P HILOSOPHY is like mathematics in that you can t just set down your answer you have to

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1 KNOWLEDGE & REALITY Essay Questions and Reading Lists Peter J. King Some notes on writing essays P HILOSOPHY is like mathematics in that you can t just set down your answer you have to show how you got there. A common fault in philosophy essays is that the writer is in such a hurry to get her ideas down to attack a hated position, to state an attractive theory that she forgets to argue. Without arguments, all you have is a set of opinions, however interesting; with arguments, you have philosophy. With good arguments, you have good philosophy. S TRUCTURE. But perhaps the most common cause of problems with essays (apart from the amount of work put into them) is poor structure. A badly structured essay doesn t only make it difficult for the reader to follow what you re saying it can make it difficult for you to keep track of what you re saying, leading to repetition, contradiction, and irrelevance. Make an essay plan before you start writing, and try to stick to it. It shouldn t be too detailed, otherwise it ll be too rigid; most, if not all, plans will fall into three parts, including an introduction to and explanation of the problems, a discussion of the main arguments, and some sort of conclusion. Whatever your position, be sure to treat the positions with which you disagree as fully and sympathetically as possible before you start to criticise them; apart from anything else this will help you to avoid knocking down straw men. Don t strive too hard for originality and new ideas; these will come (if they do) as you think and write about other people s ideas and arguments. If you do come up with what you think is an original idea or argument, don t be too protective towards it; be at least as critical of it as you would be of anyone else s. C RITICAL APPARATUS. All quotations should be given references clear and detailed enough to allow the reader to go straight to the original source. This will normally involve author, title, and page number; in the case of historical or translated works, you should be sure to give the edition you re using, and if possible use a standard reference system (often found in the margins or at the top of each page). If you re unsure, check to see how other authors do it, or ask me. Never use other writers words or even ideas without acknowledgment (see under plagiarism below). Details should be given in a separate bibliography; the reference in the text is to author and page. L ANGUAGE. Clarity and precision often depend upon careful use of language and this includes spelling and grammar. Don t underestimate the problems caused by misspelling (the differences between intention and intension, or ingenious and ingenuous, are more important than the single letters involved). This is even more true of grammar and punctuation. Keep your language simple: don t use three syllables where one will do, or had it not been written by him instead of if he hadn t written it. Make sure that quotations fit into their new contexts (avoid, for example, Descartes said that I can be certain ; write either Descartes said: I can be certain or Descartes said that he could be certain ). P LAGIARISM. Your essays must be your own work. The reading is there to guide you, to suggest avenues of thought, to offer explanations of difficult arguments or ideas; it is not there to be repeated parrot-fashion. If you need to quote from another writer, mark the quotation clearly (see above, under Critical apparatus) but again, don t overdo it. P RACTICAL MATTERS. N.B.: occasionally I give more than one essay question; these are alternatives, so choose one. Don t read too much (or, of course, too little); three or four items from the relevant reading list is usually about right (one introductory or general work, and two or three others). If you want to (or have to) go outside the reading I suggest, talk to me about it; too often I find that essays have suffered because students have depended upon what are frankly bad and misleading books. If you use a word-processor (and I d advise it), use the spellchecker, but don t rely upon it; read through (preferably aloud) what you ve written, at least once. Don t bother with grammar-checkers I ve yet to see one that works properly.

2 GENERAL READING The following general and introductory books might be of help through much of the term: Robert Audi Epistemology: a Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge Bruce Aune Metaphysics José A. Benadete Metaphysics L. Bonjour The Structure of Empirical Knowledge Brian Carr Metaphysics: An Introduction Roderick M. Chisholm On Metaphysics Jonathan Dancy Contemporary Epistemology Peter van Inwagen Metaphysics Michael Jubien Contemporary Metaphysics Charles Landesman An Introduction to Epistemology Michael J. Loux Metaphysics: a Contemporary Introduction P. Moser, D. Mulder & J.D. Trout The Theory of Knowledge: a Thematic Introduction J. Pollock Contemporary Theories of Knowledge George N. Schlesinger Metaphysics The best of the introductions to metaphysics is van Inwagen s, I think, followed by Aune s. Of the epistemology introductions, I d probably recommend the Landesman followed by the Pollock. JOURNAL ABBREVIATIONS A.J.Phil. Australasian Journal of Philosophy A.P.Q. American Philosophical Quarterly BJPS British Journal for the Philosophy of Science J.Phil. Journal of Philosophy M.S.P. Midwest Studies in Philosophy P.A.S. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society P.A.S.S. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volume Pacif.P.Q. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly Phil.Q. Philosophical Quarterly Phil.Rev. Philosophical Review Phil.Stud. Philosophical Studies P.P.R. Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Rev.Met. Review of Metaphysics COLLECTIONS OF PAPERS Referred to by editor/author s name in the reading lists: L. Alcoff Epistemology: the Big Questions Bruce Aune Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings S. Bernecker & F. Dretske Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology Jonathan Dancy Perceptual Knowledge Richard M. Gale The Philosophy of Time Jonathan Glover The Philosophy of Mind A. Phillips Griffiths Knowledge and Belief Peter van Inwagen & Dean W. Zimmerman Metaphysics: the Big Questions Jaegwon Kim & Ernest Sosa Metaphysics: an Anthology S. Laurence & C. Macdonald Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics Michael J. Loux The Possible and the Actual [Loux I] Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings [Loux II] Milton K. Munitz Logic and Ontology [Munitz I] Identity and Individuation [Munitz II] Stephen P. Schwartz Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds Ernest Sosa Knowledge in Perspective P.F. Strawson Philosophical Logic

3 a) Is existence a property? b) Is there anything that doesn t exist? Existence K.E.M. Baier Existence (P.A.S. 1960/61) Keith Donnellan Speaking of nothing (Phil.Rev. 83, 1974; & in Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds, ed. Schwartz) Gareth Evans Varieties of Reference chapter 10 Reinhardt Grossmann The Existence of the World chapter 4 William Kneale Is existence a predicate? (P.A.S.S. 15; & in Readings in Philosophical Analysis, edd Feigl and Sellars) G.E. Moore Is existence a predicate? (P.A.S.S. 15; & in Logic and Language 2, ed. Flew) D.F. Pears/J. Thomson Is existence a predicate? (in Strawson) Bertrand Russell The philosophy of logical atomism pp (Logic and Knowledge, ed. Marsh) Gilbert Ryle Systematically misleading expressions (P.A.S. 1931/32) P.F. Strawson Is existence never a predicate? (Freedom and Resentment) Introduction to Logical Theory chapter 6, section III, 11 Michael Woods Existence and tense (Truth and Meaning, edd Evans and McDowell) Modal Realism a) If there is a possible world in which it is false that p, then one can know that it is true in the actual world that p only by observing the actual world. Discuss. b) Are there things which do not actually exist? John Divers Possible Worlds Saul Kripke Naming and Necessity Identity and necessity (in Munitz II, & in Loux II, & in Aune] David Lewis Counterfactuals chapter 4 (reprinted in Loux II, & in Aune) On the Plurality of Worlds Alvin Plantinga The Nature of Necessity chapters IV and VI Actualism and possible worlds (Theoria 42, 1976; & in Loux II, & in Aune) Nicholas Rescher How many possible worlds are there? (P.P.R., 1999) Robert C. Stalnaker Inquiry chapter 3 Transworld Identity a) Is there a problem about identifying the same object in different possible worlds? b) 'I might have done something different.' How should this be understood? Kant is probably the turning point as regards this question. Before Kant, philosophers asked about the nature of existence; after him, they asked about the meaning of the verb exist. The import of the question is essentially the same what s revealed is a different way of doing philosophy. The writers above are not pre-kantian; many philosophers prefer to stick with familiar sounding article and book titles, while asking unfamiliar-sounding questions. You might want to take as your starting point a classic use of the position that existence is a property: the ontological argument for the existence of god. This brings out the importance of what might otherwise seem to be the sort of dry and purely academic question on which popular mythology has philosophers wasting their time. Robert Adams Primitive thisness and primitive identity (J.Phil. 76, 1979; & in Kim & Sosa) R.M. Chisholm Identity through possible worlds: some questions (Noûs 1, 1967; & in Loux I) John Divers Possible Worlds chapter 16 David Kaplan Transworld heir lines (in Loux I) Saul Kripke Naming and Necessity David Lewis Counterfactuals chapter 4 (reprinted in Loux II) Counterpart theory and quantified modal logic (J.Phil. 65, 1968; & in Lewis, Philosophical Papers Vol I) Individuation by acquaintance and by stipulation (in Phil.Rev., xcii, 1983) On the Plurality of Worlds especially chapter 4 (partly reprinted in Aune as Counterparts or double lives? ) Alvin Plantinga The Nature of Necessity chapters IV and VI Transworld identity or worldbound Individuals? (in Schwartz, & in Munitz I) Robert C. Stalnaker Inquiry chapter 3

4 Time a) Is time real? b) Could time move in reverse? c) Could there be more than one temporal sequence? C.D. Broad An Examination of McTaggart s Philosophy Vol. II Part I (reprinted as Ostensible temporality in Gale, & in Loux II, & in Aune) Michael Dummett 'Bringing about the past (Phil.Rev. 1964; & in his Truth and Other Enigmas, & in Le Poidevin & Macbeath) Causal loops (in Flood & Lockwood) Bringing about the past (in his Truth and Other Enigmas) Raymond Flood & Michael Lockwood [edd] The Nature of Time J.M.E. McTaggart Time (in his The Nature of Existence vol.ii; & in Loux II, & in Aune) Richard M. Gale The Language of Time part 1 P.T. Geach Truth, Love, and Immortality chapter 89 Peter J. King Other times (A.J.P. 73, 1995) David Lewis The paradoxes of time travel (A.P.Q. 13, 1976; & in his Philosophical Papers Vol. 2) E.J. Lowe The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time J.M.E. McTaggart The Nature of Existence Book II, chapter 33 (reprinted as Time in Gale, and as The unreality of time in Le Poidevin & MacBeath) D.H. Mellor Real Time II The need for tense (extract from chapter 5 of Real Time, in Loux II, & in Aune) The unreality of tense (a revision of chapter 6 of Real Time, in Le Poidevin & MacBeath) Robin Le Poidevin & Murray Macbeath [edd] The Philosophy of Time A.N. Prior Changes in events and changes in things (in his papers on Time and Tense) The notion of the present (Studium Generale 23, 1970; & in Loux II, & in Aune) A.M. Quinton Spaces and times' (Philosophy ; & in Le Poidevin & Macbeath) Alexander Rosenberg Is Lewis's genuine modal realism magical too? (Mind 98, 1989) George N. Schlesinger Aspects of Time chapter 3 Sydney Shoemaker Time without change (J.Phil. 66, 1969; reprinted in his Identity, Cause, and Mind, & in Poidevin & MacBeath) Lawrence Sklar The Philosophy of Physics pp J.J.C. Smart The space-time world (extract from his Philosophy and Scientific Realism in Aune) Norman Swartz Spatial worlds and temporal worlds: could there be more than one of each?' (Ratio 17, 1975) Richard Taylor Time and eternity (extract from his Metaphysics in Aune) W.H. Walsh Kant on the perception of time' (Monist 1967; also in T. Penelhum & J.J. MacIntosh [edd] The First Critique: Reflections on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason Donald C. Williams The myth of passage (J.Phil. 48, 1951; reprinted in his Principles of Empirical Realism, & in Gale) Palle Yourgrau The Disappearance of Time especially chapter 2 You should definitely read the McTaggart; his distinction between the A series and the B series has become part of the vocabulary of the philosophy of time. Mellor s Real Time II shouldn t be confused with his Real Time; read the latter by all means, but the former is a complete reworking of his ideas and arguments.

5 Causality a) Is it possible to distinguish between a coincidental constant conjunction and a causal one? b) Do causal relations involve necessary connections? G.E.M. Anscombe Causation and Determinism (in Sosa, & in van Inwagen & Zimmerman) Annette Baier Real Humean Causes (in Cover & Kulstad [edd] Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy) Jonathan Bennett Locke, Berkeley, Hume chapters 11 and 12 Simon Blackburn Spreading the Word chapter 6, esp. 5 6 L. BonJour In Defence of Pure Reason: a Rationalist Account of A Priori Justification V.C. Chappell [ed.] Hume C.J. Ducasse On the nature and observability of the Causal Relation (in Sosa, & in Sosa & Tooley) E. Fales Causation and Universals chapter 1 R.J. Fogelin Hume s Scepticism in The Treatise of Human Nature chapter IV John Foster Ayer III, 6 [reviewing Mackie] (Inquiry 75) Rom Harré & E.H. Madden Causal Powers esp. chapters 1, 5 8 David Hume Enquiry sections IV VIII, and XII parts 2 and 3 Treatise I,iii,14 15 Jaegwon Kim Causes and counterfactuals (in Sosa, & in Sosa & Tooley) David Lewis Causation (in Sosa, & in Sosa & Tooley) J.R. Lucas Space, Time, and Causality especially chapters III & IV J.L. Mackie The Cement of the Universe chapter 1 John Stuart Mill System of Logic book III, chapter 5 George Morice David Hume papers by Khamara & Macnabb and by Robison David Pears Hume s System part II, chapters 5 7 J.A. Robinson & Thomas J. Richards Hume s Two Definitions of Cause (Phil. Q. 1962; & in Chappell) Bertrand Russell Mysticism and Logic chapter 9 Ernest Sosa [ed.] Causation and Conditionals Ernest Sosa & Michael Tooley [edd] Causation introduction Barry Stroud Hume chapter 4 Michael Tooley Causation Causation: reductionism versus realism (in Sosa & Tooley) How is Hume using the term necessary? Is this logical necessity? Is there another kind of necessity e.g. physical necessity? If so, how should we characterise that? Is Hume after the kind of necessity that would ground a priori inference from cause to effect? Hume s definition of cause cites contiguity in the Treatise, but not in the Enquiry; why do you think he drops it? Why are there two definitions? Are they equivalent? In the first definition, is Hume s in other words really the same statement in other words? Note that the first definition makes no mention of minds, or reasoning, or necessity at all. What is his ambition: (a) to say what we mean by cause ; (b) to explain how it is that we give the word that meaning; (c) to say what it is for A to cause B? When we have a causal sequence, why do we pick out one feature rather than another as the cause? E.g., when there s a fire, why don t we usually cite as the cause the presence of oxygen in the air?

6 Necessity and the A Priori a) How can we distinguish between a priori knowledge and other kinds? b) Are all and only analytic propositions knowable a priori? Immanuel Kant Critique of Pure Reason Introduction David Hume Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding IV, VII, XII A Treatise On Human Nature I,iii,1; I,ii,2 (first three paragraphs); I,iii,3 4 John Locke Essay Concerning Human Understanding IV,iii iv; IV,vi; IV,viii A.J. Ayer Language, Truth and Logic chapters 4 5 (reprinted in Moser) Paul Benacerraf Mathematical truth (J.Phil. 70, 1973) Simon Blackburn Spreading the Word pp L. BonJour In Defence of Pure Reason chapters 5 & 6 Albert Casullo Kripke on the a priori and the necessary (Analysis 37, 1977; & in Moser) Jonathan Dancy Contemporary Epistemology chapter 14 P. Edwards & A. Pap A Modern Introduction to Philosophy section VII, introduction Gottlob Frege The Foundations of Arithmetic (trans. J.L. Austin) 3, 11 12, 15 H. Grice & P. Strawson In defence of a dogma' (Phil.Rev. 65, 1956) Philip Kitcher A priority and necessity (AJP 58, 1990; & in Moser) The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge Saul Kripke A priori knowledge, necessity, and contingency (in Moser) Naming and Necessity especially pp 34 9; 53 7; C. Landesman An Introduction to Epistemology chapter 6, 1 6 David Lewis The Plurality of Worlds chapter 1 Ian McFetridge Logical necessity: some issues (in his Logical Necessity and Other Essays) Paul K. Moser [ed.] A Priori Knowledge Introduction Alvin Plantinga The Nature of Necessity Hilary Putnam Two dogmas revisited (in his Philosophical Papers vol.3) What is a mathematical truth (J.Phil. 1962; & in his Philosophical Papers, vol.1) Analyticity and apriority, beyond Wittgenstein and Quine (M.S.P. 4, 1979; & in his Realism and Reason, & Moser) The analytic and the synthetic (in his Mind, Language, and Reality) A. Quinton The a priori and the analytic (in Strawson) W. van O. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism (in his From a Logical Point of View; & in Moser) Truth by convention (in his The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays) Bertrand Russell Lectures on logical atomism (in his Logic and Knowledge) Aaron Sloman Necessary, a priori, analytic (Analysis 26, 1969) Barry Stroud Wittgenstein and logical necessity (Phil.Rev. 74, 1965; & in Moser) Richard Swinburne Analyticity, necessity and apriority (Mind 84, 1975; & in Moser) T. Warfield A Priori Knowledge of the World: Knowing the World by Knowing Our Minds (Phil.Stud. 92, 1998; & in K. DeRose & T. Warfield [edd] Skepticism: a Contemporary Reader Is there any truly a priori knowledge? How is synthetic a priori knowledge possible? What are a priori concepts, and are there any? Did Frege succeed in refuting Kant s philosophy of arithmetic? Should one (and does Hume) distinguish between: (a) what makes a proposition true; and (b) how we come to know whether a proposition is true? Are there any arguments for thinking that the distinctions: analytic/synthetic; a priori/a posteriori; necessary/contingent, are really one distinction? What are the relations between the analytic, the necessary and the a priori? What is it to know something a priori? What is a necessary truth? Are all and only necessary truths knowable a priori? Is Quine right in claiming that no statement is immune to revision what exactly is he denying? What are Kripke s arguments for the view that there are: (a) contingent a priori truths; and (b) necessary a posteriori truths? What are: necessity de re and necessity de dicto? Is the distinction between necessity de re and necessity de dicto adequately explained merely in terms of scope?

7 a) What are substances? Substance and Particulars b) If things are anything more than bundles of properties, must there be things without properties? The world is made up of enduring objects. The world is made up of instantiations of properties at times. How should we choose between these views? Substance is what subsists independently of what is the case ; It is forma and content (Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus). How are we to understand this? E. Allaire Bare particulars (Phil.Stud. 14, 1963; & in Laurence & Macdonald, & in Loux II, & in Aune) Another look at bare particulars (Phil.Stud. 16, 1965; & in Laurence & Macdonald) Michael Ayers Substance: prolegomena to a realist theory of identity (J.Phil., 1991) Locke II: Epistemology and Ontology introduction and chapters 1 2 Max Black The identity of indiscernibles (Mind LXI, 1952; reprinted in Aune) Albert Casullo A fourth version of the bundle theory (Phil.Stud. 54, 1988; & in Loux II, & in Aune) V.C. Chappell Particulars reclothed (Phil.Stud. 15, 1964; & in Laurence & Macdonald) James van Cleve Three versions of the bundle theory (Phil.Stud. 47, 1985; & in Laurence & Macdonald, & in Loux II, & in Aune) Reinhardt Grossmann The Existence of the World Peter Hacker Substance: the constitution of reality (M.S.P. IV, 1979) Joshua Hoffman & Gary S. Rosenkrantz Substance among Other Categories Substance: its Nature and Existence William Kneale The notion of substance (P.A.S. 1940) Michael J. Loux Substance and Attribute E. J. Lowe The Possibility of Metaphysics chapters 6, 7, & 9 Anthony Quinton The Nature of Things part 1 Bertrand Russell Analysis of matter (Contemporary British Philosophy, vol. 1) P.F. Strawson Individuals chapters 1 & 4 David Wiggins Sameness and Substance Substance (in Grayling [ed.], Philosophy: a guide through the subject) especially , 4.7, , 4.13 R.S. Woolhouse Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz: The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics Through its long history, substance has been thought about in different ways by different philosophers. It has also been (more recently) subject to hostility and distaste. Yet Leibniz declared: the consideration of substance is of the greatest importance and fruitfulness for philosophy. This has tended to mean that discussion of substance has continued, but often using different terms. Thus many of the authors on the reading list talk about particulars rather than substances.

8 Natural Kinds a) What makes natural kinds or properties natural? b) Are chairs a natural kind? Freedom of the Will a) Is belief in free will compatible with belief in determinism? b) If determinism is true, can we justly be blamed for anything? D.M. Armstrong A Theory of Universals M.R. Ayers Locke versus Aristotle on natural kinds (J.Phil. 78, 1981) John Dupré Natural kinds (in Newton-Smith) The Disorder of Things Nelson Goodman Fact, Fiction, and Forecast David Hull A matter of individuality (Phil.Sci. 45, 1978) Saul Kripke Naming and Necessity David Lewis New work for a theory of universals (AJP 61, 1983) John Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding J.L. Mackie Locke s anticipation of Kripke (Analysis 34, 1974) D.H. Mellor Natural kinds (BJPS 28, 1977) J.S. Mill System of Logic H.H. Price Thinking and Experience chapter 1 (reprinted as Universals and resemblances in Aune) Hilary Putnam The meaning of meaning (in his Mind, Language, and Reality) W.V.O. Quine Natural kinds (in his Ontological Relativity and Other Essays) E. Zymach Putnam s theory on the reference of substance terms (J.Phil. 73, 1976) Roderick M. Chisholm René Descartes Meditations IV Human freedom and the self (in van Inwagen & Zimmerman) Paul Edwards Hard and soft determinism (in Determinism and Freedom, ed. Hook) Philippa Foot Free will as involving determinism (Phil.Rev., 1957; & in Free Will and Determinism, ed. Berofsky) H.G. Frankfurt Freedom of the will and the concept of a person (J.Phil., 1971; & in Free Will, ed. Watson) Jonathan Glover Responsibility especially chapter 2 Stuart Hampshire Freedom of mind (in his Freedom of Mind and Other Essays) R.E. Hobart Free will as involving determination and inconceivable without it (Mind 63, 1934; & in van Inwagen & Zimmerman) Peter van Inwagen The mystery of metaphysical freedom (in van Inwagen & Zimmerman) Alisdair MacIntyre The antecedents of action (British Analytical Philosophy, edd Williams and Montefiore) Timothy O Connor The agent as cause (in van Inwagen & Zimmerman) P.F. Strawson Freedom and resentment (in his Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays; & in Free Will, ed. Watson) J.O. Urmson Motives and causes (P.A.S.S., 1952; & in Philosophy of Action, ed. White) [This is one of the most-discussed areas of philosophy, and there s a vast literature. I ve mentioned papers from four collections on the subject others include Freedom and Determinism (ed. Lehrer) and Essays on Freedom of Action (ed. Honderich). You ll find more referred to in the papers and books. Don t be intimidated. Don t try to read too much; read the Hume, and perhaps two or three other items.] If free will isn t compatible with determinism, what might it be? How, for example, would one explain free actions? What distinguishes the free action of the professional thief from that of the person forced at gunpoint to steal, or from the kleptomaniac? What, if anything, has predictability to do with freedom (note that the weather is fairly unpredictable)? Is there a distinction worth noting between freedom of spontaneity (roughly: you re free if you do what you want) and freedom of indifference (roughly: you re free if you could have done otherwise)? I could have done otherwise if I had chosen otherwise but could I have chosen otherwise? Why might it be that we don t tend to think that animals have free will? Spell out carefully what you take determinism to be (are there several varieties?), and how and where the claim that we have free will conflicts with it.

9 a) What is a person? b) Are persons animals? Persons John Locke Essay Concerning Human Understanding Book II, chapter 27 M.R. Ayers Locke II: Epistemology and Ontology chapters F.M. Berenson Understanding Persons Daniel Dennett Conditions of personhood (in his Brainstorms) H.G. Frankfurt Freedom of the will and the concept of a person (J.Phil., 1971; & in Free Will, ed. Watson) Grant Gillett Reasoning about persons (in Peacocke & Gillett, followed by a response by Derek Parfit) Rom Harré Persons and selves (in Peacocke & Gillett) Arthur Peacocke & Grant Gillett [edd] Persons and Personality Amélie Rorty [ed.] The Identities of Persons Sidney Shoemaker & Richard Swinburne Personal Identity (the Swinburne part reprinted in Loux II) P.F. Snowdon Persons, animals, and ourselves (in Gill [ed.], The Person and the Human Mind) Persons and personal identity (in Lovibond & Williams [edd], Essays for David Wiggins) Ronald de Sousa Rational homunculi (in Rorty) P.F. Strawson Individuals chapter 3 David Wiggins Sameness and Substance chapter 6 The person as object of science, as subject of experience, and as locus of value (in Peacocke 7 Gillett) Reply to Paul Snowdon (in Lovibond & Williams [edd], Essays for David Wiggins) Personal Identity a) Discuss the implications of either the writings of Nagel or Williams or Parfit for nave conceptions of personal identity. b) What is personal identity? How do you know? c) What is it that makes a person at two different times one and the same person? Is personal identity a matter of degree? Joseph Butler Of personal identity (in Perry) Peter Carruthers Introducing Persons see especially part two, section 3 Daniel Dennett Brainstorms chapter 15 ( Where Am I? ) Jonathan Glover [ed.] The Philosophy of Mind David Hume Treatise of Human Nature I,iv,6 and Appendix David Lewis Survival and identity (in Amélie Rorty [ed.] The Identities of Persons; & in his Philosophical Papers vol. II, & in Loux II, & in Aune) John Locke Essay II, xxvii J.L. Mackie Problems From Locke chapters 5 and 6 Colin McGinn The Character of Mind chapter 6 (a clear review of the major positions) Thomas Nagel Brain bisection and the unity of consciousness (Synthèse 22; & in his Mortal Questions, & in Glover) Derek Parfit Personal Identity (Phil.Rev. 71; & in Glover, & in Loux II, & i Aune, & in Honderich & Burnyeat [edd], Philosophy As It Is) Reasons and Persons chapters Terence Penelhum Personal identity (in The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. Edwards) John Perry [ed.] Personal Identity (A useful collection which contains some historical material including extracts from Locke, Butler, and Reid as well as more recent articles) Thomas Reid Of personal and Of Mr Locke s account of our personal identity (both in Perry) Sidney Shoemaker & Richard Swinburne Personal Identity (the Swinburne part reprinted in Loux II, & in Aune) P.F. Snowdon Personal Identity and Brain Transplants (in Cockburn [ed.], Human Beings) Persons and personal identity (in Lovibond & Williams [edd] Essays for David Wiggins) Barry Stroud Hume chapter 6 David Wiggins Sameness and Substance chapter 6 Bernard Williams The Self and the Future (Phil.Rev. 70; & in his Problems of the Self, & in Glover, & in Perry) Personal Identity and Individuation (in his Problems of the Self)

10 Perhaps the best tip I can give you is not to be too ambitious; try to zero in on one of the topics mentioned in the essay titles, working out the implications of the philosophical discussion in just that area. When we come to discuss the issues, I hope that you ll have gained sufficient grasp of the general principles to be able to see their applications to the areas covered by other people. The Dennett paper is included more because it s fun than for its philosophical merit. He manages reasonably successfully to quell his usual rather self-conscious attempts at humour, and presents a sort of science fiction story in which the question of personal identity takes centre stage. Truth as Correspondence a) Is it a truism that truth is correspondence to fact? If so, is that truism the basis of an adequate philosophical theory of truth? b) Is there a satisfactory formulation of the correspondence theory of truth? c) Is Tarski s theory a correspondence theory? William P. Alston A Realist Conception of Truth passim, but esp. chapters 1 & 3 J.L. Austin How to Do Things with Words Lectures xi and xii Donald Davidson True to the facts (J.Phil. 66; & in Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation) Michael Dummett Truth (P.A.S. 59, ; & in Strawson, & in Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas) Susan Haack The pragmatist theory of truth (BJPS 27, 1976) for an alternative view D.W. Hamlyn The Theory of Knowledge chapter 5 The correspondence theory of truth (Philosophical Quarterly 12, 1962) R.G. Millikan The Price of Correspondence Truth (Noûs 20, 1986) D.J. O Connor The Correspondence Theory of Truth A.N. Prior Correspondence theory of truth (Edwards [ed.], Encyclopædia of Philosophy) Hilary Putnam Realism and Reason Introduction and paper 4 Bertrand Russell The Problems of Philosophy chapter 12 An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth especially chapter 25, but use the index under correspondence P.F. Strawson & J.L. Austin Symposium on Truth (P.A.S.S. 24) Be sure to distinguish between the Correspondence Theory of Truth and the Principle of Bivalence they re usually held together, and it s often a rejection of the latter that leads to a search for alternatives to the former. Bivalence comes in two parts: there are only two truth values, and there are no truth-value gaps. It s possible to hold these separately. Could one be a Correspondence Theorist and reject either of the two parts of the Principle of Bivalence?

11 Truth as Coherence Is there a satisfactory formulation of the coherence theory of truth? J.L. Austin Truth (in his Philosophical Papers) P. Klein & T.A. Warfield What price coherence? (Analysis 54, 1994) Nicholas Rescher The Coherence Theory of Truth Ernest Sosa Theories of Justification: old doctrines newly defended (in Sosa) Ralph Walker The Coherence Theory of Truth Michael Williams Coherence, justification, and truth (Rev.Met. 34, 1980) Verificationism Can a Criterion of Verification be used to differentiate between metaphysical and empirical propositions so as to render the former meaningless? What is the status of such a criterion, and what does this imply for verificationism as a philosophical project? William P. Alston A Realist Conception of Truth chapter 4 Anthony Appiah For Truth in Semantics A.J. Ayer Language, Truth, and Logic The Central Questions of Philosophy [ed.] Logical Positivism L.J. Cohen Is a criterion of verifiability possible? (in M.S.P. Vol. V, edd French, et al.) John Foster A.J. Ayer especially Part I A. Phillips Griffiths [ed.] A.J. Ayer: Memorial Essays Ian Hacking Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy? L.E. Hahn [ed.] The Philosophy of A.J. Ayer Oswald Hanfling [ed.] Essential Readings in Logical Positivism Chris Peacocke The limits of intelligibility (Phil. Rev. 97, 1988) beware; there are those who d add Beyond to the title Hilary Putnam Reason Truth, and History chapter 5 Scepticism a) Is scepticism justifiable? b) Does any of the approaches you ve looked at promise success in defeating scepticism? c) Explain Putnam s Brain in a Vat argument. Does it succeed as a method of refuting radical scepticism? William P. Alston A Realist Conception of Truth chapters 5 & 6 A.J. Ayer The Problem of Knowledge chapter 2 A. Brueckner Brains in a vat (J.Phil. 83, 1986) Semantic answers to skepticism (PPQ 73, 1992; & in DeRose & Warfield) P. Clark & B. Hale [edd] Reading Putnam chapters 1, 2 8, & 9 (& replies) J.D. Collier Could I conceive being a brain in a vat? (A.J.Phil. 63, 1985) P. Coppock Putnam s transcendental argument (Pacif.P.Q. 68, 1987) Jonathan Dancy Contemporary Epistemology chapters 2 3 K. DeRose & T. Warfield [edd] Skepticism: a Contemporary Reader René Descartes Meditations I Discourse on the Method Parts 1 5 J.L. Evans Knowledge and Infallibility S. Feldman Refutation of dogmatism: Putnam s brains in vats (Southern Journal of Philosophy 1984) G. Forbes Realism and skepticism: brains in a vat revisited (J.Phil. 92, 1995; & in DeRose & Warfield) H.G. Frankfurt Dreamers, Demons, and Madmen I D.W. Hamlyn The Theory of Knowledge chapter 1 Christopher Hookway Scepticism David Hume Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding G. Iseminger Putnam s miraculous argument (Analysis 48, 1988) Peter D. Klein Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism Charles Landesman An Introduction to Epistemology chapter 3 David Lewis Putnam s paradox (A.J.Phil. 62, 1984) J. McCarthy Putnam s vat world and the sceptical method (J.Phil. 81, 1984) Colin McGinn Mental Content chapter 1 J. McIntyre Putnam s brains (Analysis 48, 1988) C.B. Martin The new cartesianism (Pacif.P.Q. 65, 1984) G.E. Moore Philosophical Papers

12 Robert Nozick Philosophical Explanations pp , , J. Pollock Contemporary Theories of Knowledge Hilary Putnam Brains in a vat (in his Reason, Truth, and History; & in DeRose & Warfield) The Many Faces of Realism Representation and Reality Realism with a Human Face introduction & chapters 1, 2, 5, & 7 Nicholas Rescher Scepticism Ernest Sosa Putnam s pragmatic realism (J. Phil. 90, 1993) Philosophical scepticism and epistemic xircularity (PASS 68, 1994; & in DeRose & Warfield) Y. Steinitz Brains in a vat: different perspectives (Phil.Q. 1994) J. Stephens & L. M. Russow Brains in vats and the internalist perspective (Pacif.P.Q. 68, 1987) Barry Stroud The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism chapters 1 and 2 Stephen Toulmin The Uses of Argument chapter 5 Peter Unger Ignorance M. dell Utri Choosing conceptions of realism: the case of brains in a vat (Mind 99, 1990) J. Vogel Cartesian scepticism and inference to the best explanation (J.Phil. 87, 1990) Ralph Walker The Coherence Theory of Truth chapter 1 T. Warfield A priori knowledge of the world: knowing the world by knowing our minds (Phil.Stud. 92, 1998; & in DeRose & Warfield) Bernard Williams Descartes chapters 2 and 7, and Appendix 3 Michael Williams Descartes and the metaphysics of doubt (in A. Rorty [ed.] Essays on Descartes Meditations) Ludwig Wittgenstein On Certainty Crispin Wright On Putnam s proof that we are not brains in a vat (P.A.S. 92, ) (see also the reading for the essay on Belief) Their common source is the demand for a relevant difference between situations of false belief and situations of true belief, one that is available to the knower. This demand which doesn t just rest on the bare possibility that things might have been otherwise must be met, if we are to do more than shrug off the sceptical challenge. How many arguments to bring his beliefs into doubt does Descartes offer? What exactly are they, and how many of them work? Has the method of doubt excluded too much, and if so, how could it be improved? Is the method possible even on its own terms that is, can one throw out all one s beliefs in order to sort them out? Indeed, what exactly does he do with the beliefs he used to hold does he throw them out (albeit temporarily), or does he simply withhold assent? Does Nozick offer to defeat scepticism? If not, what exactly is he doing, and (even if it works) is it enough? How does scepticism work? 1. scepticism from error: I ve been wrong in the past, so radical sceptical hypotheses, such as the evil demon or the brain in a vat.

13 Belief a) What is belief? b) An idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea. Discuss this statement in the context of Hume s Treatise I,ii,7. Edward Craig Hume on thought and belief (in Vesey [ed.], Impressions of Empiricism) A.C. Danto Analytical Philosophy of Knowledge chapter 4 R. Braithwaite The nature of believing (P.A.S. XXXIII, ; & in Griffiths) Peter Geach Assertion (Phil.Rev., 1965; & in his Logic Matters pp 263 5) R.J. Fogelin Hume s Scepticism in the The Treatise of Human Nature passim A.P. Griffiths Belief (P.A.S. LXIII, ; & in Griffiths) D.W. Hamlyn The Theory of Knowledge chapter 4 D.M. High Language, Persons, and Belief David Hume Enquiry passim, and especially sections IV, V, IX, XI Treatise I,iii,7 10 and Appendix (pp ) Charles Landesman An Introduction to Epistemology chapter 5 H.H. Price Some considerations about belief (P.A.S. XXXV, ; & in Griffiths) Gilbert Ryle The Concept of Mind chapter 5 R.P. Wolff Hume s theory of mental activity (Phil.Rev., 1960; & in Chappell) A.D. Woozley Theory of Knowledge chapter 8 Keep the notion of memory in mind throughout. In general, would what you want to say about belief hold for memory too? How does the claim that force and vivacity distinguish belief from the imagination hold up? Compare the essay on ideas and impressions. Bear in mind that one usually believes that p that is, the object of a belief is a proposition. Forceful and vivacious feelings are occurrences. Is believing an occurrence? How, on Hume s account, would you know that somebody else believed something? Does one say I am believing that p? If you reject Hume s account, how would you like to explain belief? Is Hume s a causal account of the origin of beliefs? How do reasons differ from causes? Does Hume leave any room for reasons? Or evidence? Does Hume, in the Appendix to the Treatise, more or less admit that he hasn t really got off the ground with the whole issue? Knowledge & True Belief I am an hospitable man, said Nasrudin to a group of cronies at the teahouse. Very well then take us all home to supper, said the greediest. Nasrudin collected the whole crowd and started towards his house with them. When he was almost there, he said: I ll go ahead and warn my wife: you just wait here. His wife cuffed him when he told her the news. There is no food in the house turn them away. I can t do that, my reputation for hospitality is at stake. Very well, you go upstairs and I ll tell them that you re out. After nearly an hour the guests became restless and crowded round the door, shouting, Let us in, Nasrudin. The Mulla s wife went out to them. Nasrudin is out. But we saw him go into the house, and we have been watching the door all the time. She was silent. The Mulla, watching from an upstairs window, was unable to contain himself. Leaning out he shouted: I could have gone out by the back door, couldn t I? (from The Exploits of the Incomparable Mulla Nasrudin, Idries Shah) a) If knowledge is defined as justified true belief, what counts as justification? b) What are externalism and internalism? W.P. Alston Internalism and externalism in epistemology' (in Alcoff) David Armstrong Belief, Truth, and Knowledge chapters Does knowledge entail belief? (PAS 70, 1970) A.J. Ayer The Problem of Knowledge chapter 1 L. Bonjour The Structure of Empirical Knowledge chapter 5 (& in Alcoff) Jonathan Dancy Contemporary Epistemology chapters 2 3 Perceptual Knowledge Edmund L. Gettier Is justified true belief knowledge? (Analysis 23, 1963; & in Griffiths; Bernecker & Dretske) C. Ginet Knowledge, Perception and Memory chapter 3 A. Goldman A causal theory of knowing (J.Phil. 64, 1967; & in Bernecker & Dretske) What is justified belief? (in Alcoff) G. Harman Thought chapters 1 & 7 10 (selections in Pappas & Swain) David Hume Enquiry passim, and especially sections IV, V, IX, XI Treatise I,iii,7 10 and Appendix (pages ) Keith Lehrer Knowledge chapters 1 & 9 Norman Malcolm Knowledge and belief (in Phillips Griffiths)

14 Robert Nozick Philosophical Explanations chapter 3 (selections in Dancy) A. Phillips Griffiths [ed] Knowledge and Belief G. Pappas & M. Swain [edd] Essays on Justification and Knowledge H.A. Prichard Knowing and believing (extract, in Griffiths, from his Knowing and Believing) Ernest Sosa How do you know? (A.P.Q. 11, 1974; & in Sosa) The raft and the pyramid: coherence versus foundations in the theory of knowledge (in his Knowledge in Perspective; & in Alcoff) Barry Stroud The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism chapters 1 3 Does knowledge entail belief? Is knowledge belief that is caused in the right sort of way? Are there any reasons for thinking that something like the foundationalist picture might be right? In what sense, if any, are epistemic concepts such as justification and knowledge normative? If you have time, you might want to have a look at Paul Feyerabend s Three Dialogues on Knowledge. The term iconoclastic is often used of Feyerabend s work; it s pretty appropriate here, and though he s more concerned with the question of scientific knowledge than with the more fundamental epistemological questions we re concerned with here, you might find him provoking and useful. Induction a) Is there a sound inductive argument for the existence of the external world? b) Has anyone proved to your satisfaction that induction is rational or that it is not rational? c) Hume has only shown that induction isn t deduction. Discuss. S.F. Barker & Peter Achinstein On the new riddle of induction (Philosophical Review 69, 1960; & in Nidditch [ed.] The Philosophy of Science) Simon Blackburn Reason and Prediction chapter 4 Spreading the Word pp L. BonJour In Defence of Pure Reason chapter 7 A.F. Chalmers What Is This Thing Called Science? chapter 2 L.J. Cohen Introduction to the Philosophy of Probability and Induction first & last chapters Nelson Goodman Fact, Fiction, and Forecast chapter 3 4 Rom Harré The Philosophies of Science chapter 2 David Hume Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding sections IV VIII, and section XII parts 2 and 3 (see especially section VII, part 1) Treatise On Human Nature I, iii, 1-9 J.L. Mackie A defence of induction (in MacDonald [ed.] Perception and Identity (see also see Ayer's reply) Karl Popper Objective Knowledge chapter 1 Bertrand Russell The Problems of Philosophy chapter 6 (& in Swinburne) Tom Stoppard Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead pp 7 15 R. Swinburne [ed.] The Justification of Induction Introduction (and anything else you fancy) (Note: be careful when writing this essay to write on the problem of induction, and not on the problem of causation. Hume never uses the term induction ; however, the issue here is whether one can infer from what has been experienced to what has not, and on what any such inference is based.) How is Hume using the terms reason and reasoning here? (For this you will find the section Of the Reason of Animals helpful.) Is reasoning any movement of the mind (rationally justifiable or not) from one idea/thought to another, or is it a movement of the mind that can be rationally justified? What, for Hume, counts as rational justification? Is Hume saying (a) we can never know for certain that the sun will rise tomorrow, or (b) we never have any more reason to suppose that it will rise than that it won t? If (a), why isn t what he is saying simply boring? If (b), what can you do about it? Logicians note the following: (a) Necessarily [If x knows that p, then p]; (b) If x knows that p, then necessarily p. One is true, the other isn t (which is which?). Is Hume tacitly taking the fallacious reading, when denying that inductive inferences are justified?

15 Perception a) What is the causal theory of perception? Can it be successfully defended against its critics? b) What are the direct objects of perception? Are they physical objects or appearances? c) Does my seeing something require me to have beliefs about it? Is all seeing seeing as? D.M. Armstrong A Materialist Theory of the Mind chapters (an extract appears in Dancy) A.J. Ayer Foundations of Empirical Knowledge chapters 1,2, & 4 The Problem of Knowledge chapter 3 Central Questions of Philosophy chapter 4 Jonathan Dancy [ed.] Perceptual Knowledge René Descartes Meditations Fred Dretske Seeing and Knowing chapters 1 2 John Foster Perception D.W. Hamlyn The Theory of Knowledge chapter 6 R.J. Hirst The Problem of Perception chapter 6 The difference between sensing and observing (P.A.S.S. XXVIII, 1954; & in Warnock [ed.] The Philosophy of Perception) Frank Jackson Perception: a Representative Theory John Locke Essay Concerning Human Understanding J.L. Mackie Problems from Locke chapter 2 H.H. Price Perception chapter 4 Anthony Quinton The problem of perception (Mind LXIV, 1955; & in Warnock [ed.] The Philosophy of Perception and Swartz [ed.] Perceiving, Sensing, and Knowing) Howard Robinson The objects of perceptual experience (P.A.S.S. LXIV, 1990) Bertrand Russell The Problems of Philosophy chapter 1 Paul Snowden The objects of perceptual experience (P.A.S.S. LXIV, 1990) Perception, vision, and causation (P.A.S. LXXXI, 1980/1; & in Dancy) P.F. Strawson Perception and its objects (in MacDonald [ed.] Perception and Identity; & in Bernecker & Dretske) Richard Wollheim The difference between sensing and observing (P.A.S.S. XXVIII, 1954; & in Warnock [ed.] The Philosophy of Perception) a) What is memory? Memory b) What reason do we have for trusting our memories? A.J. Ayer The Problem of Knowledge chapter 4 The Mind and Its Place in Nature (in his Philosophical Essays) Roderick Chisholm Theory of Knowledge chapter 3 Jonathan Dancy Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology chapter 12 D.W. Hamlyn The Theory of Knowledge chapter 7 David Hume A Treatise of Human Nature I, 1, 3 5 Don Locke Memory John Locke An Essay concerning Human Understanding II,10 W. van Leyden Remembering Martin & Deutscher Remembering (Phil.Rev. 75, 1966; & in Bernecker & Dretske) Bertrand Russell The Analysis of Mind chapter 9 The Problems of Philosophy chapter 11 Gilbert Ryle The Concept of Mind chapter 8 Squires Memory unchained' (Phil.Rev. 78; 1969) How like perception is memory? Is it just retained knowledge? What is the difference between memory of facts, etc., and memory of things? What place has cause in the analysis of memory? If I see an object, must there be a causal connection between the object and my visual experience of it? If so, will any old causal connection do? Do we perceive sense data, or by means of dense data, or neither? If I can t see objects, only appearances, don t those appearances become objects? And so doesn t the same problem arise again? What should we say about telescopes? Optical microscopes? Electron microscopes?

16 Subjective and Objective What grounds are there for thinking and subjective facts are irreducible to objective facts? G.E.M. Anscombe The first person (in Guttenplan [ed.], Mind and Language) John Campbell The first person: The Reductionist view of the Self (in Charles and Lennon) Quassim Cassam Reductionism and the first person (in Charles and Lennon) D. Charles & K. Lennon [edd] Reduction, Explanation, and Realism Andrea Christofidou First person: the demand for identification-free self-reference (J.Phil. XCII) Gareth Evans The Varieties of Reference (1982) chapter 7 (hard but rewarding) Colin McGinn The Subjective View chapters 3, 6, & 7 Thomas Nagel What is it like to be a bat? (Phil.Rev., 1974; reprinted in his Mortal Questions; & in Rosenthal [ed.] The Nature of Mind) Subjective and objective (in his Mortal Questions) The View from Nowhere esp. chapter IV John Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind chapters 4 & 6 Christopher Peacocke No resting place: a critical notice of The View From Nowhere (in Phil.Rev., 1989) Sidney Shoemaker Self-reference and self-awareness (J.Phil. LXV; & in Cassam [ed.], Self- Knowledge) How would you distinguish between the subjective and the objective? What are facts? What is it to be a realist concerning a level of discourse? If reduction is not possible, is the reality of the properties to which we appear to refer in doubt? Is reduction of higher-level explanations and entities within the philosophy of science to be seen as simultaneously vindicating their truth and their reality? Bats unlike cats, have an echo-locating sensory capacity; does this mean that a special difficulty attaches to the question What is it like to be a bat? that does not attach to the question What is it like to be a cat? What is the relation between subjectivity and the first person? What is it for properties to possess essentially perspectival characteristics?