LRC780. Submission to the Lockhart Review Anglican Church of Australia, Sydney Diocese

Transcription

1 LRC780 Submission to the Lockhart Review Anglican Church of Australia, Sydney Diocese Summary Human life from its earliest known inception has always been held in the utmost honour by Christians. As such, the embryo takes its place amongst us as humanity at its weakest and most vulnerable. Our willingness to destroy excess ART embryos already represents a worrying shift in societal concern away from the needs of the vulnerable to the self-interested needs of the powerful. Further wilful destruction of embryos will, we believe, increasingly damage the fragile tapestry of thought that gives our society its capacity for care and concern. In discussions about the impact of this legislation on Australia s scientific ability, good science is not that which makes the most money, or panders to consumerism, or makes our medical researchers into merchants and commodities traders. If our decision to honour embryos and the unborn as precious seems strange and unaccountable to overseas observers, then let us be strange, in the same way that our society s commitment to egalitarianism, friendship, tolerance, and other quintessentially Australian customs might also be considered strange. We request and recommend that existing laws are not amended to enable the creation of new embryos for the purposes of research. Whilst acknowledging the need for nuanced law and policy on cross-border travel of biological material, we counsel against unrestricted traffic in embryonic material. We ask for the kind of regulation of ART clinics that will bring transparency, so enabling proper public discussion of any new innovations. The Anglican Archbishop of Sydney, Rev. Dr Peter Jensen, thanks the Committee for the opportunity to participate in this important legislative review. This submission has been prepared on his behalf by the Social Issues Executive of the Anglican Diocese of Sydney. We hope to assist the review by pointing, firstly, to some wider considerations that we believe are easily forgotten or missed. We will then proceed to engage with some points of detail regarding the review s terms of reference. 1. Wider considerations The following comments implicitly contain disagreements with some provisions of the Acts of We remain opposed to all forms of destructive embryonic research, but we do recognize that the matter was decided against this view in Our comments are necessary, though, in order to make sense of our requests concerning any amendments to the Acts. For several hundred years, Christians and their churches have stood in an ambiguous relationship with the societies they inhabit. Christians seek for an orderly, prosperous and healthy society, and want to uphold civil law wherever possible. But to this end, they often stand in loyal opposition to practices within the society which they are sure will damage it. Destructive embryonic research, and embryonic cloning, are two such arenas of loyal opposition. It is possible, of course, to find Christians who support such research; such a Page 1

2 development can only be expected in the current milieu. However, human life from its earliest known inception has always been held with the utmost honour by Christians, and attempts to argue the contrary are unconvincing. 1 We realise that for many, the embryo is simply a wonderful toolbox, a cluster of cells that is no more or less important than any other, yet filled with life-saving potential. We know that objections to destructive embryonic research really are deeply unintelligible to them. We understand that for those who work with life at a cellular level every day, it is beyond credulity to think that humanity at a one or two cell stage should be held in such high esteem. We are aware that for many, our ongoing opposition to destructive embryonic research seems doctrinaire and wickedly perverse. Since we live in a society fixated on the avoidance of pain (whether physical or emotional) almost at all costs, this embryonic toolbox commends itself as an obvious means to that end. But embryonic research is so close to the very building blocks of life that its researchers, and its proponents, can easily stop noticing the bigger picture that the research is meant to serve. If it comes from two humans, has human totipotentiality, and when nurtured properly will walk and quack like a human, then it probably is a human; and so for us, destructive embryonic research bears too much resemblance to cutting up one live human in order to save another. The Committee will hear that these cells are not personal because persons are able to demonstrate some arbitrary list of specifications or achieve some arbitrary list of skills that the embryo is unable to demonstrate or achieve. But historically, the construction of such arbitrary lists is a well-worn strategy for defining humanity as sub-human or nonhuman convenience, so as to exploit or demean the other for example the disabled, the indigenous, or the infirm. The Committee will hear that these cells matter only when they are wanted as part of a project called parenting. But this claim merely idolizes and deifies human will, and we do not accept this logic when human will fails to want others and exploits them, as in slavery. Nor do we accept that the environment is valuable just because we want it. The natural environment is inherently good despite our wants, and our failure properly to want environmental goods is usually just a vice. The Committee will hear that the genetic parents of embryos want some good to come of their progeny, and by analogy with organ donation, they graciously seek to donate it. But although we might affirm such generosity of spirit, the embryo is not their property to destroy. In childrearing, parents are custodians of a gift that is to be nurtured, and we believe the same holds true for the embryonic life they produce. (The fatal disanalogy with organ donation is, of course, that in that case there is no prospect of future life.) This area of medical science, like any other, can easily be caught up in cultural fashions and social enthusiasms. 2 In order to use the embryo, we must convince ourselves that this unwanted cluster of cells is in no way personal, and so we become a society that thinks we can define who is truly human, and therefore who deserves our respect, rather than simply 1 David Jones, et al., "A Theologian s Brief: On the Place of the Human Embryo within the Christian Tradition and the Theological Principles for Evaluating Its Moral Status," Ethics & Medicine 17 no. 3 (2001); online: and (accessed 9th September 2005). 2 See further Allen Verhey, "The Cultural Geography of Cloning," in Cloning, ed. Robert B. Kruschwitz, Christian Reflection, (Waco, TX: Baylor University Center for Christian Ethics, 2005); online: (accessed 9th September 2005). Page 2

3 recognizing and accepting humanity wherever we find it for the wonder that it is. (The recent movie The Island illustrates the way some think they can define humanity and personhood as they choose, rather than recognising it when they see it. Their definition of personhood was for their own benefit, convenience and enrichment.) For these reasons, we think that the embryo is precious, whether or not someone has placed a value on it. If we are wrong, then the Committee needs to understand that for us and for many who think as we do, the wilful destruction of the embryo has the same sort of shocking and saddening symbolic resonance as, say, the desecration or destruction of the Martin Place Cenotaph might have for Anzac veterans. In a civil polity, this reason alone should suffice for others to cease and desist from the offensive practice. But there is good reason to think that our defence of the embryo is more than symbolic. The embryo takes its place amongst us as humanity at its very weakest and most vulnerable. Our willingness to destroy excess ART embryos already represents a worrying shift in societal concern away from the needs of the vulnerable to the self-interested needs of the powerful; and further wilful destruction of embryos will, we believe, further damage the fragile tapestry of thought that gives our society its capacity for care and concern. The Committee will hear that since the Acts of 2002 now allow some destructive embryonic research, then liberalisation of this research is the logical next-step, and current limitations upon it make little sense. The committee should remember, however, that the current provisions were only made in order to make good use of excess embryos, and were explicitly framed so as to prevent embryo farming. Although we remain opposed in principle to all forms of destructive embryonic research, we at least appreciate the careful licensing of it since 2002, and we see no warrant suddenly to expand destructive embryonic research as if it has somehow become ethically unproblematic. The Committee will hear that in order most expeditiously to bring about cures for illness and infertility, all avenues of cellular research should be employed that all the horses should be allowed to run. Of course it is good to cure disease and prevent pain, but not at all costs. Given biological complexity and research ingenuity, there are plenty of others horses that can win this race. There are routes other than embryonic research by which we can rightly seek to cure illness and reduce pain. We do seriously propose, then, to keep this particular horse in the stable, just as it has often been thought that certain kinds of nuclear knowledge might better have been left unknown. Although humans are curious, it does not follow that we must inevitably know everything. We can voluntarily choose not to know some things. The Committee will hear that the creation of cloned embryos through somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) is unproblematic, because there is no intention to or likelihood of creating a reproductive clone, and because an ontological difference between such a cloned entity and the embryo derived from sperm and egg mean that the clone is not personal. These arguments all fail, of course, after the birth of Dolly the sheep, whose SCNT-produced embryonic origin was ipso facto sheeply (if not exactly personal!), and led directly to reproduction. The committee will hear that only irrational fear motivates objections to cloning technology. But the complaint is entirely patronising, and not worthy of serious consideration. Rational reasons can be given for such fear, and the fear should be construed rather as a well-considered reflection upon what kind of society we might like to inhabit, well before we inhabit it. It is in the nature of political and legal process to do such reflection, and to act accordingly including not taking some course of action. It makes as much sense to accuse the opponents of cloning of irrational fear as to accuse its proponents of blind, greedy ambition. Page 3

4 The Committee will hear that Australia must not fall behind, that investment opportunities must not be lost, that such research is inevitable and that Australia must join the rush. But the Committee need not be swayed by this debased leaders and followers rhetoric. Good science is not that which makes the most money, or panders to consumerism, or makes our medical researchers into merchants and commodities traders; and so Australia may choose to be different. If our decision to honour embryos and the unborn as precious seems strange and unaccountable to overseas observers, then let us be strange, in the same way that our society s commitment to egalitarianism, friendship, tolerance, and other quintessentially Australian customs might also be considered strange. Therefore we ask the committee not to be swayed by the social fashions and scientific enthusiasms that drive the demand for destructive embryonic research and embryonic cloning. Despite your terms of reference, this legislation is not merely in the business of reflecting community standards. Like all acts of political judgment, it will make statements about what should matter and what is acceptable. It will lead this community, not merely follow it. It cannot avoid making a statement for or against the embryo. Therefore, our requests and recommendations to you are simple: - We do not want existing laws amended to enable the creation of new embryos (whether conventionally or by cloning) for the purposes of research. - Whilst acknowledging the need for nuanced law and policy on cross-border travel of biological material, we counsel against unrestricted traffic in embryonic material, in order that this nation not become complicit in unethical practices conducted elsewhere. - We ask for the kind of regulation of ART clinics that will bring transparency, so enabling proper public discussion of any new innovations. These requests are a response to the brilliance of human life, and seek to protect humanity and to assist procreation, just as medical science at its best also does. 2. Issues for the legislative review a) Definitions and terminology. Definition of human embryo : We appreciate the first Act s definition of the embryo which encompasses the first eight weeks of human life (from almost immediately after natural fertilization or any other genesis), although we note that the definition is circular. The inclusion of all viable embryos, regardless of the means of production, should be retained. We oppose any attempts to introduce confusing and irrelevant designators such as pre-embryo into the legislation. Definition of human embryo clone : It is desirable that the definition in the legislation be broad enough to cover all the possible mechanisms of artificially creating a human clone (both presently available and those conceivable in the future). Such a definition should not depend on the intended use of the cloned embryo, but remain a purely biological description. A purely biological distinction without reference to the clone s intended use becomes important for later discussion and legislation about any distinction, whether real or apparent, between therapeutic and reproductive cloning. b) Prohibited embryos and practices & community standards Irrespective of advances in biotechnology, it is crucial to retain the prohibition of any form of cloning. It is easy, if simplistic, to portray such a stance as being anti-scientific ; but our motivation is simply because cloning techniques are dangerous and unnecessary. Page 4

5 As recognised in the Committees own issues paper (p. 25, Legislation in other countries ), there is wide international support to maintain the restriction on cloning. With respect, may we observe that the briefing paper, which erroneously mentioned 35 countries as being opposed to the resolution banning human cloning (there were 34), should also have pointed out how resoundingly they were outvoted by the 84 countries in favour of the ban. 3 We would contend, then, that there is a very widespread view internationally against the advisability of all forms of cloning. To explain our opposition to so-called therapeutic cloning, we need to recall the key arguments against reproductive cloning: A high risk of genetic defects of any offspring (indicated by defects seen in animal models to-date); Highly unpredictable social consequences related to perceptions of an entirely new type or class of people; The deprivation of key familial relationships for the cloned person (the genetic mother or father might be long-dead, and/or the cloned person s extended family will be highly attenuated); The potential for treatment of cloned people as commodities, for use in various ways (e.g.: replacement of a loved one? extension and continuation of the genetic progenitor s identity? spare body parts?); and The likely exploitation of vulnerable women to service the demand for human eggs. Although some would wish to make a distinction between therapeutic and reproductive cloning, this distinction is not biological and only has a sociological basis, not a scientific basis. The technology used for each of these practices will be identical. Attempts to assert that SCNTderived embryos are fundamentally different to conventionally derived embryos fail completely in the face of Dolly the sheep, which the Committee will recall began life as an SCNT-derived embryo. Once techniques have been developed for therapeutic cloning it will not be possible to police their use against reproductive cloning. As there is no developmental difference, the only possible difference is that of intended use, and intention is not always a robust or objective enough category upon which to legitimate a practice. When it is agreed that the SCNT-derived embryo is an embryonic human, the question of intentionality falls away: we are left with the same dispute as pertains to destructive embryonic research, where those who understand the embryo as a who also know that there is no valid use for the embryo other than to assist him or her to become a grown human being. What is hoped for in therapeutic cloning could be achieved through adult stem cell harvesting and somatic cell manipulation, without the assorted scientific difficulties (both biological and medical; e.g. non-autologous transplantation issues). What is hoped for in terms of pure scientific knowledge can undoubtedly be attained using other research techniques. c) Use of excess ART embryos and ART oversight When the sunset clause of Research Involving Human Embryos Act came into effect on 5 April 2005, nothing was in place to stop embryo farming from occurring. This situation needs to be addressed. In the Christian community at least, and almost certainly beyond, concern remains about the possibility of increased production of ART embryos for the purposes of destructive research. The Committee should take very seriously the intention of the Act to prevent such a practice, and no amendment to it should reverse this intention. 3 UN Press Release GA/10333, General Assembly adopts United Nations Declaration on human cloning by vote of ; online (accessed September 2005). Page 5

6 We note that ART clinics are currently accredited by the Reproductive Technology Accreditation Committee (RTAC). We understand that currently, the expectation that ART clinics will follow NHMRC ethical guidelines is not compulsory and not enforced. We see no reason why RTAC could not track numbers of embryos created, and other key indicators, in order to determine whether there are differences between clinics and/or trend changes correlating (or not) to clinical implantations. In this way, accreditation and oversight become more transparent, and would assist public discussion of new innovations and practices. We would challenge any claim that after the 2002 decision to allow destructive research upon excess ART embryos, the community is now at ease with large-scale destructive embryonic research. Whether or not the community has changed its mind is yet to be demonstrated; but even if it has, such a drift would evidence precisely the kind of change in sensibility that we think damages a society s way of thinking and feeling about the vulnerable. d) International exchanges of embryos and stem cell lines There will, from time to time, arise cases where individual patients need to export embryos. The law should stand as it is, as it allows individual cases to be considered as needed. Such exceptions should not dictate the rule, though, since it remains important to avoid potential trade in human embryos and to prohibit the importation of prohibited embryos. e) Effects of the two Acts on medical research in Australia Australian medical science has a reputation for world-class innovation and beneficial research. Often this research has arisen out of less than ideal circumstances, or circumstances that have operated within a constrained field of endeavour. As a nation we produce highly competent scientists despite our size and financial constraints. The Acts of 2002 have only restricted research so as to stimulate alterative modes of research. Australia cannot and does not need to compete in every aspect of medical science. One of the effects of the current ban on therapeutic cloning has been to promote the research into adult stem cells and cord blood embryonic-like stem cells (CBEs). The pluripotency of these cells has immediate clinical applicability without many of the ethical issues or the potential medical issues (e.g. immunological and oncological). Coupled with their greater stability and easier expansion into the quantities needed, these alternative stem cell therapies are the more feasible option to-date. Australian science has also started to do some very innovative work on somatic cell reprogramming. It has been reported that another one of the effects of the current restriction (that is, the prohibited embryos and practices) found within the act, has been to inadvertently make research into other associated developmental and reproductive biology difficult (for example, research on oocytes). Our strong position on the need for the protection of the embryo, in no way extends retrospectively to the either male or female gametes. The utility and potential of these cells is of a completely different order to that of the embryo. Although biologically gametes and somatic cells are distinct in their genetic constitution, ontologically they are no different. The embryo is a nascent human being, while gametes in all their developmental forms, are just another cell within the body. In essence not every sperm is sacred, but every embryo is. Thus we would encourage the committee to formulate such as definition of the embryo and any prohibited practices that doesn t inadvertently encompass non-embryonic cellular material. Increasingly, science and researchers find themselves captive to the economics of productive research and the politics of grant proposals and self-promotion. Trends in current perception drives research directions to some extent; but it is interesting to note an emerging consensus that claims for embryonic stem cell research in 2002 were overhyped. Clearly, research on excess ART embryos has not facilitated a massive leap forward in the way that was promised in 2002, and the Committee should beware of whatever similar claims are being made in 2005 to legitimate further controversial research. Page 6

7 Researchers into early embryo formation argue that it is necessary to do destructive embryonic research in order to effect higher rates of ART success. It is equally plausible, however, to effect these higher rates of success by other means (e.g. investigation of conditions upstream of embryo formation, whether in the reproductive tract or in the laboratory). Even if destructive testing is easier and more direct, research is familiar with the problem of having to research life in such a way as not to damage the life under scrutiny. We see no reason why such an ethos should not stimulate other kinds of fruitful Australian research. Such a stand need not entail a negative outcome for Australia or Australian medical science. If we as a nation continue to operate under the provisions of the current Acts we may, if funded appropriately, thereby push Australian science further into the fields of adult stem and cord blood stem cell research, and into less restrictive approaches to infertility. These could well become fields where we could, as in other celebrated areas of Australian innovation, carve out distinctive and beneficial biological and clinical disciplines. Australia need not be enslaved to the rhetoric of leaders or followers. We are allowed to choose to be different. 3. Concluding Remarks. Western medicine has advanced because human dignity has been treasured, the weak protected, and the good of human life served as a precious gift. We may now stand at a crossroad. Australia s adoption of a conservative approach to embryonic research and cloning, which might at the moment smack of backwardness and lost opportunity, might also in years to come make us a nation where medical science serves life, and where humanity is understood humanely. The Acts of 2002 walk a line between the divisions within our community. They allow some latitude for those who want to see embryonic research, and their conservative stipulations pay some attention to the concerns we have outlined. But if those Acts are overturned, or significantly altered, they risk bitterly dividing a political community that is already in some tension over this matter. We ask the Committee to recommend wisely in this regard. Mr Darren Mitchell Acting Chairman Social Issues Executive Anglican Church, Sydney Diocese Please send all correspondence to: Ms Tracy Gordon Researcher, Social Issues Executive 1 King Street, Newtown NSW 2042 Ph. (02) References Jones, David, et al. "A Theologian s Brief: On the Place of the Human Embryo within the Christian Tradition and the Theological Principles for Evaluating Its Moral Status." Ethics & Medicine 17, no. 3 (Fall 2001), Also available online at and Page 7

8 (accessed 9th September 2005). UN News Organisation, Press Release GA/10333, General Assembly adopts United Nations Declaration on human cloning by vote of ; online Verhey, Allen. "The Cultural Geography of Cloning." In Cloning, edited by Robert B. Kruschwitz, Waco, TX: Baylor University Center for Christian Ethics, Also available online at (accessed 9th September 2005). Page 8