sects, inclusive of thirty-four recognized factions, although suggestions have been made that

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1 Greg Farr Core Texts & Motifs Boston University 04 EMPTINESS IN THE MAKING Rapid expansion and division of Buddhist thought occurred within six to ten generations after the death of the Buddha. This period was marked by the emergence of eighteen recognized sects, inclusive of thirty-four recognized factions, although suggestions have been made that there could have existed as many as two-hundred. 1 It is hard to imagine how fractionation of this magnitude could become socially manifest, flourish, and endure in relative simultaneity, especially if we recall Randall Collin s intellectual law of small numbers which specifies that no more than a half dozen intellectual positions can occupy the universal attention space [i.e. of a community, a culture, etc.] at any one period of time. Turning to Collin s recent work to see how he addressed this fractionation from the perspective of his sociological theory, we find Collins concurring with several other scholars that such factionalism was possible due to conditions external to the intellectual life of Buddhist thought such as with regard to divisions and/or schism occurring on the basis of issues of monastic discipline, geographical dispersion, or distinctions maintained by disciples of particular leaders. 2 However, Collins argues, again concurring with other scholars, that despite the numerous organizational splits external to intellectual life per se, actual divergence among intellectual or philosophical positions of early Buddhism adheres to his hypothesis concerning the law of small numbers within universal attention space. Tracing the evolution of Buddhist philosophical thought developed within the various schools of the three central movement-complexes or vehicles of Buddhism -- namely, Hinayana, Mahayana, and Tantric or Esoteric Buddhism -- is somewhat complicated by the historical knowledge available to us concerning the specific network connections among the proliferation of schools and their potential interaction. This is evident as one begins to compare 1 Collins, R. (1998). The Sociology of philosophies: a global theory of intellectual change. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 2 Collins, p. 213.

2 and contrast the many diagrams prepared by scholars attempting to map out the multiple divisions among schools and the evolutionary trajectory of Buddhist thought and belief. Although there is relative consensus regarding the institutionalized identity of the many Theravada (Hinayana) schools, as is also the case with regard to the later schools within the Mahayana movement and its predominant traditions, there is a degree of uncertainty surrounding the precise affiliation or influence certain schools or sects maintained in relation to one another and finally with regard to how particular intellectual strains of Theravada Buddhism and emergent orthodox systems of Hindu thought played a role in the rise of Mahayana Buddhism. In any event, it is recognized that aside from the external reasons for division and evolution stemming from institutionalization already mentioned and the manner in which diverse schools cultivated their identity in accordance to indigenous language or laid particular emphasis on quasi-canonical collections of text such as those found in Abhidharma or Sutra genres of Tripitaka literature, divergence concerning philosophical matters also emerged as a major causal factor in the doctrinal disputes inherent to the Theravada schools and the changes to emerge with the second turning of the wheel of the Dharma marked by the rise of the Mahayana movement. The first major schism of the Theravada movement (4th century BCE), precipitated by a dispute concerning the nature of arhats and other issues of discipline implicated in this matter, lead to the formation of the Mahasamghika and Sthaviras factions and the progressive division of these movements into smaller sects or schools over the next two hundred years. From the lineage of these divisions branched four primary strains of Buddhist thought, each of which stemming from its philosophical understanding of the doctrine of Dependent Origination, the fundamental core of Buddhist thought set forth in the teaching of the historical Buddha and his early followers. The first of these intellectual camps was occupied by the Pulgadavadins (i.e. the Vatsiputriyas and Sammatiyas schools) who held to the belief that there is existing personhood (pudgala) over above the collection of aggregates comprising human experience. Their argument for personhood rested on the question of what, if not the personal soul, is reincarnated from one

3 life to another. The Theravadins, secondly, held to a strict orthodox position based on Ahbidharma scholasticism, while the third position held by the Sarvastivadins advocated an everything-exists theory which claimed the realism of the past and future and the notion that elements upon which all aggregates of experience are composed are real and permanent. This position rested on the argument that if the past or future did not exist or if dharmas are non-substantial then neither could enter the intention of cognition. Another school falling within this philosophical strain was the Vibhajyavadins, or those who make distinctions. This group sought to make certain qualifications based on subjective discernment with regard to temporal duration of the past and future and the transitory appearance of dharmas. Developing and sub-dividing along with these three doctrinal strains of thought already testifying to indisputable philosophical disagreement among Buddhists was the Mahasanghikas, who were also developing philosophical positions concerned with similar issues. For instance, the Vetulyakas (3rd Century BCE) held a counter position to the Sarvastivadins by advocating the theory that all elements were void, while the Uttarapathakas argued that although individual elements are not void, they are not determinate in the way the Sarvastivadin realism suggests. Rather, particular things were construed to possess their own self-nature (tathata, or thusness ) in the sense that their particular manifestation results from an unfathomable intrinsicality set in an impersonal substratum of ultimate reality underlying all plural and relative phenomena. 3 The doctrine of Tathata would, of course, undergo many reformulations in the progressive development of Buddhist thought and the Buddhist understanding of causation resulting from the intellectual analysis of this principle remains one of the central accomplishments of Buddhist philosophy. In its early stages, however, the principle of Tathata was conceived within an idealist framework which left its ontological status in a precarious position as perennial questions concerning the nature of ignorance and karma began their assault. Yet, such idealism was distinct from the radical departure the Andhakas took from the Buddhist tradition by holding to a strict 3 Verdu, A. (1981) The Philosophy of Buddhism. London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 20.

4 subjective idealism in which objects of the mind were considered to be the same as cognition itself. This position brings meditative practices to the foreground and places a focus on Nirvana as an element (skanda, or bundle of aggregates) which serves a pivotal controlling function to steady consciousness as it leads the human individual toward liberation. It is against the backdrop of these philosophical positions that the critical philosophy of Nagarjuna emerged. Splits occurring within the Mahasanghikas camp, however, came from theological innovations as well. The Mahasanghikas generally came to hold that the body of the Buddha pervades the universe and that there is a plurality of Buddhas. However, controversy over the status of this body, whether the Buddha body was considered a transmundane reality as the Lokottaravadins postulated or whether there was some degree of concrete or immanent embodiment such as within the collective community as the Dharmaguptakas held (or in connection with stupa worship as maintained by the Chaitiyas), evidently testified to the disagreements in play which would also factor ingredientially in the rise of Mahayana, the Great Vehicle. The Mahayana movement would embrace the notion of multiple Buddhas and further shape this apparently radical doctrine, as it emerged in its earlier manifestations, by shifting its central theological focus on the nature of the bodhisattva. With this shift, later varieties of new religious paths would emerge such as the beliefs in rebirth in a Pure Land, the conception and worship of an all-pervading, ever-enlightened cosmic Buddha, and the notion of intercessory prayer to compassionate world-intervening Bodhisattvas. 4 Moreover, the Mahayana movement would de-emphasize monastic achievement of individual salvation as it turned toward laypersons with its teachings and set the focus of religious worship into the context of the physical text with its elevation of ceremonial vows which could be taken by monks and laypersons alike, the copying and reciting of text, and finally its steady proliferation of texts expounding the novel Mahayana theological and philosophical foundations. 4 Nakamura Hajime, Buddhism, Schools of: Mahayana Buddhism, Mircea Eliade (ed.). (1987). The encyclopedia of religion. New York: MacMillian Publishing Company, pps in passim.

5 Mahayana Buddhism, more often than not, is considered a movement most heavily influenced socially, theologically, and philosophically by the Mahasanghika schools although its specific origins are not yet entirely known. On the broader social scale, the formation of the Mahasanghika faction, occasioned by this group s early split with the Sthaviras, placed the Mahasanghikas predominantly in opposition to the notion that individual salvation could only be achieved through isolated monastic life and it is this general feature of creating access for the layperson to religious understanding and enlightenment that is given notable consideration when attempting to trace the lineage leading up to the emergence of Mahayana. Moreover, theological developments in pre-mahayana Buddhist literature and practice, as just mentioned, can be seen as laying the foundation for the specific theological innovations of the Mahayana movement especially in terms of the conception of multiple Buddhas attributed to certain Mahasanghika schools. Finally, the foreshadowing of the philosophical innovations to come in Nagarjuna s thought and later Mahayana philosophers can perhaps best be identified with the Vetulyakas position concerning the voidness of elements and the later positions within the Mahasanghikas camp set in opposition to the Sarvastivadin realism. However, the issue of specific influences leading up to Nagarjuna s critical philosophy in particular and his founding of the first doctrinal school of Mahayana (the Madhyamaka school) are further complicated to the extent of uncertainty concerning the degree by which the pre-mahayana and early Mahayana Sutra literature may have influenced Nagarjuna s writings and to what degree Nagarjuna s identity as a Brahman and his likely encounters with Nyaya logic was a factor in his philosophical positioning. Early Theravada influences on later Madhyamika and Yogacara philosophers are complicated in similar ways as well, but clearly Nagarjuna s thought establishes itself as the central point of departure for these subsequent thinkers. With an eye toward theological issues and an intent focus on his contemporary philosophical horizon primarily represented by the Sarvastivadin realist and pluralist position, the nomimalist position stressing the momentariness of all phenomenon, the Mahasamghika pluralism issuing forth in its belief of multiple Buddhas, and the idealist monism held by the

6 Andhakas, Nagarjuna would create a critical philosophy which would solidify the foundational understanding of Mahayana Buddhist thought. Moreover, the Madhyamaka school developed by Nagarjuna and the later philosophical advances made within the Yogacara school would emerge as the only two main philosophical representatives of the many theological variants flourishing in the emergent Mahayana context standing in opposition to the Theravada movement. The niche created by the emergent theological positions and their lack of definitive epistemology and metaphysical doctrine carved a narrow path for the Madhyamika and Yogacarin philosophers to maneuver around the Theravada schools (as well as their Hindu opponents) in the sense that compatibility with these movements needed to be maintained to secure continued religious institution. Yet, this narrow opening proved to be a path of great breadth and depth. Ashvagosha (around 100 C.E.) was the first poet-philosopher to offer an alternative to the central Theravada philosophical positions by positing the ultimate reality of suchness, an indiscernible indexical substratum of substance comprising a monist origin out of which pluralism emanated in the order set forth by the Buddha s doctrine of Dependent Origination. 5 However, Nagarjuna would overshadow the position of suchness being representative of ultimate reality by formally situating, in its place, sunyata or emptiness. Outflanking all of his philosophical opponents, Nagarjuna set forth his theory of no-theory which demonstrated that all forms of identity are empty given that all things are caused by dependent origination. Thus, nothing ( no-thing ) is considered to possess an essence of its own or permanent independent existence (svabhava), including elemental dharmas or the self (Atman), and that realization of this insight discloses the true nature of reality itself; namely, its emptiness. The implications of this position lead Nagarjuna to construct his doctrinal understanding of the Middle Way, fundamentally positing the Madhyamika two-truths theory which argued that the linguistically constructed truth of mundane reality and the inexpressible truth of ultimate reality were mutually dependent upon one another, thus indicating 5 Collins, 220.

7 the final equation of samsara and nirvana as commensurately empty of reality. Although the Mahayana movement lead by the Madhyamika adherents of Nagarjuna s philosophical doctrine of emptiness had spread far beyond the confines of monastic life into an immense lay base, Mahayana belief and practice still maintained its presence in Buddhist monasteries. However, its most explicit penetration into the scholasticism of monastic life emerged with the rise of the Yogacara (or, Vijnanavada) tradition, founded by Maitreyanatha (Maitreya), and later systematized by Maitreyanatha s pupil Asanga (c CE) and the philosopher Vasubandhu I (c CE), Asanga s brother. This faction of Mahayana set out to account for the origin of sentient existence and the relationship between mundane existence and enlightenment. 6 Following the Madhyamikas, the Vijnanavadins denied the substantiality of external phenomena but did accept as real the pure mental experience or consciousness that produces it. Thus, inverting the Sarvastivadin realist position, the Yogacarins claimed that nothing exists but non-referential consciousness, and sentient being is thus construed as a representation of consciousness to itself. Asanga would philosophically legitimize the epistemological foundation of this Buddhist form of subjective idealism, as well as, the theological assertions concerning the nature of the Bodhisattva attributed to Maitreya by appealing to the Madhyamaka doctrine of emptiness to account for the emptiness of the external world and to implicitly suggest the voidness of consciousness at its deepest levels. However, Asanga s direct focus was not so much concerned with supporting such claims doctrinally as it was directed toward the establishment of systematic meditative techniques and interpreting the way in which the world s appearance is perceived on distinct levels of awareness associated directly with meditative experience. Vasubandhu I, known as the greatest systematic thinker of the Yogacarin tradition, would further defend the doctrine that there exists no extra-mental entities in his complex dynamic idealism, implicitly constructed upon a Hinayana scholastic blueprint inherited from his affiliation with the Sautrantikas school, which 6 Nakamura Hajime, Buddhism, Schools of: Mahayana Buddhism, Encyclopedia of Religion, p.467.

8 accounted for the appearance of the phenomenal world, again, as modes or seeds of consciousness being represented to the consciousness out of which these forms of consciousness arise. With Vasubandhu I, in other words, the notion of causation-by-ideation theory is reformulated by setting the grounding tathata into the Mind-Only context. However, it could finally be argued that the Yogacara school should not be considered as exhibiting the same style of idealism that characterizes certain Vedanta schools (or, perhaps European Idealism), to the extent that it maintained a certain alliance with the Mahayana doctrine of emptiness and the more comprehensive Buddhist teachings which conceived enlightenment to come not with the realization of mind but with its cessation. 7 With this consideration, it seems appropriate to presently shift attention to the notion of Buddhist emptiness as it was predominantly expressed within the Mahayana context. Generally speaking, liberation in Buddhist thought centers around a particular cognitive achievement in that it emphasizes the removal of ignorance and an acquiring of knowledge. The knowledge of emptiness, equated with what is real, is what is acquired as one advances toward an understanding of the Buddha s teaching of Dependent Origination and encounters subsequent Buddhist literature and philosophical doctrine. However, the realization of emptiness is considered an ineffable experience complicated further to the degree that emptiness is finally non-conceptual and hence inconceivable. Thus, to represent emptiness is problematic, especially in terms of relating an experience of emptiness. Yet, Buddhist literature and philosophy such as is found in The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines (more precisely 8,411), The Lotus Sutra, Nagarjuna s Madhyamika-Sastra ( Treatise on the Middle Doctrine ), Candrakirti s Madhyamakavatara ( Introduction of the Middle Way ), and many other Buddhist texts appearing shortly before or contemporaneously with the rise of Mahayana Buddhism all can be perceived as having the implicit focus of directly relating the experience of emptiness in its non-distinctive and non-divisive nature. In order to recognize this assertion explicitly, it is 7 Wood, T. (1991). Mind only: a philosophical and doctrinal analysis of the Vijnanavada. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

9 helpful to trace the ways in which emptiness is described in such texts and to identify the different types of emptiness conceptualized within these writings to gain a clearer understanding of emptiness in general. Given the scope of such a discussion, the numerous texts developing various formulations of the notion of emptiness, and the manner in which the notion of emptiness is employed for different purposes by distinct schools as noted earlier, only preliminary abstract considerations can be offered here concerning the manner in which emptiness is expressed or taught by the Mahayana Buddhists. However, the following considerations are offered in the hope that further discussion in this direction may ensue. Descriptions of emptiness can be discerned in Buddhist writings not only in the form of direct predication but also in the form of metaphor, allegory, and analogy. It is furthermore possible to argue that full narrative accounts of the Buddha s life implicitly convey the notion of emptiness. However, it is more directly the selected predicates of emptiness which give us a sense of what emptiness is. Metaphors such as unborn, unceasing, unproduced, solitary, and uniform, or phrases such as pure from the beginning, without acquisition or rejection, or signless and without marks, indicate the undifferentiatedness of emptiness or its nonduality. Other metaphors and analogical similies such as illusion, dream, echo, and mirror image are also often invoked to connote the insubstantiality of things thereby clarifying the pervasive nature of emptiness as well as its ineffability. Yet, of all the literary devices used in the texts mentioned earlier, perhaps the most interesting is the bi-negative locution used to convey emptiness in the style most particular to Mahayana thought. 8 Here, a disjunctive logical syntax is employed which reads neither A nor not A where A is representative of any phenomenon that is being characterized as empty. 9 This method is illustrated in its early development by Lotus Sutra passages such as: (as to why Buddha lands are not enjoyed...) 8 Fenner, P. (1990). The ontology of the middle way. London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, p Ibid., p. 39.

10 Because all phenomena are uniformly empty, tranquil, without birth, without extinction, without bigness, without smallness, without outflows, without action, And when one ponders in this way, one can feel no delight or joy. (Lotus Sutra, 93) A more sophisticated example of this method, ingeniously employed by Nagarjuna in his Treatise on the Middle Doctrine, reads: What neither is released, nor is it ever reached, What neither is annihilation, nor is it eternality What never disappears, nor has it been created This is Nirvana. It escapes precision. (Madhyamika-Sastra 2., III.) Another form of bi-negative disjunction occurs when a descriptive property (P) is set in relation to A (another entity) in the formulation A is neither P nor not P. An example of this locution can be found in many passages throughout The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines. For instance, when speaking of wisdom (the knowledge of emptiness) Verses 44-47, no.9 reads: Forms are not wisdom, nor is wisdom found in form, In consciousness, perceptions, feeling, or in will. They are not wisdom, and no wisdom is in them, Like space it is, without a break or crack. These methods convey a rigid designation of emptiness by neither adding any affirmative or negative information to the metaphors or phenomenon employed with regard to their qualities, properties, characteristics, etc., but, even more importantly, such syntax conveys a linguistic connection between the ultimate and conventional truths or realities which they simultaneously

11 reject but yet imply. Thus, the Madhyamika designation of the reality of emptiness being identified with both nirvana and samsara is conveyed as is the emptying of emptiness through the emptiness brought to experience by the linguistic disjunction which leaves one with no where to abide. Different types of emptiness are implied by such Buddhist texts as well. The coarsest division of types of emptiness lies in a two-fold division of the emptiness of the self (Atman) and the emptiness of phenomena (dharma). 10 However, later Buddhist philosophy will enumerate this two-fold division into sixteen emptinesses and four meta-divisions of emptinesses, thus creating a total of twenty emptinesses in all. The list of these emptinesses are found in Chandrakirti s Introduction to the Middle Way, 11 but it remains unclear exactly what the four meta-divisions of emptiness are. Yet, one type of emptiness emerges as clearly distinct from the first two-fold division of the emptiness discussed in relation to the self and phenomena. This division is the emptiness of emptiness posited by Nagarjuna to contest both the absolutizing of emptiness and the reification of emptiness. A final meta-division of emptiness can only be inferred through uncertain speculation with regard to this list of twenty emptinesses which primarily has been understood as a guide to facilitate the yogin s meditation on emptiness. This emptiness, perhaps correlated with the great emptiness or the emptiness without beginning or end, could refer to a contextual emptiness which grounds the emptiness connoting the lack of substantiality in all things with the emptiness connoting the fullness of the whole in which all is contained. Emptiness, as ultimately comprehensive in this sense is conceived as the grounding totality or empty extensive continuum for the complete penetration of all forms of emptiness in final no-abidance. Upon final reflection it appears that some key points concerning the context of early Buddhist philosophy have been developed, and the basic character of the more skeptical 10 Ibid., p Candrakirti (c CE) was a representative of the Prasangika school, a later faction of the Madhyamaka school faithful to the teachings of Nagarjuna.

12 soteriological approach of the Madhyamaka school versus the refined soteriology of Yogacara school s complex idealism and meditative practice has been introduced. Also, a preliminary exploration of the Buddhist philosophy of emptiness has been offered primarily to elicit further clues as to whether the Mahayana teachings on emptiness should perhaps finally be perceived as nihilistic, or perhaps might be suggestive of a transcendental monism or absolute existence, or maybe are the final word resolving the enigma of causation. However, much was not discussed in explicit detail and certain major considerations essential to a discussion of early Buddhist philosophy were entirely neglected, such as the nature and role of the Bodhisattva. Thus, there remains much to discuss, including, perhaps, the matter of how other religions respond to the Buddhist notion of emptiness, or in some ways express similar teachings.