ELEONORE STUMP PENELHUM ON SKEPTICS AND FIDEISTS

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1 ELEONORE STUMP PENELHUM ON SKEPTICS AND FIDEISTS ABSTRACT. Professor Penelhum has argued that there is a common error about the history of skepticism and that the exposure of this error would significantly improve our understanding of a current confusion in the philosophy of religion with regard to the issue of the rationality of religious beliefs. Penelhum considers certain contemporary philosophers of religion such as Plantinga skeptics because he reads Plantinga (for example) as arguing that religious beliefs are properly groundless in virtue of the fact that none of our beliefs have any ultimate grounds, and Penelhum argues that this sort of defense of religious belief is both limited and dangerous for religion. I argue that on the interpretation of ancient skepticism which Penelhum gives ancient skepticism is just what it has often been claimed to be: either practically untenable or incoherent or both. I show that in any case the confusion in philosophy of religion which Penelhum wants to sort out with the help of ancient skepticism is not one of which its alleged proponents are guilty. The views of Plantinga and others who take his line are more complex and powerful than Penelhum's presentation makes them seem; these views do not constitute an acceptance of skepticism but a denial of a certain sort of foundationalism. Contrary to Penelhum, then, I argue that ancient skepticism does not serve as a significant corrective for certain trends in contemporary philosophy of religion. The thesis of Penelhum's article is that there is a common contemporary error about the history of skepticism and that the exposure of this error would significantly improve our understanding of a current confusion in the philosophy of religion with regard to the issue of the rationality of religious beliefs. But on the interpretation of ancient skepticism which Penelhum gives in this paper, it seems to me that ancient skepticism is just what it has often been claimed to be: either incoherent or practically untenable or both, 1 and that in any case the confusion in philosophy of religion which Penelhum wants to sort out with the help of ancient skepticism is not one which its alleged proponents are guilty of. According to Penelhum, the ancient skeptic examines life and then returns to it "free of all inclination to pass judgment on it"; he "conforms to the ways of his own day" but "belieflessly". He refuses to commit himself to any particular perceptual, moral,, or theological beliefs; he suspends judgment about what is the case both with regard to physical reality and with regard to what is good or bad, valuable or Synthese 67 (1986) by D. Reidel Publishing Company

2 148 ELEONORE STUMP harmful. In this stance, Penelhum says, the skeptic "had a genuine practical orientation" because ancient skepticism was engaged "in the enterprise of helping the thinker attain a state of inner tranquility", which the skeptic sought "through the escape from doctrinal commitment". There are two understandings of ancient skepticism possible on Penelhum's exposition of it, a strong sense in which we take literally the claim that the skeptics conform to the lifestyle of their age but without any commitment to moral, metaphysical, or perceptual beliefs, and a weak sense, in which we understand the skeptic as a philosopher who wants to give up just firm commitments to any particular set of philosophical beliefs and to philosophy as a methodology designed to discover and defend such firm commitments. Understood in the strong sense, skeptics avoid committing themselves to any beliefs as part of a program for attaining inner tranquility. Penelhum thinks that their position can be described in a way which is not patently paradoxical, but it is not clear to me that he is right. Why seek tranquility unless tranquility is something we believe valuable? If we do value tranquility, then it is no longer true that we have suspended judgment about all beliefs. So either the skeptic commits himself to at least one belief, namely, that tranquility is valuable, and then he has violated his own skepticism; or he is in fact not committed to any beliefs, not even to a belief in the value of tranquility, but then he cannot explain why anyone should seek what is touted as the major goal and advantage of skepticism. Penelhum recognizes this problem and suggests that the skeptic does not seek tranquility but simply finds it by chance at the end of his philosophical labors. But this is a description of a skeptic which, it seems to me, could fit only the first generation of skeptics and not any of their disciples or students. The founding skeptics might have fallen into tranquility by chance. However, subsequent generations will know that such tranquility is the result of skepticism; they can no longer fall into it by chance. For them skepticism must become what Penelhum himself describes it as: an enterprise of attaining tranquility. Even if it could be shown to be coherent, considered as an enterprise to achieve tranquility it seems to me unworkable. Suppose a child - Monica, say - develops leukemia, and her disease disturbs her mother's inner peace. What is the skeptic's program for preserving tranquility in such a case? Apparently it consists in refusing to make commitments to

3 PENELHUM ON SKEPTICS AND FIDEISTS 149 any beliefs. Thus to be consistent and for the sake of maintaining her inner peace Monica's mother, if she accepted the skeptic's approach, would refuse to commit herself either to the belief that Monica is in pain or to the belief that her being in pain is a bad thing. Of course, the beliefs that Monica is in pain and that her pain is a bad thing would no doubt be the main reason for the disturbance of the mother's inner peace. Without such a perception of the child and such an evaluation of her state, Monica's mother might lack inner turmoil over the child's disease. But it is not clear to me that the mother would then be tranquil, because if in such circumstances she really could suspend judgment about whether Monica was in pain and whether her pain was a bad thing, it seems clear that the mother would be either crazy or wicked. Neither state is typically associated with tranquility; but if either state is after all compatible with tranquility, then the skeptics seem to me mistaken in the esteem they accord tranquility. Furthermore, if we really take seriously the claim that the skeptic is committed to no beliefs, then it seems to me that the skeptic will not only fail to attain some ideal state, but he will also fail to maintain any state of life. Even if such a skeptic could consonant with his skepticism get out of bed and get dressed in the morning, he would die on his way to work. Consider his behavior at the first red light at a busy intersection. Should he stop? Why should he? While he remains a skeptic, he cannot commit himself to the beliefs that the red light is really there, that failure to stop will in all likelihood really result in pain or death, and that we should value avoiding pain or death. In his no doubt legendary but to my mind altogether plausible account of the skeptic Pyrrho, Diogenes Laertius claims that only Pyrrho's more commonsensical friends saved him from death because, consistent with his skepticism, he refused ever to look where he was going. Penelhum would, of course, deny that such a portrait of an ancient skeptic is accurate because on his view ancient skeptics returned to ordinary life and conformed to the practices of their own age, but belieflessly. That is, they acted just like their nonskeptical neighbors but without sharing any of their neighbors' beliefs. On this view, Pyrrho does look where he is going because he conforms, although belieflessly, to the customs of his time; and my skeptic stops at red lights but without committing himself to any beliefs about the physical reality of those lights or the value of avoiding pain and death. But here I think we are entitled to a little skepticism of our own. Why stop at a red light unless

4 150 ELEONORE STUMP one believes it is there and values the consequences of stopping? Why treat a child's leukemia unless one is committed to the beliefs that she is sick and in pain and that health is to be valued? How can a skeptic conform to the practices of his own age unless he shares the beliefs of that age? Why shouldn't we conclude that the skeptic as Penelhum describes him is being insincere or self-deceived? We do typically read beliefs from actions, and it is proverbial that deeds speak louder than words. If the skeptic claims that he shares none of our beliefs but nonetheless conforms to our customary practices which are predicated on those beliefs, why aren't we within our rights in concluding that contrary to the skeptic's claim, he is committed also to our customary beliefs? If a skeptic vaccinates his children, visits the dentist, and stops at railroad crossings when the gate is down, he vitiates his claim to be committed to no beliefs. Without reference to some appropriate beliefs, he can give no explanation for his conduct, and without some beliefs about values, he has no motives for his actions. On the face of it, then, for all Penelhum has told us, skepticism in this strong sense seems incoherent or practically untenable or both. But sometimes what Penelhum says suggests that he has in mind a different interpretation of skepticism, one which may or may not be a correct understanding of ancient skepticism but which is an interesting philosophical stance in its own right. As far as I can see, it consists essentially in three positions: first, an agnosticism not with regard to any and all beliefs but just with regard to major philosophical questions, including ethical and theological issues; secondly, a repudiation of philosophical inquiry, understood as an attempt to reach a determinate conclusion about philosophical issues; and thirdly, conformity to the practical, moral, and religious conventions of one's own age. This is a much weaker sense of skepticism; but in this sense, too, skepticism seems to me at least paradoxical and certainly untenable. It recommends adopting agnosticism with regard to philosophical issues and abandoning attempts to defend dogmatic assertions on major philosophical questions. But this recommendation seems itself either to include or to rest on dogmatic philosophical assertions: that philosophical issues can never be settled, that no philosophical arguments on major issues prove their conclusions, and so on. The recommendation of conformity seems to carry with it the claim that conformity or something entailed by it is of value, so that this version of skepticism too is apparently committed to at least one belief about what is of value.

5 PENELHUM ON SKEPTICS AND FIDEISTS 151 Even if this brand of skepticism could be shown coherent, however, I do not see how its recommendations could be followed. The problem is that although ancient skeptics may have been confronted with only one set of conventional moral and religious beliefs, in our pluralistic society it is hard to know what to count as the practices of the day. Suppose, for example, that some American philosopher now decides to abandon philosophical investigation, maintain agnosticism on major philosophical issues, and conform to the practices of the day. Should he conform to Christian religious practices or to atheism? Should he adopt a restrictive sexual morality or a permissive one? Should he take a sociological survey to determine which views are most commonly held in his society? And what is to count as his society? His country? His socioeconomic class? The class of currently practicing analytic philosophers? If he were to take a job in Saudi Arabia, should he change his religious practices along with his residence? In short, I do not see that this weaker version of skepticism is any more practically tenable or any less paradoxical than the stronger version. Consequently, it seems to me that the lessons such ancient skepticism has to teach us are basically cautionary tales and that it is instructive for philosophy of religion or any other area of philosophy primarily as an example of a road to avoid. Penelhum, however, thinks that a study of ancient skepticism will yield some further lesson, and specifically for contemporary philosophy of religion. I am not sure what that lesson is, but that may be partly also because I do not share his view of contemporary philosophers of religion, a view which I want to examine next. Because I know Plantinga's recent work best and because it is widely held to be among the best work in current philosophy of religion, I want to focus on it and I want to take issue with Penelhum's account of it. 2 I think Plantinga would be very surprised to find himself classed as any sort of skeptic, fideistic or otherwise; and it is hard for me to see how he can be included among those who have "shown us the rational groundlessness.., of religion" since he is known for his defense of the ontological argument, for example. So even if some Christian philosophers have been or have professed to be skeptics, I find it difficult to accept the idea that Plantinga is in their number. Penelhum, I take it, thinks of Plantinga as a skeptic because he reads Plantinga as arguing that religious beliefs are properly groundless in virtue of the fact that none of our beliefs have any ultimate grounds.

6 152 ELEONORE STUMP Penelhum thinks that Plantinga's sort of approach to religious beliefs has some defensive value, showing that with regard to rationality religious beliefs are on a par with our secular beliefs; but he thinks that Plantinga and other philosophers like him who adopt this approach have failed to notice that it could be used to defend absolutely any sort of religious system or philosophical set of beliefs. So he thinks that this sort of defense of religious belief is both limited and dangerous for religion. I certainly agree with his conclusion. If Plantinga were giving this sort of defense of religious belief, I think religion would do well to eschew it as pernicious. But Plantinga's views on this issue are more complex and powerful than Penelhum's presentation makes them seem. Plantinga's view is that an individual may be rational in his religious beliefs without having other beliefs from which his religious beliefs are correctly deduced. Nothing in that view commits Plantinga to the claims that Penelhum in this paper takes him to be makitlg, namely, that no evidence for religious beliefs can be given or that religious belief is groundless. In fact, Plantinga himself says explicitly: "my claim is that belief in God is properly basic; it does not follow, however, that it is groundless" (Plantinga 1983, p. 78). For Plantinga, a belief is basic if it is held but not on the basis of other beliefs; and it is properly basic if the individual who holds it violates no epistemic duties in holding it as basic. Plantinga wants to argue that certain beliefs are basic - not accepted on the basis of other beliefs - but also justified and well grounded, and that religious beliefs can (although they don't need to) fall into this group. In taking this position Plantinga is not allying himself with skeptics. He is not arguing positively that there can never be sound arguments on major philosophical issues in general or for religious beliefs in particular. Rather he is arguing negatively against one epistemological theory, namely, foundationalism, which holds a very restrictive view about what can count as a properly basic belief. According to modern foundationalists, a proposition is properly basic for an individual if and only if it is either self-evident or incorrigible for that individual; and the only rational beliefs, on this theory, are those which are properly basic or correctly derived from properly basic beliefs. It is the.restrictive thesis about what can count as properly basic that Plantinga is concerned to deny. I think he mounts a successful argument against it by showing that the foundationalism based on this thesis is self-inconsistent. The thesis that only the self-evident and incorrigible can be

7 PENELHUM ON SKEPTICS AND F1DEISTS 153 properly basic is itself neither self-evident nor incorrigible, nor is there any obvious way to deduce it from self-evident or incorrigible beliefs. Therefore, by the standards of modern foundationalism, this thesis is itself one which it is irrational to hold. Modern foundationalism falls with the fall of this thesis; and in Plantinga's view its fall removes the major obstacle to taking religious beliefs as properly basic. As for the worry that his move allows any system of beliefs to count as rational - the Great Pumpkin Objection, as Plantinga has labeled it - Plantinga is concerned to show that his revised epistemology permits theistic beliefs to count as properly basic but rules out the possibility of properly basic beliefs in the Great Pumpkin, (Plantinga 1983, pp ). His argument to this effect depends on claiming that the circumstances which ground theistic beliefs and justify taking them as basic do not obtain for belief in the Great Pumpkin. It is a controversial and interesting argument which I cannot examine here. Whether it is ultimately a successful argument is not clear to me; but it is a mistake to suppose Plantinga does not recognize and try to disarm the sort of objection Penelhum rightly claims can be raised against his view. So I do not see that Plantinga and his followers in this line are skeptics or that they are fideists in their approach to religion. The point of Plantinga's work seems to me not a rejection of reason in the examination of religion but a defense of the rationality of those religious believers who are not in a position to do rational theology themselves. Plantinga is not accepting skepticism but denying what he calls 'evidentialism', which is the view (considered by many an extravagant and unwarranted epistemological claim) that it is never correct for anyone to accept a belief without himself having sufficient evidence for it. Although there are obviously many cases in which a philosophical argument or position from an earlier period contains an important lesson for a contemporary problem or can serve as a significant corrective for some current philosopical trend, I do not yet see that ancient skepticism has such a role to play with respect to contemporary philosophy of religion) NOTES For a thorough and excellent discussion of this criticism of skepticism, see M. F. Burnyeat (1983).

8 154 ELEONORE STUMP Penelhum has given a different account of Plantinga's position in Penelhum (1983, p. 147 ft.). In this paper I am responding only to the account of Plantinga Penelhum gives in the paper in this volume. I am grateful to Norman Kretzmann for his comments and suggestions on an earlier draft. REFERENCES Burnyeat, M.: 1983, 'Can the Skeptic Live His Skepticism?', in Miles Burnyeat (ed.), The Skeptical Tradition, University of California Press, Berkeley, pp Penelhum, T.: 1983, God and Skepticism, D. Reidel, Boston. Plantinga, A.: 1983, 'Reason and Belief in God', in Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (eds.), Faith and Rationality, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame. Philosophy Department Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Blacksburg VA U.S.A.

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