Model United Nations of The Hague Arab League. Study guide

Transcription

1 Model United Nations of The Hague 2017 Arab League Study guide

2 Introduction of the Arab League chairs Head chair: Danilo Paolo Bertazzo Honorable Delegates, it is with great pleasure that I welcome you to this year's Arab league committee at The Hague Model United Nations. Personally, I am completing my final year of World Politics at Leiden University College in the Hague. This will be my third time attending the conference and the second as a chair. Although my past experience has revolved around disarmament, lethal autonomous weapons and human rights, this will be my second time chairing the Arab League. While the modified rules of procedures might appear daunting at first, I m sure we ll be able to make the most out of the conference. As such I am looking forward to meeting all of you and without further due, please meet your second chair Floris Rene van Strien, the floor is yours. Vice-chair: Floris-René van Strien Honorable delegates, It is with great enthusiasm that I welcome you to this year s Arab League conference at the Model United Nations The Hague. I am currently completing my degree in International Justice at Leiden University College the Hague. This will be my third time attending the conference, I have previously been involved as both a delegate and as one of the Crisis Directors at MUNOTH I then decided to quit MUN cold turkey, as one can see, I have relapsed. In my past experience of MUN s has covered quite a variety of committees seeing that I have done a total of 18 MUN s over my career in high school and university Model United Nations. In that I have chaired 9 times. My experience in Model United Nations has primarily been focused on Security Council and other more specialised organs. I am sure that both me and Danilo will be able to provide more than adequate assistance to both newcomers and experienced veterans. Do not shy away from asking questions or approaching either of us so we can help you make the most out of the conference. I look forward to meeting you all, and wish you the best of luck in your preparations. 2

3 Arab League - an Introduction This voluntary league of arabic speaking countries was formed officially on the 22nd of March 1945 with Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan (Jordan), Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria as founding members. Today the league is formed of twenty-two states, although Syria s membership has been suspended since The League s broad mission is to draw closer the relations between member States and coordinate their political activities with the aim of realizing a close collaboration between them, to safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and to consider in a general way the affairs and interests of Arab countries. There are a number of theories behind the creation of the league, from the need to unite against an emerging Jewish presence in Palestine, to deal with territorial disputes following the colonisation period and the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement, but also a push by the British government to unite Arab countries against the Axis powers (the idea had been present since 1942). As its executive decision making body, the League s Council is composed of representatives of all the member states, usually at a ministerial level but also high ranking diplomats, with a vote each. Given that the Council meets bi-annually, once in March and once in September, its day to day operations are organised by its General Secretariat located in Cairo, Egypt. Apart from the council, there are a number of specific committees such as the Economic Committee and Social Committee. Acting as spokesperson for the league is the Secretary General, elected by all member states is the secretary-general, currently Nabil al-arabi has been serving in the position since The league reacts on various events and emergencies and passes resolutions, nevertheless, these are only binding for those nations which voted in favor, which often translates to unsuccessful outcomes. It has attempted to form a number of peacekeeping or monitoring missions, yet, because of some member-states backing of UN resolutions, the league s missions often are met with unsuccessful outcomes. These type of situations exemplify best the un-cohesive league, to the extent that to date, it has only united around the Palestinian cause and organised the economic boycott against Israel between 1948 and

4 Topic A: The creation of an Arab military force The creation of a pan-arab military force has been a goal of the Arab League for a good 65 years, when the Arab nations signed a rarely used joint defence pact. The endeavour has, however, never been realised. Discussions around the issue flared up again in 2015, when the Arab League announced the creation of a joint military force but again, it was soon postponed indefinitely. History The Arab League has a long history with attempting to implement joint military plans. The Joint Defence Council was created in 1950 after the experience of the 1948 war with Israel, when five Arab states failed to act jointly and were each defeated separately by Israel. The first Arab summit in January 1964 promised to create a joint Arab military command but the plan was never realised. However, some integration of forces has occurred, the most advanced in the internal security field. Historically, the most effective Arab actions been those led by a Saudi-Egyptian alliance. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War, for example, perhaps the Arab states most effective war of the 20 th century, was fought largely by Egyptian and Syrian troops. However, the Saudis, along with Algerians and other Arabs, played a key role economically and politically because oil was an essential weapon. When the Lebanese Civil War escalated in 1976, under the command of the Syrian forces the Arab League created an international peacekeeping unit composed of Syrians as well as Sudanese, Saudi Arabian and Libyan forces. It was named the Arab Deterrent Force (henceforth ADF). Initially, it consisted of 30,000 troops, of which 25,000 were provided by the Syrian administration. The mandate of the ADF aimed at deterring the conflicting parties from relapsing into outbreaks of violence. This included attempting to maintain a cease-fire, confiscating heavy weaponry and supporting the Lebanese government in re-asserting their monopoly of power. In 1991, when Saudi Arabia cooperated with US-led forces to combat Saddam Hussein s Iraq from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia was encouraged to participate by Egypt, whose support Washington had secured even before asking the Saudis. In fact, after the war, Hussein was quoted saying that he blamed Mubarak for the Arab action more than King Fahd of Saudi Arabia because the Iraqi dictator believed the Saudis would have been reluctant to act without Egypt. Gulf nations, under the umbrella of the Gulf Cooperation Council joined forces to defeat a 4

5 string of destabilizing Arab Spring protests in 2011 by the Shiite majority in Sunni-ruled Bahrain. Facing the escalation of the Syrian popular uprising in 2012, the Arab League requested a joint United Nations (henceforth UN)-Arab League peacekeeping mission. The peacekeeping force aimed at putting pressure on Syrian President Bashar al-assad. A communiqué called on members to "open channels of communication" with Syrian opposition groups and provide "political and financial support." It urged members to cut diplomatic as well as economic ties with Damascus "except for those that directly affect Syrian citizens. The proposed peacekeeping mission would oversee the aftermath of a cease-fire. The Arab League had suspended Syria's membership in January of that year, and the Syrian government announced that any decision made without it was not binding". According to the Syrian government, the proposal reflected "the state of hysteria affecting some Arab governments, especially Qatar and Saudi Arabia, after Qatar's failure to pass a UN resolution that allowed foreign intervention in Syria," according the Syrian government. Arab League Summit in March 2015 In March of 2015, Arab leaders announced during an Arab League summit in Egypt the establishment a joint military force named Operation Storm Resolve to maintain security within the region. Army chiefs of staff from member states of the Arab League drafted a protocol for a new joint force to intervene in Middle Eastern conflict zones. The decision was primarily aimed at fighting insurgencies, especially jihadis who had overrun large parts of Iraq and Syria and had won a foothold in Libya. A further concern was the rise of Daesh (interchangeable with IS or ISIS), who were perceived as a destructive force that threatened ethnic and religious diversity. A final summit communique outlined the leaders views; Yemen was on the brink of the abyss, requiring effective Arab and international moves after all means of reaching a peaceful resolution have been exhausted to end the Houthi coup and restore legitimacy. The draft, planned for membership to be voluntary. A decision to intervene would be based on a request from a member state that currently faced a threat.. The defence ministers of participating member states would be in charge of running the force, with two-thirds of votes required to pass decisions. Military plans on engagements would be up to the member states military chiefs. The idea of an Arab joint force has already been tested in the ongoing Saudi-led coalition s air strikes against Houthis in Yemen. Many of the Arab nations, including Egypt, Jordan and most of the Persian Gulf monarchies, have supported a campaign of airstrikes to counter advances by the Iranian-backed Houthi movement in Yemen. The United States provides 5

6 intelligence and logistical support. Saudi Arabia is leading the airstrikes while Egypt, with the largest Arab army, has pledged to send ground troops if necessary. But observers say that in cases like Libya, consensus on a military intervention would be difficult since different Arab countries support rival parties in the North African nations. Disagreements include the headquarters of the armed forces. The original draft names Cairo as the headquarters. The joint Arab force will most likely be made up of Egyptian troops, with token support from Jordan and other countries. Egyptian military and security officials have said the proposed force would be made of up to 40,000 elite troops based in either Cairo or Riyadh. It would be backed by fighter jets, warships and light armour. The biggest obstacle to an effective joint Arab force, however, may be that dealing with insurgencies and failed states the problem the force was created to address requires more political and economic means than military prowess. The Pan-Arab force is also designed to be partly political. It spreads the responsibility and the blame and could provide added legitimacy beyond the resolutions of the Arab League. Yet, much of the simmering anger that fuelled the Arab uprisings in the first place had been aimed at many of the governments now leading the way for a Pan-Arab force. Iran The announcement came as Western diplomats were attempting to reach a deal with Iran to restrict its nuclear program in exchange for the removal of economic sanctions. In response, Saudi Arabia and other American allies in the region have made clear that they are seeking to bolster independent regional security measures because they see the proposed accord as a betrayal of Washington s commitment to their security. Regardless of Iran s nuclear programme, they complain, the deal would do nothing to stop Iran from seeking to extend its influence around the region by backing favoured factions, as it has done in Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain and Yemen. The concern about Iran is not so much a direct military one, nor even about Tehran s nuclear potential. While the Arab nations surely do not want to see Iran become a nuclear power, the biggest worry is Iran s expanding political influence in Arab region, especially around Saudi Arabia. Reactions The announcement that the Arab league intends to form a unified military force has produced 6

7 different reactions from observers around the globe. For the most part, the decision was welcomed. Faced with the insurgency in Yemen as well as ongoing conflicts in Libya, Arab leaders felt that unified action was required and that the formation of a unified military force to counter growing security threats was a step in the right direction. The notion is that Arab nations must collectively face various challenges, especially terrorism. As the idea is not new, some observers are reserving judgment until concrete action has been taken. There is a sense among many, however, that even if the Arab League follows through, regional peace will not be secured through military means alone. The consequences of not solving solutions politically, some suggest, could be a war of all against all. Despite needing to prepare for the worst, what the region really needs is a political rather than military solution. The argument is that the interests of the MENA region, and the Gulf in particular, lie not in large-scale military confrontations, but in compromises and political understandings as proxy wars have failed in the region. Postponement A planned meeting by the Arab League to discuss the formation of a joint force was postponed for the second time in July 2015, this time indefinitely. The motion was backed by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE and Iraq. It is not clear what the main reason behind the delay was, but most likely it was due to disagreements among member states on where to deploy such forces, if at all. Despite statements of unity, there are still vast differences as well as political distrust between the Arab states and their opinions towards military intervention. Outlook A resolution on creating a joint Arab force would send a strong message to the world that Arabs have decided to take the initiative themselves. The creation of a Pan-Arab force may be a way to confront the need for immediate action in Yemen. Though Saudi Arabia s decision to play a war-fighting role is bold and new, challenges ahead should not be underestimated. Particularly if ground forces are ultimately needed, and attacks from Yemen on Saudi territory expand. A special concern in the growing influence of Iran. A proposed alliance may be a way of re-balancing power structures in the region. There is an incentive for the Arab states to show that they can and will protect themselves instead of relying on intervention by other states and super powers. In terms of the specific aspect of the League s military force, some hindrances are still to be removed. Financing, for one, should not be a problem due to the oil rents received by the Gulf 7

8 countries. Yet, particularly the creation of a joint force requires a high degree of mutual trust, which is difficult to achieve among rather authoritarian regimes. Related to this is the issue that an Arab military force will turn out to be a powerful instrument only if it is embedded in an institutionalized system of collective security, which requires sophisticated institutional design, including the readiness of member states to waive some rights of sovereignty. Whether the Arab League under the leadership of Saudi Arabia will be capable of implementing far-reaching institutional reforms to become the Arab NATO is far from clear. Saudi Arabia may want to register that it has finally arrived militarily. Though Saudi Arabia is the world s largest importer of arms, few nations view the kingdom s military as a major factor in the regional military balance. The Saudi military role is untested, so they don t want to be alone in the fight, either politically or militarily. There appear to be two meaningful criteria for assessing an Arab military force: whether it would increase regional self-determination on the one hand and enhance human security on the other. Simply put, regional self-determination would be boosted if the Arab military force developed as a powerful tool of a Saudi-led Arab League, since this could spare the region from more American campaigns. Moreover, in the light of Western attempts to prevent the emergence of regional powers, a greater role for an Arab regional power may appear progressive. However, the regime in Riyadh constitutes one of the most reactionary political systems in the Middle East: Not only has Saudi Arabia been in charge of securitization policies toward Shiism, but its human rights record is also one of the worst on a global scale. Thus, even if the Arab military force proved to be an effective tool of the Arab League to stabilize the Arab state system, it is far from clear whether this would not be to the benefit of the security of states only rather than to the Arab people. Questions a Resolution Should Answer 1. In organisational terms, what should be the extent of the joint military forces? Military cooperation or a fully integrated Arab defence pact? 2. In which cases could shared military units be deployed? How is a threat determined and who determines it? 3. Which is the priority: safety of citizens and their human rights or the stability of the respective regime? 4. Assessing the danger of Iran to regional security. 5. Is a joint military framework the appropriate tool to tackle Daesh and the insurgencies in Libya and Yemen? 8

9 6. What should be the role of other international actors, such as the UN, the US, or NGOs? 9

10 Topic B: Finding an efficient solution to territorial disputes within the Arab world Introduction to the topic Ever since there have been borders, there have been disputes, and with the rise of the post-westphalia sovereign state these disputes have only increased. Delimiting borders became increasingly important for the states as both a part of defining their national identity and securing strategic resources. This is especially true for younger states such as the states of the Arab world. The history of the Arab world has been complicated by the involvement of former colonial power Great Britain which has done the majority the demarcation when the countries that now form the Arab world were still in their adolescence. The reason why this delimitation was that the fuel of these new economies had to be divided, it is important to know where the oil field of one state ends and where the other begins. For a young state to mark its borders is also an act of identity expression, and an ongoing border struggle can be much more than a purely practical pursuit of economic policies. It is also a great way for a state to emphasize their position against surrounding states and show their policies regarding surrounding states to their people. To simply figure out what the border dispute will not be enough, one should find the underlying motivation as some states on a policy might never want a certain dispute to end. History of the topic Initially, the nomadic rulers that ruled the people that now constitute the proud Arab world had little interest in demarking borders. Their colonial rulers, on the other hand, did have an interest in demarking these borders. The methods utilized for this, on the other hand, were rather crude An interesting place to begin our journey through history is the negotiation of the so-called Sykes-Picot division. Named after the two negotiators of the respective agreement and agreed amid the Great War based on the assumption that the triple entente would be able 10

11 to beat the Ottoman Empire into submission and was secretly decided in May Opinions about this division have been varied. But the general sentiment is summed up by George Antonius who called it the product of greed allied to suspicion and so leading to stupidity. One can be assured that the impact has been quite significant as it has been one of the three separate irreconcilable wartime commitments that Britain made to France, The 1 Arabs and the Jews. The Southern part of Arabian Peninsula was only demarcated relatively late as the new countries started to negotiate their independence from their former colonial power. The borders became necessary as it became important to mark where the national resources of one country started and the resources of the other state ended. In the relatively quick withdrawal Britain for a colonial power, Britain tried to clean its table and resolve lingering issues 2 including border problems. One of these boundaries mediated by Great-Britain was even 3 based on the very vague definition of the Southernmost palm tree. One can understand that these are not very useful borders in a legal sense, on the other hand, strict borders were also not required at the time. This changed when oil came into the picture as a means of economic growth for these countries. It was remarked by Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia in 1935 on relations between the Arab States that: relations had been friendly and no disputes on 4 boundaries had arisen until 1935 shortly after the discovery of oil in the area. Another reason for the disputes on beforehand relatively uncontested borders was the forming of national identity through disputing with neighboring states. It allowed states to distinguish the other where previously relations between countries and the citizens of these countries were mostly based upon tribal relations and family relations. With the breaking down of these systems by the increase of central power that is associated with a modern Westphalian sovereign state, it became more important for the countries to define their positions against surrounding countries clearly. As argued by Chubin and Tripp such strategies of identification by creating an other can backfire. Territorial disputes can stress unity of the nation and discourage domestic criticism through the identification of enemies and external threats; they also have the potential to create expectations of greater governmental responsibility and a 5 heightened sense of common purpose and common rights among the citizenry. This could 1 ed-consequences 2 Yoel Guzansky, Lines Drawn in the Sand: Territorial Disputes and GCC Unity 3 Ibid 4 Ibrahim al-rashid, The Struggle between the Two Princes: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Final Days of Ibn Saud, Chapel hil NC: Documentary Publications, 1985, page Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Domestic Politics and Territorial Disputes in the Persian Gulf and the 11

12 prove problematic for monarchs who have established authoritarian-type systems in a period 6 of significant political changes in the Middle East. Still, therefore, engaging in these type of territorial disputes might be essential for individual monarchs as it enforces the idea of the common enemy to reinforce their grip on their respective population. They might not even be interested in truly solving the issue as that could lead to more attention for their problematic internal policies. Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs This is a dispute between Iran and the United Arab Emirates regarding a group of Islands situated between the both. The origin of the conflict was when in 1971 after withdrawal of British from the islands in question the Iranian Navy invaded these islands and overcame relatively little resistance to claim that these islands were historically theirs this happened just days before the United Arab Emirates became independent from the United Kingdom. An exchange of memorandums was 7 made between the Iranian government and the British representatives outlining conditions. Reasons for this dispute are mostly related to the tactical location of the islands which give Iran access to this tactically placed islands which are advantageous if we consider the strained relations between Iran and the Arab countries in general. The relationship between the Arab League and Iran has also been an abundant source of discussion for academics, and therefore any move made by the Arab League in this regard will most likely have a large impact on Arabian Peninsula, Survival, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Winter 1993), p Yoel Guzansky, Lines Drawn in the Sand: Territorial Disputes and GCC Unity

13 how the relations will be going forward. Past attempts to address the topic The first round of negotiations was concluded in 1992, but this failed. Later an attempt was made by the United Arab Emirates to bring the case before the ICJ, but Iran refused this, the claims made by the UAE have been endorsed and supported numerous times by the Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf. The current situation The current situation is at a complete standstill with both countries not wishing to give any credibility to the claim of the other country. Seeing the strained relations between Iran and UAE, it might be feasible for the Arab League to negotiate with Iran. To show goodwill towards Iran but also to help further stabilize this ongoing dispute. As it does concern a group of islands with great strategic importance. Dorra Gas Fields dispute: Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia The main players in this dispute are Kuwait and Saudi Arabia with a limited interference from time to time from Iran who also tries to benefit from parts of the Kuwait oil reserves claiming that these are within the territorial waters of Iran. For this report, we will primarily focus on the dispute between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Background of the dispute The background of this dispute is primarily economic. Seeing that Kuwait is trying to increase their domestic oil and gas production as a means of making them less dependent on foreign imports. This has to do with their increased demands for the gas as their domestic consumption has soared since

14 Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, is primarily interested in obtaining an increase in their production the problem at hand is twofold. The maritime borders have not been demarcated well enough despite there being an agreement in Problems have risen since then regarding how the gas that is being obtained from the field should be shared on land. The project has even been shelved indefinitely because of this, the basis of this being that to transport the gas mainly over Saudi Arabian soil would not be acceptable for Kuwait. Furthermore, any plans regarding the gas directly being pumped to a gas powered power plant near a Kuwaiti beach have been blocked because of disputes between the Kuwaiti energy companies. One interesting detail is that on this land the Kuwait Oil Co has built a large beach club for its employees at the supposed landing site 8 of the pipeline and refuses to give it up unless an alternative location is provided

15 Past attempts to solve the dispute Previous efforts to resolve this conflict have been primarily focused on bilateral discussion between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait with Iran intervening from time to time as they try to sell the rights to drill to other companies as it has deemed that it is part of their oil and gas reserve. 9 This spurred Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to agree quickly on their joint development of these fields. But seeing current practical concerns the entire plan has come to a standstill again. Therefore negotiation through the Arab League or further agreement on more exact demarcation might be beneficial for the countries involved. Current situation The negotiations between these countries are at a standstill. Granting Iran a seat at the table in future discussions would allow the Arab League to negotiate more efficiently in other negotiations with Iran. On the other hand, it might anger the other countries involved if they are not actively involved in this process. They might even refuse to cooperate and relinquish a part of these vital resources. Overall the role of the Arab League could be to mediate between the different parties and propose effective means of demarcation based upon the various ways international border disputes are resolved. An attractive option is the ICJ which is considered the most experienced body when it comes to maritime delimitation. An example of their working has also been included in the last case study of this paper. Overall it is important to keep in mind that maritime delimitation has always been an elaborate affair in international law and that there is no straightforward solution. Maritime delimitation is described as a careful balancing act between the nations that are occupied with it. These type of processes often fail if internal pressures are applied to them. Therefore, long term cooperation of all governments involved is essential. Bahrain and Qatar: The Hawar Islands a solved case? The Hawar Islands are an archipelago located closely to the coastlines of both Bahrain and Qatar. The island group itself is located only 1.9 nautical miles from Qatar and approximately 10 nautical miles from the main islands of Bahrain

16 There are various reasons for the existence of this dispute but overall they mostly relate to these topics. Economic reasons This dispute has a lengthy background as an economical dispute regarding oil exploitation rights, the ruler of Qatar officially initiated the territorial dispute in 1936 when the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) and the Petroleum Concession Limited (a subsidiary of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company) negotiated with the ruler of Bahrain for exploration rights in the 10 seabed areas between Bahrain and Qatar. As there is quite a substantial amount of oil in the sea-bed surrounding the Islands, which is strategically import for Bahrain as their current 11 supply of oil is only expected to last another 10 to 15 years. Their natural gas supplies on the 12 other hand should last approximately 50 more years. In this regard Qatar has a more 13 comfortable position with an approximate 40 year reserve. Seeing that Bahrain s oil output has been decreasing over the years from 75,000 barrels per day to 35,000 barrels one can 14 imagine that Bahrain is quite eager to: find and develop any further reserves it can claim.. 10 Krista E. Wiegand, Bahrain, Qatar, and the Hawar Islands: The resolution of a Golf Territorial Dispute The Middle East Journal, Volume 66, Number 1, The Telegraph, Bahrain: oil and gas facts 12 Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, "Background Note: Bahrain," US Department of State Diplomacy in Action, July 8, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, "Background Note: Qatar," US Department of State Diplomacy in Action, March 7, Helen Campbell, "Special Report - Middle East Energy: Site of First Oil discovery Still of Regional Importance," Lloyd's List, June 6,

17 Past attempts to solve the dispute 15 As can be seen in the table above it is clear that several organs have been involved in trying to mediate this issue. Such as the GCC but so far there has been inadequate initiative from the Arab League to solve this problem which is why it might be relevant for this organ to attempt to solve this issue it has been resolved quite well and can be looked at as a model of how to successfully resolve a dispute. If one desires more background on this issue, we highly recommend checking the cited sources which will also be included in the recommended literature. Overall interestingly is that it has been the first dispute to be mediated and judged in the end 15 Krista E. Wiegand, Bahrain, Qatar, and the Hawar Islands: The resolution of a Golf Territorial Dispute The Middle East Journal, Volume 66, Number 1,

18 by the ICJ which was an interesting choice seeing that countries from the Arabian Peninsula often prefer to settle disputes internally instead of attempting to find external sources of dispute settlement. The court relied on the the 1939 decision of Great Britain with respect to attributing 16 sovereignty over the Hawar Islands to Bahrain and over Janan Island to Qatar, and then further defined the other Islands using rather complicated legal delimitation methods which for the sake of brevity this paper will not go into. If a delegate is interested in this, it is explained in pages 40 to 43 of the Qatar v. Bahrain Maritime Delimitation and Territorial 17 Question case paper written by Barbara Kwiatkowska. Current situation The quick acceptance of both parties seems to have solved the problem on the surface, but tension have been rising again relations worsened because of issues unrelated to territorial concerns. In March 2014, Bahrain followed Saudi Arabia and the UAE and withdrew its ambassador to Doha due to alleged Qatari support for Muslim Brotherhood affiliated opposition movements and ruling parties in several Middle Eastern countries. The three countries issued a joint statement that contended that Qatar had failed to commit to the principles of the GCC. Described by many as one of the gravest diplomatic crises the GCC has ever faced, the withdrawal was a result of mounting tensions that culminated with Qatar s refusal of a November 2013 Saudi ultimatum to stop funding the groups. Questions a resolution must answer 1. How the Arab League wishes to deal with its internal struggles, what type of mediation would they prefer in solving the outlined disputes? 2. What type of framework does the Arab League wish to establish to solve these type of issues, in how far do they wish to facilitate reconciliation of these kind of disputes? Should this be done on a case by case basis or is a persistent forum required? 3.How will the Arab League address the wishes of the involved parties in these cases, what is the future role of the Arab League in these kind of disputes? 4. What type of actions does the Arab League wish to undertake as a joint unit towards Iran or is the policy up to the individual member states? Regarding the specific question of demarcation

19 1. In what ways can the Arab League in cooperation with other organs contribute to a peaceful solution of these problems whilst taking into regards the needs of its member states? 2. To what organs does the Arab League recommend the member states to submit its disputes, what type of dispute settlement should be engaged in this case? 3. Would the Arab League solve this issue on their own internally rather than sending it off to for example arbitration? Areas of further research Seeing that the primary part of these disputes have to do with maritime delimitation the rules regarding the relevant zones and their exploitation rights are relevant. A document relevant to further research would therefore be UNCLOS especially the parts regarding Exclusive Economic Zones and National waters. There is a variety of case law regarding maritime delimitation that has been developed by the ICJ, the most relevant cases regarding the development of maritime delimitation are: Basic principles of maritime delimitation: North Sea Continental Shelf case Anglo-French Arbitration (1977) Basic articles maritime delimitation UNCLOS III 15,16,74,83 Important post-1972 jurisprudence: Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua/Honduras 2007) Territorial and maritime dispute (Nicaragua/Columbia 2007) Black Sea (Romania/Ukraine 2009) Bangladesh/Myanmar (2012) Peru v. Chile (2014) Bangladesh/India (2014) General reading regarding the working of maritime delimitation Yoshifumi Tanaka, Predictability and Flexibility in the Law of Maritime Delimitation (Hart 2006) pp. 1-2, 7-16, 37-49, Literature about relevant international dispute settlement bodies Natalie S. Klein, Dispute settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (CUP 2005) 19

20 pp Igor V. Karaman, Dispute Resolution in the Law of the Sea (Brill 2012) pp