But Alas, at the End We All Die

Transcription

1 But Alas, at the End We All Die By Eren Orellana A Senior Essay submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree, Bachelor of Arts in the Integral Curriculum of Liberal Arts. Joseph Zepeda, Advisor Saint Mary s College of California April 9, 2013

2 1 I. Preface I have often heard it said that man by nature is a competitive being who will do whatever it takes to get where he needs to be that man is a selfish being, who does not care who he hurts or leaves behind as long as he is on his way. I, however, refuse to believe that we are, by nature, these selfish competitive beings, who only look out for ourselves. I believe that as human beings we are endowed with a quality of compassion, which draws us to look out for one another, but that the society we live in devalues this quality. Therefore, my purpose for this essay will be to demonstrate, how the economic system we live in today is responsible for the flawed view that many have concerning man s human nature. However, let me be clear: I am by no means trying to define Human Nature; I am simply trying to bring to light certain qualities, which I believe our economic system brings out in us. In this essay the question I will attempt to answer is not whether human nature is inherently cooperative or competitive, but rather I will seek to explain that being competitive or cooperative are qualities that are actually not inherent in man, but which are determined by the society we live in. II. Introduction As an existing being man s first priority is to continue existing. If nothing else, the need to preserve himself is innate in his nature. However, the way he chooses to go about surviving is not innate. In other words, whether man chooses to compete with his fellow men for the means of survival, or whether he chooses to cooperate with them, is not a quality that is innate in man. Therefore, it is this qualitative element of man s nature, which this essay will be mainly concerned with. As such, the first section of this paper will seek to bring to light what exactly determines this element, which will hereafter be referred to as man s qualitative nature. It will seek to explain how man s need to preserve himself rules over him and in this way determines

3 2 his qualitative nature. Once this has been established, the second section of this paper will transition and endeavor to explain how the capitalist economic system has taken man s need to preserve himself and has used it against him. It will seek to explain how the capitalist system has brought out a competitive element in the qualitative nature of man. The third and last section of this paper will then seek to explain that, aside from the moral obstacles which a competitive nature often encounters, being competitive is ultimately not the best qualitative element to employ as a means for survival and as a result a capitalist system is not the best economic system to employ in a society. III. Section One- Human Nature There is one basic and universal instinct that all humans contain within them: survival. It is by a direct result of this instinct that humanity continues to exist. It is also from a direct result of this notion that thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau all agreed that the chief concern of man is his preservation. However, all three of these writers defined the details of the state of nature differently and consequently they also had different views on the state of war and the civil society. For example, Locke and Hobbes argued that reason was the cause behind the perpetual existence of humanity, and therefore was also part of human nature since it helped man deliberate the best way in which to survive. On the other hand, Rousseau believed that reason was responsible for man s inequality and hence, responsible for the state of war and the state of servitude that society offers him, and therefore he did not believe that such a thing could be part of man s primitive nature. However, despite the contradictions that these writers have with each other, there is something within each of their theories, which stays consistent: self-preservation. Thus in order to bring to light the complications of this consistency, we will examine the writings of Hobbes,

4 3 Locke and Rousseau in The Leviathan, Second Treatise on Government, and A Discourse on Inequality, respectively. Through these works we will strive to bring to light these complications in order to answer the fundamental question of this section: What exactly determines the qualitative element of man s nature? Thomas Hobbes In his Leviathan, Hobbes declares that the natural condition of man is that of Warre of every man against every man (Hobbes, 185). He also notes that man s condition is due to the ill condition which man by meer nature is actually placed in (Hobbes, 188). Hobbes believes that it is in man s nature to be selfish and that man will do whatever it takes to preserve his own life. For Hobbes, man is not concerned with preserving humanity as a whole but only with preserving himself. He did not think that it was in man s nature to know right from wrong, since such concepts had not been presented to man. To him, man was akin to a machine whose only task was to survive. However, Hobbes saw the problem that came with man s inherent nature to be at war with other men. Therefore, he endeavored to explain why man is forced to leave the state of war in order to find a better means by which to survive. He observed the problems that lie in leaving man without a common power; thus he understood the necessity for men to enter into a covenant with one another. He observed that man was in constant fear of death in his natural state of war. Thus he claimed that man enters into a covenant and creates a common power in order to gain better security over his own life. The Creation of the Covenant Hobbes begins his discussion on the Natural Condition of Mankind with an affirmation of the innate equality of ability that natural men have with one another (Hobbes, 183). Ironically, Hobbes believes that man is in a state of war as a direct consequence of this equality. He states,

5 4 From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their End, (which is principally their owne conservation, and sometimes their delectation only,) endeavor to destroy, or subdue one another. (Hobbes, 184) Hobbes goes on to say that it is from this equality of ability that men become diffident of one another and thus enter further into the state of war. Moreover, Hobbes makes one thing clear in the above quote, namely that man s ultimate End is his own conservation. Further, Hobbes notes, Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit there is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the Earth no Society: and which is worst of all, the continuall feare, and danger of violent death. (Hobbes, 186) Here Hobbes points out the negative consequences that haunt every man in his war against all other men and emphasizes that above all the fear of death is the worst concern in man s natural state of war. Thus Hobbes explains that The Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; and Reason suggesteth convenient Articles of Peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement (Hobbes, 188). Man s principal end during the time of war is his conservation; however he soon comes to find out through reason that declaring war on his fellow men is not the best method to survive (Hobbes, 189). Thus in accordance with the right that nature gives him, which is by all means he can, to defend himself, (Hobbes, 190) man decides to enter into a covenant with his neighbor in order to better conserve himself. For Hobbes man s natural state of war is only a means for man to reach his principle end, i.e. his conservation. Thus by

6 5 submitting into a covenant with one another men find a better means by which to preserve themselves and not live in constant fear of death. The way man reaches a covenant is by discovering a law of nature, as stated by Hobbes: A law of nature is a precept found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life (Hobbes, 195). Hobbes also notes that the fundamental law of nature is to seek Peace, and follow it. Hence, once man has been led through his Passion to inquire of Reason what the cleverest way to conserve himself is, he discovers the idea of a covenant. Through reason man realizes that he will never be safe in his natural state of war. As stated by Hobbes, because the condition of Man is a condition of Warre of every one against every one it followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a right to everything; even to one another s body (190). Thus man agrees to renounce his rights and transfer them into a society because he realizes that his fellow neighbor has the same ability, which he possesses, to take his life. He submits to a society because he realizes that it is the best way to secure himself against death and achieve peace (Hobbes, 192). Hobbes states, The Right of Nature is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say of his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgment, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto. (Hobbes, 189) Therefore, it seems that man chooses war at first because he has failed to consult the reason required which would give him a better method by which to conserve himself. In his natural state man finds that the best way to preserve himself is through arms, however, as aforesaid he soon comes to find out that other men have the same ability he has. Thus out of fear man discovers a law of nature, which wills for peace. In this way man almost guarantees his own security.

7 6 Now, by having observed man s transition and submission into the civil society we can now bring to light what the qualitative element of man s nature depends on. As quoted above, according to Hobbes the right of nature consists in giving man the liberty to choose the best means for his preservation and the liberty to change, if necessary, the means he uses to preserve himself. Hence, for Hobbes it is perfectly fine for man to step out of society and re-enter the state of war if he feels society has abandoned the law of nature. For Hobbes man s chief end is to conserve himself- this is his only inherent nature; war and society are just the mechanisms reason has bestowed on him in order to succeed in his end. Therefore, the Leviathan is not primarily concerned with man s qualitative character, but rather with man s survival, and as such man s qualitative nature, i.e. whether it chooses to be at war or at peace with one another, will always depend on the mechanism he has to employ in order to survive. John Locke Locke s Second Treatise of Government also seems to insist that man does indeed have an innate human nature, which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind (Locke, 9). This nature helps and allows mankind to enter a political society in order to protect itself against evils that arise against the safety of man in the state of nature. Here again, Locke comes to the same conclusion Hobbes came to, namely that the state of nature, the state of war, and the civil society are merely mechanisms man employs en route to his survival. Now in order to understand how Hobbes and Locke arrive at the same conclusion, we will follow the same blueprint we followed with Hobbes, i.e. we will start with Locke s description of the state of nature and follow it through its transition into the state of war and finally into the civil society. Locke states, The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it and reason which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that

8 7 being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions. (Locke, 9) Locke makes a very important distinction between the state of nature and the law of nature in the above quote and further attempts to make that distinction apparent when he states: For men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about his business; they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another s pleasure: and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us, that may authorize to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another s uses and the law of nature be observed, which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind. (Locke, 9) Locke states that the law of nature is taught by the reason God has given man. Thus it seems that the difference between the state of nature and law of nature is that man s state of nature is the first means or method by which he follows the law of nature: the preservation of mankind. Consequently, the reason why man chooses to leave this state of nature and enter the state of war becomes apparent when Locke states, And thus it is, that every man, in the state of nature has a power to kill a murderer, both to deter others from doing the like injury and also to secure from the attempts of a criminal, who having renounced reason, the common rule and measure God hath given to mankind, hath, by the unjust violence and slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war against all mankind. (Locke, 11) Hence, when man enters the state of war it is for the greater preservation of mankind. He enters this state because of the threat he feels against his life and the lives of others by those who do not obey the law of nature: the transgressors of nature. Similarly, man seeks to enter the civil society in order to avoid the state of war and preserve mankind (Locke, 16). By joining a civil society man gives up his liberty to the rule of the commonwealth. By surrendering to this commonwealth man is able to better protect himself

9 8 against the transgressors of the law of nature and consequently succeeds in avoiding the state of war. Finally, by avoiding the state of war man avoids aggression and unnecessary death and thus continues to abide by the law of nature. Therefore, again, by transitioning into the civil society man finds a better means than that of the state of war, by which to preserve humanity and follow the law of nature. When man is in the state of nature, it is only when he feels that the law of nature is being violated that he steps out of this state to enter either the state of war or the civil society. In other words, man finds that his current state is no longer preserving mankind and therefore concludes that his current state is not the fittest state for the perpetual survival of mankind. Thus man decides to change the current state he is in to a state which he feels is more fitting to the survival of mankind. And so, like Hobbes, Locke also believes that man s only innate nature is to find the best method by which he can continue to exist. Whether the state be that of treacherous war or that of living in a commonwealth, at the end of the day mankind comes back to its one basic nature, survival at all costs. Thus again, in Locke, the qualitative element of man s nature will always depend on the mechanism he has to employ in order to survive. Making Sense of the Differences From the above conclusion a very disturbing question arises namely, how could an ideal view of human nature such as the one given by Locke, be reduced to the same conclusion as the one given by the cynical view of nature of Hobbes? Now, it is true that Locke and Hobbes both had a different theory concerning mankind s motives for survival and state of nature: namely that while Hobbes believed that man s state of nature was to be at war with one another, Locke believed that man s state of nature was to be at peace with one another but that certain people defied this peace and therefore renounced the reason God had given them, and thus the state of

10 9 war began. They nevertheless arrived at the same conclusion i.e. that the day would always arrive when man had to leave the state of nature and enter the civil society in order to protect himself. Additionally, Locke and Hobbes both understood that the state of war was inevitable in order to reach the civil society. Hence, both authors, no matter what their views on human nature were, agreed that the state of war, at times, needed to be employed in order to achieve preservation. Consequently, even the idealist Locke had to admit that regardless of man s cooperative state of nature, man sometimes had to defy this nature and go to war. Now, once man had entered the state of war both authors agreed that there came a point when man realized that the state of war did not obey the law of nature (self-preservation); therefore, they agreed that a new mechanism needed to be employed in order to escape the dangers of the state of war, i.e. the civil society. Therefore, whether this mechanism was employed in order to save humanity as a whole or just oneself does not really matter. What matters is that man s chief end will always be to survive and as such, the qualitative element of his nature will always depend on the way he has to go about surviving. Thus although the differences between these two thinkers are stark it becomes apparent that whatever their view on man s state of nature may be, at the end of the day man s qualitative nature will always be subject to the mechanism he is forced to employ in order to survive. Rousseau s Refutation of Hobbes and Locke Rousseau s A Discourse on Inequality focused on finding the root of mankind s inequality. Akin to Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau believed that man s first feeling was that of his existence, his first concern was that of his preservation (109). However, unlike Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau argued that reason was the cause of man s inequality and consequently the cause of war. As he notes,

11 10 I ask if anyone has ever heard of a savage in a condition of freedom even dreaming of complaining about his life and killing himself? Let it be judged with less pride on which side the real misery lies. Nothing, on the contrary could be as miserable as a savage man dazzled by enlightenment, tormented by passions, and arguing about a state different from his own In instinct alone man had all he needed for living in a state of nature; in cultivated reason he has what is necessary only for living in society. (Rousseau, 97) Rousseau argued that man s primitive state of nature was all that was needed for his survival. He argued that reason did nothing but bring to light man s imperfections and add superfluous worries to him. In opposition to Locke and Hobbes, Rousseau actually believed that reason brought the state of war into existence instead of being the savior who came to rescue man from it. He says, I hear it constantly repeated that the stronger will oppress the weak, but I would like someone to explain to me what is meant by the word oppression. Does it mean some men dominating with violence, and others groaning in slavish submission to their whims? Such is precisely what I observe among us, but I do not see how the same situation could be attributed to savage men, who could hardly even be brought to understand what servitude and domination are. (Rousseau, 106) Rousseau argues above how advantageous the lack of reason was to man. Without reason man lacked the ability to oppress one another. Rousseau argued, the vices which make social institutions necessary are the same vices which make the abuse of those institutions inevitable (Rousseau, 131). In short, Rousseau believed that reason was the vice, which lead humanity into the state of war, and as a result it was also the vice which encouraged humanity to create a society. Rousseau believed that mankind would have been better off left to his own instincts in the state of nature. He argued that the act of reflection ruined man s primitive state of nature. In his refutation of Hobbes, Rousseau states,

12 11 Hobbes did not see that the same cause which prevents the savage from using his reason prevents him at the same time from abusing his faculties. Thus one could say that savages are not wicked precisely because they do not know what it is to be good; for it is neither the development of the intelligence nor the restraint of laws, but the calm of the passions and the ignorance of vice which prevents them from doing evil. (Rousseau, 99) Simply put, Rousseau believed that humanity peaked at its primitive state of nature. In nature, man lived from day to day, and only worried about his survival. He did not harm or do good to others, not because he was apathetic but because he did not understand the concepts of good and evil. The only innate quality man had, outside of his instinct to survive, was compassion (Rousseau, 99) and Rousseau argued that this primitive state would have been enough for man s perpetual existence. Connecting the Three and Bringing to Light the Complications The complications that arrive from man s need to preserve himself and the above conclusions can now be brought to light in order to answer the fundamental question of this section: What exactly determines the qualitative element of man s nature? Now, although Rousseau disagrees with Locke and Hobbes concerning the value and effects of man s reason, he disagrees with them on the same grounds they disagree with him. In other words, whether one believes reason is the necessary tool that needs to be employed for man s preservation or whether, like Rousseau, one believes reason is the corrupt tool that makes self-preservation harder, one will still believe reason is the cause for the difficulty or lack of difficulty of man s striving for survival. As such, we can again see that Rousseau, like Hobbes and Locke, is primarily concerned with explaining what the best state for man s survival is. Thus, again, whether our qualitative nature in the state of nature was to be compassionate, cooperative or competitive, all of these three original natures (or states of nature) had to be left and be molded

13 12 differently according to what man at the time believed was the best mechanism that needed to be employed in order to survive. With Rousseau this meant that man went against his savage nature and reasoned himself into the state of war and then the civil society, not because this was actually the best way to survive, but because he (man) thought this was the best way to survive. Thus Rousseau s theory of the state of nature serves to further prove that man s qualitative nature will always depend on what man believes the best way to survive at the time is. Whether it is to be in the state of nature, the state of war, or the civil society, the qualitative nature of man will always depend on the mechanism man deems as essential to his survival. IV. Section Two- Transitioning to the Capitalist Economic System The rest of this essay will now be centered on the development of the capitalist economic system through the lens of Karl Marx. By explaining how the capitalist system came to be and how it works in its present state I will seek to bring to light how this system tends to bring out negative qualities in man which do not ultimately aim at survival and as a result go against the law of nature. The capitalist system makes men into competitive beings and teaches them that it is in their nature to be this way when in reality it is the system that has made them that way. Again, I am not trying to define an absolute human nature in this essay, because frankly I do not think there is one, nor to describe what it would look like if there were one. All I am trying to do is illuminate the undeniable qualities that the capitalist system brings out in man, and to show how these qualities do not actually aim towards man s ultimate end of survival, but in fact hinder him in his most important endeavor. The level of competition the capitalist system provides and the stark inequality it inevitably creates makes it harder for man to survive, and as such makes him into a competitive being who only looks after his own interests. I do not believe that men, by

14 13 mere nature, are this competitive and selfish, and my goal for the rest of this paper will be to explain how the capitalist system is responsible for this popular misconception. Karl Marx Karl Marx begins his, Das Kapital, with an explication of how he believes the capitalist economic system came to be and continues his work further by explaining the developments the system has experienced since its birth. In order to fully comprehend the stages this system has gone through and how it has developed into its present state, it is vital that, like Marx, we begin by defining what exactly a commodity is and after define what is meant by use-value, exchange value, and value. The purpose in defining these terms and understanding what exactly a commodity is, will be to help illuminate how imbedded human labour is in our society and how unaware we are of it. By bringing this to light we will then be able to understand how the capitalist economic system has gained control over the lives of its citizens without them being aware of it. 1. The commodity In the first page of Das Kapital, Marx states, The commodity is, first of all, an external object, a thing which through its qualities satisfies human needs of whatever kind (Marx, Capital, 125). In other words, a commodity is that which is useful to people in general, whether it be corn to eat or wood for a kitchen table. 2. Use- Value After commodity comes the idea of use-value. Marx explains, the usefulness of a thing makes it a use-value (Marx, Capital, 126). The use-value is conditioned by the physical properties of the commodity and has no existence apart from this, use-value is independent of the amount of labour required to appropriate its useful qualities (Marx, Capital, 126). Thus the

15 14 definition of use-value, according to Marx, is completely independent of the human labour that goes into making a commodity and rests only on the physical qualities of a commodity or the end product without paying regard to what went in to creating the product. 3. Exchange-value The exchange value appears first of all as the quantitative relation, the proportion, in which use-values of one kind exchange for use-values of another kind (Marx, Capital, 126). For example, in the use-value, a quarter pound of wheat, there can always be found a proportion that allows this wheat to be exchanged for an equal amount of another use-value such as silk or corn. Therefore, a quarter pound of wheat can be equal to x amount of silk, y amount of corn, and z amount of iron. Thus a quarter pound of wheat proportionately represents x, y, and z. Hence, you can always equate a particular use-value to another use-value or you can always make corn equal to iron in order to have an equal exchange-value of these commodities. 4. Value However, a problem arises with the above explanation of exchange-value. Namely, that this ability to equate between use-values in order to create an exchange-value signifies that a common element of identical magnitude exists (Marx, Capital, 127) in these different commodities and therefore there has to be a third thing (the common element) which allows for the creation of proportionate exchange-values. Marx states, as use-values, commodities differ above all in quality, while as exchange-values they can only differ in quantity, and therefore do not contain an atom of use-value (Marx, Capital, 128). Hence, without this third common element, 100 yards of silk could be exchanged for 100 yards of linen since exchange-value merely means an exchange of two quantitatively equal commodities and pays no attention to

16 15 their qualitative worth. This is obviously erroneous and thus drives us to find out what this third quantitative 1 common element can be. Marx states, If then we disregard the use-value of commodities, only one property remains, that of being the product of labour (Marx, Capital, 128). However, since use-values by definition are the physical properties of commodities, by disregarding the use-value we extinguish all of the sensuous characteristics of a commodity (Marx, Capital, 128). Thus Marx states, With the disappearance of the useful character of the products of labour, the useful character of the kinds of labour embodied in them also disappears; this in turn entails the disappearance of the different concrete forms of labour. They can no longer be distinguished, but are all together reduced to the same kind of labour, human labour in the abstract they (commodities) are merely congealed quantities of homogeneous human labour, i.e of human labour power expended without regard to the form of its expenditure. All these things now tell us is that human labour-power has been expended to produce them, human labour is accumulated in them. (Marx, Capital, 128) Simply put, Marx is explaining that without the physical appearance and usefulness of a commodity (the use-value) all there is left is human labour in the abstract. For example, take a kitchen table, now strip it of its usefulness and its physicality, in short extinguish all of the sensuous qualities from it, and all you have left are pieces of concrete material that have been put together for no apparent reason. All you have left is the human labour that went in to constructing this random material human labour in the abstract. In other words, take the usevalue of a commodity away and you cannot represent human labour in the form of a wooden kitchen table but only as abstract human labour that produced a thing without any particular usefulness. 1 It has to be a quantitative element since by definition exchange- values are determined by quantity.

17 16 It is this abstract human labour that is the foundation of exchange-value. Marx states, We have seen that when commodities are in relation of exchange, their exchange-value manifests itself as something totally independent of their use-value. But if we abstract from their usevalue, there remains their value, as it has just been defined. The common factor in the exchange relation, or in the exchange-value of the commodity, is therefore value. (Marx, Capital, 128) Value, in other words, is the human labour accumulated in a commodity. Value is the common factor by which commodities of different sorts can be exchanged proportionately. Marx states, use-value, or useful article, therefore, has value only because abstract human labour is objectified or materialized in it (Marx, Capital, 129). A use-value has value because of the human labour that has gone into making it a useful article. Hence, a wooden board is worth nothing and has no usefulness until human labour is expended in order to make the wooden board into a table. Once the human labour has been materialized in the table by constructing it, then the object gains its usefulness and its physical properties (i.e. a wooden plane and four legs) have now been transformed into a useful commodity that can be exchanged according to the amount of human labour (value) that has been materialized in it. In short, value is the amount of labour accumulated in commodities, and as such value is the quantitative factor by which commodities can be exchanged proportionately. Value is the reason why you do not quantitatively exchange 100 yards of silk for 100 yards of linen but instead exchange x amount of silk for y amount of linen based on the quantity of the accumulated labour (value) that went into making both of these commodities (Marx, Capital, 139). Real World Application

18 17 Now, we have discovered that commodities are objectified human labour. So when you go into a store and buy a kitchen-table you are not paying for the wood itself. 2 You are paying for the accumulated human-labour that went into making the table. You are paying for materialized human labour in the form of a kitchen table. Again, the wood itself has no value and is therefore worth nothing until human labour realizes the potential of the wood to be worth something. Wood only becomes a commodity when it can be formed by human labour into a table. Thus when you buy a table you are buying the time it took to cut up the wood, sand it, and construct it into the finished product; you are buying accumulated human labour that has been materialized through the table (Marx, Capital, 142). Moreover, you are not just buying human labour, you are exchanging human-labour for human labour; value for value. For example, if you pay a hundred dollars for the table, for value, those one hundred dollars also symbolize your accumulated human-labour, which is expressed in the form of money. Now, in order to understand how money came to be the necessary medium which allows us to buy commodities, we have to give a history of the transition between when we used to exchange commodities for commodities (C-C) to when we started exchanging money for commodities ( M-C). Consequently, we will have to further analyze exchange-values as a means to discover how the universal form of value as money came to be. The Universal Equivalent As aforementioned, when defining exchange-value, you can always equate a commodity with another commodity in order to exchange the commodities in a fair proportion. And we now know that the common factor that allows us to exchange commodities equally is value (or 2 The wood itself is merely a use- value. A thing can be a use- value without being a commodity. What makes a thing a commodity is that it contains value (human labour), is useful (use- value), and can be socially exchanged.

19 18 accumulated human-labour). Thus as Marx explains, you can exchange 20 yards of linen for a single coat. Why? Because weaving, the abstract human labour that is required to make linen, and tailoring, the abstract human labour that is required to make a coat, can both be reduced to an equal amount of human labour. In other words, weaving and tailoring can both be reduced to an equal amount of human labour, which in this case materializes itself into the exchange wherein 20 yards of linen are equal to one coat. Hence, you have an equal and fair exchange-value. Further, Marx adds a third commodity into the equation: 10 pounds of tea. These ten pounds are now also equal to 20 yards of linen and one coat. How? Again, because the human-labour required to make tea has been formed into 10 pounds of tea in order to be brought to market and be exchanged for the equal human-labour that goes into making 20 yards of linen and a coat. Hence, 20 yards of linen can be exchanged for one coat or 10 pounds of tea and conversely, one coat could be exchanged for 20 yards of linen or 10 pounds of tea, etc. Therefore, either 20 yards of linen or one coat becomes what Marx names, the universal equivalent (Marx, Capital, 161). Marx states, The universal equivalent form is a form of value in general. It can therefore be assumed by any commodity (Marx, Capital, 162). Thus in the above example 20 yards of linen is the universal equivalent for the given commodities. In other words, in that particular group of commodities, 20 yards of linen is the universal commodity, which can be exchanged for any of the other commodities in that group. However, the problem that arises with placing a commodity as a universal equivalent is that you will not always be able to exchange that particular commodity for something you want since it is only the universal equivalent of a specific group of commodities. Hence, the need for an actual universal equivalent becomes necessary and this universal equivalent arises and develops in the form of gold. Marx states when explaining how gold came to be the universal equivalent,

20 19 The advance consists only in that the form of direct and universal exchangeability, in other words the universal equivalent form, has now by social custom finally become entwined with the specific natural form of the commodity gold. Gold confronts the other commodities as money only because it previously confronted them as a commodity. Like all other commodities it also functioned as an equivalent, either as a single equivalent in isolated exchanges or as a particular equivalent alongside other commodity-equivalents. Gradually it began to serve as universal equivalent in narrower or wider fields. As soon as it had won a monopoly of this position in the expression of value for the world of commodities, it became the money commodity, and only then, when it had already become the money commodity, did {form D (gold) become distinct from form C (20 yards of linen), and} the general form of value come to be transformed into the money form. (Marx, Capital, 126) Paraphrasing, the universal equivalent by social custom gradually becomes intertwined with the commodity gold. Gold like all other commodities started off as an equivalent; for example, like 20 yards of linen, two ounces of gold could be exchanged for one coat or ten pounds of tea given that two ounces of gold were equal in value to one coat or etc. However, gold gradually came to be known in different areas of the world as the universal equivalent and ultimately came to be known in the world of commodities as the most accurate expression of value and thus became the money commodity. Therefore, money is nothing else but the expression of value which is to say, money is the universal expression of (the measurement of) accumulated human labour. Now, let us come back to the kitchen table. You just bought this table with one hundred dollars, with the universal equivalent, money, 3 which represents anywhere from 12.5 hours of human-labour to >.01 hours of human-labour in the state of California. The point is that when you dissect your purchase you are not just exchanging one hundred dollars for a kitchen table, you are exchanging value for value; human labour for human labour. As aforesaid the table is 3 Money, which no longer has a gold backing, a problem that will not be addressed in this essay, but which I do not believe hinders my point.

21 20 materialized human labour while the money is an expression of the worth of accumulated human-labour. Now, the importance of bringing to light the development and transition from trading commodities for commodities, into trading money for commodities, lies in the following: When we used to trade commodities for commodities we were perfectly aware of the amount of human-labour that went into creating these commodities and as such when we brought them to market we knew what we deserved in return. We knew that the human-labour that went into making 20 yards of linen was indeed equal to the human-labour that went into tailoring a coat. However, with the gradual creation of money as the universal equivalent we as consumers became so detached from what trading truly represents, i.e. an exchange of different types of human-labour. Marx points out, Men do not bring the products of their labour into relation with each other as values because they see these objects merely as the material integuments of homogeneous labour. The reverse is true: by equating their different products to each other in exchange as values, they equate their different kinds of labour as human labour. They do this without being aware of it (166). The money form, conceals the social character of private labour and the social relations between individual workers, by making those relations appear as relations between material objects, instead of revealing them plainly. (Marx, Capital, 169) Therefore, by our detachment from the commodities that we buy through the medium of money, we equate products to each other, in this case a commodity and money, without realizing that what we are really equating is human labour. Now there would be nothing wrong with our ignorance of what trading truly means, except that by this ignorance the capitalist is able to sneak in and create an unequal exchange of commodities or an unequal exchange of money for commodities, or, what it boils down to, an unequal exchange of human labour for human labour.

22 21 Thus the next step will be to discover where exactly the capitalist comes in and how he is able to gain unparalleled control of the world of commodities. Capital Thus we begin by explaining the rise and creation of capital. Marx notes, The first distinction between money as money and money as capital is nothing more than a difference in their form of circulation. The direct form of the circulation of commodities is C-M-C, the transformation of commodities into money and the re-conversion of money into commodities: selling in order to buy. But alongside this form we find another form, which is quite distinct from the first: M- C-M, the transformation of money into commodities, and the reconversion of commodities into money: buying in order to sell (Marx, Capital, 250). It is at this precise point--that is, the point when one trades money for a commodity, then trades the same commodity for money without the slightest intention of circulating the money back into the economy by purchasing another commodity--that the capitalist is born. Through the people s detachment of what money is really worth, the capitalist comes in and creates the circulation M- C-M. What this translates to in the real world is the following: The capitalist-in-training starts off with $10, he then goes on and buys $10 worth of corn. At this point he realizes that he can resell this corn for $15 to a different buyer and gain a surplus value of $5- he makes the transaction. The capitalist now walks off happy he has gained money; he has converted money into capital. On the other hand, the buyer walks off believing he has just made an equal exchange of value, without being aware that he actually just got cheated. Principally, he is unaware that he essentially just gave away $5 worth of his own labour. Perhaps this small event would not be a problem in the grand scheme of things, except for the fact that the capitalist is not done: and it is only in so far as the appropriation of ever more wealth in the abstract is the sole driving force behind his operations that he functions as a capitalist, i.e. as capital personified and endowed

23 22 with consciousness and a will His aim is rather the unceasing movement of profitmaking (Marx, Capital, 254). In other words, the aim of the capitalist is to continue making a surplus value, capital, to continue to basically swindle the buyer in every transaction by charging him more for a commodity than it is actually worth in value. It is thus in this way that the accumulation of money as capital begins. The capitalist gains money at every M-C-M transaction and opts not to circulate this surplus value back into the economy and instead keeps it in his pocket. In turn the buyer continually loses money at the hands of the capitalist. Hence, again, because of our detachment from the actual value of commodities due to the creation of the universal equivalent (money), the capitalist in his early stages is able to deceive us into believing that we are making fair transactions. Since we are completely unaware of how imbedded humanlabour is in the commodities we buy and in the money we buy them with, we do not question the seller but walk away, assuming that like all of the other transactions we have made this is also a fair one. We do not realize that we are giving away our human labour and through the capitalist s gradual accumulation of capital we are also slowly allowing him to gain control over the world of commodities and in turn control over us. The Creation of the Working Class As aforesaid, the aim of the capitalist is profit-making; this is his perpetual end. His sole purpose in life, as a capitalist, is to purchase commodities and sell them for a profit and there is only one special commodity which allows him to do this: Labour-power. Marx states, For the transformation of money into capital, therefore, the owner of money must find the free worker available on the commodity-market; and this worker must be free in the double sense that as a free individual he can dispose of his labour-power as his own commodity, and that, on the other hand, he has no other commodity for sale, i.e. he is rid of them, he is free of all the objects needed for the realization of his labour-power. (Marx, Capital, 272)

24 23 Hence, in order for the money owner to find a free worker in the commodity market, this worker must have at some point lost the means of production 4 necessary to him in order to produce his own commodities. He can no longer go into the commodity market and sell any kind of materialized human labour, and is therefore forced to sell his own labour-power as a commodity. So how has the producer of commodities gradually been forced out of producing his commodities and selling them, into having to instead sell his own labour-power in order to gain the means for his subsistence? Marx argues, Why this free worker confronts him in the sphere of circulation is a question which does not interest the owner of money, for he finds the labour-market in existence as a particular branch of the commoditymarket. And for the present it interests us just as little One thing, however, is clear: nature does not produce on the one hand owners of money or commodities, and on the other hand men possessing nothing but their own labour-power. This relation has no basis in natural history, nor does it have a social basis common to all periods of human history. It is clearly the result of a past historical development, the product of many economic revolutions, of the extinction of a whole series of older formations of social production. (Marx, Capital, 273) In short, for the time being, it is unclear how exactly the producer of commodities comes to lose his means of production. What is clear however, is that the money owner now has control of the means of production and offers it to the producer of commodities in exchange for his labour power. The producer of commodities, now known as the worker, accepts this and offers up his services in exchange for a wage (or in other words, in exchange for money in order to buy commodities which will allow him to survive). Now, in theory there should be nothing wrong with this exchange of commodities. The worker sells his labour, the owner of money buys it, and thus an equal exchange is made. However, the problem with this is that simply making a fair transaction does not satisfy the 4 i.e. raw materials, instruments of labour, etc. (272)

25 24 money-owner. He as capital personified needs to make a profit, needs to fulfill his dream of becoming a capitalist. Thus the next step will now be to bring to light how the money-owner becomes a capitalist through employing labour-power and as a result threatens the means of subsistence of the worker. The Working Day Marx states regarding the limits of the working day, We began with the assumption that labour-power is bought and sold at its value. Its value, like that of all other commodities, is determined by the labour-time necessary to produce it. If it takes 6 hours to produce the average daily means of subsistence of the worker, he must work an average of 6 hours a day to produce his daily labour-power. (Marx, Capital, 340) In other words, the amount of hours it takes a worker to produce a commodity which, is equal to the value that the worker himself needs to subsist determines the minimum limit of the working day. Again, before the money-owner can even begin to create surplus-value off of the labourpower of the worker he has to make sure that he is paying the worker enough, in so far as the perpetual existence of the worker is vital to the goal of the money-owner. Hence, as far as the worker is concerned he only needs to sell 6 hours of his labour a day in order to have enough for his perpetual subsistence. However, the working day can never be reduced to this minimum namely, because the capitalist needs to make a surplus. However, the working day does have a maximum limit and it cannot be prolonged beyond that point. (Marx, Capital, 341). This maximum limit is conditioned by two things. First by the physical limits to labour-power. Within the 24 hours of the natural day a man can only extend a certain quantity of his vital force During part of the day the vital force must rest, sleep; during another part the man has to satisfy other physical needs, to feed, wash and clothe himself. Besides these purely physical limitations, the extension of the working day encounters moral obstacles. The worker needs time in which to satisfy his intellectual and social requirement, and the extent and the number of these requirements is conditioned

26 25 by the general level of civilization. But these limiting conditions are of a very elastic nature, and allow a tremendous amount of latitude. (Marx, Capital, 341) As such different employers define the above time requirement for man s general subsistence differently and thus you have working days ranging from 8 hours to 18 hours. It is thus that the capitalist is born. The capitalist soon discovers that by purchasing labour-power he now has complete power over the laborer for the given work day and as such he can use him however many hours he pleases. He has thus acquired the right to make the worker work for him during one day (Marx, Capital, 342). The capitalist s only driving force is to create surplus value and he can only do this by elongating the working day to its maximum or in other words by exploiting the worker. The capitalist, since he has bought the worker for one day can make him work 18-hours, even if the worker only needs 6 hours to subsist and it is in this way that the capitalist gains 12-hours of dead labour, i.e. capital. He gains 12 hours of labour-power which are materialized in commodities which he then sells for his own profit-making. The worker only sees the fruits of 6 hours of his labour while the capitalist takes the other 12-hours and tosses them in his capital deep pockets. However, Marx explains that at the very first sighting of this exploitation the worker stands up to the capitalist and demands that he respect the limits that have been imposed on the length of the working day. Marx imitates the worker, You pay me for one day s labourpower, while you use three days of it. That is against our contract and the law of commodity exchange I demand a normal working day because, like every other seller, I demand the value of my commodity (Marx, Capital, 343). However, the capitalist believes that he has every right to demand that the worker work the hours that have been asked of him since he (the capitalist) is giving the worker the means for his subsistence. Marx states,