MANIPULATION AND INDEPENDENCE 1
|
|
- Myrtle Fox
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 MANIPULATION AND INDEPENDENCE 1 D. JUSTIN COATES UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO DRAFT AUGUST 3, Recently, many incompatibilists have argued that moral responsibility is incompatible with causal determinism because causal determination by blind physical processes is relevantly similar to causal determination via neurological manipulation. 2 And because no one, the thought goes, can be responsible for their actions if they are subjected to neurological manipulation, neither can anyone be morally responsible for their actions if they are causally determined by blind physical processes. Developing this idea, Derk Pereboom argues that in cases of neurological manipulation, the fact that an agent is not morally responsible for her action is best explained by the fact that she is not the causal-historical source of her action. 3 But Pereboom goes on to suggest that causal determination by blind physical processes similarly undermines an agent s standing as the causal-historical source of her action. After all, if causal determinism obtains, then any action that the agent performs is logically entailed by the state of the world in the distant past together with the laws of nature. So, if determinism obtains, what an agent does ultimately depends on the state of the world in the distant past together with the laws of nature. Accordingly, Pereboom and other incompatibilists conclude that moral responsibility is not compatible with causal determinism of any sort, whether it is the product of covert neurological manipulation or the product of blind physical processes. Thus, compatibilism the thesis that causal determinism and moral responsibility are compatible is putatively false. Notice that Pereboom s argument rests on his claim that the features that undermine responsibility in cases of neurological manipulation are also present (and relevant) to attributions of moral responsibility in cases of mere causal determination by blind physical processes. This, I will suggest, is no 1 For helpful comments on these ideas and earlier drafts of this paper I d like to thank John Martin Fischer, Philip Swenson, Patrick Todd, Neal Tognazzini, and Robyn Repko Waller. 2 See Derk Pereboom, Living Without Free Will, 2001; Al Mele, Free Will and Luck, 2006; Patrick Todd, Defending (a Modified Version of) the Zygote Argument, forthcoming. 3 Pereboom, Of course, what I say here in response to Pereboom will apply mutatis mutandis to Al Mele s Zygote Argument. Indeed, as far as I can tell, the approach I develop in this paper constitutes a reply to any extant version of the so called manipulation argument.
2 small assumption. Indeed, I will argue that there are important differences between cases of neurological manipulation and causal determination by physical processes. And these differences make a difference with respect to moral responsibility as well as to attributions of praise and blame. Thus in light of these differences, manipulation arguments of the sort offered by incompatibilists like Pereboom fail to undermine the truth of compatibilism. But first, we must fill in the relevant details of Pereboom s manipulation argument the so called Four Case argument against compatibilism So to begin, suppose that there is a team of neuroscientists who decide to construct a human agent. In every respect possible, they engineer this agent to be identical to a human who has developed through the normal means of conception, upbringing, etc. Like any other parents, the neuroscientists want their child, who they call Plum, to grow up with their values. Unfortunately for Plum s moral character, the neuroscientists value murder and mayhem. And doubly unfortunate for Plum, they have more effective methods for shaping Plum s values and actions than do normal parents. So Plum is neurologically manipulated to reason egoistically in situations in which violence is an effective means to achieving his ends. And together with the other character traits that the neuroscientists have induced in Plum, his egoistic deliberations guarantee that he will seek to achieve those ends violently. Of course, his parents take care not to turn Plum into some mindless automaton. Specifically, they construct him in such a way that he possesses the sort of agential capacities that compatibilists claim to be sufficient for moral responsibility. Thus, when he acts, his actions issue from his own moderately reasons-responsive mechanism, 5 there is a harmony between his higher-order volitions and his effective first-order desires, 6 he possesses the capacity to grasp and act on specifically moral reasons, 7 etc. 4 For expository purposes, my discussion of Pereboom s argument is brief. However, it adequately characterizes the argument against compatibilism. 5 John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, Fischer and Ravizza argue that acting from one s own moderately reasons-responsive mechanism is necessary and sufficient for the freedom-relevant or control condition on moral responsibility (Fischer and Ravizza also believe there to be an epistemic condition on moral responsibility). 6 Harry Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, Frankfurt argues that a mesh between an agent s effective first order desire (i.e., her will ) and her second-order volition (i.e., her second-order desire about which first-order desire she wants to be her will), is sufficient for moral responsibility. 7 R. Jay Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, Wallace ties moral responsibility to a capacity for recognizing, applying, and regulating our behavior in light of specifically moral reasons for action. 2
3 Therefore, as much as it is possible consistent with the fact that he was created in a laboratory by a team of neuroscientists Plum grows into an apparently normally functioning adult agent. With this description of Plum in the background, Pereboom constructs the following case Case 2. 8 Case 2. Plum is like an ordinary human being, except that he was created by neuroscientists, who, although they cannot control him directly, have programmed him to weigh reasons for action so that he is often but not exclusively rationally egoistic, with the result that in the circumstances in which he now finds himself, he is causally determined to undertake the moderately reasons-responsive process and to possess the set of first- and second-order desires that results in his killing Ms. White. He has the general ability to regulate his behavior by moral reasons, but in these circumstances, the egoist reasons are very powerful, and accordingly he is causally determined to kill for these reasons. Nevertheless, he does not act because of an irresistible desire. 9 Regarding Case 2, Pereboom claims that despite the fact that Plum possesses the agential capacities that compatibilists take to be sufficient for moral responsibility, Plum is not morally responsible. Some compatibilists have argued that this is false. 10 These compatibilists claim that neither causal determination (say, by blind physical processes), nor neurological manipulation of the sort described undermine moral responsibility. After all, these hard compatibilists claim, just as our own parents perhaps deterministic role in our upbringing doesn t threaten our moral responsibility, neither does Plum s parents deterministic role in his upbringing threaten Plum s moral responsibility. Despite the potential appeal of such a solution, I want to say, in agreement with incompatibilists like Pereboom, that there is something 8 Though it s the first case that I consider, this is the second case Pereboom offers as part of his Four-case Argument. However, for my purposes, it is the most pertinent. But just in case you re interested, Case 1 is exactly like Case 2 in every way except that in Case 1, the neuroscientists exercise direct control, moment by moment, over Plum s activities. I omit this case because it clearly seems to be different than mere causal determination by blind physical processes, since the moment by moment manipulation doesn t allow for the kind of continuity that seems essential for agency a kind of continuity that is not ruled out by causal determinism as such. 9 Pereboom, 2001: See e.g., Gary Watson, Soft Libertarianism and Hard Compatibilism, 1999; Michael McKenna, A Hard-line Reply to Pereboom s Four-case Argument, 2007; John Martin Fischer, The Zygote Argument Remixed, 2011, etc. 3
4 deeply worrisome about the idea that we might be neurologically manipulated via the same sorts of manipulation that Plum undergoes and nevertheless morally responsible for our actions. 11 That is, it is natural to think that this sort of manipulation does undermine (or at least mitigate) our moral responsibility i.e., it s intuitive to think that if we were neurologically manipulated in the same way that the team of neuroscientists manipulates Plum, we would not be morally responsible for our actions (or we would be less morally responsible for our actions). 12 However, I am less sanguine than Pereboom that this judgment vitiates the truth of compatibilism. Indeed, I am inclined to think that there is some important difference between the neurological manipulation that Plum experiences and causal determination by blind physical processes. And this difference, I will suggest, makes a difference for attributions of praise and blame. Thus, this difference is relevant to moral responsibility. Further, given this difference, I will suggest that Pereboom s analogy between neurological manipulation and mere causal determinism is too loose to warrant incompatibilist conclusions. Mere causal determination by blind physical forces is sufficiently different from covert manipulation, and as a result, compatibilism remains a viable option. More perspicuously, in what follows I will argue that the causal histories of actions performed by manipulated agents have different modal properties than the causal histories of action performed by agents who are merely causally determined. And as we will see below, in some ordinary cases of praise and blame, a related kind of difference in the modal properties of an action s etiology can affect the degree to which the agent is praiseworthy or blameworthy for that action. Thus, these modal properties are relevant for the degree to which an agent is morally responsible for her action(s). As a result, the mere fact that manipulated agents are not responsible for their actions does not license the conclusion that causal determinism similarly undermines moral responsibility. 3. To get to this conclusion however, we need to momentarily step away from issues relating to compatibilism, manipulation, and determinism. So first, I want you to consider the following two cases (A1 and A2), specifically with 11 It s worth pointing out however, that some hard compatibilists notably John Martin Fischer (personal correspondence) do appreciate the worrisome nature of neurological manipulation of the sort described in Case 2. Fischer thinks that manipulation of this sort undermines, or perhaps mitigates the degree to which an agent is blameworthy for her actions even though it does not undermine her moral responsibility for such an action. 12 For a recent account of degrees of responsibility that might be able to explain why manipulation would mitigate our responsibility, see D. Justin Coates and Philip Swenson, Reasons-Responsiveness and Degrees of Responsibility, forthcoming. 4
5 an eye towards the question, does the degree to which these agents are praiseworthy differ? A1. Win is a considerate partner, and sometimes just because he knows it makes her happy on his way home from work he buys his partner Pearl a bouquet of tulips. Today, as he approaches the florist on his way home, it pops into his head that he should buy Pearl flowers. Yet, just as he turns to go into the shop, Pearl calls Win to tell him that she had a rough day, and that if he brought home a bouquet of tulips, the otherwise terrible day would be, in some small way, salvaged. Win doesn t mention to Pearl that he was already planning on buying her tulips, and when he brings the bouquet home, she is very grateful. Before continuing, fix in your mind how praiseworthy (if at all) you take Win to be in A1. Once you have that worked out, I invite you to consider A2. A2. Win is a considerate partner, and sometimes just because he knows it makes her happy on his way home from work, he buys his partner Pearl a bouquet of tulips. Today, as he approaches the florist on his way home, Win is so tired from work that that it doesn t even occur to him, as it sometimes does, to stop in at the florist and buy Pearl some tulips. Yet, just as he passes the shop, Pearl calls Win to tell him that she had a rough day, and that if he brought home a bouquet of tulips, the otherwise terrible day would be, in some small way, salvaged. Win forgets about his long day, and starts thinking about how he can make Pearl s day better, and when he brings the bouquet home, she is very grateful. Again, before you go on, make a judgment of how praiseworthy (if at all) you take Win to be in A2. Once you have made such a judgment, let s compare these cases more carefully. To begin, note that in each of these cases, Win brings Pearl a bouquet of tulips. And plausibly, in neither of these cases is he obligated to do so at least not morally. As a result, Pearl s gratitude in A1 and A2 seems entirely appropriate since intuitively, in each case Win is praiseworthy (to some degree or other) for his actions. Moreover, if gratitude is (i) responsive to and (ii) takes as its object the concern others have for us manifested in their agency, it seems that Win genuinely deserves Pearl s gratitude in such cases. But despite the fact that Win is praiseworthy (to some degree or other) in both scenarios, I am inclined to think that Win A1 is more praiseworthy 5
6 than Win A2. 13 After all, in A1 his decision to bring Pearl flowers is independent of her request. Though spontaneous, his thought to buy her flowers reveals something of his devotion to her something especially admirable. Of course, this isn t to say that Win A2 isn t also admirably devoted to Pearl. But it does suggest to me at least that Win A1 is more praiseworthy for this particular action because of how it expressed that admirable devotion. But what exactly does it mean to say that in one case his decision is more independent of her request? And why exactly would that be relevant to the degree to which he is praiseworthy in A1 and A2? Before I turn to these questions, I want to first consider a parallel set of cases. 4. Now let s consider two more cases (B1 and B2), again with an eye towards the question, does the degree to which these agents are blameworthy differ? B1. Win is a neighborhood tough. He regularly breaks into cars and steals any valuable electronics. Today, as he s walking along the boulevard, he notices an expensive car. The owner is not around, and he thinks as he sometimes does when he sees expensive cars that he should break into it. Just after he makes this decision, his buddy Alex approaches from the other direction, also eyeing the car. Before Win can say anything, Alex suggests that they break into the car and steal any valuable electronics. Win doesn t mention to Alex that he was already planning on doing so, and together, Win and Alex break into the expensive car. Again, make a judgment about the degree to which Win is blameworthy (if at all) in B1 before continuing on to B2. Once you have that in your mind, consider the following: B2. Win is a neighborhood tough. He regularly breaks into cars and steals any valuable electronics. Today, as he s walking along the boulevard, he notices an expensive car. The owner is not around, and he thinks as he sometimes does when he sees expensive cars that he should stop to take a look at it and admire it (Win appreciates good cars). Just after he makes the decision to stop and admire it, his buddy Alex approaches from the other direction, also eyeing the car. 13 A note on nomenclature: when I refer to Win x I simply mean to refer to Win, with the subscript referring which scenario is being picked out. Thus, I mean for Win A1 to be transworld identical to Win A2. 6
7 However, in this case Alex has more malevolent intentions, and he suggests that they break into the car and steal any valuable electronics. Although Win hadn t been considering doing so, he sees Alex s suggestion as attractive, and together, Win and Alex break in the expensive car. Now, judge the degree to which Win is blameworthy (if at all) in this scenario. And once you have settled on that, compare your judgment in B1 to your response in B2. If you re like me, there will be some difference. Of course, in each of these cases, it s true that Win breaks into a car. And in each of these cases, I am inclined to think that he is blameworthy for doing so. Moreover, it seems clear that he is sufficiently blameworthy in each of these cases to warrant some severe responses. However, it also seems to me that Win B1 is more blameworthy than Win B2. Perhaps a natural explanation of this intuition is that moral luck plays a bigger role in Win B2 s committing the crime. After all, had Alex not been waltzing down the same street (at the exact moment that Win passed the car), Win B2 would not have broken into the car. But this is not the case for Win B1. After all, even if Alex had not been present, Win B1 would have broken into the car. And again, this seems to point to the idea that in B1, Win s decision to break into the car is independent of Alex s presence in a way that it is not independent of Alex s presence in B2. With this in mind, I want to say more about the relevant notion of independence. 5. Now, as I ve said, in A1 and A2, Win is clearly praiseworthy for his considerate deed. And in B1 and B2, Win is clearly blameworthy for his malicious deed. But in A1 and B1, Win seems to be more praiseworthy and blameworthy (respectively) for his actions than he is in A2 and B2. After all, in A2 and B2, had Pearl and Alex not intervened, Win would not have bought the flowers or broken into the car. This suggests that the degree to which an agent is praiseworthy or blameworthy for her action depends (in part) on what they would have done had their action been independent from the other agents interventions. And on the natural assumption that the degree to which an agent is praiseworthy or blameworthy is a function of the degree to which she is morally responsible, this suggests that the degree to which an agent is morally responsible for her action depends (in part) on what they would have done had their action been independent from other agents interventions. In other words, when (e.g.,) Win B1 decided to break into the car, his decision depended on fewer extrinsic features of the scenario than was the case when Win B2 decided to break into the car. And because it 7
8 depended on fewer extrinsic features, we might think that it more accurately reflected Win s character. Accordingly, Win B1 is more responsible and more blameworthy (to some degree or other) for breaking into the car than is Win B2. To put the point a bit differently, in A1 and B1, Win would have performed the praiseworthy and blameworthy actions irrespective of Pearl or Alex s presence. But in A2 and B2, Win would not have performed the praiseworthy and blameworthy actions independently of Pearl and Alex s intervention. And although this isn t a full analysis of the sorts of conditions that underwrite an agent s moral responsibility, I think this does provide (the beginnings of) a suggestive account of why, in A1 and B1, Win is more praiseworthy and blameworthy than he is in the alternative scenarios. After all, this kind of counterfactual independence plausibly reflects that the act in question is, to some greater degree, the agent s own. And the degree to which an action is an agent s own certainly seems relevant to the degree to which the agent is morally responsible for her actions. Now, if this independence between an agent and the set of facts that actually contribute to the actual production of her action does in fact reveal something about our attributions of praise and blame, then there is good reason to suspect that neurologically manipulated agents like Plum are less blameworthy for their actions than those agents who are merely causally determined by blind physical processes. After all, independently of the specific manipulative inputs given to him by the team of neuroscientists, there is no reason to suspect that Plum would have murdered Ms. White. That is, in the nearest world in which Plum is not neurologically manipulated to kill Ms. White, it s not plausible to think that he would have killed Ms. White. After all, however we construe Plum in this alternative scenario, it seems clear that his killing of Ms. White in the actual world is not independent in the sense of independence present in A1 and B1 of the wishes of the neuroscientists. That is, the etiology of his murdering of Ms. White would be tied to a specific causal history that accompanies the neurological manipulation a causal history that is not present in the absence of the particular sort of neurological manipulation that Plum actually experiences. We can express the counterfactual dependence of Plum s action on the manipulation as follows: (1) If Plum were not neurologically manipulated to murder Ms. White, it would not have been the case that Plum would have murdered Ms. White. 8
9 We have reason to accept (1) because of standard counterfactual semantics. 14 After all, the nearest world in which the antecedent of (1) obtains plausibly isn t a world in which the consequent obtains, either because Plum is not created, or because the neuroscientists manipulate him to act in some other way. In either case, the truth of (1) strongly suggests that Plum s decision to murder depends on neurological manipulation in some strong sense. 15 And as we ll see, the fact that Plum s act of murder supports the truth of this counterfactual will be relevant to the question of whether there are important differences between causal determination by covert neurological manipulation and causal determination by blind physical processes. 6. Moreover, notice that something like (1) is also true of Win in the situation described in cases A2 and B2. For example, consider: (1*) If Win A2 had not been called by Pearl, it would not have been the case that Win bought Pearl flowers. In other words, Win wouldn t have bought the flowers if Pearl had not asked for them. The same can be said of Win B2. (1**) If Win B2 had not seen Alex, it would not have been the case that Win broke into the expensive car. That is, in B2 Win wouldn t have broken into the car if Alex hadn t first suggested it. Recall that these counterfactual properties of the causal history of Win s action plausibly reflect a difference in the degree to which Win was praiseworthy and blameworthy. Similarly, we should expect that because in Case 2, Plum s action supports the truth of a relevantly similar counterfactual, the degree to which Plum is responsible and blameworthy for his action is also affected. In other words, just as the sort of dependence present in (1*) and (1**) reflects a modal property of the causal history of Win s action that is relevant to the degree to which he is responsible, the presence of the same sort of dependence in (1) suggests that in cases of 14 See David Lewis, Counterfactuals Note that I am not reductively analyzing the notoriously vexed notion of dependence in terms of counterfactual dependence here (such reduction is undoubtedly doomed to failure). However, I am suggesting that (at least in this kind of case) the counterfactual dependence of Plum s decision to murder White on the fact that he is neurologically manipulated gives us good reason to think that this decision depends on the neurological manipulation in some deeper sense. Thus on this picture, counterfactual dependence of the sort expressed by (1) is a manifestation of a deeper, perhaps unanalyzable kind of dependence. 9
10 neurological manipulation, the degree to which an agent is responsible is affected. However, despite the fact that neurological manipulation supports (1), we shouldn t think that something like (1) is true in the situation in which Plum is merely causally determined by blind physical processes to murder Ms. White. In might be that even if our actions are not independent from neurological manipulation that is present in their causal history, what we do might be independent from the presence of mere causal determinism in the causal history of our actions. I turn to this possibility below. 7. Given what we ve just seen, I want to argue that in the case of causal determination by blind physical processes, it is plausible to think that Plum s decision and subsequent murder of Ms. White is importantly independent from the fact that he was causally determined (by blind physical processes) to do so. To see this, consider Case 4. Case 4. Physicalist determinism is true, and Plum is an ordinary human being generated and raised under normal circumstances, who is often but not exclusively rationally egoistic (exactly as egoistic as in Case [2]). Plum s killing of White comes about as a result of his undertaking the moderately reasons-responsive processes of deliberation, he exhibits the specified organization of first- and second-order desires, and he does not act because of an irresistible desire. He has the general ability to grasp, apply, and regulate his behavior by moral reasons, but in these circumstances the egoistic reasons are very powerful, and together with background circumstances they deterministically result in his act of murder. 16 Notice that in this case the fact that causal determinism obtained in the actual causal sequence of Plum s action is independent (in the sense at stake) from his act of murder. This is, in this case, whether Plum is causally determined to murder Ms. White doesn t bear on the actual-sequence etiology of his decision to do so. If it did, then it would be true of Plum that had he not been causally determined to murder Ms. White, he would not have done so. But this is not the case. After all, in the closest world or set of worlds in which causal indeterminism obtains (i.e., the closest world in which he is not 16 Pereboom, 2001: 115. As I did with Case 1, I have omitted Case 3 since it does not directly bear on the point I wish to make here. For the curious, Case 3 is identical to Case 2 except that instead of the team of neuroscientists causally determining Plum to murder Ms. White, Plum is causally determined to murder White by his parents and environment in the course of an ordinary upbringing. 10
11 causally determined to murder Ms. White), it is plausible to think that the same prior events would still have occurred and indeterministically issued in Plum s murdering Ms. White, since he would still reason egoistically, it would still be the case that murdering White would further his aims, etc. Indeed, in this set of worlds, we would still have the causal chain that leads to Ms. White s murder. 17 In other words, the mere introduction of causal indeterminism to the actual-sequence etiology of Plum s decision doesn t, by itself, seem relevant to whether a type-identical causal sequence in fact obtains. 18 And although the evaluation of such counterfactuals is admittedly delicate and contentious, it is thereby plausible to think that: (2) If Plum were not causally determined (by blind physical processes) to murder Ms. White, it would have nevertheless been the case that Plum would have murdered Ms. White. As I see it, (2) simply codifies the intuition that even if the causal sequence leading up to his decision had been indeterministic, Plum would have chosen, for the same egoistic reasons that drove his choice in Case 4, to murder White. 19 But notice, something like (2) is also true of Win in the situation described in cases A1 and B1. Consider, for example (2*): (2*) If Win A1 had not been called by Pearl, it would have nevertheless been the case that Win would have bought Pearl flowers. And likewise, consider (2**): (2**) If Win B1 had not been provoked by Alex, it would have nevertheless been the case that Win would have broken into the 17 Though in such a case, this causal chain would be such that the probability of the causal antecedents producing the relevant outcome (i.e., Plum murdering White) would be less than 1.0 (as would be the case given the truth of causal determinism). Of course, in the nearest world to the world in which Plum is causally determined, the relevant probabilities would undoubtedly be high perhaps.999. And it is in light of this fact that we have good reason to accept (2), which I argue for below. 18 Of course, the introduction of causal indeterminism does affect whether the antecedent causes are sufficient for Plum s murdering White, and this might affect whether Plum has the ability to do otherwise (it certainly affects whether holding fixed the past and the laws Plum has the ability do otherwise). But this is not germane to the issue at hand. 19 Of course, the mere fact that on the assumption of causal indeterminism it s true that Plum would choose murder White doesn t undermine the further fact that some incompatibilists (though not Pereboom) take to be paramount for responsibility namely, that Plum could have chosen to do otherwise, even holding fixed the past and the laws of nature. 11
12 car. In A1 and B1, I claimed that Win was more praiseworthy and blameworthy (respectively) for his actions than he was in the alternative scenarios of A2 and B2. If this is true, then we should think that Plum is more blameworthy for murdering White assuming causal determination by blind physical processes (i.e. Case 4) than he is as described by Pereboom in Case 2 (i.e., the case of neurological manipulation). After all, the difference between (1) and (2) is the same as the difference between (1*) and (2*), and as we saw from the cases involving Win, that difference, while apparently only minor, is relevant to Win s moral responsibility because it is relevant to the degree to which it is appropriate for Pearl to be grateful for the flowers. Likewise, the difference between (1) and (2) is the same as the difference between (1**) and (2**). And as we saw, that difference is similarly relevant to Win s moral responsibility because it is relevant to the degree to which it is appropriate for us to resent or otherwise blame Win for breaking into the car. 8. Thus, there is an important difference between the neurological manipulation as described in Case 2 and mere causal determination by blind physical processes as described in Case 4. And further, as I argued earlier, this difference is present in at least some ordinary cases in which we alter judgments of praise and blame, gratitude and resentment. So, it is, as they say, a difference that makes a difference. And while the actions of causally determined agents are in some real sense independent of the causal determinism itself, the actions of the manipulated agents are not independent of the manipulation at least if the manipulation looks anything like the sort described by Pereboom and other incompatibilists. Of course, I haven t hereby shown that compatibilism is true, but I do think we are in a good position to defend compatibilism from this sort of manipulation argument. The cases involving Win help to show that there is a relevant difference (with respect to moral responsibility, attributions of praise and blame, the fittingness of gratitude and resentment, etc.) between neurological manipulation and causal determination by blind physical processes. And this is all that is required to undermine the incompatibilist argument. After all, because the causal histories of Plum s actions support importantly different counterfactuals in Case 2 and Case 4 counterfactuals that we know (from considering Win) to be relevant to moral responsibility, praiseworthiness, and blameworthiness it is possible that the best explanation for the fact that Plum is not responsible in Case 2 does not generalize to Case 4. Quite simply, Plum s murder of White in Case 2 12
13 depends on the manipulators in a way that it would not, were Plum merely causally determined by blind physical processes. This is because in the latter case, the causal history that produces Plum s action possesses importantly different modal properties. As a result, we have little reason to think that manipulation cases of the sort Pereboom develops successfully show causal determinism to wholly undermine moral responsibility and its attendant practices of praise and blame. 13
14 Works Cited Coates, D. Justin and Philip Swenson, Reasons-Responsiveness and Degrees of Responsibility, Philosophical Studies. forthcoming. Fischer, John Martin, The Zygote Argument Remixed, Analysis, Fischer, John Martin and Mark Ravizza. Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Frankfurt, Harry. Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person. Journal of Philosophy Volume LXVIII Lewis, David. Counterfactuals. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell McKenna, Michael. A Hard-line Reply to Pereboom s Four-case Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Mele, Al. Free Will and Luck. New York: Oxford University Press Pereboom, Derk. Living Without Free Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Todd, Patrick. Defending (a Modified Version of) the Zygote Argument, Philosophical Studies. forthcoming. Wallace, R. Jay. Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Cambridge: Harvard University Press Watson, Gary. Soft Libertarianism and Hard Compatibilism. Journal of Ethics
Chapter Six Compatibilism: Mele, Alfred E. (2006). Free Will and Luck. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Chapter Six Compatibilism: Objections and Replies Mele, Alfred E. (2006). Free Will and Luck. Oxford University Press: Oxford. Overview Refuting Arguments Against Compatibilism Consequence Argument van
More informationThe Zygote Argument remixed
Analysis Advance Access published January 27, 2011 The Zygote Argument remixed JOHN MARTIN FISCHER John and Mary have fully consensual sex, but they do not want to have a child, so they use contraception
More informationA Compatibilist Account of Free Will and Moral Responsibility
A Compatibilist Account of Free Will and Moral Responsibility If Frankfurt is right, he has shown that moral responsibility is compatible with the denial of PAP, but he hasn t yet given us a detailed account
More informationManipulation and Hard Compatibilism
Georgia State University ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University Philosophy Theses Department of Philosophy 8-7-2007 Manipulation and Hard Compatibilism Daniel Justin Coates Follow this and additional
More informationMitigating Soft Compatibilism
Mitigating Soft Compatibilism Justin A. Capes Florida State University This is a preprint of an article whose final and definitive form will be published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Philosophy
More informationAN ACTUAL-SEQUENCE THEORY OF PROMOTION
BY D. JUSTIN COATES JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY DISCUSSION NOTE JANUARY 2014 URL: WWW.JESP.ORG COPYRIGHT D. JUSTIN COATES 2014 An Actual-Sequence Theory of Promotion ACCORDING TO HUMEAN THEORIES,
More informationAn Argument for Moral Nihilism
Syracuse University SURFACE Syracuse University Honors Program Capstone Projects Syracuse University Honors Program Capstone Projects Spring 5-1-2010 An Argument for Moral Nihilism Tommy Fung Follow this
More informationKane is Not Able: A Reply to Vicens Self-Forming Actions and Conflicts of Intention
Kane is Not Able: A Reply to Vicens Self-Forming Actions and Conflicts of Intention Gregg D Caruso SUNY Corning Robert Kane s event-causal libertarianism proposes a naturalized account of libertarian free
More informationPOWERS, NECESSITY, AND DETERMINISM
POWERS, NECESSITY, AND DETERMINISM Thought 3:3 (2014): 225-229 ~Penultimate Draft~ The final publication is available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/tht3.139/abstract Abstract: Stephen Mumford
More informationNote: This is the penultimate draft of an article the final and definitive version of which is
The Flicker of Freedom: A Reply to Stump Note: This is the penultimate draft of an article the final and definitive version of which is scheduled to appear in an upcoming issue The Journal of Ethics. That
More informationLeeway vs. Sourcehood Conceptions of Free Will (for the Routledge Companion to Free Will)
Leeway vs. Sourcehood Conceptions of Free Will (for the Routledge Companion to Free Will) Kevin Timpe 1 Introduction One reason that many of the philosophical debates about free will might seem intractable
More informationFree Will. Course packet
Free Will PHGA 7457 Course packet Instructor: John Davenport Spring 2008 Fridays 2-4 PM Readings on Eres: 1. John Davenport, "Review of Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility and Control," Faith and Philosophy,
More informationBad Luck Once Again. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXXVII No. 3, November 2008 Ó 2008 International Phenomenological Society
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXXVII No. 3, November 2008 Ó 2008 International Phenomenological Society Bad Luck Once Again neil levy Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, University
More informationFreedom, Responsibility, and Frankfurt-style Cases
Freedom, Responsibility, and Frankfurt-style Cases Bruce Macdonald University College London MPhilStud Masters in Philosophical Studies 1 Declaration I, Bruce Macdonald, confirm that the work presented
More informationDefending Hard Incompatibilism Again
Defending Hard Incompatibilism Again Derk Pereboom, Cornell University Penultimate draft Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Nick Trakakis and Daniel Cohen, eds., Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars
More informationSensitivity to Reasons and Actual Sequences * Carolina Sartorio (University of Arizona)
Sensitivity to Reasons and Actual Sequences * Carolina Sartorio (University of Arizona) ABSTRACT: This paper lays out a view of freedom according to which the following two claims are true: first, acting
More informationFischer-Style Compatibilism
Fischer-Style Compatibilism John Martin Fischer s new collection of essays, Deep Control: Essays on freewill and value (Oxford University Press, 2012), constitutes a trenchant defence of his well-known
More informationCompatibilist Objections to Prepunishment
Florida Philosophical Review Volume X, Issue 1, Summer 2010 7 Compatibilist Objections to Prepunishment Winner of the Outstanding Graduate Paper Award at the 55 th Annual Meeting of the Florida Philosophical
More informationCausation and Freedom * over whether the mysterious relation of agent- causation is possible, the literature
Causation and Freedom * I The concept of causation usually plays an important role in the formulation of the problem of freedom and determinism. Despite this fact, and aside from the debate over whether
More informationA Coherent and Comprehensible Interpretation of Saul Smilansky s Dualism
A Coherent and Comprehensible Interpretation of Saul Smilansky s Dualism Abstract Saul Smilansky s theory of free will and moral responsibility consists of two parts; dualism and illusionism. Dualism is
More informationWhy Pereboom's Four-Case Manipulation Argument is Manipulative
Georgia State University ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University Philosophy Theses Department of Philosophy 8-11-2015 Why Pereboom's Four-Case Manipulation Argument is Manipulative Jay Spitzley Follow
More informationPhilosophical Perspectives, 14, Action and Freedom, 2000 TRANSFER PRINCIPLES AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY. Eleonore Stump Saint Louis University
Philosophical Perspectives, 14, Action and Freedom, 2000 TRANSFER PRINCIPLES AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY Eleonore Stump Saint Louis University John Martin Fischer University of California, Riverside It is
More informationIf God brought about the Big Bang, did he do that before the Big Bang?
If God brought about the Big Bang, did he do that before the Big Bang? Daniel von Wachter Email: daniel@abc.de replace abc by von-wachter http://von-wachter.de International Academy of Philosophy, Santiago
More informationA New Argument Against Compatibilism
Norwegian University of Life Sciences School of Economics and Business A New Argument Against Compatibilism Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum Working Papers No. 2/ 2014 ISSN: 2464-1561 A New Argument
More informationFRANKFURT-TYPE EXAMPLES FLICKERS AND THE GUIDANCE CONTROL
FRANKFURT-TYPE EXAMPLES FLICKERS AND THE GUIDANCE CONTROL By Zsolt Ziegler Submitted to Central European University Department of Philosophy In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
More informationI will briefly summarize each of the 11 chapters and then offer a few critical comments.
Hugh J. McCann (ed.), Free Will and Classical Theism: The Significance of Freedom in Perfect Being Theology, Oxford University Press, 2017, 230pp., $74.00, ISBN 9780190611200. Reviewed by Garrett Pendergraft,
More informationmoral absolutism agents moral responsibility
Moral luck Last time we discussed the question of whether there could be such a thing as objectively right actions -- actions which are right, independently of relativization to the standards of any particular
More informationDOES STRONG COMPATIBILISM SURVIVE FRANKFURT COUNTER-EXAMPLES?
MICHAEL S. MCKENNA DOES STRONG COMPATIBILISM SURVIVE FRANKFURT COUNTER-EXAMPLES? (Received in revised form 11 October 1996) Desperate for money, Eleanor and her father Roscoe plan to rob a bank. Roscoe
More informationJones s brain that enables him to control Jones s thoughts and behavior. The device is
Frankfurt Cases: The Fine-grained Response Revisited Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies; please cite published version 1. Introduction Consider the following familiar bit of science fiction. Assassin:
More informationManipulators and Moral Standing
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-018-0027-1 Manipulators and Moral Standing Benjamin Matheson 1 Received: 20 June 2018 /Revised: 12 August 2018 /Accepted: 18 September 2018 # The Author(s) 2018 Abstract
More informationHard Determinism, Humeanism, and Virtue Ethics
Hard Determinism, Humeanism, and Virtue Ethics The Southern Journal of Philosophy (2008) Vol. XLVI Hard Determinism, Humeanism, and Virtue Ethics William Paterson University Abstract Hard determinists
More informationResisting the Manipulation Argument: A Hard-liner Takes it on the Chin 1
Resisting the Manipulation Argument: A Hard-liner Takes it on the Chin 1 Manipulation arguments for incompatibilism have become all the rage as of late in debates about free will and moral responsibility.
More informationREASONS-RESPONSIVENESS AND TIME TRAVEL
DISCUSSION NOTE BY YISHAI COHEN JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY DISCUSSION NOTE JANUARY 2015 URL: WWW.JESP.ORG COPYRIGHT YISHAI COHEN 2015 Reasons-Responsiveness and Time Travel J OHN MARTIN FISCHER
More informationFree Will [The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
8/18/09 9:53 PM The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z Free Will Most of us are certain that we have free will, though what exactly this amounts to
More informationThe Problem of Freewill. Blatchford, Robert, Not Guilty
The Problem of Freewill Blatchford, Robert, Not Guilty Two Common Sense Beliefs Freewill Thesis: some (though not all) of our actions are performed freely we examines and deliberate about our options we
More informationMoral Psychology
MIT OpenCourseWare http://ocw.mit.edu 24.120 Moral Psychology Spring 2009 For information about citing these materials or our Terms of Use, visit: http://ocw.mit.edu/terms. 24.210 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY RICHARD
More informationModerate Reasons-Responsiveness, Moral Responsibility, and Manipulation
This is the penultimate version of an essay published in Freedom and Determinism, Ed. Joe Keim-Campbell, Michael O'Rourke, and David Shier (MIT Press) 2004. Moderate Reasons-Responsiveness, Moral Responsibility,
More informationTHE ASSIMILATION ARGUMENT AND THE ROLLBACK ARGUMENT
THE ASSIMILATION ARGUMENT AND THE ROLLBACK ARGUMENT Christopher Evan Franklin ~Penultimate Draft~ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93:3, (2012): 395-416. For final version go to http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01432.x/abstract
More informationChapter 5: Freedom and Determinism
Chapter 5: Freedom and Determinism At each time t the world is perfectly determinate in all detail. - Let us grant this for the sake of argument. We might want to re-visit this perfectly reasonable assumption
More informationALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES AND THE FREE WILL DEFENCE
Rel. Stud. 33, pp. 267 286. Printed in the United Kingdom 1997 Cambridge University Press ANDREW ESHLEMAN ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES AND THE FREE WILL DEFENCE I The free will defence attempts to show that
More informationHow (not) to attack the luck argument
Philosophical Explorations Vol. 13, No. 2, June 2010, 157 166 How (not) to attack the luck argument E.J. Coffman Department of Philosophy, The University of Tennessee, 801 McClung Tower, Knoxville, 37996,
More informationTraditional and Experimental Approaches to Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Gunnar Björnsson and Derk Pereboom
Forthc., Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter (eds.) Companion to Experimental Philosophy, Blackwell Traditional and Experimental Approaches to Free Will and Moral Responsibility Gunnar Björnsson and Derk
More informationHard incompatibilism and the participant attitude
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1516057 ARTICLE Hard incompatibilism and the participant attitude D. Justin Coates Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of
More informationA Relational Theory of Moral Responsibility
Prolegomena 15 (1) 2016: 71 88 A Relational Theory of Moral Responsibility Zsolt Ziegler Budapest University of Technology and Economics Department of Philosophy and History of Science, Műegyetem rkp.
More informationCausation and Free Will
Causation and Free Will T L Hurst Revised: 17th August 2011 Abstract This paper looks at the main philosophic positions on free will. It suggests that the arguments for causal determinism being compatible
More informationVihvelin on Frankfurt-Style Cases and the Actual- Sequence View
DOI 10.1007/s11572-014-9355-9 ORIGINALPAPER Vihvelin on Frankfurt-Style Cases and the Actual- Sequence View Carolina Sartorio Ó Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014 Abstract This is a critical
More informationTo appear in Metaphysics: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82, Cambridge University Press, 2018.
To appear in Metaphysics: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82, Cambridge University Press, 2018. Compatibilism, Indeterminism, and Chance PENELOPE MACKIE Abstract Many contemporary compatibilists
More informationResponsibility Neal A. Tognazzini
499 Responsibility Neal A. Tognazzini The notion of responsibility is vexed, both conceptually and metaphysically. It is invoked in a bewildering variety of contexts, and in many of those contexts its
More informationFree Agents as Cause
Free Agents as Cause Daniel von Wachter January 28, 2009 This is a preprint version of: Wachter, Daniel von, 2003, Free Agents as Cause, On Human Persons, ed. K. Petrus. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 183-194.
More information3 Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility
3 Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility We distinguish between creatures who can legitimately be held morally responsible for their actions and those who cannot. Among the actions a morally responsible
More informationFree Will as an Open Scientific Problem
Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem Mark Balaguer A Bradford Book The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England 2010 Massachusetts Institute of Technology All rights reserved. No part of this
More informationKantian Humility and Ontological Categories Sam Cowling University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Kantian Humility and Ontological Categories Sam Cowling University of Massachusetts, Amherst [Forthcoming in Analysis. Penultimate Draft. Cite published version.] Kantian Humility holds that agents like
More informationSUPPORT MATERIAL FOR 'DETERMINISM AND FREE WILL ' (UNIT 2 TOPIC 5)
SUPPORT MATERIAL FOR 'DETERMINISM AND FREE WILL ' (UNIT 2 TOPIC 5) Introduction We often say things like 'I couldn't resist buying those trainers'. In saying this, we presumably mean that the desire to
More informationLiberty University Graduate School DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN FREEDOM: A LIBERTARIAN APPROACH. A Report. Presented in Partial Fulfillment
Liberty University Graduate School DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN FREEDOM: A LIBERTARIAN APPROACH A Report Presented in Partial Fulfillment Of the Requirements for the Course THEO 690 Thesis Defense By Daniel
More informationA Relational Theory of Moral Responsibility and related essays
BUDAPEST UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMICS Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences Doctoral School in History and Philosophy of Science A Relational Theory of Moral Responsibility and related essays
More informationThink by Simon Blackburn. Chapter 3b Free Will
Think by Simon Blackburn Chapter 3b Free Will Review of definitions Incompatibilists believe that that free will and determinism are not compatible. This means that you can not be both free and determined
More informationDENNETT ON THE BASIC ARGUMENT JOHN MARTIN FISCHER
. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK, and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA METAPHILOSOPHY Vol. 36, No. 4, July 2005 0026-1068 DENNETT ON THE BASIC ARGUMENT
More informationFailing to Do the Impossible * and you d rather have him go through the trouble of moving the chair himself, so you
Failing to Do the Impossible * 1. The billionaire puzzle A billionaire tells you: That chair is in my way; I don t feel like moving it myself, but if you push it out of my way I ll give you $100. You decide
More informationFinal Paper. May 13, 2015
24.221 Final Paper May 13, 2015 Determinism states the following: given the state of the universe at time t 0, denoted S 0, and the conjunction of the laws of nature, L, the state of the universe S at
More informationEach copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.
Moral Responsibility and the Metaphysics of Free Will: Reply to van Inwagen Author(s): John Martin Fischer Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 191 (Apr., 1998), pp. 215-220 Published by:
More informationAlfred Mele s Modest. Hard Determinism Compatibilism. Libertarianism. Soft Determinism. Hard Incompatibilism. Semicompatibilism.
336 Free Will: The Scandal in Philosophy Illusionism Determinism Hard Determinism Compatibilism Soft Determinism Hard Incompatibilism Impossibilism Valerian Model Soft Compatibilism Alfred Mele s Modest
More informationTHE LUCK AND MIND ARGUMENTS
THE LUCK AND MIND ARGUMENTS Christopher Evan Franklin ~ Penultimate Draft ~ The Routledge Companion to Free Will eds. Meghan Griffith, Neil Levy, and Kevin Timpe. New York: Routledge, (2016): 203 212 Locating
More informationThe Mystery of Free Will
The Mystery of Free Will What s the mystery exactly? We all think that we have this power called free will... that we have the ability to make our own choices and create our own destiny We think that we
More informationFree Will Agnosticism i
Free Will Agnosticism i Stephen Kearns, Florida State University 1. Introduction In recent years, many interesting theses about free will have been proposed that go beyond the compatibilism/incompatibilism
More informationThe Consequence Argument
2015.11.16 The Consequence Argument The topic What is free will? Some paradigm cases. (linked to concepts like coercion, action, and esp. praise and blame) The claim that we don t have free will.... Free
More informationRECENT WORK MORAL RESPONSIBILITY. Introduction
Oxford, PHIB Philosophical 0031-8051 10.1111/j.0031-8051.2004.00374.x 46 4Original Blackwell UK Article Publishing, Books Ltd. RECENT WORK MORAL RESPONSIBILITY ELINOR MASON The University of Edinburgh
More informationFolk Fears about Freedom and Responsibility: Determinism vs. Reductionism
Folk Fears about Freedom and Responsibility: Determinism vs. Reductionism EDDY NAHMIAS* 1. Folk Intuitions and Folk Psychology My initial work, with collaborators Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer, and
More informationBayesian Probability
Bayesian Probability Patrick Maher September 4, 2008 ABSTRACT. Bayesian decision theory is here construed as explicating a particular concept of rational choice and Bayesian probability is taken to be
More informationDaniel von Wachter Free Agents as Cause
Daniel von Wachter Free Agents as Cause The dilemma of free will is that if actions are caused deterministically, then they are not free, and if they are not caused deterministically then they are not
More informationFree Will, Determinism, and Moral Responsibility: An Analysis of Event-Causal Incompatibilism
Macalester College DigitalCommons@Macalester College Philosophy Honors Projects Philosophy Department July 2017 Free Will, Determinism, and Moral Responsibility: An Analysis of Event-Causal Incompatibilism
More informationLibertarian Free Will and Chance
Libertarian Free Will and Chance 1. The Luck Principle: We have repeatedly seen philosophers claim that indeterminism does not get us free will, since something like the following is true: The Luck Principle
More informationFREE WILL AND DETERMINISM: AN ADOPTION STUDY. James J. Lee, Matt McGue University of Minnesota Twin Cities
FREE WILL AND DETERMINISM: AN ADOPTION STUDY James J. Lee, Matt McGue University of Minnesota Twin Cities UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA RESEARCH TEAM James J. Lee, Department of Psychology Matt McGue, Department
More informationMETAPHYSICS. The Problem of Free Will
METAPHYSICS The Problem of Free Will WHAT IS FREEDOM? surface freedom Being able to do what you want Being free to act, and choose, as you will BUT: what if what you will is not under your control? free
More informationAm I free? Free will vs. determinism
Am I free? Free will vs. determinism Our topic today is, for the second day in a row, freedom of the will. More precisely, our topic is the relationship between freedom of the will and determinism, and
More informationThe Mind Argument and Libertarianism
The Mind Argument and Libertarianism ALICIA FINCH and TED A. WARFIELD Many critics of libertarian freedom have charged that freedom is incompatible with indeterminism. We show that the strongest argument
More informationFree Will Theodicies for Theological Determinists
SOPHIA (2017) 56:289 310 DOI 10.1007/s11841-016-0563-8 Free Will Theodicies for Theological Determinists T. Ryan Byerly 1 Published online: 18 January 2017 # The Author(s) 2017. This article is published
More informationHABERMAS ON COMPATIBILISM AND ONTOLOGICAL MONISM Some problems
Philosophical Explorations, Vol. 10, No. 1, March 2007 HABERMAS ON COMPATIBILISM AND ONTOLOGICAL MONISM Some problems Michael Quante In a first step, I disentangle the issues of scientism and of compatiblism
More informationON THE COMPATIBILIST ORIGINATION OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY. Stefaan E. Cuypers ABSTRACT
Philosophica 85 (2012) pp. 11-33 ON THE COMPATIBILIST ORIGINATION OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY Stefaan E. Cuypers ABSTRACT Derk Pereboom defends a successor view to hard determinism in the debate on free will
More informationAN ANALOGICAL APPROACH TO DIVINE FREEDOM KEVIN TIMPE
10 AN ANALOGICAL APPROACH TO DIVINE FREEDOM KEVIN TIMPE Abstract: Assuming an analogical account of religious predication, this paper utilizes recent work in the metaphysics of free will to build towards
More informationWhat would be so bad about not having libertarian free will?
Nathan Nobis nobs@mail.rochester.edu http://mail.rochester.edu/~nobs/papers/det.pdf ABSTRACT: What would be so bad about not having libertarian free will? Peter van Inwagen argues that unattractive consequences
More informationDEFENDING NONHISTORICAL COMPATIBILISM: A REPLY TO HAJI AND CUYPERS 1. Michael McKenna University of Arizona
Philosophical Issues, 22, Action Theory, 2012 DEFENDING NONHISTORICAL COMPATIBILISM: A REPLY TO HAJI AND CUYPERS 1 Michael McKenna University of Arizona Is moral responsibility an historical or a nonhistorical
More informationWHAT MORAL RESPONSIBILITY REQUIRES WILLIAM SIMKULET
WHAT MORAL RESPONSIBILITY REQUIRES BY WILLIAM SIMKULET Submitted to the graduate degree program in Philosophy in the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements
More informationWhy Frankfurt-Style Cases Don t Help (Much) Neil Levy
Why Frankfurt-Style Cases Don t Help (Much) Neil Levy Contemporary debates about free will and moral responsibility frequently focus on arguments around Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs). Their centrality reflects
More informationStrawson, Moral Responsibility, and the Order of Explanation : An Intervention*
Strawson, Moral Responsibility, and the Order of Explanation : An Intervention* Abstract P.F. Strawson s (1962) Freedom and Resentment has provoked a wide ride range of responses, both positive and negative,
More informationCausing People to Exist and Saving People s Lives Jeff McMahan
Causing People to Exist and Saving People s Lives Jeff McMahan 1 Possible People Suppose that whatever one does a new person will come into existence. But one can determine who this person will be by either
More informationResponsibility as Attributability: Control, Blame, Fairness
Responsibility as Attributability: Control, Blame, Fairness By Anna Réz Submitted to Central European University Department of Philosophy In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor
More informationFree Will and Theism. Connections, Contingencies, and Concerns. edited by Kevin Timpe and Daniel Speak
Free Will and Theism Connections, Contingencies, and Concerns edited by Kevin Timpe and Daniel Speak 1 3 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department
More informationDe Ethica. A Journal of Philosophical, Theological and Applied Ethics Vol. 1:3 (2014)
Shaky Ground William Simkulet The debate surrounding free will and moral responsibility is one of the most intransigent debates in contemporary philosophy - but it does not have to be. At its heart, the
More informationDeontological Perspectivism: A Reply to Lockie Hamid Vahid, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences, Tehran
Deontological Perspectivism: A Reply to Lockie Hamid Vahid, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences, Tehran Abstract In his (2015) paper, Robert Lockie seeks to add a contextualized, relativist
More informationMORAL RESPONSIBILITY, DETERMINISM, AND THE ABILITY TO DO OTHERWISE
PETER VAN INWAGEN MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, DETERMINISM, AND THE ABILITY TO DO OTHERWISE (Received 7 December 1998; accepted 28 April 1999) ABSTRACT. In his classic paper, The Principle of Alternate Possibilities,
More informationFreedom and Determinism: A Framework
camp79054_intro.qxd 12/12/03 6:53 PM Page 1 Freedom and Determinism: A Framework Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O Rourke, and David Shier The Traditional Problem of Freedom and Determinism Thoughts about
More informationFederico Picinali Generalisations, causal relationships, and moral responsibility
Federico Picinali Generalisations, causal relationships, and moral responsibility Article (Accepted version) (Refereed) Original citation: Picinali, Federico (2016) Generalisations, causal relationships,
More informationThe Mystery of Libertarianism
The Mystery of Libertarianism Conclusion So Far: Here are the three main questions we have asked so far: (1) Is Determinism True? Are our actions determined by our genes, our upbringing, the laws of physics
More informationFree Acts and Chance: Why the Rollback Argument Fails Lara Buchak, UC Berkeley
1 Free Acts and Chance: Why the Rollback Argument Fails Lara Buchak, UC Berkeley ABSTRACT: The rollback argument, pioneered by Peter van Inwagen, purports to show that indeterminism in any form is incompatible
More informationThis handout follows the handout on Determinism. You should read that handout first.
Michael Lacewing Compatibilism This handout follows the handout on Determinism. You should read that handout first. COMPATIBILISM I: VOLUNTARY ACTION AS DEFINED IN TERMS OF THE TYPE OF CAUSE FROM WHICH
More informationMental Causation and Ontology, S. C. Gibb, E. J. Lowe, R. D. Ingthorsson, Mar 21, 2013, Philosophy, 272 pages. This book demonstrates the importance o
Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, E. J. Lowe, OUP Oxford, 2010, 0199592500, 9780199592500, 222 pages. Personal Agency consists of two parts. In Part II, a radically libertarian theory
More informationDana Kay Nelkin. It is often tempting to take it as a given that the topic of free will is an important and
Moral Responsibility, The Reactive Attitudes, and The Significance of (Libertarian) Free Will (To appear in Libertarian Free Will, edited by David Palmer (2014)). Dana Kay Nelkin I. Introduction It is
More informationMoral Twin Earth: The Intuitive Argument. Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have recently published a series of articles where they
Moral Twin Earth: The Intuitive Argument Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have recently published a series of articles where they attack the new moral realism as developed by Richard Boyd. 1 The new moral
More informationLucky to Know? the nature and extent of human knowledge and rational belief. We ordinarily take ourselves to
Lucky to Know? The Problem Epistemology is the field of philosophy interested in principled answers to questions regarding the nature and extent of human knowledge and rational belief. We ordinarily take
More informationWhat God Could Have Made
1 What God Could Have Made By Heimir Geirsson and Michael Losonsky I. Introduction Atheists have argued that if there is a God who is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent, then God would have made
More information