Overcoming Regional Challenges in the Middle East: An Iranian Perspective: Q&A

Transcription

1 Transcript Overcoming Regional Challenges in the Middle East: An Iranian Perspective: Q&A Dr Minister of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Iran Chair: Sir Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House; President, British Iranian Chamber of Commerce; British Ambassador to Iran ( ) 4 February 2016 The views expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the speaker(s) and participants do not necessarily reflect the view of Chatham House, its staff, associates or Council. Chatham House is independent and owes no allegiance to any government or to any political body. It does not take institutional positions on policy issues. This document is issued on the understanding that if any extract is used, the author(s)/ speaker(s) and Chatham House should be credited, preferably with the date of the publication or details of the event. Where this document refers to or reports statements made by speakers at an event every effort has been made to provide a fair representation of their views and opinions. The published text of speeches and presentations may differ from delivery. 10 St James s Square, London SW1Y 4LE T +44 (0) F +44 (0) Patron: Her Majesty The Queen Chairman: Stuart Popham QC Director: Dr Robin Niblett Charity Registration Number:

2 2 Overcoming Regional Challenges in the Middle East: Q&A I'm going to start with a question and then I'll throw the floor open. In accordance with the breadth and diversity of Chatham House's work, I shall look for questions across the breadth of the room. Many of the suspicions which give rise to the thought that Iran is not yet serious about seeking a change of paradigm relate to the issue of whether throughout the Iranian system, win-win has been accepted. There are those perhaps who believe that Iran should lay claim to supremacy within the region. How do you respond to that? Well, Iran is not a monolith. Iran has, thankfully, a multitude of voices that express themselves. But I believe that at the end of the day, Iran is a rational actor. We have made it very clearly our policy to accommodate our neighbours. Just look at how we reacted to various developments. Four hundred and sixty-four Iranians were killed in Mina. People have different narratives, but the least you can say is that they died because of Saudi negligence. That's the least you can say. They didn't prepare properly. Twenty million people go from Karbala to Najaf, or Najaf to Karbala, on a day and nothing like that happens. So negligence, at least, caused 464 Iranian deaths. What did we do? Did we break diplomatic relations? Did we downgrade? Then there was another case of negligence. Unfortunately, the Saudi government has not even expressed condolences to the families of the victims. [interjection from audience] No, they didn't. No, they didn't. Show me one way. They said: this was an act of God. Not even condolences to the families of the victims. [interjection from the audience] No, 464 Iranians died and we are yet to receive a single word of condolence. The condolences came after the Mecca incident, after the crane incident in Mecca, not after the Mina incidents, where there was a disproportionate number of Iranian deaths. What happened in Iran? There was negligence. We fired two security officers. We arrested people who were responsible. Not a single Saudi diplomat was injured, not a single Saudi diplomat. Our president condemned it the following morning. We took action. We promised the Saudi government, this is systemwide. This is not just the foreign ministry, this is system-wide. So you asked about the question just test us. People were saying exactly what you said, Sir Richard, that this government cannot implement the nuclear deal. You remember that. When I was negotiating, they said: he will do the talking but when it comes to actually implementing on the ground, they won't implement it. You see that it was implemented. People have not listened. After the Geneva agreement in 2003, the first thing I did was I flew to the Persian Gulf region. Unfortunately at that time, Saudi Arabia was not prepared to receive me. Then after the actual final agreement, even though a lot of our friends in the Persian Gulf had gone to Washington and Camp David and all of that, the first thing I did was I flew to Kuwait and Qatar. I said: we are ready to engage with our Persian Gulf partners. I'm saying it now: we are ready to engage. You don't believe us? Test us. But each time, unfortunately, Saudi Arabia, having defined its interests in a zero-sum perspective, has not been able to respond positively to the articles I wrote, to the trips we made. So as long as they haven't tested us, they can always say that we have a plurality of opinion, of which we are proud.

3 3 Overcoming Regional Challenges in the Middle East: Q&A Question 1 You emphasized a lot today the exclusion of Iran from the Syria talks. This is your first visit to the United Kingdom after 12 years. Are you putting the blame on the UK and Western nations, particularly for not having Iran at the table over Syria? Are you thinking this is why we are in such a stalemate over Syria now? I think we can do a lot of recrimination about the past. Let's look at the future and see what we can do about the future. Now Iran has been invited to the negotiations in Syria. If I can boast, after Iran's invitation to the negotiations, we had the first positive outcome in the negotiations. Let's hope that the current pause in the negotiations is temporary and we can in fact resume the talks, and hopefully move to implement the agreed framework, which is basically the conceptual framework that we presented a couple of years ago to have a ceasefire, a national unity government, a political reform process, and at the end of the day, elections based on those reformed institutions. I want to stay with Syria a little bit longer and perhaps ask you, Your Excellency, whether Iran has a view on who should represent the Syrian opposition in these talks. I think we decided in New York that we should give Staffan de Mistura, the Secretary-General's special envoy, to form the opposition delegation, or to invite opposition members who should be invited. The criteria was that opposition should be inclusive and it should not include recognized terrorist organizations. I think that criteria should apply. I think he should be given the possibility of inviting people. People should not veto organizations or individuals who are not members of terrorist organizations. By terrorist organizations, I would only include three: ISIL (Daesh, as we call it), al-nusra and Al-Qaeda. These three groups are recognized by the UN as terrorist organizations. So we apply that criteria: anybody who is either ISIL, Nusra or card-carrying members of AQ should not be invited. And there are card-carrying members of AQ included in one of the teams. Question 2 Do you see a time where Saudi Arabia and Iran will collaborate? When will that be? Tomorrow, if they're ready. We didn't break diplomatic relations. I'm saying it, and I'm saying it with every possible intention. We are ready to engage with all our neighbours in the Persian Gulf for security in the region, starting tomorrow. If they're ready. Question 3 You mentioned that countries in the region should look for issues where they can work on a non-zero-sum effect and outcome for everyone. I'd like to ask, what do you think prospects are for a weapons of mass

4 4 Overcoming Regional Challenges in the Middle East: Q&A destruction-free zone in the Middle East? What do you think the JCPOA how you think that will affect that. Thank you. I think JCPOA removed any smokescreen that anybody wanted to use in order to avoid discussing establishment of a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East. That is why the first article I wrote after JCPOA, and I think I wrote it either for the Guardian or the Financial Times here was it the Guardian? was that now we've got to go for a nuclear-free world. A nuclear-free Middle East is a good step in the right direction towards that nuclear-free world. So Iran, which initiated in 1974 the idea of establishing a zone free from weapons of at that time, it was a zone free from nuclear weapons. Then it became, upon the initiative of Egypt, a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. We are prepared, and we have been following that. Unfortunately, some people are trying to put the carrot before the horse. That is, the entire idea about non-proliferation is that no security concern justifies working for nuclear weapons or trying to proliferate nuclear weapons. Not that you should resolve your security concerns before you admit or accept nonproliferation. Some people are trying to say in order for them to accept non-proliferation, there has to be a resolution of security concerns. Well, that's a vicious circle that you'll never get. The entire idea about prohibition of nuclear weapons and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is that they don't augment anybody's security that they in fact are threats to everybody's security. That includes, by the way, if I may say, the nuclear weapons of the possessors. Agreed. Question 4 I may be more optimistic than others. I remember a time when Khatami and King Abdullah started good relations, and then things went downhill. But I find it hard to reconcile your statement with what's been mentioned in your own Tehran Times, which stated: 'Mohammad Ali Jafari, the chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, has said that there are about 200,000 armed young forces in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen who are ready to fight extremism and terrorism'. Again, to continue quoting, he described these Iranian youths as 'brave, insightful and faithful'. So to acknowledge this in your semi-official English newspaper, how do you reconcile the two? It's a lie. If he said there are 200 Iranian youths outside Iran ready to fight, he never said that. If anybody reported that he said that, it's simply untrue. The entire Revolutionary Guards has not 200,000 members. So I can tell you that Iran has military advisers in Syria, has military advisers in Iraq, but we have them on the official invitation of the legitimate governments of these two countries. Look in the agenda of the United Nations and you'll see the Syrian Arab Republic and the Government of Iraq legitimately representing these two states. If we are there on their invitation, not with boots on the ground, with military advisers, it's legitimate. Those who are there without the invitation of the government recognised by the United Nations are officially, at least formally, breaking international law.

5 5 Overcoming Regional Challenges in the Middle East: Q&A But we do not have those numbers anywhere. You see, the first part of the sentence was a general statement that he may have said that there are hundreds of thousands of youth who are ready to resist Daesh and Al-Qaeda in all these countries. He's stating a fact. But whether those are Iranians, that's not a quote. You added that. It's not a quote. Question 4 It's in the newspaper. But it's not a quote from him. It may be in the newspaper. A lot of things are in the newspapers. Question 5 I'd like to pass my condolences to you on the death of Ambassador Roknabadi, who was your ambassador in Lebanon. He was a good friend and a good diplomat. You talked about the need for a new paradigm and a new approach. The question I have is that modern states are defined by their monopoly of violence, the fact that their armed forces report to their governments. There is a force in the Middle East there are many forces but one in particular, Hezbollah, which is not responsible to the Lebanese government. There is no request from the Lebanese government for the organization of Hezbollah. It's a force which, of course, has been involved in wars with Israel, which is now fighting in Syria on a purely sectarian basis. You talked of the need for paradigm changes and new approaches. Surely this is one. There is no request from the Lebanese parliament or from the Lebanese government for the organization of this force. Let's look at that question again. Hezbollah is recognized in Lebanon as the party that liberated Lebanon from Israeli occupation. It's recognized as the force that has prevented all these extremist elements from coming into Lebanon and wreaking havoc in Lebanon. And it's a part of the Lebanese government. The debate in Lebanon about armament or disarmament of various groups is still continuing. It has not been resolved. So the latest I know from Lebanon is that Hezbollah is a part of the Lebanese government and we will allow the Lebanese to sort this out. In Lebanon, everybody I talk to, at least in the government there may be opposition, there may be members of the government who oppose this, but believe that resistance should be respected. So let's engage in a serious debate. It's not sectarian. The most dangerous thing you can do is to turn this unfortunate situation in Syria as sectarian. At times, there was very close collaboration between Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey. Did Assad change his religion all of a sudden in 2011, so that they became sectarian? There have been problems. There have been excesses from all sides. But let's not redefine the problem. The worst thing that can happen is we define this as a sectarian problem. Question 5 But Hezbollah defines itself as No, it doesn't. It doesn't.

6 6 Overcoming Regional Challenges in the Middle East: Q&A Question 5 But you can't be a Christian or a That's the nature of the Lebanese political system, unfortunately. But Hezbollah who now has the best chance of winning the presidency, the Christian presidency, in Lebanon? Question 5 That's in their constitution. That's in their constitution, but it is within a political framework where Hezbollah is supporting the Christian candidate. So please, Lebanon has a very peculiar form of government, which is the only way that they could operate. But it doesn't mean that you would push groups and individuals towards looking at the problems from a sectarian perspective. Question 5 It's a zero-sum perspective. It is not a zero-sum but what is a zero-sum perspective? Question 5 There are no other forces other than the Lebanese army, which is formed of people from all [indiscernible]. Then talk to the Lebanese army and see how they collaborate with Hezbollah in liberating some of their towns and villages from Daesh extremists who are coming from Syria into Lebanon. Question 6 One thing I've realized is that despite coming here a lot, I don't feel I know very much about Syria as a country. A lot of my friends outside Chatham House, my peer group, definitely don't know much about Syria, but our press and our politics talk really frequently about how we're going to make a net positive input in Syria if we get involved. I was wondering what your view is in terms of whether Western democracies are making a positive contribution overall in Syria at the moment. I think people make mistakes in Syria, including Western democracies, by trying to put pre-conditions for the beginning of negotiations. Pre-conditions that they now have withdrawn from. You remember for

7 7 Overcoming Regional Challenges in the Middle East: Q&A many months it's been five years. At least for four of those five years, people in the West were saying that negotiations cannot start while President Assad was in power. We thought that that was a wrong precondition, not only because of the fact that the vacuum created in Syria would immediately be filled with Daesh, and instead of a terrorist organization you would have a terrorist state, but because of the fact that you cannot invite people to the negotiating table and ask them to accept the outcome the one possible outcome of the negotiation before they even enter the negotiations. So that was the wrong premise and we are very fortunate that that premise has now been abandoned. Now they're talking about a future. I think that is still an erroneous approach to this problem. We, as non- Syrians, should not set pre-conditions one way or the other, not that Assad should stay and not that Assad should go. That's none of our business. That's the business of the Syrian people. Allow them, facilitate for them to come to the negotiating table, engage with each other, and maybe at the end of the day, that becomes irrelevant, because they will decide to form institutions of the government that no one person will have the sort of power that would make it detrimental to have him or not have him. So let us allow, let us help the Syrians to come to the negotiating table, rather than preclude their negotiations by setting pre-conditions. Question 7 One of the most difficult weeks that I encountered during my tenure as permanent secretary was the time when the British embassy in Tehran was taken over and we had to evacuate our diplomats. I think we're all very pleased that we're now on a better footing and that we're in the process of fully restoring relations. But I wonder if you could say in light of that, and in light of the fact that when I look back over my career, the relationship has been dogged on many occasions by difficulties what is your perception of the relationship with this country now, and what is your aspiration, particularly in the light of the lifting of sanctions that is now underway? Iran and Britain have had traditionally good commercial and economic relations. I think those could resume. We need to work together on moving the political relations forward. I think there are possibilities for cooperation in the region. I think certainly, at least I hope, that the United Kingdom has no interest in seeing turmoil in our region. I hope the United Kingdom has no interest in allowing organizations like ISIL and Nusra to spread, not only in Syria and Iraq but Afghanistan, Central Asia, Libya, all over the place. So I believe there are possibilities. I hope the United Kingdom wants to see an end to this senseless war in Yemen. Nobody can be happy with the fact that for 11 months, innocent people have been bombarded in Yemen. There is no military target in Yemen to hit. People are being hit. And it can continue for a very long time to come, and it will only increase hatred. So all of these are areas of possible collaboration between Iran and the UK, and others in Europe and elsewhere, for a serious, reasonable policy toward ending violence and extremism. You know that we have a proposal for a world against violence and extremism. I think everybody has a stake in that, including the United Kingdom and including countries in the region. So I believe there are a lot of issues on our agenda, but I think what is important right now is the commitment that I heard from Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond in the course of our consultations: that the United Kingdom looked at JCPOA not as a shortterm negotiation and agreement, but as a long-term prospect for ensuring a different type of relationship. We have started that. We have shown our good faith. We have shown our commitment. I'm sure the

8 8 Overcoming Regional Challenges in the Middle East: Q&A United Kingdom has interests economic interests and political interests in rewarding that commitment by fulfilling its own obligations under the JCPOA. I hope that you can convince your friends across the ocean to also come along. Question 8 I completely agree that a win-win can be possible sometimes. I guess one of the best examples we have here in Europe is the very close friendship and cooperation between France and Germany, who have been fighting each other and battling for centuries over the hegemony in Europe. So my first question would be, what concrete steps do you think you would like to take for creating a win-win situation in your region? A second question: how often do you speak to your Saudi counterpart? Not too often these days. But I don't know because I've discussed this twice today, I don't know whether I raised this here. I think we can in fact use a step-by-step approach that you in Europe started with the Helsinki process. That is, there are a number of principles that we can all agree upon, and we can start by committing ourselves to those principles. Principles that are readily acceptable, UN Charter principles non-intervention, respect for territorial integrity, respect for international borders, the inviolability of borders, non-resort to force. Then start areas of confidence-building. We can start with the easier ones free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf. We can have freedom of navigation. We can have the nuclear safety option that I suggested. Then we can go to the more difficult issues, such as even defence transparency. So these are possibilities. We are prepared to work on those. I welcome your belief that you should start to articulate the kind of Middle East, the kind of region which you would hope to see. If I may say so, for that to be articulated at the very highest level in Iran would help deal with the problem that is perceived by so many, of mixed messages coming out of your country. If it were possible for those principles that you articulate to make absolutely clear that Iran intends to work within the state system because much of the suspicion and concern about Iran, if I read it correctly, relates to the fact that Iran has had and still has direct relationships with non-state actors in certain countries. You see, one of the most important characteristics of today's international environment is the emergence of non-state actors, who have even become security actors. And everybody has relations with them. Nonstate actors are becoming more and more a part of our global milieu, and it is impossible to simply try to exclude them. Now, there are non-state actors such as AQ and Nusra and others, where there is a consensus that we need to fight them. But we cannot neglect them, they are a fact of life. But Iran recognizes the states in the Persian Gulf. We recognize international boundaries. We recognize the sovereignty of all these states. I hope that our neighbours do the same, particularly with some of their own neighbours. I hope that everybody recognizes the current state system in this region. I hope everybody refuses to accept the division of Iraq, the division of Syria, the division of Yemen. I hope people go on record saying that they respect the territorial boundaries of the current states in the Persian Gulf region. We are prepared to make that unequivocal commitment. Let's see if others do.

9 9 Overcoming Regional Challenges in the Middle East: Q&A Question 9 The so-called hardliners are already upset over newly signed oil contracts. How can you convince Europeans that the political risk of working in Iran has lessened with the implementation of the deal? Because we have shown that anything we agree with the international community, anything that we agree with anybody, we fulfil our commitments. We have shown it time and again, including during the nuclear deal. There is going to be a plurality of view in Iran and I think that's good. You've got to be used to that. You don't have a monolithic society here. So if you don't have a monolithic society, why do you expect us to have one? Everybody is more worried about the next US president tearing up the agreement than about us not implementing our agreement. I'm sure the next US president will not be able to tear up the agreement, because if we implement that agreement it's so good for everybody that nobody will see it in their interest. Once they enter the White House, not on the campaign trail on the campaign trail they will have interest in saying things that people may like. But once they get to the White House and once they look at the agreement because the agreement was drafted in a way that everybody would benefit from it. So the oil contract, once we have them, it has to go through that difficult process, as the nuclear agreement did. I had to fight that process for several months, as did our counterparts in Washington. But once we made that, we implemented it. The new framework for oil agreements, once it gets through the process in Iran, I'm sure if it's signed, it will be implemented, guaranteed. We are a little worried that maybe there are still some disagreements over the new petroleum contract in Iran, and that these issues of resource nationalism haven't yet been laid to rest. As I said, there will always be disagreement. But whether it will become a commitment of the state or of the National Iranian Oil Company, once that becomes a commitment of the National Iranian Oil Company, it will be respected. Yes, I have every confidence in that. Question 10 Firstly, congratulations on so speedily implementing JCPOA. You mentioned that the implementation of the rest should take time, but I thought the idea was that when the implementation day comes, everything should be implemented. I hope so too.

10 10 Overcoming Regional Challenges in the Middle East: Q&A Question 10 A big worry I have is that in the UK, it is very clear that the UK wants to do trade with Iran the government is supporting it, everybody is very pleased. But at the same time, banks are not able to process transactions. There are reasons for it, and the reasons are to do with our American cousins. So what do you expect the UK government to do to enable banking transactions? As an example, two Iranian banks that have been authorized now by the regulator to fully transact are not able to do any transactions because no bank is ready or willing to accept a corresponding banking relationship with them. What is it that you expect from us? That's what I said and what I meant the difference would be between implementing the commitments of the United States on paper, and implementing it in practice. Many banks in Europe have been fined by the US Justice Department and by OPAC rather heavily. Now they are over-complying. The problem is in fact over-compliance. I believe the UK government, as well as other governments in Europe, have a stake not just an economic stake but a political stake, and I think in the political stakes the US government is also a political stakeholder in making sure that these banks could be given the necessary assurances that the United States will no longer intervene. I have been assured by Secretary Kerry, including in our conversation today, that he will make sure that European banks will not have any restrictions in doing legitimate business with Iran. I'm sure that Secretary Hammond, Foreign Secretary Fabius and Foreign Minister Steinmeier are working also with their American colleagues in order to make sure that this process goes through smoothly. That was the part that I said may require some time, because rebuilding the confidence of the banks that the United States will not re-intervene in their relations with Iran may require some further assurance from the United States. I hope that is fast coming, because if not, then it would be a problem in implementation of the JCPOA. We gave the same message to Deputy Assistant Secretary Keller at a meeting in Chatham House recently, that what he called a 'bright line', that the Americans wouldn't go after banks that are in compliance with their legal obligations, is now needed. No, we don't need any more legalese. We need assurances in pure English. This is my message. This was the message that I gave Secretary Kerry during our negotiations. I'm a lawyer, he's a lawyer. Let the lawyers go home, we can work out the details. We don't need legalese, we need clear, precise assurances that banks can do business with Iran. I'm sure OPAC and the other parts of the US government are capable of writing good English. They don't need to write in legalese. Question 11 You said Iran is a rational player and we can test that. I can talk about my own industry. Your government continues to arrest Iranian journalists, especially those who are living overseas. They are harassing family members. I wonder what your government wants to do in that regard.

11 11 Overcoming Regional Challenges in the Middle East: Q&A I can have an easy answer to your question, and tell you our judiciary is independent. They very much respect their independence and do not want government interference in their activities. But it's a process and we are working with the judiciary in order to make sure that freedom of the press is ensured to its fullest extent. That was one of the promises of President Rouhani. He is working on a national citizens' rights agenda. He will issue it soon and I hope it will be an important achievement in our government. Question 12 Recently, Turkish-Russian relations have deteriorated because of the shooting down of the Russian jet plane. I think Iran wants to be a mediating role in the relations. That's what I read from Rouhani's side. So my question is, how did this pursue from the Russian side and the Turkish side, and did Iran take any practical steps towards this issue? We never said that we wanted to mediate, but we've always said that we have good relations with Turkey and we have good relations with Russia, and we want our region to be free from further tension. Because it's not free from tension, it would be delusional to hope we would be free from tension. But free from further tension, free from exacerbation. So we are available to both our Turkish and Russian friends. We will continue to work with both of them. We believe that restraint should prevail and reason should prevail, and we should move for greater cooperation in this region to address the common problem, which is ISIL and Nusra and the other challenges facing all of us. Question 13 There are hopes that the Iran nuclear deal will translate into greater liberalization in Iranian domestic politics, empowering reformers and improving relations between Iran's society and the state. How do you feel the Iranian nuclear deal will change the trajectory of domestic politics in Iran? I do not want to make the nuclear deal a reformist versus conservative issue in Iran. It's a victory for diplomacy. It's a victory for reason and moderation. I hope that all segments of Iranian society, whom I respect moderates, conservatives, reformers could benefit from this. I think the message of hope for the future is the message that this nuclear deal has given to the Iranian society, and you see the outcome within the Iranian population. There are people who did not like this. There are people in Iran who were, in my view, not unreasonably suspicious of whether the United States particularly would live up to its commitments. I hope they are proven wrong. It requires a lot of effort by the United States. Once that is done, then we have removed a major hurdle. Thank you very much indeed. Thank you, audience, for your excellent questions and for not making speeches. We'll draw proceedings to a close now with a round of applause for our speaker. Thank you very much indeed.

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