will

2 What s the mystery exactly?

3 We all think that we have this power called free will... that we have the ability to make our own choices and create our own destiny

4 We think that we do what we want to do... that we have a host of legitimate options... that we make choices based upon those options... that we re in control of our own future

5 In other words, we all think the future is open and undetermined, like a garden of forking paths in front of us

6 When we deliberate we think we are actually trying to decide which possible future is the one that we want to make actual

7 But is the future really open and undetermined in this sense?

8 Many scientists believe that the universe is deterministic (or mechanistic) in the sense that everything that happens in the universe operates in accordance with a very structured set of natural laws

9 Determinism is the theory that the state of the universe at any point in time is entirely fixed by the state of the universe at a prior time and the laws of nature

10 The laws of nature refer to the various principles/forces/ powers which govern the natural phenomena of the world

11 For instance, no object having mass is accelerated beyond the speed of light

12 The idea of determinism

13 All events, even those which on account of their insignificance do not seem to follow the great laws of nature, are a result of it just as necessarily as the revolutions of the sun [As such], we ought to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its antecedent state and as the cause of the one which is to follow...

14 The way the world was 1 second ago + = The laws of nature The way the world is right now

15 How exactly is determinism a threat to free will?

16 If the universe is deterministic, then the future is determined by the conjunction of the past and the laws of nature, which means that the future is NOT open and undetermined

17 If determinism is true, then only one future is genuinely open to us and all other futures are merely illusions X X

18

19 What do we mean when we say free will exactly?

20 According to Hume, the question of the nature of free will is the most contentious question of metaphysics...

21 A few different ways of understanding free will Defining free will in terms of doing what you want to do... According to this op.on, free will (or ac.ng freely) merely consists in doing what you want, or choose to do Defining free will in terms of the ability to do otherwise... According to this op.on, free will (or ac.ng freely) consists in one s having the power to do otherwise

22 A helpful example to help understand the difference John Locke s famous locked room example... Suppose a man be carried whilst fast asleep into a room where there is a person that he longs to see and speak with... And be there locked fast in, beyond his power to get out, he awakes and is glad to find himself in so desirable company... so much so that he decides to stay willingly in the room and converse rather than leave...

23 Alan s Mystery Room Stay or Leave? STAY!!!!!

24 Did Alan have free will in this case? Was it really in his power to do anything but stay?

25 Free will is best defined in terms of possessing the ability to do otherwise. So we act freely in doing X if and only if, at the time just before we do X it is in our power to do otherwise than X

26 Defining free will as the ability to do otherwise... Defining the free will thesis... To say that we have free will means that we are some.mes in the following posi.on with respect to a contemplated future act: We simultaneously have the ability to both perform X AND refrain from performing X In other words, we freely do X if and only if, at the Gme just before we do X it is in our power to do otherwise than X

27 The million dollar question!!!

28 Is it possible for free will to exist in a deterministic world?

29 Answering the compatibility question... If you answer No, then you re an incompagbilist The incompagbilist thesis is the thesis that determinism and the free- will thesis could not both be true If you answer Yes, then you re a compagbilist The compagbilist thesis is the thesis that determinism and the free- will thesis could both be true

30 A fairly intuitive argument for compatibilism (1) It appears that I have free will and that the future is genuinely open like a garden of forking paths (2) It appears that the universe is determinisgc such that given its state at one.me and the laws of nature, every future state of the universe follows of necessity Therefore, (3) It appears that free will and determinism are compagble with one another

31 It has seemed obvious to most people who have not been exposed (perhaps subjected would be a beler word) to philosophy that free will and determinism are incompagble... Indeed, people who have not been exposed to philosophy usually understand the word determinism (if they know the word at all) to stand for the thesis that there is no free will. And you might think that the incompa.bility of free will and determinism deserves to seem obvious- - because it is obvious However, many philosophers are compagbilists... In fact, compa.bilism has an illustrious history among English- speaking philosophers... [and according to some compa.bilist accounts] compagbilism can look like nothing more than robust common sense... Peter van Inwagen

32 I think that compatibilists can make their doctrine seem like common sense only by sweeping a mystery under the carpet and that, despite their best efforts, the bulge shows. People are aware that something is amiss with compatibilism even when they are unable to articulate their misgivings. [And] I believe that it is possible to lift the carpet and dispel the hidden mystery. [For] the notion of not having a choice has a certain logic to it...

33 Van Inwagen s consequence argument... The consequence argument is widely regarded as the best argument for the conclusion that if determinism is true, then no one ever really has a choice about anything For if determinism is true, then our acts are just a consequence of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. And since it's not up to us what went on before we were born nor what the laws of nature are, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us

34 Van Inwagen s consequence argument... A non- technical formulagon of van Inwagen s consequence argument (1) No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature (2) No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail that only one future is possible Therefore, (3) No one has power over the facts of the future

35 Van Inwagen s consequence argument... The consequence argument seems to preclude the common sense no.on of free will that we ve been considering. For if determinism is true, then our acts are just a consequence of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. And since it's not up to us what went on before we were born nor what the laws of nature are, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us So it looks like free will is inconsistent with determinism, which means that the thesis of compagbilism is false aner all

36 Is van Inwagen a determinist?

37 Van Inwagen s consequence argument... An important to point to emphasize: Van Inwagen is an incompagbilist, not a determinist! In other words, all that Van Inwagen wants to do is show that the compagbilist thesis (namely, the thesis that determinism and the free- will thesis could both be true) is false + =

38 What do you think?

39 The reasoning underwriting the consequence argument is captured in what van Inwagen calls the no choice principle (NCP)

40 Here is an example that will illustrate what this thesis/principle implies. Suppose it s an untouchable fact that the last dinosaur died long before I was born. And suppose also that the following condi.onal statement expresses an untouchable fact: if the last dinosaur died long before I was born, then I have never seen a living dinosaur. It follows from these two supposi.ons that it s an untouchable fact that I have never seen a living dinosaur. Is the Principle correct? It is hard to see how anyone could deny it. How could anyone be able to do anything about something that is an inevitable consequence of something no one can do anything about? But if determinism is true and if the Principle is correct, then all facts are untouchable facts. So it follows, given the Principle, that determinism implies that there is no free will... The No Choice Principle - Peter van Inwagen

41 This is the hidden mystery that, I contend, lies behind the facade that common sense compatibilism presents to the world: the compatibilist must reject the Principle, and the Principle seems to be true beyond all possibility of dispute...

42 The consequence argument is just a particular application of the No Choice Principle

43 Van Inwagen s argument against compatibilism (1) The theory of CompaGbilism is true only if the No Choice Principle is false (2) But, the No Choice Principle is not false Therefore, (3) The theory of CompaGbilism is not true Therefore, (4) The free will thesis and the theory of Determinism cannot both be true simultaneously

44 This is really bad news for compatibilists...

45 Where do we go from here?

46 Since compatibilism hides a mystery, should we not therefore be incompatibilists?

47 Why not just reject the thesis of determinism and accept an indeterministic incompatibilism?

48 How about indeterministic incompatibilism? Quantum intederminism? Suppose that our world works in the way that a quantum- mechanical theory claims that it does indeterminisgcally On this account, if the laws of nature are quantum- mechanical, then they merely probilify a set of outcomes rather than determine a single unique outcome And so, perhaps this indeterminisgc view of the world makes room for the no.on of free will

49 But do such appeals to indeterminacy really help solve the problem? Is indeterminism any more compatible with free will than Determinism?

50 Unfortunately, incompatibilism also holds a mystery... since the indeterminism that seems to be required for free will seems also to destroy free will...

51 Suppose Jane is in an agony of indecision; if her delibera.ons go one way, she will in a moment speak the words, John, I lied to you about Alice, and if her delibera.ons go the other way, she will bite her tongue and remain silent. Let us look carefully at the consequences of supposing that human behavior is undetermined... Let us suppose that there is a certain current- pulse that is proceeding along one of the neural pathways in Jane s brain and that it is about to come to a fork. And let us suppose that if it goes to the len, she will make her confession; and that if it goes to the right, she will remain silent. And let us suppose that it is undetermined which way the pulse goes when it comes to the fork: even an omniscient being with a complete knowledge of the state of Jane s brain and a complete knowledge of the laws of physics and unlimited powers of calcula.on could say no more than: The laws and present state of her brain would allow the pulse to go either way... The Liar example - Peter van Inwagen

52 Consequently, no predic.on of what the pulse will do when it comes to the fork is possible; it might go to the le`, and it might go to the right, and that s all there is to be said. Now let us ask: does Jane have any choice about whether the pulse goes to the len or to the right? If we think about this quesgon for a moment, we shall see that it is very hard to see how she could have any choice about that... If it goes to the len, that just happens. If it goes to the right, that just happens. There is no way for Jane to influence the pulse. There is no way for her to make it go one way rather than the other. Or, at least, there is no way for her to make it go one way rather than the other and leave the choice it makes an undetermined event... The Liar example - Peter van Inwagen

53 The gist of this reasoning is sometimes referred to as the mind argument

54 The basic idea behind the mind argument is this... The Mind argument is a kind of argument designed to show that indeterminism and free will are incompagble. More precisely, it is designed to show that posigng indeterminism in key places in the causal chain leading to the agent s ac.on undermines rather than makes room for free will, by making the relevant acgons seem random and hence unfree

55 What s the point?

56 The basic idea behind the mind argument is this... If my acgons are caused by events or processes that are themselves indeterminisgc, then they won t be any more up to me than if they were caused by events that follow determinis.cally from events that occurred before I was born So it seems like if we lack freedom of ac.on in a determinis.c world, it s not clear that we re going to get it by moving to an indeterminis.c world So, in the end, it appears that denying determinism is really no help in making space for genuine freedom

57 All of this leaves us with a very troubling dilemma to consider

58 Perhaps the explanation why both compatibilism and incompatibilism seem to lead to mysteries is simply that the concept of free will is selfcontradictory... If free will is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, then, since either determinism or indeterminism has to be true, free will is impossible. And, of course, what is impossible does not exist...

59 A very troubling anti free will dilemma to consider... (1) If the thesis of determinism is true, then the free will thesis is false (by the consequence argument) (2) If the thesis of indeterminism is true, then the free will thesis is false (by the mind argument) (3) Either the thesis of determinism or the thesis of indeterminism is true Therefore, (4) The free will thesis is false whether the world is determinisgc or indeterminisgc

60 Since the dilemma argument is clearly valid, and all three premises seem to be well supported (if not true), it looks like we have a very persuasive argument for the conclusion that: contrary to our common sense intuitions there is no such thing as free will after all

61 Where do we go from here?

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