Resilience of the Lebanese Armed Forces. November 8, 2015 A product by the MENA Analysis network Authored by Maxime de Taisne

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1 Resilience of the Lebanese Armed Forces November 8, 2015 A product by the MENA Analysis network Authored by Maxime de Taisne

2 MENA Analysis November 8, 2015 MENA ANALYSIS Tel: Advice given and recommendations made do not constitute a warranty of future results by MENA Analysis or an assurance against risk. Recommendations made are based on information provided by the client and other information available at the time of writing. No express or implied warranty is given in respect of any judgment made or to changes or any unforeseen escalation of any factors affecting any such judgment. Documents are for the benefit of the client only and may not be disclosed to any third parties without the prior written consent of MENA Analysis. The client agrees to indemnify MENA Analysis against any claims and any resulting damages that may be caused by any unauthorised disclosure of such documents. Follow MENA Analysis on

3 Resilience of the Lebanese Armed Forces Rebuilt after a bloody civil war ( ) and stepping up as the prime security agent since the departure of the Syrian troops in 2005, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) operates in a fragmented society. The LAF, which is made up of Lebanon s different Christian and Muslim sects, is highly dependent on the political stability of the Lebanese confessional system. Because of the permeability of Lebanese politics to the regional context, the turmoil in neighbouring Syria has heightened tensions between the various communities and eroded the fragile stability of post-civil War Lebanon, thus threatening the cohesiveness of the LAF. So far, however, the LAF has avoided an open fracture along sectarian lines and has contributed to keeping Lebanon from following Syria in its dramatic collapse. Against all odds, the LAF is withstanding spill over effects from the Syrian conflict, but domestic and regional forces could upset the balance. Overwhelming Popular Support The resilience of the LAF depends to a great extent on the legitimacy it derives from Lebanese society and confessional leaders. The Army portrays itself both as a neutral security agent and as the vanguard of the Lebanese nation to gain cross-sectarian legitimacy. Despite the fact that the structure of the LAF is indeed confessional at heart the Army Commander has to be a Maronite, the Chief of Staff a Druze, the Secretary General of the Higher Defense Council a Sunni, etc. the Army has been defining itself as the only truly supra-sectarian institution in Lebanon. Many Lebanese media outlets have the policy of not covering allegations against the Army in order to avoid tarnishing the image of what is depicted as Lebanon s only safety valve since the outbreak of the Syrian conflict. Because it completely depends on the consent of the Lebanese people, the Army is one of the most transparent military institutions of the Middle East and puts a lot of effort into nation-wide public relations campaigns. The August 1st Army Day is an official holiday which draws crowds in every major Lebanese town and has become a traditional display of unity and unconditional support of the LAF across Lebanon. Media campaigns with catchy slogans, such as in the heart and on the borders and we are all the Lebanese Army, are rare symbols of unity in an otherwise deeply divided country. The Army has thus become the projection screen of an ideal-type Lebanon, which severely contrasts with the debility of the Lebanese state, made even more apparent during the September 2015 garbage crisis and ensuing social movement. Perceived double standards This general consensus among media and politicians that the Army is above criticism has preserved it so far. However, repeated and documented mistreatment and torture of Sunni detainees in the notorious Roumieh prison as well as Palestinian and Syrian refugees a majority of which are Sunniis evidently fuelling resentment among certain Sunni segments of society. More importantly, the LAF s image suffers from its double-standard towards Hezbollah, whose members seem to enjoy complete immunity. Indeed, the Lebanese Army has turned a blind eye to its military activities in Shiite strongholds in the Dahiyeh suburbs of Beirut, Southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, used as a base for Hezbollah fighters operating in Syria. By contrast, the three major internal operations undertaken by the LAF in recent years have been (1) the violent crackdown against Sunni cleric Assir and his followers in the Abra District of Sidon in 2013 (2) confronting Jihadi fighters in the northeastern border town of Arsal in August 2014, with 24 soldiers captured (3) and implementing an aggressive security plan in Tripoli, a predominantly Sunni city in north Lebanon in October

4 As of now, the LAF shows little external signs of fracture: defections among Sunni soldiers are limited to a couple of individual cases, but are nevertheless a worrying sign. The LAF is an effective force enjoying genuine and widespread popular support, but as political consensus is eroding among certain segments of the Sunni population so is the Army s manoeuvring space. Appointment of High Ranking Security and Military Officials Since the Cedar Revolution of 2005, the Lebanese political scene has crystallized into two opposing camps. The March 14 Alliance is composed of the Sunni Future Movement headed by Saad Hariri as well as Christian political parties such as the Kataeb of Amin Gemayel, the Forces Libanaises of Samir Geagea and other smaller parties. The March 8 Alliance is made up of Hezbollah headed by Hassan Nasrallah, the Shia Amal party of Speaker of Parliament Nabi Berri and the Maronite Free Patriotic Movement under the leadership of former General Michel Aoun. Historically, every Lebanese political leader has unconditionally endorsed the LAF, and even mild criticism of the Armed Forces was perceived as sectarian and unpatriotic. However, the recent controversy over military appointments and promotions is eroding this general consensus and drawing the LAF dangerously close to political infighting between and among the March 14 and March 8 coalitions. Michel Aoun and his son in law, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Gebran Bassil, have recently directed violent criticism against Lebanese Army Commander Kahwaji and accused him of using his position to become Lebanon s next president, like former Lebanese Army commanders and Presidents Emile Lahoud ( ) and Michel Suleiman ( ) before him. At this stage, it appears that the March 14 Alliance is able to maintain its candidates in key security position without fierce resistance from the Hezbollah, which has not shown unconditional support for its political ally Michel Aoun. See next page for table overview of the most prominent figures of the Lebanese security apparatus. 2

Prominent figures of the Lebanese security apparatus: Major General Jean KAHWAJI, Commander-in-Chief of the LAF: A Maronite Christian from Bint Jbeil, Kahwaji was appointed commander of the LAF to

Although a natural candidate, Maronite politician Michel Aoun has been vocal against Kahwaji and is unlikely to agree to his appointment as president as he is himself running for the position.

Brigadier General Chamel ROUKOUZ, former commander of the Rangers Regiment: Roukouz distinguished himself at the head of Lebanon s first and largest special forces unit against Fatah al-islam in Nahr

He has become a popular but controversial media figure, as he is the son in law of General Aoun, to whom he was loyal at the end of the Civil War.

Roukouz finally retired in October 2015, putting an end to the controversy and increasing even more his popularity, which he could use to launch his political career.

5 Prominent figures of the Lebanese security apparatus: Major General Jean KAHWAJI, Commander-in-Chief of the LAF: A Maronite Christian from Bint Jbeil, Kahwaji was appointed commander of the LAF to replace General Suleiman when he was appointed president in He is a natural contender for the presidency as the leader of the Army. Although a natural candidate, Maronite politician Michel Aoun has been vocal against Kahwaji and is unlikely to agree to his appointment as president as he is himself running for the position. Aoun has repeatedly opposed the extension of Khawaji s mandate, the latter having reached retirement age, suggesting instead his own son in law Chamel Roukouz as Khawaji s successor. Brigadier General Chamel ROUKOUZ, former commander of the Rangers Regiment: Roukouz distinguished himself at the head of Lebanon s first and largest special forces unit against Fatah al-islam in Nahr el Bared (2007), Salafist Sheikh Assir supporters in Abra/Sidon (2013) and the Al Nusra Front in Arsal (2014), becoming an enemy of Sunni radicals. He has become a popular but controversial media figure, as he is the son in law of General Aoun, to whom he was loyal at the end of the Civil War. Roukouz is of retirement age but Aoun had been pushing for Roukouz to extend his mandate and replace Kahwaji as commander-in-chief. Roukouz finally retired in October 2015, putting an end to the controversy and increasing even more his popularity, which he could use to launch his political career. Brigadier General Edmond FADEL, Director of the LAF Intelligence Service (B2): a Maronite from Bsharri, Fadel graduated from the Military Academy in 1976, the same year as Commander in Chief Kahwaji and has remained close to him ever since. He was appointed head of Military Intelligence--a position also reserved to Maronites--in His term has been extended several times since he reached retirement age, a decision supported by the United States. Brigadier General Wadhi Ghafari (close to former President Michel Suleiman), Brigadier General George Khamis (close to Aoun) and Brigadier General Richard Helou (close to Maronite Patriarch) are strong potential candidates when Fadel retires. Major General Abbas IBRAHIM, Head of the General Security Directorate (DGS): Prior to taking the Shia position as DGS Director, Ibrahim was deputy head of B2 ( ). Reportedly close to Commander in Chief Kahwaji, he is also closely associated with Hezbollah and played a key role in coordinating army intelligence with Hezbollah during his time as head of the B2 in South Lebanon ( ). He has allegedly been the target of an Al Qaeda suicide attack at a LAF checkpoint in June Colonel Imad OTHMAN, head of the ISF Information Branch: Othman is a Sunni ISF officer, who had been close to former Prime Minister Saad Hariri since his tenure as head of the Grand Serail Police Force (2011). He was backed by Saudi Arabia to replace his assassinated predecessor Wissam Al-Hassan in 2012, and he has increased coordination with the B2, especially since the battle of Arsal (2014) to counter the terrorist threat. He is the strongest candidate to replace Major General Ibrahim Basbous, interim chief of the ISF. 3

6 Politization of Military Aid Part of the LAF s regained legitimacy since 2005 is also due to its increased operational capacity. As a result of the bitter lessons the Army learnt in the Nahr el Bared Operation in 2007, in which it lost 168 soldiers, the LAF has gained a strong and tested counter-terrorism capability among its elite units, namely the Rangers (now under the command of Colonel Maroun al-qobayati), the Navy Commandos (Colonel Mouhamad Moustafa) and the Airborne Regiment (Brigadier General Jean Nohra). The United States, France and Saudi Arabia have been training, equipping and financing the LAF in the face of threats from Sunni Jihadis and, more subtly, to eventually counter-balance Hezbollah s armed branch in the long run. By reinforcing the counterterrorism and border control capacities. The gradual strengthening of LAF s capacities in counter-terrorism and border control over the last 10 years meant that it was better prepared than the Hezbollah to face the consequences of an asymmetric conflict in Syria. Whereas Hezbollah had been solely focused at confronting the conventional Israel Defense Forces, elite units of the LAF were training in counterinsurgency and urban warfare training which was not perceived as a threat to Hezbollah s military might. Today, the LAF is becoming the prime security agent in the country and is now the 6th largest US military aid recipient in the world. In addition, Saudi Arabia has paid France $3 billion to provide the LAF with a range of equipment, including long-range tactical transport helicopters and corvette warships. In addition, both Russia and Iran have shown increasing interest in supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces as part of their arms diplomacy strategy in the Middle East. Lebanon has been renegotiating a contract for Mi-24 attack helicopters and T-72 tanks with Russia to diversify its supply of weapons. Similarly, during his visit to Lebanon in August 2015, Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Javad Zarif emphasized Tehran s lasting intention to support the Lebanese Army, especially after signing the nuclear agreement in Vienna, which could lift export bans on ammunition and spare parts. In response, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have pressured Lebanon to reject these offers or risk losing all the aid they provide to the Lebanese Army. Considering the CIA has built a close relationship with the ISF Information Branch led by Colonel Othman, the Iranian and Russian would naturally reinforce their cooperation with the General Security Directorate and LAF s Military Intelligence branch (see profile of Colonel Othman, General Ibrahim and Fadel) which cooperates with the Hezbollah intelligence apparatus. Russia s increasing role in the region can only reinforce this trend. Although, the LAF is currently reaping the benefits of international support, it could quickly become another arena of competition between the U.S, France and Saudi Arabia, on one side, and Russia and Iran, on the other. Conclusion The multi-confessional Lebanese Army has shown a surprising level of resilience when confronted with the divisive tensions heightened by the Syrian conflict. The LAF stance against terrorism has the widespread approval of the Lebanese population and serves to reinforce its role as defender of the nation s sovereignty. However, given the tense context, the Army is under close scrutiny and the slightest mistake whether mistreatment of Sunni refugees or open cooperation with Hezbollah could delegitimize it. Lebanon s older generations who lived through darkest years of the Lebanese Civil War still recall when the Lebanese Arab Army of Sunni Lieutenant Khatib (1976), the South Lebanese Army led by Maronite Major Haddad (1979) and the entire 6th Shia Brigade (1986) all gradually broke away from the official Lebanese Army to defend their respective communities, paving the way to a long cycle of sectarian violence. The LAF has to walk a fine line between different foreign backers and confessions to ensure its survival as a cohesive institution. Today, the dilemma inherent in the Lebanese Armed Forces is even more apparent: maintaining the domestic and international neutrality of the institution, while actively preventing the escalation of violence. 4

Lebanon at the Eye of the Syrian Storm

Position Paper Lebanon at the Eye of the Syrian Storm Tel: +974-44663454 jcforstudies-en@aljazeera.net http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/ 1 May 2012 Will Lebanon, eventually, be attracted to the Syrian crisis,