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3 Analysis ETHNO-RELIGIOUS DYNAMICS IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN About the Authors Dr. Moghset Kamal is a freelance researcher who obtained his PhD degree in politics from the International Islamic University Malaysia. His primary research interests are Iran s foreign and domestic policies. Hadi Gamshad is a PhD candidate at the Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization at the International Islamic University Malaysia Analysis: No.1

4 Ethno-Religious Dynamics in the Islamic Republic of Iran Summary Points The Iranian government is reluctant to specify the demographic distribution of ethno-religious groups in its census reports in order to keep the ethno-religious issues low profile. The rigid official ideology in Iran leaves little room for diversity and pluralism. Although Jews, Zoroastrians and Armenians are specified as the only recognized religious minorities in Iran s Constitution, in practice, Sunnis constitute the largest religious minority since for Iran s Shiite leadership, Islam is identical with Shi ism. Baha i children are not only banned from studying in Iranian schools and universities, but they are also banned from acquiring education through any other means. The ethnic policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is an extension of the pre-1979 revolutionary policies. The post-monarchy revolutionary leaders, instead of abandoning the security-oriented assimilationist approach toward the ethnicities, have consolidated it by a religious discourse which is based on the denial of religious differences. There is a trust deficit between the Shiite Persian dominated Iranian elites and the non-shiite and non-persian ethno-religious minorities in Iran. Keywords: Iran, ethno-religious groups, ethnicity, diversity, Persian, non-persian, Shiites, Sunnis 1

5 Introduction: Modern Iran s emergence is largely associated with Reza Khan and later Reza Shah Pahlavi following the establishment of the Pahlavi dynasty ( ). Prior to that, although Iran maintained its legal status as a sovereign state it practically was a loose federation of tribal and ethnic fiefdoms controlled by different tribes, clans, or Qajar princes. 1 Following the devastation brought by WWI during which Iran remained neutral, Reza Shah succeeded in laying the foundations of an efficient and centralized government. Consequently, the central government established, for the first time in modern Iranian history, its writ over the entire country. 2 Subsequently, Reza Shah initiated a comprehensive nation building project with the aim of nurturing a homogenous nation. 3 The administrative structure of the Pahlavi state remained intact even in the post-revolutionary era. Since then, the central government s power is increasing as it penetrated into every corner of the country. Amidst these ambitious modernization attempts, ethno-religious issues constituted some of the direst challenges to the political elites in Iran which was then, as it is now, a heterogeneous country ethnically as well as religiously. This paper examines the ethno-religious politics of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It begins with a discussion of the ethno-religious composition of the country, followed by the investigation of the legal status of the ethno-religious minorities in the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Finally, the paper explores the approach of the Iranian leadership towards the minorities. Analytical Consideration: Ethnicity refers to individuals and groups who identify themselves on the basis of their race, culture, language, origin, values and, in specific cases, religion. 4 Yet, the existence of ethnic groups does not necessarily bring about ethnic consciousness, for it requires an external factor to instigate it. 5 The relationship between ethnicity and religion is rather complex, but religion is still considered a dominant ethnicity-determining factor. 6 In some cases, ethnic identity is solely based on religion; for instance, the ethnic identities of religious minorities such as the Ahmadis in Pakistan or Bahaees in Iran rely largely on their faith. Cultural diversity is a given in modern societies since hardly any homogenous society exists in the modern world. Brown and Ganguly argue that most governments have to contend with ethnic problems of one kind or another. Fewer than 20 of the more than 180 states in the world are ethnically homogenous. 7 Studies suggest that around 5000 ethnicities are living in about 200 nation-states. According to Henderson, 500 of these ethnic groups constitute potential states. 8 While some governments welcome this diversity and view it as an advantage, others regard the heterogeneity of the population as a challenge. Ethno-Religious Composition of Iran: Despite a predominant Persian Shiite majority, Iran is far from being ethnically or religiously homogenous. The Persian ethnic group constitutes half of the country s total population, while the rest comprises of dozens of other ethnic groups. 9 Map 1: Ethno-religious map of Iran Source: University of Texas, Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, < maps/middle_east_and_asia/iran_ethnoreligious_ distribution_2004.jpg > (Accessed on September 28, 2016). info@iramcenter.org 2

6 Ethno-Religious Dynamics in the Islamic Republic of Iran 3 As shown on the map, Arabs make the main ethnic group of Southern Iran while the Lurs inhibit the South-western part of the country. Also, while Kurds constitute the ethnic majority of Western Iran, Turkic-speaking Azeri people live the North-western region. Northern Iran is home to diverse ethnicities such as Mazandarani, Gilak and Talysh. In the northeast, there are Turkmens, while in the Southeast Baloch people constitute the ethnic majority. Most of the above mentioned ethnic groups also inhabit the regions beyond Iranian borders. For instance, Arabs extend to Iraq and the Gulf region. Azeris and Azerbaijani people have ethnic affinity. Turkmens are located primarily in the State of Turkmenistan. Moreover the Baloch of Iran are related to the Baloch of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Likewise, Kurds are living in Iraq, Syria and Turkey. While some of these ethnic minorities such as Lurs, Azeris and Arab have the Shiite belief system as a unifying factor with the Persians Shiites, some ethnic minorities such as the Kurds, the Baloch, Turkmen and the Talysh differ with their Sunni faith too. 10 The Iranian government is reluctant to specify the demographic distribution of ethnoreligious groups in its census reports in order to keep the ethno-religious issues low profile. Only the nationwide census conducted in 1987 provided an option related to ethnic origin in the questionnaire. But in the final census report, no information was provided regarding the ethno-religious details. 11 This lack of official data has opened the door for different speculations. Usually, the official media, and other information sources, put the Persians above 50 percent of the total Iranian population, and some even claim 65 percent and above. 12 But, this figure is contradicted by other official reports. For instance, according to a survey conducted by the National Organization for Civil Registration (NOCR) in 1992, the Persians were reported to constitute 46.2% of the entire population who were followed by Azeri Turks (20.6%), Kurds (10%), Lurs (8.9%), Shomalis (7.9%), Arabs (3.5%), the Baloch (2.7%), Turkmen (0.6%), Armenians (0.1%), and others 0.2%. 13 On the other hand, the non-persian ethnic activists and scholars have their own estimations regarding the population strength of different ethnic groups. For instance, some Azeri Turks claim that Turks constitute 40% of the Iranian population, and even try to prove it through the provincial census reports of Azeri majority provinces and cities. This figure is also supported by other sources, which regard the population of Azeri Turks in Iran over 35 Million. 14 For instance, on January 18, 2012, Ali Akbar Salehi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, of the time, admitted that 40 percent of the Iranian population spoke Turkish. 15 The same distrust with official numbers holds for Kurds, Arabs and the Baloch. To them, the official statistics aim at projecting Persians as the largest ethnic group in Iran. 16 The Iranian government is reluctant to specify the demographic distribution of ethno-religious groups in its census reports in order to keep the ethno-religious issues low profile. Thus calls are made for a transparent and independent countrywide census to determine the exact demographic composition of the country. 17 Also, the absence of reliable data causes inconsistencies in national and international studies and reports about the Iranian population. For instance, a US Congressional Report entitled Iran: Ethnic and Religious Minorities, gives the ratio of Balochi-speaking Iranians as one percent, while the same report specifies the number of the Baloch to constitute two percent of the entire population of Iran. 18 In addition to the ethnic diversity of the country, the Iranian population is also divided into different religions and sects, such as Sunni, Shiite, Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians. 19 Although the majority of the Iranian population consists of Shiites, a disagreement exists on their actual proportional strength. The official statistics claim that Shiites constitute 90 percent of the population. 20 Most of the related studies on Iran consider this figure. However, this figure is contested by non-shiite groups, particularly by the Sunnis who regard themselves as the second majority group rather than a religious minority. 21 They criticize the Shiite religious authorities with high political powers for their unwillingness to provide accurate information about the

7 denominational map of Iran. One such critic, Dr. Noorzi, makes the following points: The Iranian government is not ready to accept the reality. If you just put together the population of some Sunni-dominated cities, such as Sanandaj, Zahedan, Iranshahr, Chabahar, Mahabad, Marivan, Gumbad and the like, it exceeds 10 percent of Iran s population. To this you need to add the population of Sunni communities who live in Shiite -dominated cities. In every Iranian city you will find a significantly large Sunni community, even in Qom, which is the hub of Shi ism and of the Shiite clergy. You will find a population of over million Sunnis only in Tehran. The Iranian leaders are ignoring all these facts. 22 Moreover, there are notable indications that the number of the non-shiite groups, primarily the Sunnis, are rising. Amir Khalid Rastgar and Misam Mohammadi, find in their study on cultural change in fertility rates in Iran that Balochistan has the highest fertility rate in the country, followed by Hormozgan, Kerman, Ahvaz and Bushehr respectively. 23 These provinces have a significant Sunni population along with other denominational groups. The same survey reveals that Tehran has the lowest fertility rate followed by other Persian dominated cities such as Isfahan, and Shiraz. 24 Therefore, it is safe to suggest that the non-persian and non-shiite dominated provinces were affected less by the national birth control program in contrast to the Shiite-Persians. Official sources reflect the increase in one-child families in major Iranian cities. For instance, Ali Reza Abedinzadeh, a senior official in the Iranian National Data Registration Department, stated on May 31, 2014 that the future generations of Tehranis would have no aunts or uncles. 25 There are also indications of growth in the number of non-shiites as a result of conversion, especially in big cities. According to Basiri, a Qom Seminary alumnus, the Baha ee community in Iran, which is excommunicated by the mainstream Shiites, is growing rapidly. He argues that Bahaee ism could become one of the major religions in Iran in the near future. 26 Also, a significant number of Shiites accept the Sunni school of thought. This especially holds for the Arab-dominated areas such as Ahvaz and Khuzestan. Walid al-ahvazi, a newly converted Sunni from Ahvaz, estimates that a large number of the Arab Shiite population in Arab-dominated areas of Iran has already embraced the Sunni belief system. 27 Such claims are difficult to substantiate in Iran, but the Iranian authorities express their concerns over the spread of what they call Wahabism in Ahvaz. For instance, Ayatollah Mosavi Jazayeri, the representative of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in Ahvaz, warned about the promotion of Wahabism in Ahvaz as early as Similarly, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Shafiee, a member of Iran s Assembly of Expert from Khuzestan, stated that the wave of Wahabism is moving on like an octopus in Khuzistan. 29 Moreover, there are reports of Shiite conversions to Christianity. For example Jumhūrī Islāmī, an official daily newspaper in Iran, published a report on October 2, 2010, to attract attention to the worrying number of inhome or underground churches in the country. 30 According to the report, there were as many as 200 underground churches in operation in Tehran alone. It is difficult to verify such reports about the demographic changes in the number of non- Persian and non-shiite population of Iran. But, the Iranian Shia religious authorities anxiety over the population growth of the Sunni community has significantly increased in recent years. 31 For instance, Zahra Sajjadi, Deputy Director for Family Affairs of the Presidential Centre for Women and Family Affairs, made the following statements in an interview: The Sunnis did not pay attention to this program [family planning] while it was welcomed by the Shiites whose number declined. As you know, the Sunnis don t believe in family planning, therefore, their population is increasing. The population growth rate is 1.8, but if you exclude the Sunnis, the growth rate becomes Similarly, Ayatollah Mohsen Haydari, a member of Iran s Assembly of Expert, referred to the same phenomenon and claimed that the Sunnis have outnumbered the Shiite population in some regions where they previously constituted only five percent of the inhabitants. 33 He also cautioned the imminent risk of a sharp decrease in the Shiite population should the current population planning policies continue. 34 Further, Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi, an influential Shiite religious authority, warned about the increase info@iramcenter.org 4

8 Ethno-Religious Dynamics in the Islamic Republic of Iran of the Wahhabi influence in Shiraz, Urumiyeh and Mashhad. 35 He claimed that, the Sunnis were buying Shiites properties in Mashhad in order to change the demographic setting to their advantage. Such events were denounced by the Sunni religious authorities. For instance, Molana Abdul Hamid, a prominent Sunni authority in Iran, criticized the Shiite authorities for fueling ethno-religions tension in the country. 36 Such warnings by Shiite religious authorities brought about a policy shift regarding family planning policies. In 2012, the Iranian Cultural Revolution Council passed a bill in order to reverse the fertility trend in the country. 37 The anti-family planning campaign gained momentum when the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei joined the effort. Between 2013 and 2014 he repeatedly expressed his worries about the population decline. In 2014 he openly criticized the national birth-control program that he had personally supported. He said: I believe in population affluence. [ ] One of the mistakes that we committed - I personally also contributed to this mistake - was the birth control policy. This birth control policy should have stopped in the mid-1990s. Although, initially the policy was good and needed, from the mid-1990s onwards it should have been stopped. We did not discard it. It was a mistake. As I said the authorities contributed to this mistake. This humble person, I, also contributed to this mistake. May God and history forgive us for committing this mistake. 38 Immediately after Khamenei s speech, the Iranian Parliament rushed through an emergency bill with fifty signatures to ban all methods of birth-control in the country. According to the bill, all measures leading to abortion or impotency, such as vasectomy and any campaigns in favour of birth control were banned and the violators were to be prosecuted. 39 Later on, the Supreme Leader promulgated his Statement of Principle on Family, in which he emphasised the significance of fertility and in-house roles of women. The earlier anxiety over the Shiite population decline, as well as the consequent policy shift, testify to the concern among Iranian leadership about the changing trend in the ethno-religious map of the country. Constitutional Rights of Ethnoreligious Groups in Iran: The Shiite nature of the Islamic Republic of Iran is central to understand the constitutional rights of ethno-religious groups in Iran where the official ideology plays a key role in policy making processes. Such an ideological rigidity leaves little room for diversity and pluralism. Salzman makes the following observations on this point: Diversity, plurality, and difference do not fit the vision, the duty, and the mandate of the Islamic Republic. Rather, the Islamic Republic has for its raison d etre the advancement, exclusively, of Shi a Islam. This is believed to be God s mandate to the Islamic Republic. Consequently, inclusion is not a value in its own right, but is only possible within the parameters of Shi a domination. 40 Paradoxically, although Jews, Zoroastrians and Armenians are specified as the only recognized religious minorities in Article 13 of Iran s Constitution, in practice, Sunnis constitute the largest religious minority since for Iran s Shiite leadership, Islam is identical with Shi ism. Put otherwise, the Constitution repeats the words Islam and Muslim more than 200 times. However, there are articles which restrict their meanings to the Shiite Islam. For instance, Article 12 reads that, the official religion of Iran is Islam and the Twelver Ja fari School, and this principle will remain eternally immutable. This way not only the Sunni Iranians, but also other sub-groups within Shiites are excluded. Further, Article 58 asserts that Iranian Parliament resolutions must be compatible with the official religion. Similarly, Article 115 asserts that the President must be elected from amongst those with convinced belief in the official sect. More importantly, in tandem with Article 121, before assuming office, the President must take oath that he would guard the official religion and dedicate himself to its propagation. As a result, the Iranian Sunnis de facto are considered a minority. Since its establishment in 1979, the practices of the ruling elites also attest to the disadvantaged position of the Sunni Iranians, compared to the officially recognized religious minorities. The constitutional status of non-muslim Iranians gives them certain constitutionally protected rights which the Sunnis are denied, for they are neither considered a 5

9 minority nor treated as part of the mainstream majority. The principle of velāyat-i mutlaqah-i faqīh, or the Absolute Leadership of the Islamic Jurist, is another central theme in Iran s religious policies. Apart from the President, other state officials must also declare their firm conviction and practical attachment to this key principle of the Constitution. Based on Article 67, even a Sunni Iranian must, before assuming the office, ensure his or her devotion to it. The significance becomes clearer when one considers its centrality to the Iranian state structure. Although the popularly elected Iranian Parliament constitutes the main legislative body, it is controlled by the twelvemembered Shūrā-yi Nigahbān, or the Council of Guardians, which determines the compatibility with the Shari a of the laws passed by the Parliament. 41 Therefore, despite the continued presence of non-shiite and non-muslim members in the Parliament, the framework of the legislative body is strictly determined by sectarian decisions of this powerful Council. Furthermore, as noted by Yasmin Alem the current majority run-off system for legislative elections, however, excludes minorities from fair representation in the legislature. 42 Further: The Iranian political system has shown an ability to weather dissent. The system is complex, with a parallel structure for religious and bureaucratic authority. This complicated system provides both the strength to deflect opposition from within and the resilience to accommodate dissenting views. Elections and the accompanying debate protect the conservative leadership from serious internal threats by providing a release valve. The system engages the citizenry politically but, in a controlled way. 43 Similarly, although Armenians, Assyrians, Jews and Zoroastrians enjoy certain rights as ahl al-dhimmah (protected people) or ahl al-kitab (people of the book), such as electing their own deputies to the Parliament based on a quota system, they are excluded from participating in decision making. 44 Moreover, there are some religious minorities, such as Baha is, who are not recognized at all. The Iranian leaders usually refer to this group as a deviant sect (firqah-i dhāllah). Baha i children are not only banned from studying in Iranian schools and universities, but they are also banned from acquiring education through any other means. 45 As far as the ethnic minorities, the Iranian ruling elites tend to equate ethnic demands as separatism. The central governments do not show a democratic attitude towards ethnic minorities demands for practicing their cultures, despite the constitutional rights given to them. 46 For instance, Article 15 of the Islamic Republic of Iran s constitution reads: The Official Language and script of Iran, the lingua franca of its people, is Persian. Official documents, correspondence, and texts, as well as textbooks, must be in this language and script. However, the use of regional and tribal languages in the press and mass media, as well as for teaching of their literature in schools, is allowed in addition to Persian. 47 Despite the continued presence of non-shiite and non-muslim members in the Parliament, the framework of the legislative body is strictly determined by sectarian decisions of the Council of Guardians But, so far the Article 15 has not been implemented in its entirety, as there is still a strong resistance against permitting non-persian languages. In the Iranian political discourse the non-persian languages of Iran are often referred to as dialects or distorted versions of the Persian language. 48 Therefore, in effect Persian remains to be the only officially recognized language in Iran. Saleh makes the following observations on this point: These constitutional provisions, however, have little impact on the reality of daily life for the ethnic population. They have few positive repercussions for the political and economic situation of ethnic and minority groups. The state continues its policies of national unification along Persian lines at the expense of minority rights. A good law is not sufficient unless it is actually enforced appropriately. 49 On the other hand, the relevant top policymaking institutions keep on formulating new policies to reinforce the Persian-oriented nation building. For instance, on January 22, 2000, the Expediency Council of Iran passed a bill regarding info@iramcenter.org 6

10 Ethno-Religious Dynamics in the Islamic Republic of Iran the ethnic minorities of Iran. The amendment mentions Islam and the Iranian civilization as the key sources of national identity. The statute specifically emphasizes upon promoting Persian language and script as the key factors of national unity and solidarity. 50 Apart from cultural suppression and political exclusion at the top level leadership, the ethnoreligious minorities are also marginalized in local administrations as the Iranian political system is highly centralized. In fact, the excessive power of the central government was one of the most important factors used by Ayatollah Khomeini and other revolutionaries to mobilize ethnoreligious groups against the Pahlavi regime. 51 They propagated against the immense powers enjoyed by a small group of Tehran-residing politicians who decided the entire country s fate without having the knowledge about the ground realities of different regions and provinces. 52 In line with this concept of Islamic democracy, the revolutionaries inserted Article 100 into the constitution suggesting that a municipal council control every community, which would handle local issues and decide about the rules and regulations at the local level. However, implementation of this article was deferred for nearly two decades. Finally, in 1998, the government decided to hold the first elections for Municipal Councils. But, by then the Iranian parliament had already passed several laws to significantly reduce the Municipal Councils power and brought them under the central government s control. 53 Ethno-religious Issues among the Iranian Leadership: The security-oriented ethno-religious policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran result in assimilationist policies. 54 According to Salzman, the cultural, linguistic, organizational, and religious diversity of Iran is not, however, cause for celebration on the part of the rulers of the Islamic Republic and their agents. 55 Essentially, Ayatollah Khomeini, in his political thought, had serious reservation about pluralism in Iran. He explicitly regarded forming political parties as a satanic project reinforced by arrogant western powers. 56 In fact, the ethnic policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is an extension of the pre revolutionary policies. According to Saleh, repressive policies against ethnic minorities have remained unchanged since the foundation of the Pahlavi regime in Traditionally, non- Persian ethnic groups have been viewed as antistate, and their loyalty to the country has been doubted by the Iranian leaders. This view still exists in the present Islamic political system of Iran. As put by Salzman: Each fall of a regime in Iran is followed by declarations of independence by ethnic groups and tribes around the country, and must be suppressed militarily if the new government is to take effective control. So the diffidence of the Islamic Republic toward these groups is historically grounded. 58 The Pahlavi monarchs in search of nation building, sought to remove all signs of ethnic diversity in Iran. This held for all aspects of social life, from the names of individuals and towns to the traditional dresses and ways of living. Among the various features of diversity, the language issue was of particular importance, as Pahlavi monarchs were determined to impose Persian on all Iranians. The Persian intelligentsia also reinforced the single language policy. 59 This mindset can be measured by the following quotes from an editorial written by Afshar. In his editorial titled Guzashtah Emrūz Āyandah (Past Present Future) in 1925 Afshar wrote: What I mean by Iran s national unity is a political, cultural and social unity of the people who live within Iran s present day boundaries. This unity includes two other concepts, namely, the maintenance of political independence and the geographical integrity of Iran. However, achieving national unity means that the Persian language must be established throughout the whole country, that regional differences in clothing, customs and such must disappear, and that moluk al-tavayef (the local chieftains) must be eliminated. Kurds, Lurs, Qashqa is, Arabs, Turks, Turkmen, etc., shall not differ from one another by wearing different clothes or by speaking different languages. In my opinion, unless national unity is achieved in Iran, with regard to customs, clothing, and so forth, there will always be the possibility that our political independence and geographical integrity will be endangered

11 And by way of eliminating ethnic divisions and fostering national unity, Afshar suggested the following measures: Thousands of low-priced, attractive books and treatises in Persian must be distributed throughout the country, especially in Azerbaijan and Khozestan regions. Little by little, the means of publishing small, inexpensive newspapers locally in the national language in the most remote parts of the country must be provided. All this requires assistance from the state and should be carried out according to an orderly plan. Certain Persian speaking tribes could be sent to regions where a foreign language is spoken and be settled there, while the tribes of that region, who speak a foreign language, could be transferred and settled in Persian speaking areas. Geographical names in foreign languages or any souvenirs of the marauding and raids of Genghis Khan and Tamerlane should be replaced by Persian names. The country should be divided from an administrative point of view if the goal of national unity is to be achieved. 61 Such an attitude was so prevalent among the Iranian intellectuals and elites of that time that even those with a distinct ethnic background like Ahmad Kasravi, Taqi Arani, and Khalil Maleki would also champion assimilationist policies. 62 As a result, and as part of such policies, non- Persian language publications were banned, and to achieve greater national uniformity Reza Shah Pahlavi later ordered the setting up of a government office called Sāzmān-i Parvarish-i Afkār (Department for the Development of Thoughts). The institution was assigned to encourage and guide the new generation towards service to the homeland. 63 For this purpose, it formed six specialized commissions (public speech, radio, theatre, textbooks, music, and media) all were active to nurture a culturally homogenous nation through producing integrated cultural contents. 64 The ethnic minorities had developed serious grievances due to the monarchic regime s Persianoriented socio-economic policies. Hence Ayatollah Khomeini s slogan of equality among all ethnic groups in Iran appealed to these ethnicities. They were envisioning a greater role in the central government as well as greater powers of their local administrative institutions. But, soon after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the new revolutionaries claimed that their objective was to establish a universal Islamic state based on the notion of a Muslim Ummah (nation). Therefore, they did not allow ethno-religious issues to enter the political discourse in Iran. Consequently, ethnic groups found themselves in a bitter struggle with the central government. 65 Interestingly, the fourth President, Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsenajani, in his autobiography, admits that the multi-ethnic nature of Iran was one of the most vital concerns of the revolutionaries before the revolution occurred. He admits that some of Khomeini s colleagues warned him about post-monarchy ethnic conflicts in the country. Rafsanjani asserts that these individuals did not want the monarchic regime to collapse as they maintained that this power vacuum would trigger ethnic uprising in Iran. 66 The new establishment s inability to meet the demands of the ethnic minorities produced further discontent among these groups and prompted unrest in several regions, such as Khuzestan, Kurdistan, North Eastern Turkmen territory, and Balochistan. 67 However, given the chaotic state of the country in the aftermath of the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, and the Revolutionary Council, which was formed during the early days of the Revolution, preferred to control the situation through a reconciliatory approach. But, the later development demonstrated that the revolutionaries had adopted reconciliation as a tactic, not as a principle, since they had to face a referendum and needed support from the ethnic groups for the establishment of the new Islamic political system. 68 This is clearly visible in a letter composed by Ayatollah Khamenei on March 29, 1979, in which he addressed his envoy to Balochistan and instructed him to introduce Islamic Revolution, which has positively responded to their demand, to those people [the Baloch], and encourage them to participate in the referendum. 69 The referendum was held on March 30 and 31 in 1979 and 98.2 percent of the electorate voted positively for the new regime. Soon afterwards the revolutionaries changed their attitude toward ethno-religious minorities, particularly those insisting on their fundamental rights, such as the Kurds and the Baloch. On August 13, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini issued his disputed decree for info@iramcenter.org 8

12 Ethno-Religious Dynamics in the Islamic Republic of Iran aggressively suppressing the Kurdish activists and militants whom he regarded a threat to the new political system. 70 Using the fatwā the Islamic Revolutionary Guard launched a full-fledged military operation in the Kurdistan region, and several Kurdish activists and protesters were courtmartialled. 71 Khomeini s decree was supported by almost all revolutionary leaders, even those who were critical to the extra constitutional order of Khomeini. For instance, Banisadr, who had made many promises to ethnicities at his oath taking ceremony, 72 in his interview with Markaz-i Asnād-i Huqūq-i Bashar-i Irān, (Center for Human Rights Documents of Iran), admits that he had supported the operation, although he claimed that he was critical to the issuance of the decree having problems with Khomeini s extra constitutional order. 73 A similar approach was adopted towards other ethnic groups such as Turkmen, the Baloch, etc. As a matter of fact, the post-monarchy revolutionary leaders, instead of abandoning the security-oriented assimilationist approach toward the ethnicities, have consolidated it by a religious discourse which is based on the denial of religious differences. Given that the current Iranian political system is an ideological system, the Iranian leaders have constantly tried to preclude religious demands from different religious groups by relying on the notion of Islamic unity. It is particularly true about the Sunnis whose demands, for the political elites, work against the unity of all Muslims. While before the Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini had personally contacted many Sunni leaders, assuring them equal rights for all Muslims, he abandoned this view after the revolution. In spite of his public declarations in favour of Islamic unity, nevertheless, Khomeini argued negatively about Sunnis and some of the major Sunni figures. For instance, he writes, except our Shiites no one is our brother, even if they are Muslims. 74 He continues: There is no doubt about disrespecting the Sunnis; rather it is the requirement of our religion as the scholars have asserted. If one refers to different traditions in different texts, he or she would not doubt on the permissibility of insulting them [Sunnis]. He or she will find that the [Shia] imams themselves used to insult and curse the Sunnis. 75 Essentially, Ayatollah Khomeini s view about the Sunnis is widely recognized in Shia theological tradition. For instance, Ayatollah al-khuei says: Sometimes situation requires to use traduce against enemies, and name-call them, and call them something which does not exist in reality. 76 In line with the above, the Iranian religious clergy often label the Sunnis as Wahhabis, 77 and those who demand their ethnic rights as separatists and as agents of Zionist. 78 Therefore, in relation with Sunnis, the Iranian leaders are religiously sanctioned not to recognize Sunnis fundamental rights. The post-monarchy revolutionary leaders, instead of abandoning the security-oriented assimilationist approach toward the ethnicities, have consolidated it by a religious discourse which is based on the denial of religious differences. On June 3, 1989, Ayatollah Khomeini died, and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was elected as the new Supreme Leader. Like his predecessor, Khamenei also did not have a positive attitude about ethnoreligious pluralism. The assimilationist approach toward ethno-religious minorities is clearly visible in his statements and speeches. For instance, on December 10, 2013, in his meeting with the members of the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council, he made the following points: The Supreme Cultural Revolution Council beside its sagacious struggle against any activity related to weakening and opposing the beautiful and deep language of Persian, should make tangible and serious efforts for the strengthening and expansion of Persian language in all aspects. 79 Following the supreme leader s instruction, the Council initiated several efforts under the program of Cultural Engineering. A magazine was also launched under the same title. Its editor is Gholam Ali Haddad Adel, the father in-law of the Supreme Leader s son, Mojtaba Khamenei. The magazine focuses on methods and mechanisms of cultural assimilation of all Iranians into a defined culture based on Persian culture and Shia religion. 9

13 Although, the Iranian leadership showed a continuity as far as assimilationist policies are concerned, strategies and tactics depended on the ideological orientations of various governments. Traditionally, the weaker political wing of the political establishment tends to raise issues related to ethnicities and religious minorities. During the 1997 presidential campaign a political group called Reformists emerged on the Islamic Republic of Iran s political horizon under the leadership of Hujjatul Islam Mohammad Khatami. Khatami had realized that the continued repressive policies against the ethno-religious minorities brought the country to the edge of territorial disintegration. 80 Khatami s campaign motto was Iran for all Iranians. This drove many people, including the ethnic minority groups, to support him in the presidential election. President Khatami, during his first term in office, demonstrated some interest in ethno-religious minority issues. The political environment also opened up for expression and political activities. President Khatami announced that his government would implement the above mentioned Articles 100 and 107 of the Iranian constitution which suggested reinforcement of local administrations. 81 This brought a ray of hope to the Iranian people, particularly the ethno-religious minorities. They were optimistic that at least they could get some autonomy at the local level. Khatami succeeded to hold Municipal elections. However, as noted earlier, several laws were passed by the Iranian parliament prior to the elections that aimed at limiting the power of Municipal Councils. Apart from his willingness, President Khatami failed to meet promises he had made in relation to the rights of ethno-religious minorities. Initially the most visible obstacle was the oppositioncontrolled parliament. Notwithstanding this, the ethno-religious groups continued to support the reformist politicians. As a result, the reformists won the sixth parliamentary elections held on 18 February Initially, the reformists felt obliged to ethno-religious minorities, particularly the Sunnis, for their electoral victory, to such an extent that they chose to incorporate a Sunni parliamentarian Jalal Jalalizadeh in the presiding board of the Parliament for the first time in the history of the Islamic Republic. But, the decision was revoked quickly, once some influential clergy in Qom protested and threatened that they would march to Tehran in funeral dresses. 82 Eventually, the reformists attention was diverted to other socio-political issues such as freedom of press, social life, youth, etc. There was a clear lack of consideration about the root causes of ethnic tension in the country. Despite the weak tolerance shown toward religious minorities, Persianization efforts continued as before. In this regard, perhaps the most important event was the disclosure of an official letter related to bringing demographic changes to the Arab dominated province, Khuzestan. 83 The official letter was allegedly issued from the office of the president, signed by Abtahi, President Khatami s Chief of Staff, and addressed to the then Head of Iran s Planning and Budgeting Organization. The letter specifically instructs for the implementation of the following policies: 1) To bring down the ratio of Arabs against total population to one-third within 10 years; 2) To encourage people from other ethnic origins to migrate to this region; 3) The educated young Arabs should migrate to other Persian dominated regions such as Tehran, Tabriz, and Isfahan, and 4) Any relicts which denote the existence of any specific ethnic group in the area should be removed. 84 The disclosure of the letter led to wide protests in the Arab dominated areas, displaying the trust deficit between the ethnic minorities and the Persian dominated centre. The Reformists rule ended in 2005 when the conservative forces won the Presidential election with the ultra-conservative Mahmoud Ahamdinijad ascending to presidency. Ahmadinijad s approach was based on complete denial of ethnoreligious pluralism in Iran. Prominent figures in his government referred to ethnic culture as micro cultures, or khurdah farhang, nationalities as tribes, and languages as dialects. During Ahamadinejad s presidency, hundreds of ethno-religious activists and leaders were arrested, and many were executed. As a result of the unfavourable circumstances of the ethno-religious minorities, the United Nations appointed a special rapporteur, Ahmad Shahid, for monitoring the human rights violations in info@iramcenter.org 10

14 Ethno-Religious Dynamics in the Islamic Republic of Iran Iran. Ahmad Shahid presented his report to the United Nations in March 2012, which highlighted severe human rights violations against the ethnoreligious minorities. 85 Meanwhile, the European parliament also passed a resolution criticizing the violations of ethno-religious minorities fundamental rights in the country. 86 Although the European countries double standards towards human rights violations in Iran have been rightfully criticized by the Iranian leadership, it does not change the fact that Ahmandinejad s governments have significantly increased the pressure on ethno-religious minorities. As a matter of fact, President Ahmadinijad and his team s most powerful project was the revival of ancient Persian Civilization intermixed with a Shia messianic undertone popularly known as Iranian School (Maktab-e Irani) From one side, he would talk about Imam Mahdi s Global Just Society, while at the same time praising the ancient Iranian kings. As part of this idea, in 2010, after a five-year negotiation with British authorities, President Ahmadinejad s government brought the Cyrus Cylinder, described as the oldest human rights charter, to Iran on loan. This was the second time the cylinder was displayed in Iran. The first time being the highly debated, expensive 2,500th anniversary of the foundation of the Persian Empire by the Cyrus the Great, dated 1971, during the reign of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. At the unveiling ceremony, Ahmadinejad put a keffiyeh, a revolutionary symbol in Iran, around the neck of a soldier who had dressed as an Achaemenid soldier. 87 He congratulated all justice seeking people and world nations, and asserted that the general movement of Iranian nations for reviving their original divine and humanistic identity would continue. He called upon the world leaders to follow Cyrus should they desire eternality. At the same event Ahmadinejad s chief of staff regarded Ahmadinejad as the Cyrus of the Age. 88 Ahmadinejad and his team s overemphasis on Iranian School resulted in strong reactions from the Shiite clergy who condemned the idea, calling it anti-islamic. 89 However, idealizing the Iranian kings was not limited to Ahmadinejad and his colleagues. Earlier, Moammmad Baqer Ghalibaf, a former military commander and current mayor of Tehran, had also described himself as an Islamic version of Reza Khan or Reza Khan-e Hizbullahi. 90 During Ahmadinejad s presidency, several instances of insulting non-persian ethnic groups and denying their identity were witnessed. A notable example is a comic strip published by Daily Iran on May 12, 2006, where a cockroach spoke some sort of fragmented and distorted Turkish that even 80 percent of cockroaches cannot properly understand. 91 The publication of this comic led to wide unrest in the Turkish areas which injured many and killed several people. 92 Similarly, Aftāb-i Yazd, on June 10, 2010, published a report, claiming that the people of Azerbaijan were not Turks. 93 In a recent case, on August 13, 2016, a famous comedian insulted the Sunni religious symbols during a live show, which prompted wide political turmoil. 94 Ahmadinejad s ethno-religious policies, and the heightened tension among the minorities, were masterfully utilized by Rafsenjani and his fellow reformist companions. Rafsenjai s appeal to ethno-religious forces worked and he succeeded to gain the necessary support of ethno-religious groups in favor of his favorite candidate, Hassan Rouhani, as Rafsenjani, himself, was disqualified by the Council of Guardians for contesting the 2013 presidential election. Rouhani played the ethno-religious card wisely. He promised a special package of rights to ethno-religious groups to remove their decades-old grievances. In this regard, he explicitly declared his determination to implement, what he called the long-ignored, Articles 3, 12, 15, 19, and 22 of the Constitution about ethno-religious minorities. 95 In his statement, Rouhani specifically promised the following: 1) To formulate policies for eradication of ethno-religious discrimination; 2) To give equal opportunity to all citizens, irrespective of ethnicity and religion, to take part in all levels of government, including the cabinet; 3) To appoint competent local people in administrative positions in various regions of the country and empower them within the general framework of the central government; 4) To introduce education, in mother tongue, at school and university levels in tandem with article 15 of the Iranian constitution; 5) To preserve the culture and literature of all Iranian ethnicities; 6) To respect freedom of religion and 11

15 faiths, and provide all citizens with equal space and freedom to practice their religious rituals; 7) To conduct research and prepare long term and short-term plans for cultural, social and economic development of deprived and frontier regions, and also allocate a special financial package in order to compensate their backwardness; 8) To eradicate severe discrimination in all walks of life; 9) To change the security-oriented approach toward the nationalities into a scientific approach in order to utilize human and natural resources of ethno-religious dominated areas; 10) To appoint one special deputy president to follow up on the realization of the above objectives. 96 Promising such an attractive package, Rouhani won the Presidential race. However, so far he has failed to keep most of the above promises. For instance, he did not include any individuals from religious minority groups in his cabinet. His promise to appoint a deputy president for ethno-religious affairs was changed into the appointment of Ali Younesi, the former intelligence minister, as an advisor in ethnoreligious minority affairs. Nonetheless, even this amount of toleration shown by President Rouhani about ethno-religious demands triggered strong reactions by Iranian cultural elites. For instance, to counter President Rouhani s move for allowing non-persian languages in schools, the members of the Persian Academy (Farhangistān Zabān va Adab Fārsī) held a meeting to discuss the promotion of Persian language. The participants talked against instructing mother tongues, calling it a conspiracy against the Persian language. 97 Hujjatul Islam Muhyeddin Mohammadian, the Head of Organization for Educational Research and Planning, talked about the increment of credit hours of Persian language at schools and universities. 98 Haddad Adel, the Head of Persian Academy, stated: I would specifically refers to the statement of Mohammadian and will say that our standard language is Persian. 99 Mohammad Ali Movahhed, a member of the academy said: the government should avoid direct involvement in the education of local and indigenous languages. We have one standard language that is our official language [Persian]. If the government forgets this, and enters into the areas of local languages, then we are in trouble. 100 Mohammad Dabir Moghadam, also a member of the Academy, said: what is important is to conduct scientific research on languages, but if were start teaching them, then many problems and issues will arise. 101 Bahauddin Khorramshahi said: the government should clearly define the limitations for teaching in mother tongues. 102 Salaim Nisari, said: some think that to love a nationality means getting education in the language of that particular nationality, but this is very dangerous. Fat-hullah Mojtabaee said: The issue of teaching mother tongue is an imported issue I have no doubt that this issue has been imported from outside. This is a conspiracy. 103 The statements of the Iranian cultural elites clearly show that they don t believe in ethno-religious pluralism, and not ready to even compromise on teaching mother tongues, let alone education in mother tongue, regional autonomy, etc. Not much later, Younesi, in his first ever statement as the advisor for ethno-religious minority affairs, stated that education in mother tongue was not a demand for ethno-religious minorities, but a bunch of the intellectuals of these ethnic groups. 104 He added that the government would happily respond to such demands should it originate from ethno-religious groups. Such controversial statements, as well as his position as advisor without any executive power, made some ethno-religious activists regard Younesi as a statement-therapist for ethno-religious groups. However, President Rouhani s government, for the first time, opened Turkish and Kurdish language departments in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan provinces respectively. Although being a positive step, it does not reflect the actual demand of the ethno-religious groups, for these departments categorize these languages with many other foreign languages, such as Urdu, Spanish, Chinese, etc. The Iranian ethnic groups want their mother tongues recognized as a medium of instruction at schools and enjoy the same status as the Persian language. Finally, international and regional developments constituted another significant dimension of the Iranian leaders approach toward ethno-religious minorities. International issues and conflicts in the world, particularly those of the Middle East and Iran s surrounding regions, have caused the Iranian leaders to revisit their ethno-religious approach. In this regard, the sectarian conflict in Iraq has alarmed Iranian leaders over ethnic relations in Iran, which can easily be felt through info@iramcenter.org 12

16 Ethno-Religious Dynamics in the Islamic Republic of Iran their statements. For instance, Younesi cautioned the Iranians to abstain from provoking ethnoreligious issues. 105 Similarly, Rouhani in his address on June 12, 2014, discussed national unity and said that all ethnic groups should work for the prosperity of the country under a single umbrella. He emphasized that Iranians should avoid dividing themselves on ethno-religious lines. 106 Additionally, on June, 28, 2014, the Iranian Minister of Interior, Abdol Reza Rahmani Fazli, at the Administrative Council of Kirmanshah, a Kurd dominated Province, demanded all political forces of the province not to indulge into differences in view of the chaotic situation of the region. 107 Conclusion: Analysing the ethno-religious dynamics in Iran gives significant insight about the Iranian society. First, the Islamic Republic of Iran, unlike predominant views about its homogeneity, is a highly heterogeneous society in terms of ethnicity and religion. Roughly 50 percent of the Iranian population is Persian, while the remaining belong to different ethnic groups. Similarly, the country is also not homogeneous in terms of the religious beliefs of its inhabitants. The followers of other religions and sects, apart from the majority Shiite Muslims, do exist and in significant numbers. Furthermore, some religious communities, such as Sunnis and Baha is, are increasingly growing in size to the extent that it is becoming a challenge to the Shia dominant establishment. Analysing the constitutional rights of the ethno-religious minorities suggests that their rights are seriously affected by the different discriminatory clauses of the Iranian constitution. In this regard, Iran s Sunni community is the most affected one. Finally, the approaches and policies of the Iranian leaders and elites show that they don t believe in ethno-religious rights, as such. They are strongly committed to the doctrine of one Iran, one nation, and one religion. This approach has pushed the country to the brink of a serious ethno-religious crisis. Besides, it has left significant socio-political and psychological impacts beyond human rights violations on all ethno-religious minorities in Iran. In this regard, one should quote Gerald Taiaiake Alfred, who argues that most often the focus is on the injustice taking place against the local or indigenous people or what he calls the First Nation. But according to him, what is more important is the impact of this oppression over the years and decades which has created a situation in which the opportunities for a selfsufficient, healthy and autonomous life for First Nations peoples on an individual and collective basis are extremely limited. 108 Various measures carry the potential of bringing change to the state of affairs of the ethno-religious minorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran. First and foremost, short-term measures can be implemented to control the tension. There is widening in the gap between the Shia dominant establishment and the ethno-religious groups which result in a serious trust deficit between ethno-religious groups and the central government. As a first step, moderate forces should replace the fanatical Shia Persian forces in non-shiite or non-persian dominated regions. These fanatic forces of the establishment are currently in charge of implementing Iran s assimilation project in those regions, and are fueling the sectarian and communal violence; with an unforeseen end. More importantly, the Islamic Republic should change its securityoriented approach towards ethno-religious groups, replacing it with a human development and social empowerment based approach. The long-term measures should include delegating the administration for the ethnoreligious regions to the indigenous people of those regions. The aim should be to bring those ethno- religious forces on board, which, on ethnic and religious grounds, have been ignored by the establishment thus far. These measures are very critical and are directly related to the constitutional rights of the ethno-religious groups throughout Iran. In this regard, the government of President Rouhani should prepare and propose a bill to amend the Islamic Republic s constitution, and remove all discriminatory clauses in it, which are providing justification for the current ethnoreligious discrimination against non-shia and non-persian ethno religious groups in Iran. Some new clauses should be added to the constitution, through which the rights of the different ethnoreligions groups to run their local affairs should be ensured. More importantly, the share of all ethnoreligious groups in power structure of the central government based on their population and the size of their regions should be constitutionalized. 13

17 Notes 1 Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between two revolutions, Translated by Ahmad Gol Muhammadi & Muhammad Ibrahim Fattahi Valilali, (Nashr-i Nay, 1998). pp Ibid, Ibid, Ali Banuazizi & Myron Weinr, the State, Religion and Ethnic Politics (USA: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 3. 5 Ibid 6 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (USA: University of California Press, 1985), Michael E. Brown & Sumit Ganguly, Government Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia and the Pacific (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1997), vii. 8 Conway W. Henderson, International Relations: conflict and cooperation at the turn of the 21st Century (Singapore: McGraw-Hill, 1997), Keith Crane, Rollie Lal & Jeffrey Martini, Iran s Political, Demographic, and Economic Vulnerabilities (California : Rand Corporation, 2008), Philip Carl Salzman, (2009, April 14). Persians and Others: Iran s minority politics, John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies Harvard University, 14 April persians-and-others-irans-minority-politics> (Accessed on 28 September 2016). 11 Mohammad Reza Hafeznia, Jughrāfīyā-yi Sīyāsī-i Īrān, [Political Geography of Iran] (Tehran: Samt Publication, 2003), Vol. 1, Hafeznia, Habibollah Zanjani, Sayr-i Tahavvul-ī Jam īyat-i Irān, in Jam īyat, Tawsi ah va Bihdāsht-i Bārvarī, edited by Amir Hushang Mehryar & others (Tehran: Nashr va Tablīgh-i Basharī, 2001), Brenda Shaffer, Borders and Brethren: Iran and the Challenge of Azerbaijani Identity (BCSIA Studies in International Security) (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), Islamic Republic of Iran s Ministry of Foreign Affair, Salehi: Istanbul may be venue of Iran-G5+1 nuclear talks (6 July, 2012), < mfa.ir/index.aspx?fkeyid=&siteid=3&pageid=2026&newsview=23267 > (Accessed on February 22, 2016). 16 Jamaluddin Noorzi, Interview by author, UPM, Kuala Lumpur, February 30, Ibid. 18 Hussein D. Hassan, Iran: Ethnic and Religious Minorities, CRS Report for Congress (Congressional Research Service, November 25, 2008), Central Intelligence Agency, the World Factbook: Iran, < (Accessed on May 10, 2016). 20 Ibid. 21 Jamaluddin Noorzi, Interview by author. 22 Ibid. 23 Amir Khaled Rastegar, & Misam Mohammadi, Taghīrat-i farhangī va uft-i barvarī dar Īrān [Cultural changes, and the decline of fertility in Iran], Jāmi ih Shināsī-i Kārburdī, Year 26, Vol. 58, No.2 (Summer 2015): Ibid 25 Ali Reza Abedinzadah, Sī sāl-i āyandah az ammih, khalih va amū khabarī nīst, [There will be no uncles and aunts after 30 years], Fars News Agency, 31 May 2014, < php?nn= > (Accessed, 11 July, 2016). 26 M. Basiri, interview by author, June 10, 2014, Ampang, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 27 Wahid al-ahvazi, interview by author, January 10, 2014, Penang, Malaysia. 28 Kayhān, Ayatullah Mosavi Jazayeri s Text of Speech, 14 October 2007, Hushdār-i Namāyandih Majlis-i Khibrigān darbārih-yi gustarish-i wahābīyat dar Khūzistān, 31 July 2012, Iranian Students News Agency, < > (accessed on 3 September 2016). 30 Jumhūrī-i Islāmī, Gustarish-i kilīsāhā-yi khānagī dar Tehrān, [Growth of in-home churches in Tehran], 2 October, 2010, Iranian Students News Agency, Izhār nazar-i yik kārshinās-i masāyel-i dīnī az kāhish-i jam īat-i shī ih kishwar [statement of a religious issues expert on the decline of the shia population in the country] 7 April 2014,< > (accessed on 3 September 2016). 32 Risālat, Interview with Zahra Sajjadi, 13 October 2011, Iranian Student s News Agency, Ayatullah Haydari s text of Speech, 2 December 2013, < aspx?nsid=5&sslid=46&nid=45929 > (accessed 3 September 2016). 34 Ibid 35 Fars News Agency, Ayatullah Makarim Shirazi s text of speech, 17 October 2013, < php?nn= > (accessed 29 September 2016). 36 Deutsche Welle, Afzāyish-i intiqād-i mutaqābil-i ruhānīyān-i sunnī wa shī ih dar Irān, [Increase in mutual criticism among Sunni and Shia religious authorities], 22 May < > (accessed 3 September 2016). 37 Jām-i Jam, Sīyāsathā-yi Tashvīqī Jam īyat rā Ijrā Kunīd, [Introduce incentives for population growth], 2 November, 2013, Supreme Leader s Text of Speech, Dunyā-yi Iqtisād, 14 April, 2014, Dunyā-yi Iqtisād, Majlis tarh-i afzāyish-i jam īyat rā tasvīb kard [Assembly Approves Emergency Bill on Population], 14 April, 2014, Salzma, Ibid. 41 Guardian Council, Sākhtār-i Shūrā-ye Nigahbān, [Organizational Structure of the Guardian Council], < (Accessed on June 20, 2016). 42 Yasmin Alem, Duality by Design: The Iranian Electoral System (Washington D.C: International Foundation for Electoral System, 2011), Keith Crane, Rollie Lal and Jeffrey Martini, Iran s Political, Demographic, and Economic Vulnerabilities (California: Rand Corporation, 2008), Nayereh Tohidi, Ethnicity and religious minority politics in Iran pp in Ali Gheissari, Contemporary Iran: Economy, Society, Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), Nazila Ghanea- Hercock, Human Rights, the UN and the Baha is in Iran (Oxford: George Ronald Publisher, 2002) Alam Saleh, (2013). Ethnic Identity and the State in Iran. New York: Palgrave Maclillan The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran Article Iran Kalbasi, Tanavvu -i Zabānhā va Gūyish hā-yi Irānī [Diversity of Iranian languages and dialects], Majallah Mutāli āt-i Āsīyā-i Markazī va Qafqāz, Vol. 3, No. 6 (1994): Alam Saleh (2013), The Expediency Council, Sīyāsathā-yi Kullī-i Nizām dar Bakhsh-i Aqallīyathā-yi Qawmī va Mazhabī, [General policies of the Islamic Republic pertaining Ethno-religious minorities], 22 January < > (Accessed on January 10, 2014). 51 Ruhollah Khomeini, Sahīfah -i Imām: bayānāt, payāmhā, musahibah ha va nāmah ha, [Sahifah Imam; statements, messages, interviews & letters] (Tehran: Muassisah-i Tanzīm va Nashr-i Āsār-i Imām Khumaynī, 1999), Vol. 5, 367. See also Vol. 6, Ibid. 53 Islamic Consultative Assembly, Shūrā dar Qānūn: Mavādd-i Islāhī-i 1-5 Qānūn-i Tashkīlāt Shuraha-yi Islāmī Musavvab-i [Islamic Municipal Councils in Law: Amendment of the clauses 1-5 of Islamic Municipal Councils Act May 21, 1996], < File/ShowFile.aspx?ID=60d3050e-83c6-4d85-aedd-eace8b31f1c5> (Accessed on July 5, 2016). 54 Alam Saleh (2013), 64. info@iramcenter.org 14

18 Ethno-Religious Dynamics in the Islamic Republic of Iran 55 Salzman, Ibid. 56 Ruhollah Khomeini, Vol. 4, Alam Saleh (2013), Salzman, Ibid. 59 Athena S. Leoussi ed. Encyclopedia of Nationalism, Iran: Nationalism in Iran (London, Academic Press, 2001), vol. 2, As cited in: Touraj Atabaki, Ethnic Diversity and Territorial Integrity of Iran: Domestic Harmony and Regional Challenges Iranian Studies, Vol. 38, No.1 (2005): As cited in. Ibid, Brenda Shaffer, Borders and Brethren: Iran and the challenge of Azerbaijan identity, (MA: MIR Press, 2002), pp Touraj Atabaki, Ethnic Diversity.., Mahmood Dulfaee, Justarī bar sāzmānhā va siyāsat hāy-i farhangī Iran dar durih-i Reza Shah, [An assessment of the Department of Development of thoughts in Reza Shah s era], Ganjīnih-i Asnād, vol. 22 & 23, pp Athena S. Leoussi, Vol. 2, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Inqilāb va Pīrūzī: Kārnāmah va Khātirāt-i sālhā-yi 1357/1358, [Revolution and victory: Records and memoires of ], Edited by Abbas Bashiri (Tehran: Daftar-i Nashr-i Ma ārif-i Islāmī, 2009), Alam Saleh (2013), Hashemi Rafsanjani (2010), Ruhollah Khomeini (1999),Vol. 6, Ruhollah Khomeini (1999),Vol. 9, Amirali Fatemi, Ubūr az buhrān: bāznigāhī bih nā ārāmīhā-yi qawmī va mantaqih ī pas az pīrūzī-i inqilāb [A Historical overview of the ethnic and regional uprising after the Islamic revolution], Risālat Tehran, July 13, 2009, Abolhasan Banisadr, Matn-i sukhanrānī-i Raīs-i Jumhūr [President s Speech], Inqilāb-i Islāmī, No. 183, 5 February, Abolhasan Banisadr, interview with Iranian Human Right Documentation Center, March, , < permalink/3543.html#.u6rurp2zho1> (Accessed on June 20, 2016). 74 Ruhollah Khomeini, al-makāsib al-muharramah, [Unlawful Businesses], Vol. 1 (Qom: Muassisah-yi Isma īlīyān, 1990), Ibid. 76 Abū al-qasim al-khuei, al-misbāh al-fiqāhah fī al-mu āmalāt, [Floodlight of Jurisprudence into civil laws],vol. 1 (Qom: Intishārāt-i Ansāriyān, 1990), Husain Shaydaian, Jaryānhā-yi sīyāsī az nigāh-i Imām Khomeini va Maqām-i Mu azzam- Rahbarī, [Political parties from The perspective of Imam Khomeini and the Supreme Leader], Faslnamah-i Husūn, No. 14 (Winter, 2008), Ibid., Kayhān, Supreme Leader s text of speech, December 11, 2013, 1&3. 80 Alireza Naderi & Robert Stewart, Iran s Forgotten ethnic minorities the Middle East Channel, < posts/2013/04/03/iran_s_forgotten_ethnic_minorities> (Accessed on May 10, 2016). 81 The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran, Article 91, Jalal Jalalizadeh, former member of Islamic Consultative Assembly, Interview by Author, Hotel Hilton Petaling Jaya, Malaysia on November 10, British Ahvazi Friendship Society, Letter from Vice-President, Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, 2005, April 17. < ltr.pdf > (accessed on July 18, 2016) 84 Ibid. 85 Ahmad Shahid, Report by Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran (2012, March 6). Re. No. A/HRC/19/66, presented to the UN General Assembly, United Nations, New York. Available at: < > (Accessed on June 3, 2016). 86 The European Parliament, Situation of ethnic minorities in Iran Resolution of 14 June 2012 on the situation of ethnic minorities in Iran (2012/2682(RSP), available at < > (Accessed on June 1, 2016). 87 Sadra Muhaqeq, Manshūr i Kurush, az 19 isfand be āmrīka mīravad, [Cyrus Cylinder travels to America on March 9], Shargh, 24 February 2013, Mahmoud Ahmadi Nejad s Text of Speech, Iran, 13 September 2010, p.3. Also see. Payam Fazli Nejad, Shāh Kilīd Inglīsī-Fasl e 4 [English master key-part 4], Kayhān, 25 May 2013, Shargh, Hushdar e Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi bih Rahim Mashaée [Ayatullah Mesbah Yazdi warns Masha ee], 11 August 2010, Kasra Naji, Ahmadinejad: The Secret History of Iran s Radical Leader (University of California press, 2008), Mana Nayestani, Chih kunīm kih Sūskha sūskimān nakunand [How to stop the cockroaches from making us into cockroaches], Daily Iran, [Friday edition], May 12, 2006, I timād-i millī, Tajammu hā-yi I tirāzī dar Tabrīz, Urūmīyeh va Tehrān, [Protests in Tabriz, Urmia and Tehran], May 25, 2006, Aftāb-i Yazd, Āzarbāyjānīhā Turk Nīstand [Azerbaijanies are not Turks], June 10, 2010, Iranian Students News Agency, Darkhāst 20 namāyandih ahl-i sunnat barāy-i barkhurd bā awāmil dur-i hamī, [20 Sunni parliamentarians demand punishment for Dorhami show s hosts], 14 August 2016, < >, (Accessed on 4 September 2016). 95 Hassan Rouhani, Statement no.3, 30 May, 2013, < rouhani.ir/event.php?event_id=63> (Accessed on July 18, 2016). 96 Ibid. 97 Mehr News Agency, Āmūzish-i Zabānhā-yi Mādarī Bū-yi Tawti ah Mīdahad, [Call for studying mother tongue indicates a conspiracy], January 27, 2014, < (Accessed on July 18, 2016). 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid. 101 Ibid. 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid. 104 Jam-i Jam, Ali Younesi s text of speech, February 25, 2014, Iran Daily, Ali Younesi s text of speech, November 16, 2015, Iran Daily, Hasan Rouhani s text of speech, 5 July 2014, Radio France International Persian, Nigarānī-i Vazīr-i kishvar az Mahrūmīyat-i Ustānhā va Manātiq-i Marzī, [Minister concerns over deprivation of border areas and provinces], June 28, 2014, < gl/84ouur > (Accessed on July 17, 2016). 108 Taiaiake Alfred, Colonialism and State Dependency Journal of aboriginal Health, Vol. 5, No.2, (November 2009):

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