# Handout for: Ibn Sīnā: analysis with modal syllogisms

Size: px
Start display at page:

## Transcription

1 Handout for: Ibn Sīnā: analysis with modal syllogisms Wilfrid Hodges November Peiorem rule Ibn Sīnā introduces the peiorem rule at Qiyās as follows: Know that there is no syllogism from two negative premises, or from two existentially quantified premises.... And know that the conclusion follows the worse of the two premises, not in every respect, but in quantity and quality though not in modality. (1) (The text is after correcting ahsan ( better ) to ak ass ( worse ), as required by the logic.) The corresponding passage in Išārāt runs: Don t pay attention to what is said to the effect that the conclusion follows the worse of the two premises in every respect. It s [just] in quality and quantity note the exception mentioned above. The main difference seems to be that in Qiyās Ibn Sīnā introduces the peiorem rule at the head of his discussion of absolute moods of the syllogism, as one of a number of guiding principles. In Išārāt he delays it to near the end of his treatment of the first figure, so that he can point to a counterexample to applying it to modalities. A further point about the peiorem rule: Ibn Sīnā s counterexample is worthless as it stands, because it depends on the arbitrary decision to 1 (2)

2 count universally quantified descriptionals (see below) as not necessary. We know that this decision is arbitrary, because when he has his epistemological hat on, Ibn Sīnā votes the other way. To take a favourite example of his, The moon gets eclipsed merely reports temporary events and so has no necessity. But if we study astronomy and expand it to The moon with the earth passing between it and the sun is eclipsed, we have a proposition which states the cause of its predicate and hence has both necessity and certainty. (The examples count as universally quantified, Ibn Sīnā explains, not because they are singular but because they apply to anything that is a moon; it s irrelevant that the earth happens to have just one.) Maybe Ibn Sīnā responds to this point somewhere. It s my strong impression that he is not in the habit of dressing up terminological decisions as real discoveries. One possible resolution is that the counterexample is merely meant to show that we can t take the peiorem rule as robust, because there are defensible decisions about modality that produce counterexamples to it. This is a very fair point. But if Ibn Sīnā offers the counterexample in this spirit, without further explanation, this does suggest that other statements of his are made in the spirit of This is one view you could reasonably take, not as views that he commits himself to. I do believe that. 2 References to descriptional reading The descriptional reading of Every A is a B is Every A is a B so long as it continues to be an A. Ibn Sīnā calls this reading lāzim in Easterners. Elsewhere he has no special name for it, and he spells out the sense when he needs to refer to it. (The word wasfī apparently never occurs in Ibn Sīnā s logical writings.) Below I list the places in Qiyās Chs. iii, iv and Išārāt vii where I found descriptionals mentioned. They match pretty closely, though Qiyās has several items not in Išārāt. In Qiyās 36.8, 43.2 and Išārāt iii 10, iv 2, Ibn Sīnā introduces the descriptional readings. His usual formulation goes along the lines Every C is a B so long as it continues to fit the description C (mā dāma mawṣūfan bi C) which suggests he thinks of C as a description that holds over continuous intervals. But an example at Qiyās shows that he is well aware of 2 (3)

3 descriptions that hold at repeated separate points of time. So my guess is that he just means at all times at which it is a C. (For the negative descriptionals, see Qiyās and Išārāt iv 6; in both passages he discusses specific languages.) Two other descriptional readings are worth a mention. First, Ibn Sīnā sometimes adds necessarily, as for example at Qiyās This conflicts with other things he says about necessity; I can t offer a clarification. (At Qiyās 36.8 he adds a redundant permanently.) Second, at Išārāt i.4, Inati p. 137 we find Every C is a B so long as it continues to fit the description C, but not always. (4) This reading may be a figment. As Ibn Sīnā says explicitly, his point here is about wujūdī sentences, which deny permanence; so the descriptional part is probably an accidental irrelevance. This is one of the passages mentioned below where Ibn Sīnā attacks uses of descriptionals by other logicians; so maybe he has just copied a text in front of him. There are four argument-forms where Ibn Sīnā invokes descriptionals. They are as follows. Every C is a B as long as it exists. Every B is a C at all times when it is a B. Therefore every C is an A as long as it exists. (5) (5) is at Qiyās Same as (5) but with Some C in minor and conclusion. (6) (6) is at Qiyās 129.5f, though as a follow-on from (1) with no explicit mention of descriptionals. Every C is a B as long as it exists. No B is an A at any time while it is a B. Therefore no C is an A at any time while it exists. (7) (7) is at Qiyās Some C is a B as long as it exists. No B is an A at any time while it is a B. Therefore some C is not an A at any time while it exists. (8) 3

4 (8) is at Qiyās , but he leaves it to the reader to work out what sense of absolute is needed to make it work. All four arguments are covered by a very laconic statement in Išārāt vii.4, which again leaves it to the reader to find the relevant sense of absolute (though with a clue). Paul Thom suggests (Medieval Modal Systems p. 74) that Ibn Sīnā was the first to construct a theory articulating the inferential capacities of [the descriptional] propositions, their logic. This is possible but I think unlikely. Already in the 2nd century AD, Sosigenes was proposing to use descriptionals in modal Barbara; Flannery in Ways into the Logic of Alexander of Aphrodisias Ch. 2 has a detailed discussion. Also in Qiyās (parallelled in Išārāt vii 4) and Qiyās ff there are two places where Ibn Sīnā discusses and rejects some uses of descriptionals by earlier logicians. The inferential capacities that Ibn Sīnā notes are limited to (5) (8) above, and Ibn Sīnā claims no originality for these observations. At least in Qiyās and Išārāt, Ibn Sīnā makes no attempt to draw out the logic of these propositions any further. Ibn Sīnā says in one place that the use of descriptionals has been customary : And likewise the custom has been (qad jarrat al- c āda) to use the sentence Every B is an A. with the meaning that every B is an A while it is a B. (Qiyās f.) From the context, custom here refers to custom in scientific writing and in debate. So he could still claim to have been the first person to have detected this custom; but in fact he doesn t claim this, and from the references above it seems unlikely. So what is original in Ibn Sīnā s treatment of descriptionals? The answer seems to be the semantic context in which he explains them. There are three components to this: (1) He argues that all descriptions contain a temporal reference, usually implicit. For example eclipsed has to mean eclipsed at time t (he says at a time which is indeterminate, ġayr mu c ayyan, e.g. Qiyās 23.13f). This is a special case of a much more general observation about implied parameters; for example father means father of y, where the of y is normally implicit. 4

5 Comment. So it s not appropriate to speak of ampliation here. Ampliation is where a restriction on the range of values is lifted. But at the basic level Ibn Sīnā has no temporal restriction. (2) He argues that in normal usage the speaker will intend some condition (šarṭ) which makes the parameter definite. For example I might notice an eclipse and say The moon is eclipsed, where a full analysis would be If t is the present moment, then the moon is eclipsed at t. Or I might add (explicitly or tacitly) a more elaborate condition, thus: At every time t when the earth comes between the sun and the moon, the moon is eclipsed at time t. Normal usage in the relevant context will show what kind of condition is likely to be meant. Ibn Sīnā gives examples where the descriptional reading is clearly appropriate: Everybody who writes moves his hand. (Sc. at any time t, everybody who writes at time t moves his hand at time t.) But also he gives examples where it is clearly not the right reading: Everything that breathes in breathes out. Comment. These are factual observations about customary meanings; they are not recommendations or requirements. So statements in Ibn Sīnā that we ought to use the descriptional reading are presumably short for something like need to if we want to regard the argument as Barbara XLL. (3) He argues that when sentences with indeterminates are used, a common interpretation is that the indeterminate is existentially quantified. In some cases this is clearly correct: He is a father means He is a father of someone. (And in this case Ibn Sīnā offers a deeper analysis that includes a further existential quantification: There was an occasion on which he begat....) But Ibn Sīnā himself remarks that usage doesn t always go along with this; for example we would never say He is walking and intend Someone is walking somewhere ( c Ibāra ). In cases like Every animal breathes he suggests a meaning For every animal there is a time in its life at which the animal breathes. This is not very convincing, but I don t believe I can offer anything better using only temporal quantification; I suppose one needs to refer to the regular functioning of an organism. Comment. Again these are factual observations about actual usage. Ibn Sīnā is not well served by translations like Every animal is breathing in 5

6 place of Every animal breathes. Granted, there are cases (particularly involving negations) where it is rather obscure what usage he thinks he is reporting. 3 The modal syllogisms in Qiyās Chs. iii, iv Zayd is white. Everything white is necessarily of a colour dispersed for vision. (126.11) (9) Every colour in the shade is necessarily black. No colour of a heavenly body is black. (133.1) (10) No animal is human. Everything rational is human necessarily. (142.2) (11) Every A is necessarily an actual laugher. Every actual laugher is human. (143.3) (12) Everything that rises moves. Everything that moves is necessarily a body. (149.1) (13) Necessarily not every white thing is an animal. Every human is an animal. (151.12) (14) Everything that breathes is an animal necessarily. Every human breathes not necessarily. (156.12) (15) Every horse is an animal. No horse sleeps necessarily. (157.6) (16) 6

7 Every animal wakes. Some animals have two legs necessarily. (158.5) (17) Necessarily every human is an animal. Not every human wakes. (159.2) (18) Everything with two legs is an animal. Necessarily not everything with two legs moves. (159.7) (19) Every human can be white. Some white thing can be an animal. (188.11) (20) It s possible that every human is white. It s possible that every white thing is a horse. (189.9) (21) Every moving thing is a human. Every horse can be moving. (193.12) (22) Every human can write. Every human touches the paper with his pen. (196.16) (23) Every human can meditate. No meditator is a crow. (197.10) (24) Every human can move. Every moving thing is a body necessarily. (203.11) (25) Every phoenix is white necessarily. Every human is possibly not white. (217.13) (26) Everything that wakes moves necessarily. Every animal can move. (222.11) Išārāt vii has two example syllogisms, but neither of them is modal. 7 (27)

8 4 From Al-Nayrizī s edition of Euclid Elements 1 In Proposition 6: If it is possible to have two angles [of a triangle] equal but their sides not equal, let the side AB be greater than the side AG. In Proposition 7: I say that it is not possible to have a line from point A that is equal to the line AG and a line from the point B that is equal to the line BG, such that the two lines coincide at their other end in a point distinct from G. If it is possible, let them be drawn and let them be AD and BD. In Proposition 8: If it is possible to translate one [triangle] onto the other so that their bases coincide but their sides do not, let us do that. In Proposition 14: For if it is possible for us to draw a line other than BD to the point B so that the two lines join to make a straight line, let this line be BE. For this mathematical style of possibility, which is just as common in modern university texts as it was in Euclid, see Hodges, Modality in mathematics, Logique et Analyse (forthcoming). 8

### Ibn Sīnā s modal logic

1 3 Ibn Sīnā s modal logic Wilfrid Hodges Herons Brook, Sticklepath, Okehampton November 2012 http://wilfridhodges.co.uk/arabic20a.pdf For Ibn Sīnā, logic is a tool for checking the correctness of arguments.

### What would count as Ibn Sīnā (11th century Persia) having first order logic?

1 2 What would count as Ibn Sīnā (11th century Persia) having first order logic? Wilfrid Hodges Herons Brook, Sticklepath, Okehampton March 2012 http://wilfridhodges.co.uk Ibn Sina, 980 1037 3 4 Ibn Sīnā

### Ibn Sīnā: analysis with modal syllogisms. Dedicated to my grandson Austin Jacob Hodges (6lb) born Wednesday 16 November 2011

1 3 Ibn Sīnā: analysis with modal syllogisms Wilfrid Hodges Herons Brook, Sticklepath, Okehampton November 2011 http://wilfridhodges.co.uk Tony Street asked me to speak on Ibn Sīnā s modal syllogisms.

### Selections from Aristotle s Prior Analytics 41a21 41b5

Lesson Seventeen The Conditional Syllogism Selections from Aristotle s Prior Analytics 41a21 41b5 It is clear then that the ostensive syllogisms are effected by means of the aforesaid figures; these considerations

### 1/9. The First Analogy

1/9 The First Analogy So far we have looked at the mathematical principles but now we are going to turn to the dynamical principles, of which there are two sorts, the Analogies of Experience and the Postulates

### Reconciling Greek mathematics and Greek logic - Galen s question and Ibn Sina s answer

1 3 Reconciling Greek mathematics and Greek logic - Galen s question and Ibn Sina s answer Wilfrid Hodges Herons Brook, Sticklepath, Okehampton November 2011 http://wilfridhodges.co.uk We have sometimes

### Ibn Sīnā on Logical Analysis. Wilfrid Hodges and Amirouche Moktefi

Ibn Sīnā on Logical Analysis Wilfrid Hodges and Amirouche Moktefi Draft January 2013 2 Contents 1 Ibn Sīnā himself 5 1.1 Life................................. 5 1.2 Colleagues and students.....................

### Facts and Free Logic R. M. Sainsbury

Facts and Free Logic R. M. Sainsbury Facts are structures which are the case, and they are what true sentences affirm. It is a fact that Fido barks. It is easy to list some of its components, Fido and

### SYLLOGISTIC LOGIC CATEGORICAL PROPOSITIONS

Prof. C. Byrne Dept. of Philosophy SYLLOGISTIC LOGIC Syllogistic logic is the original form in which formal logic was developed; hence it is sometimes also referred to as Aristotelian logic after Aristotle,

### Logic: Deductive and Inductive by Carveth Read M.A. CHAPTER IX CHAPTER IX FORMAL CONDITIONS OF MEDIATE INFERENCE

CHAPTER IX CHAPTER IX FORMAL CONDITIONS OF MEDIATE INFERENCE Section 1. A Mediate Inference is a proposition that depends for proof upon two or more other propositions, so connected together by one or

### Facts and Free Logic. R. M. Sainsbury

R. M. Sainsbury 119 Facts are structures which are the case, and they are what true sentences affirm. It is a fact that Fido barks. It is easy to list some of its components, Fido and the property of barking.

### Reply to Kit Fine. Theodore Sider July 19, 2013

Reply to Kit Fine Theodore Sider July 19, 2013 Kit Fine s paper raises important and difficult issues about my approach to the metaphysics of fundamentality. In chapters 7 and 8 I examined certain subtle

### Complications for Categorical Syllogisms. PHIL 121: Methods of Reasoning February 27, 2013 Instructor:Karin Howe Binghamton University

Complications for Categorical Syllogisms PHIL 121: Methods of Reasoning February 27, 2013 Instructor:Karin Howe Binghamton University Overall Plan First, I will present some problematic propositions and

### Anthony P. Andres. The Place of Conversion in Aristotelian Logic. Anthony P. Andres

[ Loyola Book Comp., run.tex: 0 AQR Vol. W rev. 0, 17 Jun 2009 ] [The Aquinas Review Vol. W rev. 0: 1 The Place of Conversion in Aristotelian Logic From at least the time of John of St. Thomas, scholastic

### Conference on the Epistemology of Keith Lehrer, PUCRS, Porto Alegre (Brazil), June

2 Reply to Comesaña* Réplica a Comesaña Carl Ginet** 1. In the Sentence-Relativity section of his comments, Comesaña discusses my attempt (in the Relativity to Sentences section of my paper) to convince

### Intro Viewed from a certain angle, philosophy is about what, if anything, we ought to believe.

Overview Philosophy & logic 1.2 What is philosophy? 1.3 nature of philosophy Why philosophy Rules of engagement Punctuality and regularity is of the essence You should be active in class It is good to

### Ayer on the criterion of verifiability

Ayer on the criterion of verifiability November 19, 2004 1 The critique of metaphysics............................. 1 2 Observation statements............................... 2 3 In principle verifiability...............................

### Overview. Is there a priori knowledge? No: Mill, Quine. Is there synthetic a priori knowledge? Yes: faculty of a priori intuition (Rationalism, Kant)

Overview Is there a priori knowledge? Is there synthetic a priori knowledge? No: Mill, Quine Yes: faculty of a priori intuition (Rationalism, Kant) No: all a priori knowledge analytic (Ayer) No A Priori

### KANT S EXPLANATION OF THE NECESSITY OF GEOMETRICAL TRUTHS. John Watling

KANT S EXPLANATION OF THE NECESSITY OF GEOMETRICAL TRUTHS John Watling Kant was an idealist. His idealism was in some ways, it is true, less extreme than that of Berkeley. He distinguished his own by calling

### Verificationism. PHIL September 27, 2011

Verificationism PHIL 83104 September 27, 2011 1. The critique of metaphysics... 1 2. Observation statements... 2 3. In principle verifiability... 3 4. Strong verifiability... 3 4.1. Conclusive verifiability

### Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity Robert Merrihew Adams

Robert Merrihew Adams Let us begin at the end, where Adams states simply the view that, he says, he has defended in his paper: Thisnesses and transworld identities are primitive but logically connected

### Predicate logic. Miguel Palomino Dpto. Sistemas Informáticos y Computación (UCM) Madrid Spain

Predicate logic Miguel Palomino Dpto. Sistemas Informáticos y Computación (UCM) 28040 Madrid Spain Synonyms. First-order logic. Question 1. Describe this discipline/sub-discipline, and some of its more

### Moore on External Relations

Moore on External Relations G. J. Mattey Fall, 2005 / Philosophy 156 The Dogma of Internal Relations Moore claims that there is a dogma held by philosophers such as Bradley and Joachim, that all relations

### A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC FOR METAPHYSICIANS

A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC FOR METAPHYSICIANS 0. Logic, Probability, and Formal Structure Logic is often divided into two distinct areas, inductive logic and deductive logic. Inductive logic is concerned

### How Gödelian Ontological Arguments Fail

How Gödelian Ontological Arguments Fail Matthew W. Parker Abstract. Ontological arguments like those of Gödel (1995) and Pruss (2009; 2012) rely on premises that initially seem plausible, but on closer

### PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS & THE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE

PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS & THE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE Now, it is a defect of [natural] languages that expressions are possible within them, which, in their grammatical form, seemingly determined to designate

### Ayer s linguistic theory of the a priori

Ayer s linguistic theory of the a priori phil 43904 Jeff Speaks December 4, 2007 1 The problem of a priori knowledge....................... 1 2 Necessity and the a priori............................ 2

### A Note on a Remark of Evans *

Penultimate draft of a paper published in the Polish Journal of Philosophy 10 (2016), 7-15. DOI: 10.5840/pjphil20161028 A Note on a Remark of Evans * Wolfgang Barz Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt

### (2480 words) 1. Introduction

DYNAMIC MODALITY IN A POSSIBLE WORLDS FRAMEWORK (2480 words) 1. Introduction Abilities no doubt have a modal nature, but how to spell out this modal nature is up to debate. In this essay, one approach

### The Ontological Argument for the existence of God. Pedro M. Guimarães Ferreira S.J. PUC-Rio Boston College, July 13th. 2011

The Ontological Argument for the existence of God Pedro M. Guimarães Ferreira S.J. PUC-Rio Boston College, July 13th. 2011 The ontological argument (henceforth, O.A.) for the existence of God has a long

### The Summa Lamberti on the Properties of Terms

MP_C06.qxd 11/17/06 5:28 PM Page 66 6 The Summa Lamberti on the Properties of Terms [1. General Introduction] (205) Because the logician considers terms, it is appropriate for him to give an account of

### Ayer and Quine on the a priori

Ayer and Quine on the a priori November 23, 2004 1 The problem of a priori knowledge Ayer s book is a defense of a thoroughgoing empiricism, not only about what is required for a belief to be justified

### Prior, Berkeley, and the Barcan Formula. James Levine Trinity College, Dublin

Prior, Berkeley, and the Barcan Formula James Levine Trinity College, Dublin In his 1955 paper Berkeley in Logical Form, A. N. Prior argues that in his so called master argument for idealism, Berkeley

### Philosophy of Mathematics Nominalism

Philosophy of Mathematics Nominalism Owen Griffiths oeg21@cam.ac.uk Churchill and Newnham, Cambridge 8/11/18 Last week Ante rem structuralism accepts mathematical structures as Platonic universals. We

### Wittgenstein s Logical Atomism. Seminar 8 PHIL2120 Topics in Analytic Philosophy 16 November 2012

Wittgenstein s Logical Atomism Seminar 8 PHIL2120 Topics in Analytic Philosophy 16 November 2012 1 Admin Required reading for this seminar: Soames, Ch 9+10 New Schedule: 23 November: The Tractarian Test

### Quine on the analytic/synthetic distinction

Quine on the analytic/synthetic distinction Jeff Speaks March 14, 2005 1 Analyticity and synonymy.............................. 1 2 Synonymy and definition ( 2)............................ 2 3 Synonymy

### 2.3. Failed proofs and counterexamples

2.3. Failed proofs and counterexamples 2.3.0. Overview Derivations can also be used to tell when a claim of entailment does not follow from the principles for conjunction. 2.3.1. When enough is enough

### Could have done otherwise, action sentences and anaphora

Could have done otherwise, action sentences and anaphora HELEN STEWARD What does it mean to say of a certain agent, S, that he or she could have done otherwise? Clearly, it means nothing at all, unless

### SAVING RELATIVISM FROM ITS SAVIOUR

CRÍTICA, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía Vol. XXXI, No. 91 (abril 1999): 91 103 SAVING RELATIVISM FROM ITS SAVIOUR MAX KÖLBEL Doctoral Programme in Cognitive Science Universität Hamburg In his paper

### Van Fraassen: Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism

Aaron Leung Philosophy 290-5 Week 11 Handout Van Fraassen: Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism 1. Scientific Realism and Constructive Empiricism What is scientific realism? According to van Fraassen,

### Pastor-teacher Don Hargrove Faith Bible Church September 8, 2011

Pastor-teacher Don Hargrove Faith Bible Church http://www.fbcweb.org/doctrines.html September 8, 2011 Building Mental Muscle & Growing the Mind through Logic Exercises: Lesson 4a The Three Acts of the

### (Refer Slide Time 03:00)

Artificial Intelligence Prof. Anupam Basu Department of Computer Science and Engineering Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur Lecture - 15 Resolution in FOPL In the last lecture we had discussed about

### A Brief Introduction to Key Terms

1 A Brief Introduction to Key Terms 5 A Brief Introduction to Key Terms 1.1 Arguments Arguments crop up in conversations, political debates, lectures, editorials, comic strips, novels, television programs,

### A Problem for a Direct-Reference Theory of Belief Reports. Stephen Schiffer New York University

A Problem for a Direct-Reference Theory of Belief Reports Stephen Schiffer New York University The direct-reference theory of belief reports to which I allude is the one held by such theorists as Nathan

### HANDBOOK (New or substantially modified material appears in boxes.)

1 HANDBOOK (New or substantially modified material appears in boxes.) I. ARGUMENT RECOGNITION Important Concepts An argument is a unit of reasoning that attempts to prove that a certain idea is true by

### Empty Names and Two-Valued Positive Free Logic

Empty Names and Two-Valued Positive Free Logic 1 Introduction Zahra Ahmadianhosseini In order to tackle the problem of handling empty names in logic, Andrew Bacon (2013) takes on an approach based on positive

### Logic: Deductive and Inductive by Carveth Read M.A. CHAPTER VI CONDITIONS OF IMMEDIATE INFERENCE

CHAPTER VI CONDITIONS OF IMMEDIATE INFERENCE Section 1. The word Inference is used in two different senses, which are often confused but should be carefully distinguished. In the first sense, it means

### HANDBOOK. IV. Argument Construction Determine the Ultimate Conclusion Construct the Chain of Reasoning Communicate the Argument 13

1 HANDBOOK TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Argument Recognition 2 II. Argument Analysis 3 1. Identify Important Ideas 3 2. Identify Argumentative Role of These Ideas 4 3. Identify Inferences 5 4. Reconstruct the

### What is the Frege/Russell Analysis of Quantification? Scott Soames

What is the Frege/Russell Analysis of Quantification? Scott Soames The Frege-Russell analysis of quantification was a fundamental advance in semantics and philosophical logic. Abstracting away from details

### KAPLAN RIGIDITY, TIME, A ND MODALITY. Gilbert PLUMER

KAPLAN RIGIDITY, TIME, A ND MODALITY Gilbert PLUMER Some have claimed that though a proper name might denote the same individual with respect to any possible world (or, more generally, possible circumstance)

### Ethical non-naturalism

Michael Lacewing Ethical non-naturalism Ethical non-naturalism is usually understood as a form of cognitivist moral realism. So we first need to understand what cognitivism and moral realism is before

### There are three aspects of possible worlds on which metaphysicians

Lewis s Argument for Possible Worlds 1. Possible Worlds: You can t swing a cat in contemporary metaphysics these days without hitting a discussion involving possible worlds. What are these things? Embarrassingly,

### the aim is to specify the structure of the world in the form of certain basic truths from which all truths can be derived. (xviii)

PHIL 5983: Naturalness and Fundamentality Seminar Prof. Funkhouser Spring 2017 Week 8: Chalmers, Constructing the World Notes (Introduction, Chapters 1-2) Introduction * We are introduced to the ideas

### HANDBOOK (New or substantially modified material appears in boxes.)

1 HANDBOOK (New or substantially modified material appears in boxes.) I. ARGUMENT RECOGNITION Important Concepts An argument is a unit of reasoning that attempts to prove that a certain idea is true by

### Am I free? Freedom vs. Fate

Am I free? Freedom vs. Fate We ve been discussing the free will defense as a response to the argument from evil. This response assumes something about us: that we have free will. But what does this mean?

### Broad on Theological Arguments. I. The Ontological Argument

Broad on God Broad on Theological Arguments I. The Ontological Argument Sample Ontological Argument: Suppose that God is the most perfect or most excellent being. Consider two things: (1)An entity that

### Overview of Today s Lecture

Branden Fitelson Philosophy 12A Notes 1 Overview of Today s Lecture Music: Robin Trower, Daydream (King Biscuit Flower Hour concert, 1977) Administrative Stuff (lots of it) Course Website/Syllabus [i.e.,

### Syllogism. Exam Importance Exam Importance. CAT Very Important IBPS/Bank PO Very Important. XAT Very Important BANK Clerk Very Important

1 About Disha publication One of the leading publishers in India, Disha Publication provides books and study materials for schools and various competitive exams being continuously held across the country.

### Richard L. W. Clarke, Notes REASONING

1 REASONING Reasoning is, broadly speaking, the cognitive process of establishing reasons to justify beliefs, conclusions, actions or feelings. It also refers, more specifically, to the act or process

### Theories of propositions

Theories of propositions phil 93515 Jeff Speaks January 16, 2007 1 Commitment to propositions.......................... 1 2 A Fregean theory of reference.......................... 2 3 Three theories of

### Hume s Missing Shade of Blue as a Possible Key. to Certainty in Geometry

Hume s Missing Shade of Blue as a Possible Key to Certainty in Geometry Brian S. Derickson PH 506: Epistemology 10 November 2015 David Hume s epistemology is a radical form of empiricism. It states that

### Spinoza s Modal-Ontological Argument for Monism

Spinoza s Modal-Ontological Argument for Monism One of Spinoza s clearest expressions of his monism is Ethics I P14, and its corollary 1. 1 The proposition reads: Except God, no substance can be or be

### It Ain t What You Prove, It s the Way That You Prove It. a play by Chris Binge

It Ain t What You Prove, It s the Way That You Prove It a play by Chris Binge (From Alchin, Nicholas. Theory of Knowledge. London: John Murray, 2003. Pp. 66-69.) Teacher: Good afternoon class. For homework

### Semantic Foundations for Deductive Methods

Semantic Foundations for Deductive Methods delineating the scope of deductive reason Roger Bishop Jones Abstract. The scope of deductive reason is considered. First a connection is discussed between the

### This is an electronic reprint of the original article. This reprint may differ from the original in pagination and typographic detail.

This is an electronic reprint of the original article. This reprint may differ from the original in pagination and typographic detail. Author(s): Yrjönsuuri, Mikko Title: Obligations and conditionals Year:

### 16. Universal derivation

16. Universal derivation 16.1 An example: the Meno In one of Plato s dialogues, the Meno, Socrates uses questions and prompts to direct a young slave boy to see that if we want to make a square that has

### 1/12. The A Paralogisms

1/12 The A Paralogisms The character of the Paralogisms is described early in the chapter. Kant describes them as being syllogisms which contain no empirical premises and states that in them we conclude

### Introduction Symbolic Logic

An Introduction to Symbolic Logic Copyright 2006 by Terence Parsons all rights reserved CONTENTS Chapter One Sentential Logic with 'if' and 'not' 1 SYMBOLIC NOTATION 2 MEANINGS OF THE SYMBOLIC NOTATION

### Logic: Deductive and Inductive by Carveth Read M.A. CHAPTER V THE CLASSIFICATION OF PROPOSITIONS

CHAPTER V THE CLASSIFICATION OF PROPOSITIONS Section 1. Logicians classify Propositions according to Quantity, Quality, Relation and Modality. As to Quantity, propositions are either Universal or Particular;

### CHAPTER THREE ON SEEING GOD THROUGH HIS IMAGE IMPRINTED IN OUR NATURAL POWERS

BONAVENTURE, ITINERARIUM, TRANSL. O. BYCHKOV 21 CHAPTER THREE ON SEEING GOD THROUGH HIS IMAGE IMPRINTED IN OUR NATURAL POWERS 1. The two preceding steps, which have led us to God by means of his vestiges,

### Varieties of Apriority

S E V E N T H E X C U R S U S Varieties of Apriority T he notions of a priori knowledge and justification play a central role in this work. There are many ways in which one can understand the a priori,

### The Problem of Major Premise in Buddhist Logic

The Problem of Major Premise in Buddhist Logic TANG Mingjun The Institute of Philosophy Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Shanghai, P.R. China Abstract: This paper is a preliminary inquiry into the main

### Evaluating Classical Identity and Its Alternatives by Tamoghna Sarkar

Evaluating Classical Identity and Its Alternatives by Tamoghna Sarkar Western Classical theory of identity encompasses either the concept of identity as introduced in the first-order logic or language

### PHI 1700: Global Ethics

PHI 1700: Global Ethics Session 3 February 11th, 2016 Harman, Ethics and Observation 1 (finishing up our All About Arguments discussion) A common theme linking many of the fallacies we covered is that

### Williams on Supervaluationism and Logical Revisionism

Williams on Supervaluationism and Logical Revisionism Nicholas K. Jones Non-citable draft: 26 02 2010. Final version appeared in: The Journal of Philosophy (2011) 108: 11: 633-641 Central to discussion

### Baronett, Logic (4th ed.) Chapter Guide

Chapter 6: Categorical Syllogisms Baronett, Logic (4th ed.) Chapter Guide A. Standard-form Categorical Syllogisms A categorical syllogism is an argument containing three categorical propositions: two premises

### Resemblance Nominalism and counterparts

ANAL63-3 4/15/2003 2:40 PM Page 221 Resemblance Nominalism and counterparts Alexander Bird 1. Introduction In his (2002) Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra provides a powerful articulation of the claim that Resemblance

### VERITAS EVANGELICAL SEMINARY

VERITAS EVANGELICAL SEMINARY A research paper, discussing the terms and definitions of inductive and deductive logic, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the certificate in Christian Apologetics

### Philosophy of Mathematics Kant

Philosophy of Mathematics Kant Owen Griffiths oeg21@cam.ac.uk St John s College, Cambridge 20/10/15 Immanuel Kant Born in 1724 in Königsberg, Prussia. Enrolled at the University of Königsberg in 1740 and

### Comments on Truth at A World for Modal Propositions

Comments on Truth at A World for Modal Propositions Christopher Menzel Texas A&M University March 16, 2008 Since Arthur Prior first made us aware of the issue, a lot of philosophical thought has gone into

### Strawson On Referring. By: Jake McDougall and Siri Cosper

Strawson On Referring By: Jake McDougall and Siri Cosper Russell s Theory of Descriptions S: The King of France is wise. Russell believed that our languages grammar, or every day use, was underpinned by

### Subjective Logic: Logic as Rational Belief Dynamics. Richard Johns Department of Philosophy, UBC

Subjective Logic: Logic as Rational Belief Dynamics Richard Johns Department of Philosophy, UBC johns@interchange.ubc.ca May 8, 2004 What I m calling Subjective Logic is a new approach to logic. Fundamentally

### Understanding, Modality, Logical Operators. Christopher Peacocke. Columbia University

Understanding, Modality, Logical Operators Christopher Peacocke Columbia University Timothy Williamson s The Philosophy of Philosophy stimulates on every page. I would like to discuss every chapter. To

### LTJ 27 2 [Start of recorded material] Interviewer: From the University of Leicester in the United Kingdom. This is Glenn Fulcher with the very first

LTJ 27 2 [Start of recorded material] Interviewer: From the University of Leicester in the United Kingdom. This is Glenn Fulcher with the very first issue of Language Testing Bytes. In this first Language

### From Transcendental Logic to Transcendental Deduction

From Transcendental Logic to Transcendental Deduction Let me see if I can say a few things to re-cap our first discussion of the Transcendental Logic, and help you get a foothold for what follows. Kant

### WHAT IS HUME S FORK? Certainty does not exist in science.

WHAT IS HUME S FORK? www.prshockley.org Certainty does not exist in science. I. Introduction: A. Hume divides all objects of human reason into two different kinds: Relation of Ideas & Matters of Fact.

### The Ten Categories of Being. The Primacy of Substance

The Ten Categories of Being The Primacy of Substance Two Sentences Socrates is pale. Socrates is human. Two observations: There is no reason to assume that the deep grammar of these sentences matches their

### What is a logical argument? What is deductive reasoning? Fundamentals of Academic Writing

What is a logical argument? What is deductive reasoning? Fundamentals of Academic Writing Logical relations Deductive logic Claims to provide conclusive support for the truth of a conclusion Inductive

### Durham Research Online

Durham Research Online Deposited in DRO: 20 October 2016 Version of attached le: Published Version Peer-review status of attached le: Not peer-reviewed Citation for published item: Uckelman, Sara L. (2016)

### From Aristotle s Ousia to Ibn Sina s Jawhar

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Beneficent From Aristotle s Ousia to Ibn Sina s Jawhar SHAHRAM PAZOUKI, TEHERAN There is a shift in the meaning of substance from ousia in Aristotle to jawhar in Ibn

### The Relationship between the Truth Value of Premises and the Truth Value of Conclusions in Deductive Arguments

The Relationship between the Truth Value of Premises and the Truth Value of Conclusions in Deductive Arguments I. The Issue in Question This document addresses one single question: What are the relationships,

### A New Argument Against Compatibilism

Norwegian University of Life Sciences School of Economics and Business A New Argument Against Compatibilism Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum Working Papers No. 2/ 2014 ISSN: 2464-1561 A New Argument

### Against Vague and Unnatural Existence: Reply to Liebesman

Against Vague and Unnatural Existence: Reply to Liebesman and Eklund Theodore Sider Noûs 43 (2009): 557 67 David Liebesman and Matti Eklund (2007) argue that my indeterminacy argument according to which

### Venn Diagrams and Categorical Syllogisms. Unit 5

Venn Diagrams and Categorical Syllogisms Unit 5 John Venn 1834 1923 English logician and philosopher noted for introducing the Venn diagram Used in set theory, probability, logic, statistics, and computer

### Possibility and Necessity

Possibility and Necessity 1. Modality: Modality is the study of possibility and necessity. These concepts are intuitive enough. Possibility: Some things could have been different. For instance, I could

### Review of Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics by Thomas Hofweber Billy Dunaway University of Missouri St Louis

Review of Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics by Thomas Hofweber Billy Dunaway University of Missouri St Louis Are there are numbers, propositions, or properties? These are questions that are traditionally

### Reply to Bronstein, Leunissen, and Beere

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. XC No. 3, May 2015 doi: 10.1111/phpr.12181 2015 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC Reply to Bronstein,

### ILLOCUTIONARY ORIGINS OF FAMILIAR LOGICAL OPERATORS

ILLOCUTIONARY ORIGINS OF FAMILIAR LOGICAL OPERATORS 1. ACTS OF USING LANGUAGE Illocutionary logic is the logic of speech acts, or language acts. Systems of illocutionary logic have both an ontological,