PHIL 4800/5800/5801 Fall Core Theoretical Philosophy I and II

Transcription

1 PHIL 4800/5800/5801 Fall Core Theoretical Philosophy I and II Course Directors: C. Verheggen M. A. Khalidi cverheg@yorku.ca khalidi@yorku.ca Ross S436 Ross S438 This course offers an advanced survey of some central themes in contemporary theoretical philosophy, drawn from recent work in metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophies of mind, language, and science. While it is designed to provide background for those who pursue graduate level research in these areas, it is not an introductory course. (Those who do not have some undergraduate preparation in these areas are advised to discuss remedial work with the course directors as soon as possible.) Requirements and Evaluation All students are required to complete the required readings, submit the essays and/or paper, and participate in seminar discussions. Evaluation is on the following basis: PHIL 4800 Weekly Comments and Class Participation 20% First essay (due: Oct 17) 20% Term paper (due: Dec 5) 60% PHIL 5800 Weekly Comments and Class Participation 25% Three essays (due: Oct 17, Nov 14, Dec 5) 75% Comments and Participation: Before noon of the Thursday preceding each class meeting, you must post a comment to the class Moodle page on any one claim or argument drawn from that week s required readings. Your comment should consist of a brief observation or criticism, something that interests you, puzzles you, or seems incorrect to you (no longer than 300 words). Your comments will form the basis of our weekly discussions and will be assessed for your class participation grade, provided that you are present in the seminar on the relevant day. You may without penalty take two passes and post no comment for that week. Essays (4800 and 5800): The essays for the course are due on the dates indicated above. Essay topics will be distributed roughly two weeks in advance of the due date. Both graduates and undergraduates must submit the first essay; only graduate students must submit the following two essays. Essays should be words in length (3000 words is a strict upper limit). Term Paper (4800): This paper may be on any topic within the purview of the course, subject to the approval of the course directors, not to exceed 5000 words. We will also offer some suggestions for possible topics. It will include as a graded component of 10% a bibliographic note to be submitted by November 7. Late Penalties: Weekly comments are not accepted late; other work may be accepted late at the discretion of the course directors, subject to a penalty of 2.5% per calendar day or fraction thereof.

2 2 PHIL 5801 PHIL 5801, taken in conjunction with 5800, provides a forum for further discussion of central themes in contemporary theoretical philosophy. It is designed to prepare students to write the comprehensive exam in theoretical philosophy. It covers the same topics as PHIL 5800, with additional readings, discussions, and colloquia to broaden one s grasp of the field. In addition to the required readings for PHIL 5800, students in 5801 are required to complete the required readings for PHIL 5801, as well as some or all of the recommended readings, to attend the discussion seminars, give a presentation on one of the readings for the afternoon session, and attend the departmental Philosophy Colloquium (a schedule will be made available in due course). Evaluation will be based on a written comprehensive final exam in theoretical philosophy, which will range over the twelve topics covered in this course. At the discretion of the course directors, students may also be asked to defend the written examination orally. Sample questions will be distributed in advance. Reading Schedule Readings with one asterisk (*) are required for PHIL 4800/5800, readings with two asterisks (**) are required for PHIL 5801, and readings with no asterisk are recommended for PHIL Sept 5: Introduction (CV & MAK) Sept 12: Realism and Anti Realism (CV & MAK) *Carnap, R., Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology in Metaphysics, An Anthology, E. Sosa and J. Kim (eds). (2002) *Quine, W.V., Ontological relativity, in his Ontological relativity and Other Essays. (1969) **Davidson, D., On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in his Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation. (2001) Quine, W.V., On What There Is, in Sosa and Kim. Quine, W.V., Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in his From a Logical Point of View. (1953) Putnam, H., Pragmatic Realism, in Sosa and Kim. Sosa, E., Putnam s Pragmatic Realism, in Sosa and Kim. Alston, W.P., Yes, Virginia, There Is a Real World, in Sosa and Kim. Davidson, D., The Method of Truth in Metaphysics, in his Inquiries. Davidson, D., The Structure and Content of Truth, Journal of Philosophy 87, Sept 19: Natural Kinds (MAK) *Quine, Natural Kinds, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (Columbia University Press, 1969) *Wilkerson, Natural Kinds, Philosophy (1988) **Hacking, A Tradition of Natural Kinds, Philosophical Studies (1991) **Boyd, Realism, Foundationalism, and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds, Philosophical Studies (1991)

3 3 Mellor, Natural Kinds, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (1977) Dupre, Natural Kinds and Biological Taxa, Philosophical Review 90 (1981), Lewis, New Work for a Theory of Universals, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (1983) Hacking, Working in a New World: The Taxonomic Solution, in Horwich ed. World Changes (MIT Press, 1993) Khalidi, Natural Kinds and Crosscutting Categories, Journal of Philosophy (1998) Sept 26: Semantic Externalism: Perceptual and Social (CV) *Putnam, H., Meaning and Reference, Journal of Philosophy (1973) *Burge, T., Individualism and the Mental, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6, **Davidson, D., Knowing One s Own Mind, in his Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. (2001) Kripke, K., Naming and Necessity. (1972) Putnam, H., The Meaning of Meaning, in his Language, Mind, and Reality. (1975) Davidson, D., Truth and Meaning, in his Inquiries. Davidson, D., Radical Interpretation, in his Inquiries. Davidson, D., The Social Aspect of Language, in his Truth, Language and History. (2005) Loar, B., Social Content and Psychological Content, in Contents of Thought, H.Grimm and D.D. Merrill (eds), Burge, T., Intellectual Norms and the Foundations of Mind, Journal of Philosophy 83, Jackman, H., Temporal Externalism, Deference and our Ordinary Practices, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86, Jackman, H., Intuitions and Semantic Theory, Metaphilosophy 36, Verheggen, C., How Social Must Language Be?, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 36, October 3: Concepts (MAK) *Burge, "Concepts, Definitions, and Meaning," Metaphilosophy 24 (1993) *Fodor, "Concepts: A Potboiler," Cognition 50 (1994). **Woodfield, "Do Your Concepts Develop?" Philosophy (Supplement) (1993) **Machery, Concepts Are Not a Natural Kind, Philosophy of Science (2006) Peacocke, "Possession Conditions: A Focal Point for Theories of Concepts," Mind & Language (1989) Carey, "Conceptual Differences between Children and Adults," Mind & Language (1988) Khalidi, Two Concepts of Concept, Mind & Language (1995) Laurence and Margolis, Concepts and Cognitive Science, in Margolis and Laurence (eds.), Concepts: Core Readings, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp October 10: No Class October 17: Language and Thought (CV) (FIRST ESSAY DUE) *Davidson, D., Rational Animals, in his Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. *Davidson, D., The Second Person, in his Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective.

4 4 **Gluer, K. and Pagin, P., Meaning Theory and Autistic Speakers, Mind and Language 18, Davidson, D., Talk and Thought, in his Inquiries. Verheggen, C., Triangulating with Davidson, Philosophical Quarterly 57, Andrews, K., Interpreting Autism: a Critique of Davidson on Thought and Language, Philosophical Psychology 15, Bouma, H., Radical Interpretation and High Functioning Autistic Speakers: a Defense of Davidson on Thought and Language, Philosophical Psychology 19, Andrews, K. and Radenovic, L., Speaking Without Interpreting: a Reply to Bouma on Autism and Davidsonian Interpretation, Philosophical Psychology 19, Bouma, H., High Functioning Autistic Speakers as Davidsonian Interpreters: a Reply to Andrews and Radenovic, Philosophical Psychology 19, Jackman, H., Expression, Thought and Language, Philosophia 31, 2003 October 24: Innateness (MAK) *Fodor, The Present Status of the Innateness Controversy, in Representations (MIT Press, 1975) *Jackendoff, What is a Concept, That a Person May Grasp It? Mind & Language (1989) **Stich, Introduction, in Stich (ed.) Innate Ideas (1975) **Griffiths, What Is Innateness? Monist 85 (2002) Sober, Innate Knowledge, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Ariew, Innateness Is Canalization: In Defense of a Developmental Account of Innateness, in Hardcastle (ed.), Where Biology Meets Psychology (MIT Press, 1999) Samuels, Nativism in Cognitive Science, Mind & Language (2002) Khalidi, Innate Cognitive Capacities, Mind & Language (2007) October 31: Reductionism and Functionalism (MAK) *Churchland, Reductive Materialism, in Matter and Consciousness (MIT Press, 1988) *Block, What Is Functionalism? in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement (Macmillan, 1996) **Churchland, Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes, Journal of Philosophy (1981) Lewis, Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) Rorty, "In Defense of Eliminative Materialism," Review of Metaphysics 24 (1970) Enc, "In Defense of the Identity Theory," Journal of Philosophy 80 (1983) Dennett, Real Patterns, Journal of Philosophy (1991) Kim, Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (1992) Block, Anti Reductionism Slaps Back, Philosophical Perspectives (1997) Shapiro, Multiple Realizations, Journal of Philosophy (2000) Hattiangadi, The Emergence of Minds in Space and Time, in Johnson and Erneling (eds.), The Mind As a Scientific Object (Oxford University Press, 2005) Khalidi, Against Functional Reductionism in Cognitive Science, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science (2006)

5 5 November 7: Rule Following and Meaning (CV) *Kripke, S., from Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. (1982) **Wilson, G., Semantic Realism and Kripke s Wittgenstein, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57, McDowell, J., Wittgenstein on Following a Rule, Synthese 58, 1984 McDowell, J., Meaning and Intentionality in Wittgenstein s Later Philosophy, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17, 1992 Verheggen, C., The Meaningfulness of Meaning Questions, Synthese 123, Verheggen, C., Wittgenstein s Rule Following Paradox and the Objectivity of Meaning, Philosophical Investigations 26, Miller, A. and Wright, C., (eds), Rule Following and Meaning. (2002) November 14: Normativity of Meaning and Content (CV) (SECOND ESSAY DUE) *Gampel, E.H. The Normativity of Meaning, Philosophical Studies 86, *Hattiangadi, A. Is Meaning Normative?, Mind and Language 21, **Boghossian, P., Is Meaning Normative?, in Philosophy Science Scientific Philosophy, A. Beckerman and C. Nimtz (eds), Glock, H J., The Normativity of Meaning Made Simple, in Philosophy Science Scientific Philosophy. Davidson, A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs, in his Truth, Language and History. Gluer, K., Dreams and Nightmares: Conventions, Norms and Meaning in Davidson s Philosophy of Language, in Interpreting Davidson, P. Kotatko, P. Pagin and G. Segal (eds), CSLI, Jackman, H., Convention and Language, Synthese 117, Wikforss, A.M., Semantic Normativity, Philosophical, Studies 102, Whiting, D., The Normativity of Meaning Defended, Analysis 67, Miller, A. and Wright, C. (eds), Rule Following and Meaning. (2002) November 21: Epistemic Internalism, Externalism and Contextualism (CV) *Stroud, B., The Problem of the External World, in Epistemology: An Anthology, E. Sosa and J. Kim (eds). (2000) *Goldman, A., What is Justified Belief?, in Sosa and Kim. **Lewis, D., Elusive Knowledge, in Sosa and Kim. DeRose, K., Solving the Skeptical Problem, in Sosa and Kim. Descartes,R., Meditation I. Fumerton, R., Externalism and Skepticism, in Sosa and Kim. McDowell, J., Knowledge and the Internal, in Sosa and Kim. Sosa, E., Reflective Knowledge in the Best Circles, in Sosa and Kim.

6 6 November 28: Epistemology Naturalized (MAK) *Quine, Epistemology Naturalized, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (Columbia University Press, 1969) *Stich, Naturalizing Epistemology: Quine, Simon and the Prospects for Pragmatism, in Hookway & Peterson (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Science (Cambridge University Press, 1993) **Kitcher, "The Naturalists Return," Philosophical Review (1992) **Kim, "What is Naturalized Epistemology?" Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988) ed. Tomberlin, (Asascadero, CA: Ridgeview), pp Cohen, Can Human Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated? Behavioral and Brain Sciences (1981) Kornblith, "In Defense of a Naturalized Epistemology" in Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, ed. Greco and Sosa (Malden, Ma: Blackwell, 1999), pp Feldman, "Methodological Naturalism in Epistemology," in Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, ed. Greco and Sosa (Malden, Ma: Blackwell, 1999), pp Stich and Samuels, "Rationality and Psychology," in Oxford Handbook of Rationality (Oxford University Press, 2004) December 5 THIRD ESSAY DUE/TERM PAPER DUE