WEEKLY GLOBAL TERROR WATCH

Transcription

1 WEEKLY GLOBAL TERROR WATCH

2 HIGHLIGHTS HIGHLIGHTS OF THE WEEK Indonesia. On 29 Mar 211, unnamed intelligence sources claimed that JI terror suspect Umar Patek was arrested in Pakistan in early 211. Unnamed security officials from Pakistan also confirmed that a tip-off from the CIA had led to the arrest. Meanwhile, POLRI said that it would be sending a joint team with other Indonesian agencies to Pakistan to verify Umar's arrest. Nevertheless, security analysts said that Umar's arrest was significant, because he was one of the few Indonesian militants who could explain to authorities the connections and extent of cooperation between Islamist militant groups in Asia. Afghanistan. In an article an by Afghan independent secular daily newspaper Hasht-e Sobh on 26 Mar 211, the author warned of the possible Taliban's reactions to the security transition. He said that the recent cessation of telecommunications operations in Helmand province was part of the Taliban's attempts to show the government and the international community that the Taliban wielded more power than the government in provinces where security responsibilities were to be transferred to Afghans. The author believed that the Taliban would increase their attacks on the seven provinces where responsibilities would be transferred, to prove that the security of Afghanistan could not be ensured without the Taliban. Separately, an National Directorate of Security (NDS) spokesman stated on 27 Mar 211 that 91% of organised insurgent attacks in Afghanistan were prevented due to the efforts of the ANA and ANP, with the NDS providing intelligence to arrest the masterminds of the organised attacks. Pakistan. Taliban forces base in North Waziristan reportedly had established a vigilance cell to hunt down people suspected of providing information to guide US' drone strike campaign. The cell was named Lashkar-e-Khorasan (LeKh), reportedly made up of more than 3 members, and its purpose was to identify, capture and execute locals who were working for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The bulk of LeKh came from the Haqqani network and the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group that control the regions along the Afghan border. The Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) was reported to have occasional cooperation with LeKh which operated in the Datta Khel, Miranshah and Mir Ali regions of North Waziristan. Iraq. On 29 Mar 211, an unknown number of militants, some wearing military uniforms and suicide vests, launched a series of coordinated attacks comprising suicide bombing and VB, on the provincial council building in Tikrit, about 16km north of Baghdad. 53 people were killed and 98 others were wounded in the attack. Middle East. Israeli media on 25 Mar 211 reported that the IDF was bracing for a possible further expansion of rocket attacks from Gaza, to as far as Tel Aviv. It was believed that Gaza militant groups possessed Iranian-made rockets, such as the Fajr-5, which were capable of reaching Tel Aviv. Subsequently, the IDF on 27 Mar 211 stationed the first batteries of its Iron Dome short-range missile defence system in southern Israel. The system was stationed outside the southern city of Beersheva. Meanwhile, the second of the two batteries IDF possessed would soon be deployed at Ashkelon. Gulf of Aden. According to international piracy monitoring organisation, Ecoterra International, as of 28 Mar 211, at least 45 vessels remain under the control of pirates while at least 714 people remain hostages. Meanwhile, EU NAVFOR reported that on 28 Mar 211 at around 9hr GMT (17H), pirates armed with RPGs hijacked a Kuwaiti-owned oil tanker, the MV Zirku, 463km SE of the Omani port of Salalah in the Gulf of Aden. The hijacked vessel was carrying 29 sailors. However, the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation later denied EU NAVFOR's report, saying that no such hijack took place. 2

3 TABLE OF CONTENTS INDONESIA JI Terror Suspect Umar Patek Arrested in Pakistan Parcel Bombs Come from Outside Jakarta: KAPOLDA Metro Jaya Bashir Denies Plot to Undermine Yudhoyono Witness Admit Weapons Sold to Aceh Camp Indonesian Counter-Terror Efforts Hampered by Several Issues: Former KADENSUS 88 Decoding Indonesia s Radical Islamists: What to De-Radicalise? 4 5 THAILAND Violence in Thai South 7 PHILIPPINES Violence in the Southern Philippines AFP Files Charges Against NPA Peace Between Philippine Government, MILF Still a Long Shot: ICG 8 AFGHANISTAN & PAKISTAN Violence in Afghanistan Afghan, ISAF Forces Readying for Spring Offensive Twenty-three Insurgents Join Peace Process ISAF Abandoned Base in Pech Dara: Taliban 91% Of s Thwarted: NDS Taliban Changing Tactics in Kunduz Taliban Orders Shut Down of Cell Phone Services in Helmand (update) Taliban Seize Control of Waygal District Taliban Employs Modern Weapons in War of Words Taliban s Will Increase Under Security Transition Security Transition Mere Propaganda : Hezb-e Islami Leader Rebranding the Taliban Violence in Pakistan Taliban Forms Cell to Hunt Down Spies Bin Laden Sets Alarm Bells Ringing IRAQ Violence in Iraq 17 MIDDLE EAST Violence in Middle East (Israel, Palestine and Lebanon) Hamas Urges Islamic Jihad to Stop s on Israel Gaza Militants Offer Truce if Israel Reciprocates Hamas Seeks Diversion from Gaza Unrest: Israeli Intelligence Hamas Calls on UN to Halt IAF's Air Strikes on Gaza IDF Braces for Rocket Fire Close to Tel Aviv Islamic Jihad Orders Commanders to Go into Hiding IDF Identifies Radar Sent to Hamas by Iran Fatah, Hamas Set to Hold Unity Talks in Cairo Israeli-Palestinian Tensions Escalating: A Special Report Radical Islam in Gaza MARITIME SECURITY (GULF OF ADEN & WATERS OFF SOMALIA) Cumulative Figures of Kidnapped Vessels in Somalia Incidents and Events Other Developments SPECIAL REPORT Libya's Terrorism Option 25 3

4 INDONESIA Terror Incident Charts 5 3 No. of s 4 3 Minor s Major s Extreme s No. of s 2 Minor s Major s Extreme s Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb 17/3 18/3 19/3 2/3 21/3 22/3 23/3 24/3 25/3 26/3 27/3 28/3 29/3 3/3 Data from Janes Terrorism and Insurgency Centre JI Terror Suspect Umar Patek Arrested in Pakistan On 29 Mar 211, unnamed intelligence sources claimed that JI terror suspect Umar Patek was arrested in Pakistan in early 211. He was believed to have served as JI's deputy field commander in the Bali nightclub bombings in 22 that left 22 people dead. Unnamed security officials from Pakistan also confirmed that a tipoff from the CIA led to the arrest. However, it was unclear if the US would gain access to Umar. Meanwhile, POLRI said that it would be sending a joint team with other Indonesian agencies to Pakistan to verify Umar's arrest. Nevertheless, security analysts said that Umar's arrest was significant, because he was one of the few Indonesian militants who could explain to authorities the connections and extent of cooperation between Islamist militant groups in Asia. Sidney Jones of the International Crisis Group said that Umar would be able to explain the nature of linkages between Pakistan and South Asian groups, and more generally, with their Southeast Asian counterparts. Parcel Bombs Come from Outside Jakarta: KAPOLDA Metro Jaya KAPOLDA Metro Jaya IRJEN Sutarman on 29 Mar 211 suggested that the recent spate of parcel bombs (refer to WGTW 1 16 Jan 211 for details) could have originated from outside Jakarta. Meanwhile, KABARESKRIM POLRI KOMJEN Ito Sumardi admitted on 29 Mar 211 that investigations of the parcel bomb attacks had been slow due to the lacked of suitable equipment to keep pace with technological advancements used by terror groups to make s. Nevertheless, he assured that POLRI was relying on foreign assistance to catch up in technology. Bashir Denies Plot to Undermine Yudhoyono Abu Bakar Bashir on 24 Mar 211 denied that he had any knowledge of plans to topple the incumbent Indonesian government, insisting that he was not against President Yudhoyono but simply against the country's political system. He added that Yudhoyono might rule the country as long as he wanted, if the country was based on Islamic law. Witness Admit Weapons Sold to Aceh Camp A witness at Abu Bakar Bashir's trial on 24 Mar 211 admitted that weapons had been sold to a militant training camp in Aceh, which Bashir was believed to be affiliated to. According to witness Sofyan Tsauri, a former policeman currently in jail for terrorism, at least 24 firearms and almost 2, rounds of ammunition had been sold to the Aceh camp for Rp35 million (US$4,25). He further admitted that militant training at the camp was intended to prepare militants for waging jihad in Palestine. Meanwhile, another suspected militant Joko Sulistyo during the trial said that the al-qaeda flag was raised within the camp grounds to motivate the camp's trainees. Definition of the scale of attacks according to Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre Extreme s: An attack that causes (or is intended to or demonstrably capable of causing) more than 1, fatalities or more than 2, injuries, or that causes the entire destruction of many buildings or the complete loss of a major facility.) Major s: An attack that causes (or is intended to or demonstrably capable of causing more than 2 fatalities or more than 5 injuries; or significant structural damage to one or more buildings or physical facilities; or mass disruption of activities for a large number of people.) Minor s: Damaging attacks that cause death, injury, damage to property or significant disruption to activities, below the threshold of major attacks. 4

5 INDONESIA Indonesian Counter-Terror Efforts Hampered by Several Issues: Former KADENSUS 88 Former KADENSUS 88 BG Tito Karnavian on 23 Mar 211 opined that even as Indonesia made great strides in foiling militant attacks, its efforts were hampered by several issues, such as the lack of tough laws criminalising the expression of hate, and a comprehensive rehabilitation programme for convicts. Tito further admitted that Indonesia still lack a grand strategy to bring together all its assets to neutralise the terror movement. He also warned that the recent spate of terror plots, including a series of parcel bomb attacks in Jakarta, showed that terror networks continued to evolve and survive despite police crackdowns. In addition, he asserted that terror networks today had blended the old ideology, which was to create an Islamic state, with a new agenda, which was to be part of a global network like al-qaeda. Decoding Indonesia s Radical Islamists: What to De-Radicalise? Source: Bilveer Singh, RSIS 1, 22 Mar 211 Counter-terrorism involves a plethora of tasks encompassing operational strikes against armed terrorists, de-radicalisation and rehabilitation. While no one faith has a monopoly of politically-motivated violence, for some, radical Islamism has emerged as the major challenge to most Muslim and non-muslim states. While no consensus exists on how to define terrorism, radicalism, de-radicalisation and rehabilitation, the existence of the threat is undisputed. Since 22, the more than 6 arrests and 5 deaths of the Jemaah Islamiyah and affiliated members in Indonesia alone testify to its ability to generate insecurity. Islamist terrorism s rejuvenation was again demonstrated when more than 12 armed militants surfaced in north Sumatra from February 21, targeting the police, now labelled as thoghut enemies that could be killed. What to Deradicalise? Indonesia has responded with multiples counter-measures to meet the threat. This is premised on the principle that while Indonesia has to be lucky all the time in pre-empting terrorist strikes, the terrorists just need to be lucky once to harm society, the government s image and its political will. The recent establishment of the National Anti-Terrorism Agency reflects the government s resolve to address this priority. De-radicalisation is the new agency s major goal which aims to persuade the radicals to abandon the use of violence followed by a change in the radicals mindset. While many states have complemented hard counter-terrorism measures with soft ones, the key issue is what is there to deradicalise? The answer lies in what has been radicalised. Radicalisation is the transformation of an individual s behavioural and cognitive outlook in terms of extremist thinking, sentiments and actions. In turn, de-radicalisation involves the abandoning of radical ideology, de-legitimising the utility of violence and a willingness to co-exist in a pluralistic milieu. The term counterradicalisation is often preferred as this targets not just those who are exposed to radical ideas but also to pre-empt those who are yet to be contaminated by them. Due to a host of factors, Indonesia continues to witness an upsurge of religious radicalism. Some salient characteristics, the DNA of radicalism so to speak, stand out when one analyses the attitudes and behaviour of jihadists. DNA of the Jihadist The jihadist embodies the following characteristics: a literalist approach towards religion with religious teachings being interpreted strictly based on the written word. The Arabs refer to this as zahiriah in command, meaning the supreme importance of the written word; a romantic importance attached to religion, with the unseen past viewed as good tradition and the ideal type that should be recreated; holds the view that there should be no new interpretation or ijtihad of what has been stated in the Holy Quran. The opposition to new tafsir or exegesis is based on the notion that the Quranic text is all-supreme and sacred, relevant for all times, and the context in which it is being practised is irrelevant. In short, the text always overrides the realm of practice; 1 5

6 INDONESIA believes in kebenaran mutlak or the unconditional absolute truth, with any other view treated as heretical. A believer of such wrong views can be classified as an apostate or murtad, and labelled as a traitor to the religion; practises exclusivity, where working with adherents of other religions (kafirs or infidels) is considered haram or forbidden. Many Islamist hardliners will not even cooperate with Muslims who do not share their views, viewing them as jahiliyyahs (ignorant) or worst still, as kafir harbi (enemy infidels), which traditionally only described non-believers operating in a conflict zone, and how Muslims should relate with them; Labelling those who disagree with the radical discourse as enemies has intensified conflicts among Muslims, exacerbated intolerance and widened the scope for violence within a state, especially in a Muslim majority one, best evident in the recent attacks on the Ahmadiyah sect in Java; sees justification in the use of violent jihad to realise their beliefs. Radical Islamists believe that violence carried out for religious causes is legitimate, with a jihadist achieving the ultimate goal of shahid or martyrdom by dying for a religious cause. Increasingly, lesser jihad or violent jihad is preferred rather than greater jihad, which is for personal fulfilment. Increasingly too, the term qital, or armed struggle, is used. For radicals, whether the jihad is far, near, offensive or defensive is irrelevant as qital is deployed against Islam s enemies; adopts Islamist radical ideology in political discourse. All issues are described purely in religious idioms with Muslims persecution as the common theme; virulently opposed to westernisation and democracy, as these are viewed as un-islamic; resists liberalism, pluralism and secularism as being antithetical to Islam; is Sharia-minded, and aims to create a Darul Islam (Abode of Islam) as a prerequisite to Darul Salam (Abode of Peace), where Islamic law or Sharia would determine the rules of society. Jihadi Salafist Indonesian radical ideologues such as Abu Bakar Bashir and Aman Abdurrahman, essentially of the jihadi salafist persuasion, have been influencing dogmas and practices at various levels of society. This is leading to the Arabisation of Indonesian Islam, in opposition to the traditional practice of Islam Pribumi or indigenous Islam. Fissures are threatening to emerge between those championing Arabisasi Islam and Pribumisasi Islam, especially in Java, as Islam is more about religion while Arabisation is cultural in orientation. Reversing, through counter-ideological measures, the political and theological discourses of the extremists would go a long way in undermining their aim of promoting radical thought in Indonesia s body politic. The aim is to encourage the extremists to abandon violence and adopt a more moderate mindset. If violence is abandoned only on tactical grounds, as long as the violence-prone ideology survives, it will remain a threat to democratic societies as violence is inherent in such ideologies. As such, if Indonesia fails in its de-radicalisation efforts, it could result in greater insecurity in Indonesia and the Southeast Asian region. (Extracted from source) 6

7 THAILAND Terror Incident Charts 8 8 No. of s Minor s Major s Extreme s No. of s Minor s Major s Extreme s Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb 17/3 18/3 19/3 2/3 21/3 22/3 23/3 24/3 25/3 26/3 27/3 28/3 29/3 3/3 Data from Janes Terrorism and Insurgency Centre Violence in Thai South Location/ Province Date Type of Casualties Table 1: Violence in Thai South (24 3 Mar 211) Comments Narathiwat 27 Mar Shooting 1 killed A rubber taper was killed in an ambush by three suspected militants in Rueso district while driving a motorcycle to work. Pattani 26 Mar Drive-by Shooting 1 killed Suspected militants on motorcycles shot dead a village head riding his motorcycle home in Muang district. Yala 24 Mar Shooting 1 killed A village defence volunteer was shot dead by suspected militants in Raman district. Yala 27 Mar Drive-by Shooting 1 killed 1 wounded A villager was killed while another was wounded after being shot by suspected militants on motorcycles at a market in Raman district. Yala 29 Mar Explosive Projectile 2 wounded Suspected militants fired six M79 grenades at an RTA outpost in Muang district, wounding two RTA soldiers. There were no updates for Thailand this week. 7

8 PHILIPPINES Terror Incident Charts 6 5 No. of s Minor s Major s Extreme s No. of s 4 3 Minor s Major s Extreme s Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb 17/3 18/3 19/3 2/3 21/3 22/3 23/3 24/3 25/3 26/3 27/3 28/3 29/3 3/3 Data from Janes Terrorism and Insurgency Centre Violence in the Southern Philippines Table 2: Violence in the Southern Philippines (24 3 Mar 211) Location/ Province Date Type of Casualties Comments Basilan Davao del Norte Sulu Surigao del Sur Surigao del Sur 24 Mar Armed Clash 25 Mar Armed Clash 3 Mar Armed Clash 29 Mar Armed Clash 27 Mar Search 1 killed AFP troops killed a suspected Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) militant during an armed clash in Ungkaya Pukan municipality. 1 killed A New People's Army (NPA) militant was killed in a clash with AFP soldiers in Suaon village, Kapalong town. 3 killed AFP troops clashed with six ASG militants in Patikul town. Three of the militants were killed. 2 wounded Two AFP soldiers were wounded during a clash with NPA militants in Bislig city. The militants withdrew without any casualties after realising that they were outnumbered.. - AFP soldiers captured a NPA militant in Barobo town during a search operation. AFP Files Charges Against NPA The AFP on 25 Mar 211 said that it had filed criminal charges before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against the NPA for the use of landmines. The NPA was alleged to have carried out seven landmine attacks since Jan 211 in continued defiance of international laws and an agreement with the government. According to AFP spokesman BG Jose Mabanta, although the number of violations was lower compared to the same period in 21, 211's attacks were deadlier, killing two soldiers and a civilian and wounding five soldiers and four civilians. Peace Between Philippine Government, MILF Still a Long Shot: ICG The International Crisis Group (ICG) on 3 Mar 211 provided an assessment which cited the breakaway of Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) leader Umbra Kato (refer to WGTW 1 9 Feb 211 for details regarding the split) as an important complication to the negotiations between the Philippine government and the MILF. The ICG further asserted that there were now serious doubts on whether the 11,-strong MILF could deliver on any peace accord that might emerge from the negotiations, especially in maintaining peace and security in the area. 8

9 AFGHANISTAN & PAKISTAN Terror Incident Charts (Afghanistan and Pakistan) 35 2 No. of s Micro s Major s Extreme s Afghanistan Pakistan No. of s Micro s Major s Extreme s Afghanistan Pakistan Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb 17/3 18/3 19/3 2/3 21/3 22/3 23/3 24/3 25/3 26/3 27/3 28/3 29/3 3/3 Data from Janes Terrorism and Insurgency Centre Violence in Afghanistan Location/ Province Date Type of Baghlan 24 Mar Search Baghlan 26 Mar Search Baghlan 27 Mar Search Table 3 : Violence in Afghanistan (24 3 Mar 211) Casualties Comments - Afghan and ISAF forces detained two insurgents in Baghlan-e Jadid district. - Afghan and ISAF forces detained two Taliban leaders in Baghlan-e-Jadid district. - ISAF forces detained a senior Taliban commander in Baghlan-e Jadid. Baghlan Eastern Afghanistan Eastern Afghanistan 3 Mar Police Raid 29 Mar Militant 3 Mar Militant - Afghan police detained a would-be suicide bomber in Farang wa Gharu district. 1 killed An ISAF soldier of unspecified nationality was killed in a militant attack in eastern Afghanistan. 1 killed An ISAF soldier of unspecified nationality was killed in a militant attack in eastern Afghanistan. Farah 26 Mar Arson - Taliban insurgents set fire to four ISAF supply vehicles in Bakwa district. Ghazni 24 Mar Roadside 1 killed 2 wounded A policeman was killed and another two were wounded when their vehicle hit a roadside in Gelan district. Ghazni 25 Mar Air Strike 1 killed An insurgent was killed in an ISAF air strike in Andar district. Ghazni 27 Mar Armed Clash Helmand 23 Mar Roadside 2 killed 1 wounded Two Taliban militants were killed and another was wounded in a clash with ANP forces when Taliban forces attacked the Rashidan district centre. 2 killed Two UK soldiers were killed in a roadside in Helmand. Helmand 25 Mar Air Strike 7 killed Seven civilians were killed in an ISAF air strike in Naw Zad district. Helmand 25 Mar Air Strike Several killed Several insurgents were killed in an ISAF air strike in Reg-e Khan district. Helmand 26 Mar Armed Clash Helmand 27 Mar Explosive Projectile Several killed and wounded An ISAF patrol killed and wounded several insurgents in a clash in Sangin district. - ISAF forces engaged insurgents with mortar fire, killing one insurgent in Kajaki district. 9

10 AFGHANISTAN & PAKISTAN Helmand 28 Mar Armed Clash Helmand 28 Mar Armed Clash Helmand 28 Mar Armed Clash Helmand 28 Mar Military Helmand 28 Mar Roadside Helmand 28 Mar Search Helmand 28 Mar Search Helmand 29 Mar Several killed ISAF forces killed several insurgents planting an in Sangin district. 1 killed An ISAF patrol killed one insurgent in an armed clash in Sangin district. Numerous killed ISAF patrols killed numerous insurgents in armed clashes in Musa Qalah and Nahr-e Saraj district. - ISAF forces killed several insurgents in Reg-e Khan Neshin district 1 killed 6 wounded A woman was killed and six others were wounded when their vehicle hit a roadside in Nawzad district. - Afghan and ISAF forces detained one suspected insurgent in Musa Qalah district. 2 killed Afghan and ISAF forces killed a Taliban facilitator and another insurgent in Dishu district. Security forces also detained several individuals. 3 wounded Three civilians were wounded in an blast in a market in Lashkar Gah. Herat 27 Mar Abduction 4 abducted Militants hijacked four trucks carrying food and abducted their drivers in Pashtun Zarghun district. Jowzjan 26 Mar Shooting 1 killed Taliban militants shot dead a civilian in Aqcha district on charges of spying for the government. Jowzjan 29 Mar Search Kabul 26 Mar Search Kandahar 23 Mar Militant Kandahar 24 Mar Search Kandahar 24 Mar Search Kandahar 25 Mar Search Kandahar 25 Mar Suicide Kandahar 26 Mar Search Kandahar 27 Mar Roadside Kandahar 27 Mar Search Kandahar 28 Mar Military Kandahar 28 Mar Search Kapisa 29 Mar Armed Clash 2 killed ISAF forces killed two Taliban militants and detained four others in Qosh Tepa district. - Afghan and ISAF forces detained a Militant weapons facilitator and two other insurgents in Kabul. 7 killed 3 wounded Seven security guards were killed while three others were wounded in a militant attack between Arghandab and Zhari districts. - Afghan and ISAF forces detained a Taliban facilitator in Dand district. - Afghan and ISAF forces detained several suspected insurgents in Kandahar City. 2 killed Afghan and ISAF forces killed two insurgents and detained a Taliban leader together with numerous other insurgents in Daman district. 2 killed 4 wounded A child was killed and four civilians were wounded when a suicide bomber detonated his explosives in Spin Boldak district. - Afghan and ISAF forces detained several suspected insurgents in Zhari district. 1 killed A Canadian soldier was killed in a roadside blast in Panjwaii district. - Afghan and ISAF forces detained a Taliban leader in Kandahar City. 4 killed An ANA Special Forces patrol killed four armed insurgents in Maiwand district. - Afghan and ISAF forces detained several suspected insurgents in Zhari district. Numerous killed ISAF forces killed numerous insurgents in a clash in Alah Say district. Khost 23 Mar Air Strike 5 killed A Haqqani leader and two other insurgents were killed in an ISAF air strike in Tere Zayi district. However, two civilians were inadvertently killed when their vehicle went too close. Khost 24 Mar Search 1 killed Afghan and ISAF forces killed a Haqqani facilitator and detained another in Sabari district. 1

11 AFGHANISTAN & PAKISTAN Khost 25 Mar Search Khost 26 Mar Search Khost 28 Mar Search Khost 29 Mar Search Kunar 26 Mar Abduction 5 abducted Kunar 28 Mar Military Kunduz 24 Mar Roadside Logar 26 Mar Search Logar 27 Mar Search Logar 28 Mar Search Logar 29 Mar Search Logar 29 Mar Search Nangarhar 25 Mar Roadside Nangarhar 27 Mar Search Nimroz 26 Mar Militant - Afghan and ISAF forces detained a Hezb-E Islami Gulbuddin leader in Sabari district. - Afghan and ISAF forces detained numerous suspected Hezb-E Isami Gulbuddin (HIG) insurgents in Sabari district. - Afghan and ISAF forces detained two Haqqani facilitators and another insurgent in separate incidents in Bak district. - Afghan and ISAF forces detained a Haqqani leader and a a HIG facilitator in two separate incidents in Sabari district. Numerous killed The Taliban abducted 5 ANP policemen in an ambush at Chapa dara district. (Please see below for more details). Afghan and ISAF forces killed numerous insurgents in Sar Kani district. 3 wounded Three tribal militiamen were wounded when their vehicle hit a roadside. - Afghan and ISAF forces detained a senior Taliban facilitator in the Mohammed Aghah district. - Afghan and ISAF forces detained a Taliban facilitator and several other insurgents in Pul-e Alam district. - Afghan and ISAF forces detained several insurgents in Baraki Barak district. - Afghan and ISAF forces detained several suspected insurgents in Mohammad Aghah district. - Afghan and ISAF forces detained two suspected insurgents in Baraki Barak district. 2 killed 1 wounded Two children were killed and another was wounded in a roadside blast in Behsud district. - Afghan and ISAF forces detained two suspected insurgents in Jalalabad district. - Militants ambushed an ISAF supply convoy in Delaram district. Four vehicles were destroyed and two others were damaged. There were no casualties reported. Paktika 27 Mar Air strike 1 killed At least 1 insurgents were killed in an ISAF air strike in Barmal district. Paktika 28 Mar Search Paktika 28 Mar Suicide Samangan 24 Mar Search Southern Afghanistan 26 Mar Militant Uruzgan 24 Mar Roadside Uruzgan 28 Mar Search Zabul 24 Mar Search Zabul 26 Mar - Afghan and ISAF forces detained a Haqqani facilitator in Orgun district. 23 killed 6 wounded 23 people were killed and 6 others were wounded in a suicide attack on a construction company in Barmal district. (Please see below for more details). - Afghan and ISAF forces detained several suspected Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) insurgents in Dara Soof Payan district. 1 killed An ISAF soldier of unspecified nationality was killed in a militant attack. 1 killed 3 wounded An Afghan policeman was killed and three others were wounded when a police vehicle hit a roadside in Terinkot district. - Afghan and ISAF forces killed two insurgents and detained several others in Tarin Kowt district. - Afghan and ISAF forces detained a suspected Taliban insurgent in Qalat district. 2 killed Two civilians were killed in an blast in Shamulzai district. 23 Killed in Truck Explosion AFP reported on 28 Mar 211 that three suicide bombers shot their way into the compound of a road construction company in 11

12 AFGHANISTAN & PAKISTAN the Barmal district of Paktika province. Once they gained entry, the insurgents detonated a truck loaded with explosives, killing 23 people and wounding about 6 others. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack, adding that they were targeting a joint Afghan-ISAF base. Officials had said that there were no Afghan or ISAF forces at the site. Taliban Abduct 5 Policemen, Demand Prisoner Swap Reuters reported on 27 Mar 211 that Taliban insurgents abducted 5 off-duty Afghan policemen in Kunar province. The insurgents ambushed the unarmed policemen in Chapa Dara district when the policemen were travelling from Nuristan province after collecting their salaries. Pajhwok further reported on 28 Mar that because of mediation by tribal leaders, the Taliban freed 19 of the 5 policemen. However, the Taliban demanded the release of 15 jailed Taliban militants in exchange for the rest of the captives. Afghan, ISAF Forces Readying for Spring Offensive Xinhua quoted ISAF spokesman BG Josef Blotz on 28 Mar 211 as saying that Afghan and ISAF forces were preparing to counter a Taliban-led spring offensive in Afghanistan. He added that ISAF was trying to change to environment such that when the insurgents try to attack in the spring, they would be facing a different situation. Blotz noted that the ISAF's mutual, multi-pronged offensive strategy was hitting the insurgents hard. Blotz added that the joint forces had launched an operation in Helmand and parts of Kandahar, in an effort to prevent insurgent movement. [Comments: AFP reported on 15 Mar 211 that ISAF was confident that its troops could match an expected Taliban counter-attack in the Spring (Refer to WGTW 1 17 Mar 211 for details)]. Twenty-three Insurgents Join Peace Process Tolo News reported on 26 Mar 211 that 23 insurgents have left militancy to join the peace process in Baghlan province. Officials confirmed that the insurgents had joined the government side in Jalgi district ISAF Abandoned Base in Pech Dara: Taliban Afghan Islamic Press quoted a Taliban commander, Haji Dawran Safi, in Kunar on 27 Mar 211 as claiming that ISAF forces had abandoned a military base as they could not repulse Taliban attacks. He said that all ISAF forces had left the Kandgol military base in Pech Dara in Kunar province and the Taliban were now controlling a vast area there. Safi also stated that the Taliban had set up an administration there, forming a 12-member council to govern the area and appointing about 2 people to police the area and provide security. Safi added that educational and health institutions would remain open and a new judicial system would be established. Safi also warned that the Taliban were now preparing to attack another important ISAF base in the Manogai area. 91% Of s Thwarted: NDS Pajhwok reported on 27 Mar 211 that 91% of organised insurgent attacks in Afghanistan were prevented due to the efforts of the ANA and ANP, with the National Directorate of Security (NDS) providing intelligence to arrest the masterminds of the organised attacks. A NDS spokesman praised the NDS, and stated that militants had only managed to execute 9% of their planned attacks. Taliban Changing Tactics in Kunduz Pajhwok reported on 24 Mar 211 that Afghan officials believed that the Taliban were changing tactics to focus on suicide attacks and assassinations of government officials as they were being forced out of their sanctuaries in Kunduz. The article stated that in the past, the Taliban controlled the Chardara, Imam Sahib and Dasht-e Archi districts of Kunduz but Afghan and ISAF forces had driven them out. However Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid claimed that the insurgents had moved out of Kunduz because of winter, not because of the government's military operation. The article also quoted an unnamed Taliban commander as confirming that the Taliban were currently focusing on suicide attacks and planting s, however he said when spring came, Taliban forces would return to their districts. Meanwhile, Commander of the 33 Pamir Zone in North Afghanistan GEN Daud Daud said that unless people support the ISAF and the ANSF, ensuring security was impossible. 12

13 AFGHANISTAN & PAKISTAN Taliban Orders Shut Down of Cell Phone Services in Helmand (update) AFP reported on 24 Mar 211 that the Taliban had ordered all mobile phone services to shut down in Helmand, starting in Lashkar Gah. Mobile Telephone Networks, one of Afghanistan's four mobile phone operators was quoted as saying that the Taliban threatened to attack its operations should it not switch off the signal in Helmand. The article also quoted a Taliban spokesman as saying that the shutdown had been ordered as Taliban fighters had been increasingly targeted by ISAF forces and they suspected that ISAF was using the services of phone companies against them. It was previously reported that on 16 Mar 211, the Taliban ordered the shut down of mobile phone networks in Helmand (refer to WGTW 1 16 Mar 211 for details). Taliban Seize Control of Waygal District The Associated Press reported that on 29 Mar 211, about 3 Taliban militants seized control of the district centre in Waygal district in Nuristan province. Nuristan provincial police chief, Shamsul Rahman, was quoted as saying that the militants took control of the main village in Waygal district and police forces retreated as they had no way to fight as they did not possess enough heavy weapons. He admitted that the Taliban had influence over large parts of Nuristan's districts for months now. A spokesman for the provincial governor said that the government was preparing to launch a counter-offensive to retake the district. Meanwhile, the Taliban claimed that the district was captured along with 12 police officers. Taliban Employs Modern Weapons in War of Words Eurasia quoted Abdul Sattar Maiwandi, the editor-in-chief of an official Taliban website named: Al-Emarah, in an interview on 2 Mar 211 as saying that the Taliban understood the importance of winning the war of words and its bearing on the actual war. He claimed that the Taliban employed a number of tactics on the modern media battlefield, and said that there was an official media committee to oversee the effort. He claimed that a professional production studio called Al-Shahamat had been set up to produce videos. His website Al-Emarah featured a series of videos criticising projects funded by the US and the coalition, as well as videos which showed suicide bombings against the ANSF and the coalition. Maiwandi revealed that the Taliban was taking advantage of mobile phones as well, in which news posted on their site would be converted to SMS texts, and sent to subscribers, who would further disseminate it. While many in the public had questioned why the government do not do anything to stop the dissemination, Afghan Information and Technology Ministry spokesman Emal Marjan replied that it was simply not possible for such information to be controlled. Separately information-technology expert Azmat Gharanai believed that the Taliban used the Internet to reach out to foreign sympathisers and financiers, in which the Taliban was effective in using sites like YouTube, Twitter and Facebook. Taliban s Will Increase Under Security Transition In an article titled: "Cessation of telecommunications operations in Helmand, a Taleban reaction to the transfer of responsibility for security" by Afghan independent secular daily newspaper Hasht-e Sobh on 26 Mar 211, the author warned of the possible Taliban's reactions to the security transition. He said that the recent cessation of telecommunications operations in Helmand province was part of the Taliban's attempts to show the government and the international community that the Taliban wielded more power than the government in provinces where security responsibilities were to be transferred to Afghans. The author believed that the Taliban would not increase their attacks on the seven provinces where responsibilities would be transferred, to prove that the security of Afghanistan could not be ensured without the Taliban. He concurred that the security transition would be fraught with many challenges and difficulties because Taliban would focus all their capabilities to show that the government was incapable of assuming this responsibility. Security Transition Mere Propaganda : Hezb-e Islami Leader On 28 Mar 211, Pajhwok quoted Hezb-e Islami Afghanistan leader Golboddin Hekmatyar as calling the security transition to the ANSF a mere propaganda. He claimed that although the ANSF were already in the seven areas, they had failed to keep the security. He insisted that his organisation was not responsible for the burning of schools and clinics, and instead blamed US security company Blackwater for the deeds. He added that the coalition must leave Afghanistan unconditionally, and alleged that the insurgents who were joining the peace process were not real insurgents, but were produced by intelligence agencies. He further urged Afghan youths to rise and stand up against the government, like in Yemen, Egypt and other Islamic countries. 13

14 AFGHANISTAN & PAKISTAN Rebranding the Taliban Source: Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies 2, 19 Mar 211 Afghanistan's government may want to bring the Taliban back into the fold, but not all Afghans support this strategy. Since the beginning of his second term in office, President Karzai has increasingly favoured a political settlement to the war. Sources close to the president say that he had begun to lose hope in a military solution before his re-election campaign and that the behaviour of Western diplomats during the election saga further strained already rocky relations with the White House. Feeling isolated by his allies, the president immediately went in search of a political solution. His first step was to bring local leaders together for a Consultative Peace Jirga. Considered a choreographed event by many opposition leaders, the Jirga echoed the president's agenda and called for the reintegration of Taliban members who denounce violence and ties to al-qaeda. It also led calls for the creation of the High Council for Peace as the body that would lead negotiations with the Taliban. To ease the reintegration of the Taliban, the government has sought to emphasise the ideological differences between the group and al-qaeda, insisting that a large portion can be persuaded to join the democratic process. Some, including Farouq Wardak, the minister of education and a member of the High Council for Peace, argue that the Taliban has changed. Publicly, the government has stopped referring to the Taliban in association with violence against civilians. Last month, more than 1 people were killed in attacks in Jalalabad and Kunduz, which were strongly condemned by the president. Not once, however, was the word 'Taliban' mentioned in his statements. But many in Afghanistan argue that the Taliban has not done enough to show that it has changed and that its oppressive regime and continued violence against civilians remains fresh in the public memory. Those critical of the efforts also question whether the Taliban's links to al-qaeda are really as superficial as the government claims. Nadery points to the example of the stoning of a young couple in Kunduz three months ago. "The video tapes of the incident I reviewed shows Arab and Uzbek fighters are not only publicly present at the scene but also serving as organisers of the murder event," he says. Others, however, insist that the relationship between the Taliban and al-qaeda has always been a strained marriage of convenience. Hekmat Karzai says there have been indications that the relationship is growing more strained and points to the fact that Mullah Omar has not shown any interest in al-qaeda's globalist jihad in his recent addresses. "But not enough has been done to build confidence for the Taliban to disassociate themselves from al-qaeda," Karzai adds. "What do they leave all that for?" Some analysts, however, believe that the strategy of talking to the Taliban might not achieve the peace and stability Afghans are looking for and argue that the insurgents are too fragmented to be dealt with through negotiations. "In my view, the whole idea of negotiations with [the] Taliban is a fruitless endeavour," says Hassan Abbas, a professor of South Asian politics and security at Columbia University and a former Pakistani government official. Abbas points to the multiplicity of groups involved in the insurgency and their varying interests. He argues that making peace with figureheads might not solve Afghanistan's problems. "Mullah Omar and Co. are no more in effective control of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan - they are becoming irrelevant in fact," he says. It is also unclear whether NATO and the US are fully on board with the Afghan government's attempts to reach a political settlement. The Obama administration's support for Karzai's agenda has been minimal at best and, at a time when NATO is focusing on a military transition out of the country, a cohesive strategy towards an end-game in Afghanistan is lacking. Karzai's mistrust of US officials further undermines a unified approach. At the regional level, too, Pakistan's ambiguous policy towards the Taliban complicates the peace process, with many believing that unless a decisive understanding is reached with Islamabad, any internal peace with the Taliban will be superficial and temporary. But Abbas says that the Pakistani army is deeply suspicious of long-term US interests in Afghanistan and "believes that US- India interests are aligned" in the country. The lack of clarity in the mandate of the High Council for Peace is also a source of worry for Afghans, who are not sure whether the organisation, whose members were appointed by the president, is simply a facilitating body or one that has the authority to make concessions to the Taliban

15 AFGHANISTAN & PAKISTAN "The High Council has an advisory role and it has no executive powers," explains Fazel, a member of the Council, in response to those queries. "It has a mediator role to facilitate the environment of peace with the Taliban and help the integration process now and post peace." But many remain concerned that the ambiguity of the council's role could compromise Afghanistan's hard-won achievements. (Abridged from source) Violence in Pakistan Location/ Province Date Type of Casualties Table 4 : Violence in Pakistan (24 3 Mar 211) Comments Balochistan 24 Mar Shooting 2 killed Pakistani police recovered two bullet-ridden bodies in Hub City. Balochistan 27 Mar - A gas pipeline in the Sui district was destroyed in an blast planted by militants. Balochistan 29 Mar Militant attack 1 wounded FATA 23 Mar 8 killed 2 wounded FATA FATA FATA FATA FATA Islamabad Khyber- Pakhtunkhwa Khyber- Pakhtunkhwa 25 Mar 27 Mar 27 Mar 28 Mar 28 Mar 3 Mar 23 Mar Suicide Militant Search Militant Militant Militant Suicide 13 killed 11 wounded 35 abducted - 6 killed 13 killed Insurgents opened fire and torched a NATO tanker in Kalat district. One driver was wounded. Two Pakistani soldiers were wounded in an blast in Orakzai Agency. Subsequently, Pakistani soldiers killed eight militants in a counter-attack. Militants opened fire on two vehicles carrying Shiite Muslims, killing 13 people, wounding 11 and abducting 35 others in Kurram Agency. Pakistani security forces detained the leader of Lashkar-e Islam, a banned militant organisation, in Kurram Agency. Six people were killed when insurgents launched a rocket at a passenger bus in Kurram Agency. 13 Pakistani soldiers were killed in friendly fire, when a mortar landed in the wrong location. Several other militants were also killed and detained in the attack. 14 killed 14 Pakistani security personnel were killed in a militant ambush in Khyber Agency 13 killed 5 killed 25 wounded 13 people were killed when a suicide bomber detonated his explosives at a police checkpoint in Swabi town Five people were killed and another 25 were wounded when a suicide bomber rammed his car into a police station near Hangu. (please see below for details of the attack) 28 Mar - Two schools in Kohat were destroyed in blasts planted by militants. Sindh 25 Mar Shooting 1 killed A man was shot dead in Gulistan-i-Jauhar, Karachi. Sindh 25 Mar Shooting 1 killed A man was tortured and subsequently shot dead in the Landhi area, Karachi. Sindh 25 Mar Shooting 1 killed A civilian was shot dead in Mauripur, Karachi. Sindh 25 Mar Shooting 1 killed A man was shot dead in Korangi, Karachi. Sindh 25 Mar Shooting 1 killed The bullet-riddled body of a man was found in Azizbad, Karachi. Sindh 25 Mar Shooting 1 killed A man was shot dead in the Pakistan Bazaar area in Karachi. Sindh 25 Mar Shooting 1 killed A man was shot dead in Frontier Colony, Karachi Sindh 25 Mar Shooting 1 killed Sindh 28 Mar Shooting 1 killed The bullet-riddled body of a man recently kidnapped, was found in Soldier Bazar market, Karachi. A religious activist was shot dead by militants who ambushed his car in Mauripur, Karachi Five Killed, 25 wounded in Suicide Reuters reported that on 23 Mar, a suicide bomber driving an explosive-laden car detonated his explosives near a police station near Hangu town in Khyber-Pakhtunkwa killing five people and wounding 25 others. The bomber was targeting the police station building but failed to do so because of the barricades erected outside the building. The dead included a policeman and four civilians, while most of the wounded were civilians. Apart from the police station, the blast also damaged several homes and shops nearby. 15

16 AFGHANISTAN & PAKISTAN Taliban Forms Cell to Hunt Down Spies Express Tribune reported on 28 Mar 211 that Taliban forces base in North Waziristan had established a vigilance cell to hunt down people suspected of providing information to guide US' drone strike campaign. The cell was named Lashkar-e- Khorasan (LeKh) and its purpose was to identify, capture and execute locals who were working for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The bulk of LeKh came from the Haqqani network and the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group that control the regions along the Afghan border. The Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) was reported to have occasional cooperation with LeKh. LeKh operated in the Datta Khel, Miranshah and Mir Ali regions of North Waziristan, while a source in the tribal belt said that LeKh was made up of more than 3 members. The article noted that an intelligence official in the Pakistan Army confirmed the existence and activities of the LeKh. Bin Laden Sets Alarm Bells Ringing Source: Syed Saleem Shahzad, Asia Times Online 3, 25 Mar 211 After a prolonged lull, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has launched a series of covert operations in the rugged Hindu Kush mountains of Pakistan and Afghanistan following strong tip-offs that al-qaeda leader Osama bin Laden has been crisscrossing the area in the past few weeks for high-profile meetings in militant redoubts. Asia Times Online has learned that decision-makers have put a lot of weight on the information on Bin Laden's movements as it has come from multiple intelligence agencies, in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia. For at least two years, little credible news has emerged of Bin Laden's movements and motives. Now, intelligence officials believe they have top-grade accounts as they come from the inner circles of militant camps. Officials are said to be "stunned" by the visibility of Bin Laden's movements, and their frequency, in a matter of a few weeks in the outlawed terrain of Pakistan and Afghanistan, the most unprecedented reports about him since he evaded the US in the Tora Bora mountains in Afghanistan in 21. The development has fuelled speculation in intelligence circles that al-qaeda could be planning another major attack along the lines of the 9/11 assault on New York and Washington. However, extensive investigations by Asia Times Online, including exchanges within al-qaeda's camps, point in another direction: given the nature of Bin Laden's meetings, this appears to be the beginning of a new era for a broader struggle in which al-qaeda, through its Laskhar al-zil (Shadow Army), will try to capitalize on the Arab revolts and the Palestinian struggle and also revitalize and redefine its role in Afghanistan. Several weeks ago, Bin Laden is reported to have met with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the legendary Afghan mujahid and founder and leader of the Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan (HIA) political party and paramilitary group, in a militant camp in thick jungle on the fringes of Kunar and Bajaur provinces in Afghanistan. "The talks appeared to discuss some grand strategy and Osama bin Laden aims to take Gulbuddin Hekmatyar on board, especially as Hekmatyar's commanders have brokered ceasefire agreements with NATO forces in Afghanistan and Hekmatyar's representatives have been negotiating a truce with the Americans," an intelligence source told Asia Times Online. Adding to the view of the importance of Bin Laden's meeting with Hekmatyar is that it took place when the interest of the CIA and its special forces had already been piqued by reports of the al-qaeda leader's movements in Kunar and Nuristan for meetings with various militant commanders and al-qaeda bigwigs. Bin Laden would have been aware of the dangers and was obviously prepared to take the risk. While intelligence agencies might be involved in a guessing game about Bin Laden's plans and a possible grand al-qaeda operation, his movements can be read in the perspective of recent discourse in al-qaeda circles and a major shift in its policies. Bin Laden's meeting with Hekmatyar and other militant commanders in the Hindu Kush can be seen as a part of this new war in which al-qaeda aims to involve the whole Muslim nation. Hekmatyar's HIA has been a part of al-qaeda's Laskhar al-zil, which comprises elite guerrillas. Possibly, al-qaeda aims to revitalize its operations in Afghanistan, and throughout the world, along with mainstream resistance groups (sons of the soil or Ibnul Balad) and in addition to Islamic political parties. While fears attached to Bin Laden s unprecedented visibility and movement for a grand al-qaeda operation cannot completely be dismissed, it is more possible that al-qaeda will undertake both worldwide terror operations and join forces with mainstream Muslim groups. (Abridged from source)