Religious Diversity and its Challenges to Religious Belief

Transcription

1 Philosophy Compass 3/4 (2008): , /j x Religious Diversity and its Challenges to Religious Belief Nathan L. King* University of Notre Dame Abstract Contemporary Western culture is experiencing a heightened awareness of religious diversity. This article surveys a range of possible responses to such diversity, and distinguishes between responses that concern the salvation or moral transformation of persons (soteriological views) and those that concern the alethic or epistemic status of religious beliefs (doctrinal views). After providing a brief taxonomy of these positions and their possible relations to one another, the article focuses primarily on competing views about the truth and rationality of religious beliefs (e.g., pluralism, exclusivism, and skepticism). Here a heavy emphasis is placed on arguments for and against the rationality and moral propriety of retaining one s religious beliefs in the face of disagreement. The article surveys some of the more prominent arguments from the literature on this topic and closes with suggestions for further research. Religious diversity is not a new phenomenon. As any standard history of world religions makes clear, the diversity itself is thousands of years old. 1 Awareness of such diversity has ebbed and flowed over time, but is currently on the rise. In the modern and contemporary world, with the advent of liberal democracy and concomitant separation of church and state, those holding different religious beliefs have often lived alongside each other in relative peace and safety. These conditions have allowed the members of diverse religious communities to enter deeply and sympathetically into alternative systems of religious belief and practice. Inter-religious dialogue has been further facilitated by comparative religion courses and inter-religious worship services, and by widely available translations of the relevant religious texts. Of course, even in the contemporary world, religions (or the institutions in which they are embedded) often clash violently, as is evidenced by the continuing strife in the Middle East and the frequent clashes between Western culture and militant versions of Islam. While some hold out hope for lasting peace, many are less optimistic. But whatever is the case about the future of religious violence, the phenomenon of religious diversity appears unlikely to go away anytime soon. For centuries of wars, crusades, 2008 The Author

2 Religious Diversity and its Challenges to Religious Belief 831 inquisitions, missions, evangelism, and apologetics have failed to bring about religious consensus and new means to consensus are apparently not forthcoming. This state of affairs raises a number of questions worthy of philosophical reflection: What is the best explanation for the phenomenon of religious diversity? Do all religions fare equally well (or poorly) with respect to the truth? Or, is one religion privileged in its truth claims? Is it morally (or epistemically) appropriate to believe that only the doctrines of one s own religion are true, while those of other religions diverge from the truth in some significant way? Are all religions on par with respect to their soteriological efficacy, their ability to bring about salvation? In what follows, we will examine several of the most prominent and plausible ways in which philosophers have addressed such questions. 1 Possible Responses to Religious Diversity Some scholars use the term religious pluralism to refer to the phenomenon of religious diversity. However, the term is also commonly used to refer to one of the chief competing theoretical responses to this phenomenon. To avoid confusion, hereafter, religious diversity will refer to the fact that there exists an astonishingly diverse range of religious beliefs and practices. Religious pluralism (or simply pluralism) will designate the view that all religions are on par with respect to their truth claims or their capacity to impart salvation to mankind (or both) (Quinn and Meeker 3). Pluralism is sharply distinguished from exclusivism, according to which one religion, typically one s own, or home religion, is uniquely privileged over other, alien religions, in its truth claims or its salvific efficacy (or both). 2 Inclusivism occupies a sort of middle ground between pluralism and exclusivism, and its proponents aim to adopt the perceived advantages and avoid the perceived disadvantages of both views. While inclusivists are committed to the superiority of their home religion, they allow that alien religions may contain more by way of truth and transforming power than is typically granted by exclusivists. Exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism are really families of views, and we will describe the family members in greater detail shortly. First, however, it is important to note that the proponents of all three views claim that there exists a supernatural Ultimate Reality with which human beings sometimes make cognitive contact, at least in a mitigated way. In this respect, the three views contrast with both skepticism and naturalism. A typical kind of skeptic grants that some religious persons may be rational in their beliefs about a supernatural Ultimate Reality. However, the skeptic says, once such persons become fully aware of religious diversity, these beliefs often cease to be rational. In many cases, rationality requires that believers lower their confidence in religious doctrines to a point below the threshold of belief specifically, to the point of withholding judgment. And the skeptic himself withholds judgment with respect to

3 832 Religious Diversity and its Challenges to Religious Belief particular religious doctrines. The naturalist, by contrast, makes a positive metaphysical claim namely, that the natural world is all there is. There are no supernatural beings, and thus none can be known. Naturalism itself is not standardly considered a view about religious diversity. However, if it is true it carries the important implication that the supernatural claims espoused in the world s great religions are false. The pervasiveness of religious belief, on this view, is typically explained in terms of psychological projection, evolutionary advantage, or some other such mechanism. Despite naturalism s prominence in contemporary philosophy of religion, many discussions of religious diversity bracket this view (see, e.g., Hick, Interpretation). Moreover, philosophers who in fact espouse naturalism often enter the discussion in a skeptical guise (see the works by Hume and Feldman), with the effect that the main views addressed are exclusivism, inclusivism, pluralism, and skepticism. The following discussion reflects this tendency. 2 Varieties of Exclusivism, Inclusivism, and Pluralism The explication of these three positions benefits from a distinction between views regarding salvation and views about doctrine. 2.1 views concerning salvation Soteriological exclusivism is the view that salvation (or its equivalent) is available only to adherents of one s home religion. This view has been historically dominant in some religious traditions. In the Jewish and Christian traditions, for instance, there has been a strong tendency to label as idolatrous religious activities undertaken outside the home religion (Wright 156, 369); only via participation in the home religion is salvation made available. Recently, some prominent scholars representing traditionally exclusivist religions have shifted toward one of two alternatives to exclusivism. First, soteriological pluralism is the view that all religions make salvation available. Pluralists often add that: (a) All religions (or all ethical 3 religions) are on a par with respect to their salvific efficacy and transformational power. Moreover, pluralists sometimes add, either as an auxiliary thesis or as part of a reason for accepting (a), the claim that (b) All religions (or all ethical religions) are on an alethic 4 and epistemic par. (Hick, Interpretation) Thus, while primarily a thesis about the salvation of persons, soteriological pluralism is in various ways relevant to views about religious doctrine. Second, soteriological inclusivism is the claim that salvation may be available outside the home religion, e.g., on the basis of a personal revelation,

4 Religious Diversity and its Challenges to Religious Belief 833 innate knowledge of Ultimate Reality, general revelation, or even through the mediation of some other religion. However, the inclusivist adds, the home religion contains the fullest expression of divine revelation and the most reliable access to salvation. Soteriological inclusivism comes in several varieties, and it is important to distinguish these varieties from one another and from pluralism. Inclusivist views differ from one another along two dimensions. First, there is the issue of the inclusivist s confidence regarding salvation outside the home religion. A limiting case of inclusivism is the person who does not deny the possibility of salvation outside the home religion, but does not affirm that this possibility is actual or necessary (McGrath seems to defend such a view, with certain important qualifications; see his Particularist View ). At the other end of the spectrum is the inclusivist who is very confident that some outside the home religion are actually saved; or even that, given certain truths about God s nature, it is necessary that some be so saved. Second, there is the issue of the forms that Divine activity outside the home religion can take. On one inclusivist view, alien religions as such do not mediate salvation. However, adherents to such religions can gain salvation and knowledge of God through general revelation (see Pinnock, Wideness; also Inclusivist ). Other inclusivists claim that the instruments of God s saving activity include even the rituals exercised in other religions, so that such rituals mediate salvation (see, e.g., Rahner). The latter view, but not the former, involves a kind of endorsement of alien religious practices. Given the range of views falling under the inclusivist umbrella, it can be somewhat difficult to distinguish some versions of inclusivism from soteriological pluralism. Consider, for instance, an inclusivist view that (i) takes salvation outside the home religion to be actual; and (ii) allows that the doctrines and rituals of an alien religion can mediate salvation. How is such a view distinct from pluralism? The chief difference between these views seems not to be over who may be saved, but rather over the parity theses expressed in (a) and (b) above. Pluralists typically accept these theses; inclusivists must deny them. The latter group holds that one religion (the home religion) is uniquely privileged with respect to the truth about Ultimate Reality and with respect to saving or transforming power. On this view, the home religion makes available God s final, normative revelation and unique transforming power; other religions at best mediate only approximations of the same. Such a view is obviously distinct from pluralism. 2.2 views concerning doctrine Doctrinal exclusivism is the view that the doctrines of one s home religion are true and, where the doctrines of alien religions are incompatible with those of the home religion, the former are false. This kind of exclusivist takes it that the doctrines of her home religion are both alethically and epistemically privileged over those of other religions. It should therefore

5 834 Religious Diversity and its Challenges to Religious Belief be plain that doctrinal exclusivism is distinct from, and stronger than, the claim that the doctrines of at most one religion can be true. Indeed, the religious skeptic can accept this latter claim, which by itself privileges no religion. The doctrinal exclusivist accepts the claim that the doctrines of at most one religion can be true, and adds that it is the doctrines of her religion that are true. The doctrinal pluralist asserts, on the contrary, that all religions at least all ethical religions are on par with respect to truth and epistemic access to Ultimate Reality. On this view, no religion is epistemically or alethically privileged. In contrast to the taxonomy of soteriological views sketched above, it is not clear that there is a unique inclusivist position regarding doctrine. First, the doctrinal exclusivist need not deny that other religions could contain doctrines that overlap with those of the home religion; that is, that some alien religions teach some of the same truths found in the home religion. Indeed, exclusivists typically admit this so doctrinal exclusivism is inclusive to at least this extent. Second, no traditional soteriological inclusivist claims that where the doctrines of an alien religion conflict with those of the home religion, the claims of the alien religion may be true for this would call into question the inclusivist s commitment to the privileged status of the home religion. Thus, inclusivism as a soteriological view seems to presuppose exclusivism as a doctrinal view. With respect to views about doctrine, religious believers seem forced to choose between exclusivism and pluralism. 5 Suppose this is right there is no unique inclusivist view with respect to doctrine. There is nevertheless a distinction between two different kinds of doctrinal exclusivism: (1) closed doctrinal exclusivism: the doctrines of the home religion are true, doctrines incompatible with these are false, and there are no religious truths to be found only outside the home religion. (2) open doctrinal exclusivism: the doctrines of the home religion are true, doctrines incompatible with these are false, and there may be religious truths to be found only outside the home religion relations between soteriological and doctrinal views Thus far we have cataloged several different responses to religious diversity. Some such views concern the salvation of persons, while others concern the truth or epistemic status of doctrines. In what remains, we will focus primarily on the plausibility of competing views about doctrine. Views regarding salvation are clearly important and deserve attention in their own right. Indeed, many religious believers consider their doctrinal beliefs important only as a means to (or partial constituent of) salvation. In this sense, views about doctrine are secondary to views about salvation. 7

6 Religious Diversity and its Challenges to Religious Belief 835 In another sense, however, views about salvation are secondary to views about doctrine. For whatever one s view about salvation, this view is likely to be significantly limited by one s view about the status of religious doctrines. Strange counterexamples aside, one is unlikely to advocate soteriological exclusivism unless one adopts doctrinal exclusivism and takes soteriological exclusivism to be among the doctrines of the home religion (or at least compatible with these doctrines). 8 And as we saw above, soteriological inclusivism seems to presuppose exclusivism with respect to doctrine. Thus, one will likely adopt soteriological inclusivism only if one accepts doctrinal exclusivism and takes soteriological inclusivism to be included in (or at least compatible with) the doctrines of the home religion. Finally, religious pluralists seem at least partly motivated in their soteriological views by their assessment of the discussion at the doctrinal level, as is especially apparent in their rejection of doctrinal exclusivism as an epistemically plausible position (Hick, Interpretation; also Epistemological Challenge ; Dialogues 25 36). The upshot here is that one s views about salvation are rightly influenced and limited by one s views about doctrine. This provides us with a good reason to pay special attention to the latter. 3 Pluralism We begin with pluralism. The most sophisticated defense of this view to date is that offered by John Hick (Interpretation; also Dialogues). 9 Hick begins with the claim that the universe is religiously ambiguous. That is, the universe is amenable to being experienced in accordance with both (supernatural) religious and naturalistic conceptual frameworks (Interpretation xvii). Given this ambiguity, Hick says, it is rational for those who experience the universe religiously to trust this experience. On his view, it is an axiom of cognitive sanity that it is rational to trust one s experiences, provided that one lacks a good reason to doubt their veracity. This principle the Principle of Rational Credulity applies both to everyday experiences such as perceptual experience, and to religious experience (Dialogues 20 n. 1). Accordingly, the Principle can be employed to show that religious beliefs grounded in religious experience are prima facie rational (Interpretation xviii). However, application of the Principle to the multiplicity of extant religious experiences quickly leads to a problem: these experiences issue in diverse, mutually incompatible sets of religious beliefs. It is widely assumed that at most one such set of beliefs could be true. But if so, Hick says, it follows that the practice of forming religious beliefs on the basis of religious experience is in general unreliable (Dialogues 26). Having realized this, it is arbitrary and irrational for, e.g., the Christian, to think that the beliefs delivered by her own religious experiences are the sole exception to this rule. Moreover, Hick thinks that such arbitrariness is all the more problematic in light of the fact that the world s great religions

7 836 Religious Diversity and its Challenges to Religious Belief appear to be on a par with respect to their powers of moral transformation. Each of the great religions is concerned to bring human beings to salvation; that is, to transform human existence from self-centeredness to realitycenteredness. However, each seems, so far as we can tell from their moral and spiritual fruits in human life, to be more or less equally successful (and also equally unsuccessful) as contexts of this salvific transformation (Dialogues 14; more on this empirical claim below (section 4.2)). For now it must suffice to note that, in Hick s estimation, the data of religious diversity and parity of moral transformation cry out for explanation and the traditional exclusivist explanation won t do. What is needed to account for this data, Hick says, is a distinction between Ultimate Reality (the Real) as it in itself, and the Real as it is experienced and thought by human subjects. Such a distinction is found in many of the world s great religions, and is further supported by the Kantian distinction between noumenal and phenomenal reality. The Real an sich (the Real in itself) is never experienced directly, on Hick s view (Interpretation xix). Rather, human experience of the Real is always culturally conditioned, so that subjects experience the Real as, e.g., personal or impersonal. Manifestations of the Real found in the various religions are in part the products of concepts and practices embedded in these religious traditions. However, the Real in itself is formless and ineffable, so that it is literally beyond human concepts (xix). Several clarifications are needed here. First, Hick does not claim simply that human concepts do not exhaust the nature of the Real. Few religious persons would reject such a claim, and Hick means to assert something stronger. Second, Hick does not advocate what we might call a cautious agnosticism. His view is not equivalent to the claim that human subjects cannot know whether their concepts apply to the Real (xx). It is, rather, a still stronger thesis. In claiming that the Real is ineffable, Hick is claiming that no substantive (informative) human concepts, positive or negative, apply to the Real an sich. The Real in itself is beyond all such concepts; it is transcategorical (xx). Third, in saying that the Real is ineffable, Hick does not claim that no concepts that humans are aware of apply to it. Nor does he say that no substantive concepts so apply. Rather, Hick s view is that no concept applies to the Real an sich that is both substantive and within the grasp of human cognizers. On his view, purely formal concepts of which humans are aware do apply to the Real an sich (example: being capable of being referred to) (xxi). But such concepts are not substantive. And as Alvin Plantinga notes (Warranted Christian Belief 49), it is consistent with Hick s view that some substantive concepts apply to the Real an sich so long as these are not concepts of which humans are aware. Hick s considered view, then, is that the Real an sich is beyond all substantive concepts (positive or negative) of which human cognizers are aware. Crucially, on this view, all our attempts to apply substantive concepts to the Real an sich result in false beliefs. Thus, for example, both the

8 Religious Diversity and its Challenges to Religious Belief 837 Christian belief that the Real an sich is personal and the Buddhist belief that the Real an sich is impersonal, are false. Construed as beliefs about the Real an sich, all the doctrines of the world s religions are false. However, construed as beliefs about the phenomenal Real the Real as it appears in the various religious traditions all such doctrines are true. This dual alethic parity, Hick says, allows us to avoid privileging one religion over the others (because all religious doctrines are false in one sense but true in another). Moreover, there is no incompatibility in claiming that, construed as claims about phenomenal reality, both the Christian claim that the Real is personal and the Buddhist claim that the Real is impersonal, can be true. For, the Real does appear to the Christian to be personal, and to the Buddhist to be impersonal; such phenomenal claims are mutually compatible. Much recent criticism of Hick s view has focused on the claim that no substantive concepts of which humans are aware can apply to the Real. To repeat: Hick takes this claim to encompass both positive and negative concepts. The idea is not merely that humans can apply no positive substantive concepts (e.g., personality) to the Real. Rather, his view is that neither the concept of personality nor the concept of non-personality applies to the Real (Interpretation xx, xxi). This claim has drawn the ire of several critics (Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief; Rowe, Religious Pluralism ). Like anything else, these critics say, the Real must have one or the other of any two contradictory properties X and non-x. And if so, then the Real an sich is not beyond our human concepts. In response, Hick points to concepts that seem to apply to some object neither positively nor negatively: It does not make sense, for example, to ask whether a molecule is clever or stupid, or whether a stone is virtuous or wicked, because they are not the kind of thing that can be either (Interpretation xx). Likewise, it does not make sense to ask of the transcategorical Real whether it is personal or non-personal, good or evil, just or unjust, because these concepts do not apply to it positively or negatively (xx xxi). Critics respond by reasserting that the Real must have one or the other of two contradictory properties, terms, or concepts. Some such critics doubt that Hick means to deny this claim, and opt for alternative readings of his work (see Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief 45ff for one such reading). Thus, Plantinga: I take it that the term tricycle does not apply to the Real; the Real is not a tricycle. But if the Real is not a tricycle, then, is not a tricycle applies literally to it; it is a nontricycle. It could hardly be neither a tricycle nor a nontricycle; nor do I think that Hick would want to suggest that it could. (45) To this, Hick replies, I do indeed hold that the Real cannot properly be said to be either a tricycle or a non-tricycle and either green or non-green, on the ground that the

9 838 Religious Diversity and its Challenges to Religious Belief concepts of tricycality and greenness do not apply to it either positively or negatively. (Interpretation xxi) 10 He adds, moreover, a distinction between terms and concepts that are religiously relevant and those that are religiously irrelevant. Concepts such as personality and impersonality, justice and injustice fall into the former camp, while concepts such as tricycality, greenness, and teapotality fall into the latter. We do no serious damage to the world s religions in saying that either tricycality or nontricycality must apply to the Real. But, Hick claims, in making a similar move with respect to religiously relevant concepts say, the concepts of being either personal or non-personal (and not both) we thereby falsify either all the theistic or all the non-theistic religions. Hick concludes that from a global religious point of view, such a maneuver is unacceptable (xxii). Whatever one s evaluation of this dialectic, it is important to note that Hick s pluralism implies that all the doctrines of the world s great religions, construed as claims about the Real as it is in itself, are false. But many traditional religious believers do construe at least some important religious doctrines as claims about the Real as it is in itself; and many such believers think that if their beliefs are true, then beliefs incompatible with these are false. That is to say, many traditional believers are doctrinal exclusivists. For such believers, adopting Hick s pluralism would be a major revisionary move. They will be disinclined to make such a move in the absence of good arguments against exclusivism. We now turn to the question whether there are any such arguments. 4 Objections to Doctrinal Exclusivism Doctrinal exclusivism has recently been subjected to a barrage of criticisms. As the exclusivist Alvin Plantinga notes, [T]here is a fairly widespread belief that there is something seriously wrong with exclusivism. It is irrational, or egotistical and unjustified, or intellectually arrogant, or elitist, or a manifestation of harmful pride, or even oppressive and imperialistic. ( Pluralism 194) Contemporary discussion of these objections commonly proceeds according to three assumptions. First, it is assumed that the religious beliefs of the exclusivist in question are prima facie rational. Without such an assumption, the question of the rationality of such beliefs in the face of religious diversity would not be particularly interesting. (For varying accounts of how religious beliefs can gain this status, see Swinburne; Alston, Perceiving God; Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief). Second, it is assumed that the exclusivist is aware of others who disagree with her (e.g., proponents of naturalism, skepticism, or of other religions). There seems to be nothing morally or rationally objectionable with an exclusivist who holds to her views in the absence of such awareness. The more interesting question is

10 Religious Diversity and its Challenges to Religious Belief 839 whether there is something wrong with maintaining the exclusivist position after having been made aware of dissenters. Third, it is assumed that the exclusivist lacks (or at least does not take herself to have) a knockdown, non-circular argument of the sort that should convince all rational persons that her religious beliefs are correct. If she takes herself to have such an argument, then surely she should consider those who disagree with her to be simply mistaken. Let us therefore proceed on the assumption that the exclusivist takes herself to lack an argument of this sort. Given these assumptions, is there something seriously wrong with holding to doctrinal exclusivism? Affirmative answers to this question come in both moral and epistemological varieties; let us consider these in turn moral objections According to one common kind of objection, holding to doctrinal exclusivism renders one properly subject to moral censure. The possible indictments here are legion, but among the relevant charges are those of imperialism, oppression, arrogance, and a kind of self-serving egotism or arbitrariness. Space does not permit the detailed consideration of all such charges. With respect to imperialism and oppression, however, doctrinal exclusivists admit that doctrinal exclusivism can play a role in various sorts of oppression and imperialism (Plantinga, Pluralism 197). However, exclusivists add that such misfortunes result not from exclusivism itself, but rather, from its abuse exclusivism isn t in itself oppressive. Indeed, oppression is often antithetical to the doctrines that the exclusivist holds dear. Still, many think that taking up the exclusivist stance is morally problematic in another way. Here the idea is that one cannot adhere to religious exclusivism without thereby incurring the charge of arrogance or selfserving arbitrariness. Wilfred Cantwell-Smith expresses this line of thought in his assessment of Christian versions of exclusivism: [M]y submission is that... the traditional position of the Church has in fact militated against its traditional moral position, and has in fact encouraged Christians to approach other men immorally. Christ has taught us humility, but we have approached them with arrogance.... This charge of arrogance is a serious one...[e]xcept at the cost of insensitivity or delinquence, it is not morally possible actually to go out into the world and say to devout, intelligent, fellow human beings:... We believe that we know God, and we are right; you believe that you know God, and you are totally wrong. (13 14) So, the doctrinal exclusivist takes her beliefs about God to be both alethically and epistemically privileged. According to the objector, this stance bespeaks a morally blameworthy sort of arrogance. Alvin Plantinga defends exclusivism against the arrogance, egotism, and arbitrariness charges ( Pluralism ). The core of his response consists in a tu quoque directed toward would-be objectors. The exclusivist, Plantinga says, finds herself in the situation of believing the core doctrines of her

11 840 Religious Diversity and its Challenges to Religious Belief religion despite knowing both that others disagree with her and that she lacks a knockdown, non-circular argument that should convince these others that she is correct. However, Plantinga argues, the exclusivist is not thereby guilty of arrogance, egotism, or arbitrariness or, if she is guilty, then those who disagree with her are guilty as well ( ). (Plantinga thinks that the following reply will work for all three of these moral indictments. To simplify, we will put things in terms of the arrogance charge.) In responding to religious diversity, Plantinga says, the exclusivist has just three options. First, she can continue believing as she does. Second, she can give up her current beliefs and instead adopt their denials. Third, she can withhold judgment with respect to the core doctrines of her religion; that is, believe neither these doctrines nor their denials. 12 Now, call the conditions in which the exclusivist finds herself namely, knowing both that others disagree with her and that she lacks a knockdown, non-circular argument for the disputed beliefs conditions C. According to the objector, taking the first option despite being in conditions C renders the exclusivist guilty of arrogance. However, Plantinga argues, if this line of thought is correct, then it shows that certain pluralists (most notably, Hick) are also guilty of arrogance. For this sort of pluralist believes that the doctrines of every religion, construed as claims about a supernatural Ultimate Reality as it is in itself, are literally false. Moreover, the pluralist knows both that exclusivists disagree with him and that no knockdown, non-circular argument shows that pluralism 13 is correct. But if this is the case, then the pluralist is in conditions C with respect to the disputed beliefs. If he continues to adhere to pluralism under such conditions, Plantinga argues, then the pluralist is no less guilty of arrogance than is the exclusivist. So, the doctrinal exclusivist cannot elude the charge of arrogance just by adopting Hickean pluralism (or any other view that requires her to adopt the denials of her current religious beliefs) (198). One might conclude from the above line of thought that the correct attitude under conditions C is to withhold judgment to adopt neither the exclusivist s doctrines nor their denials. This is the position adopted by a certain kind of religious skeptic. However, Plantinga argues, taking up such a position does not enable one to avoid the charge of arrogance. To begin to see this, Plantinga says, we must carefully consider the nature of disagreement. On his view, disagreement consists in subjects adopting conflicting propositional attitudes toward some proposition, p. The simplest case of disagreement consists in one party believing p and another believing not-p. In this case, the parties contradict each other. Another relevant sort of case consists in one party believing p where another withholds with respect to p; in this case, the parties dissent from one another s views. On Plantinga s account, cases of dissent count as disagreements just as surely as do cases of contradiction (199). He argues that if one is arrogant to contradict another s view in lieu of a knockdown argument for one s own position, then one is arrogant to dissent from another s view under the

12 Religious Diversity and its Challenges to Religious Belief 841 same conditions. For, such dissension involves, at least implicitly, a condemnation of the other s attitude toward the relevant proposition. The skeptical dissenter believes that it is better or wiser to withhold belief under conditions C, but also realizes that he has no knockdown argument showing that withholding is the right attitude in such conditions. But then, Plantinga concludes, the skeptic is guilty of the same sort of arrogance he has attributed to the exclusivist (199). Perhaps more fundamentally, Plantinga argues, the skeptic occupies a position that is self-defeating in the circumstances that obtain. In charging the exclusivist with arrogance, the skeptic seems to employ a principle like the following: (SK) For all subjects S, if S knows that others don t believe p and that S is in conditions C with respect to p, then S should not believe p. Of course, the exclusivist rejects SK. The skeptic realizes this, and also realizes that he has no argument of the sort that will convince the exclusivist of SK. But then the skeptic realizes that he is in conditions C with respect to SK. Thus, by SK, the skeptic should not believe SK (200). 4.2 transformational parity Hick raises an objection to exclusivism that, while primarily aimed at soteriological exclusivism, is residually relevant to doctrinal exclusivism. A passage quoted in section 3 indicates the objection he has in mind; we now quote the passage at greater length. Of the world s great religions, Hick says, [E]ach seems, so far as we can tell from their spiritual and moral fruits in human life, to be more or less equally successful (and also equally unsuccessful) as contexts of this salvific transformation of individuals and...societies. Again, each has its own unique belief-system, arising from the immensely powerful religious experience of its founder(s) and their successors in the developing tradition. (Dialogues 14) Elsewhere Hick makes the somewhat weaker claim that we have no good reason to believe that any one of the great religious traditions has proved itself to be more productive of love/compassion than another ( Religious Pluralism and Salvation 369). But, crucially, we should expect disparity of moral fruits across the world s religions on the exclusivist hypothesis that one religious tradition is alethically and epistemically privileged over the others. Superior access to divine truth should yield superiority of moral transformation, at least if all else is equal. That we do not seem to find that one religion is superior to others in this respect makes trouble for doctrinal exclusivism. Thus, in comparing the relative fruits of Christianity and Buddhism, Hick takes the appearance of transformational parity to pose a problem for the Christian exclusivist: [I]t is incumbent upon the Christian theologian to explain how a religion that is, from a theistic

13 842 Religious Diversity and its Challenges to Religious Belief point of view, so totally wrong, can have spiritual and moral fruits that are not inferior to Christianity s (Dialogues 42). On Hick s view, while no plausible exclusivist explanation is available, pluralism readily explains the relevant data. Exclusivists sometimes respond by rejecting Hick s stronger transformational parity claim. Even granting Hick s assumption that the claim admits of empirical evaluation, they say, it is difficult to see how one could obtain good grounds for accepting it. A full-dress empirical evaluation of the claim would require both (a) a set of neutral, non-question-begging criteria for spiritual/moral evaluation; and (b) reliable methods for testing such criteria. Hick does attempt to provide something like (a). Insofar as all the world s great religions give a central role to compassionate, unselfish regard for others e.g., as expressed in the Golden Rule we may use this as a neutral criterion of evaluation. However, Hick acknowledges that that there is a paucity of empirical research comparing the various religious traditions with respect to this criterion. He admits that such evidence as is available for his stronger parity claim is anecdotal and impressionistic. In view of this, he ultimately employs only the weaker claim that we have no good reason to believe one religious tradition to be superior to the others in his objection to exclusivism ( Religious Pluralism 58). While this move does seem to render Hick s parity claim more amenable to empirical evaluation, it does not thereby make his objection (taken on the whole) easy to assess. Though few have done so, the exclusivist may continue to insist on the transformational superiority of his own tradition, and may attempt to marshal non-question-begging evidence to this end. Other exclusivists may attempt to marshal their own religious beliefs as evidence against the parity claim. Very roughly: if these beliefs are rational, and if they imply the denial of Hick s parity claim (and if the exclusivist sees the implication), then it is rational for the exclusivist to deny this parity claim (see Clark, Perils for a detailed development of this sort of move). Another exclusivist tack would be to reject the claim that we should expect moral disparity (with respect to some neutral, behavioral criterion) across the world s religions, given doctrinal exclusivism. For instance, the exclusivist may argue that, while certain versions of his religion predict that proponents will be measurably superior to outsiders in their outward moral behavior, this prediction is no part of his religion as such and if not, then transformational parity does not defeat doctrinal exclusivism. 14 The attractiveness of such a response will vary widely across religious traditions. Granting the empirical premise of the argument, the extent to which transformational parity poses a problem for doctrinal exclusivists of a certain tradition will vary according to the extent that the tradition asserts its own transformative superiority. Traditions committed to their

14 Religious Diversity and its Challenges to Religious Belief 843 own superiority may find the Hickean objection quite troubling, while those not so committed may find it to attack a view that they do not hold. 4.3 accidents of birth Another objection to exclusivism, also developed by Hick (Interpretation; also Epistemological Challenge ) concerns the geographical distribution of adherents to the various religious traditions: [R]eligious allegiance depends in the great majority of cases on the accident of birth: someone born into a devout Muslim family in Pakistan is very likely to be a Muslim, someone born into a devout Hindu family in India to be a Hindu, someone born into a devout Christian family in Spain or Mexico to be a Catholic Christian; and so on. ( Epistemological Challenge 281) In interpreting this data, Hick develops an objection to exclusivism that targets both soteriological and doctrinal versions of the view. 15 With respect to the latter, Hick claims that, having realized that her religious beliefs would differ if she had been raised in a different environment, the exclusivist should apply a hermeneutic of suspicion toward these beliefs (281). Exclusivists respond by claiming that this sort of objection, if cogent, recommends a similar hermeneutic toward beliefs not commonly taken to merit such suspicion. Peter van Inwagen employs this maneuver by way of a political analogy. He notes that one s political views are often largely a function of one s upbringing; but argues that this is not a reason for doubting such beliefs ( Non Est Hick ). 16 Alvin Plantinga develops a similar reply in which pluralistic belief is itself the target: Pluralism isn t and hasn t been widely popular in the world at large; if the pluralist had been born in Madagascar, or Medieval France, he probably wouldn t have been a pluralist ( Pluralism 212). It doesn t follow, Plantinga notes, that the pluralist s belief is thereby irrational, unjustified, unreliably formed, or arbitrary. But if not, then no such conclusion follows from the corresponding etiology of the exclusivist s beliefs. Debate continues regarding the adequacy of the exclusivists analogies. Hick points to several respects in which belief in pluralism differs from typical religious beliefs. He notes, for instance, that acceptance of the pluralistic hypothesis is not typically a matter of one s upbringing ( Challenge 281). Moreover, pluralism is a second-order hypothesis about the world s religions, whereas the exclusivist s religious doctrines are first-order claims about Ultimate Reality (Dialogues 57). We cannot pursue this thread further here. Instead it must suffice to note that an adequate treatment of the topic would require at least (i) an inquiry into the extent to which the academic environments in which pluralistic beliefs are formed are less (or more) doxastically coercive than the environments in which religious beliefs are typically formed; (ii) the relevance (or irrelevance) of the content of a belief to an objection that is based on its causal history.

15 844 Religious Diversity and its Challenges to Religious Belief 4.4 disagreement and epistemic parity A final sort of skeptical objection stems from the idea that religious believers are sometimes aware of others who are apparently just as intelligent and intellectually virtuous as they are, have comparable evidence, and yet hold religious beliefs that are incompatible with their own. The objection proceeds on the assumption that both (all) 17 the subjects in question are prima facie rational in maintaining their religious beliefs by way of internal markers, such as arguments or the phenomenology of religious experience. So, for example, a Christian may have one set of arguments and religious experiences that support his Christian beliefs, while a Buddhist has his own set of arguments and experiences supporting his own religious beliefs. Among the things the Christian believes is: (G) There exists an omnipotent and wholly good personal being who created the world. The (typical) Buddhist believes the denial of G. As long as these subjects remain unaware of each other, there seems to be no problem granting that both are rational in holding their beliefs, despite the fact that these beliefs are mutually incompatible. Suppose, however, that the subjects become aware of their disagreement, and that each acquires good reasons for thinking that the other has equally good internal markers in support of his beliefs. Under such conditions, the skeptic says, both subjects are furnished with a reason to give up their beliefs. The Buddhist s initial rationality is defeated by his awareness that his Christian friend is equally well justified in holding a belief that is incompatible with his own. Ditto for the Christian. In such circumstances, the skeptic says, both parties should withhold judgment. By way of response, the exclusivist (in this case, the Christian or Buddhist) may question whether he has grounds for thinking that the other subject s internally available evidence is on a par with that of his own. He may doubt that he is in a position to make reasonable judgments about the character and quality of another subject s internally available evidence (Plantinga hints at this move, but then sets it aside; see Warranted Christian Belief 457). Extended conversation with the religious alien can provide the exclusivist with access to some of this other subject s evidence but only to such evidence as is communicable. And given the plausible assumption that the phenomenology of religious experience typically includes, but goes beyond what is communicable, it may be quite difficult to gain good grounds for thinking that someone else s internally accessible evidence is on a par with one s own. If so, then the present version of the skeptic s objection fails. 18 Some exclusivists are willing to grant the parity assumption mentioned above. That is, some exclusivists grant for the sake of argument that some religious aliens have internal markers supporting their beliefs that are on

16 Religious Diversity and its Challenges to Religious Belief 845 par with the exclusivist s internal markers supporting his own beliefs (Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief 457). The skeptic thinks that, having granted this, the exclusivist is in trouble. Richard Feldman develops an argument to this effect ( Plantinga on Exclusivism ). He begins his argument by noting (though not endorsing) the following epistemic principle: (SK2) If (i) S has good reasons ( internal markers ) to believe p, but (ii) also knows that other people have equally good reasons ( internal markers ) for believing things incompatible with p, then S is not justified in believing p. 19 SK2, conjoined with the exclusivist s concession that he satisfies the clauses in its antecedent, implies that the exclusivist is not justified in holding the target belief. Now, the exclusivist will likely think that SK2 is false for, parity with respect to internal markers is insufficient for parity in all epistemically relevant respects. 20 And the exclusivist will think that he is better off than his friend in respects that are external to his friend s perspective. He will think that he enjoys some special insight or cognitive grace that his friend lacks; or that his friend has made a mistake in assimilating his evidence (Plantinga, Pluralism ). So, while the exclusivist grants that he would have a defeater for his beliefs if he granted that he and his friend were on par in all relevant respects, he will not grant this. In fact, he will deny it, and thereby conclude that the skeptic s objection fails as thus far stated. The skeptic may reply (Feldman does reply) by saying that what the exclusivist will believe about his own epistemic standing is irrelevant here. What matters, rather, is whether the exclusivist has a good reason for thinking that he is epistemically better off, all things considered, than his friend. And, according to the skeptic, the exclusivist lacks such a reason. He thereby runs afoul of an epistemic principle that is more plausible than SK2, namely: (SK3) If (i) S has good reasons ( internal markers ) to believe p, but (ii) also knows that other people have equally good reasons ( internal markers ) for believing things incompatible with p; and (iii) S has no reason to discount their reasons and favor S s own, then S is not justified in believing p. (Feldman, Plantinga on Exclusivism 88) Note that this principle does not say that S is unjustified in retaining his belief if S has a good positive reason for thinking that he and his dissenter actually are on a par in all epistemically relevant respects. No prominent exclusivist denies that claim. Rather, the principle utilizes only the more modest idea that the relevant subject has no reason to think that he is (all things considered) epistemically better off than his friend. The skeptic takes the exclusivist to lack such a reason. But without such a reason, the skeptic concludes, the exclusivist s beliefs are unjustified. We cannot here undertake a complete evaluation of the skeptical objection from epistemic parity. Instead, it must suffice to note a number of issues that may arise in the course of such an evaluation. First, a crucial question

17 846 Religious Diversity and its Challenges to Religious Belief is, What would count as a reason for the exclusivist to think that he is epistemically better off than his friend? Must such a reason be independent of the exclusivist s original grounds for holding the target belief? Or may such a reason be at least partly dependent on these grounds? Assessments of the force of the skeptical objection may vary with answers to these questions. Second, the dialectic to this point seems to assume that religious beliefs, if justified, are justified by evidence. But some prominent exclusivists (e.g., Plantinga) deny this, and instead take the relevant beliefs to be properly basic (that is, such that they do not gain their positive epistemic status by way of their relations to evidence or other beliefs). Such exclusivists do not typically take properly basic beliefs to be indefeasible; so their view is open to discussion with skeptical objectors. However, it seems that a skeptical objection that targeted religious beliefs qua basic beliefs would require a structure somewhat different from the objection discussed above. Third, the root of our skeptic-exclusivist debate may be a disagreement about the conditions under which one must give epistemic weight to the views of one s dissenters. On one reading, the skeptic claims that unless a subject has reason to think that his epistemic position is better than that of his dissenters, he must give weight to their opinions. The exclusivist, on the other hand, thinks that a subject need not give such weight unless he has reason to think that these dissenters epistemic position is superior to his own. On an alternative reading, the exclusivist grants that he must give some weight to his dissenters views (in lieu of a reason to think himself their epistemic superior), but denies that he must assign these views an epistemic weight that is equal to his own views. 21 Such a position would allow that parties to religious disagreements can rationally retain their beliefs, but would recommend that they hold these beliefs with reduced confidence. 5 Issues for Further Discussion We have already highlighted a handful of issues whose further treatment may yield fruitful advances in the ongoing debates about religious disagreement. Let us close by noting two additional issues for further discussion. 5.1 skeptical principles There is a need for further inquiry regarding the skeptical principles themselves. One might wonder about the coherence of principles like SK3, given the fact that many philosophers will deny this principle. For if the skeptic grants that some non-skeptic has internal reasons for denying SK3 that are as good as the skeptic s reasons for endorsing it, and if the skeptic is unable to discount such reasons, then by SK3, the skeptic is unjustified in believing SK3. 22 In response to this problem, the skeptic may wish to employ one of the following strategies. First, he may argue