RS 84D Iranian Insights - British-Iranian relations

Transcription

1 RS 84D Iranian Insights - British-Iranian relations By Nima Khorrami Assl "The British are unreliable elements as always. The British who are the fathers of Americans should be termed Satan's fathers and in confronting Satan, one should never do away with caution" Hostility towards the "old fox" codename for Britain is one of the defining characteristics of Iran s anti-western rhetoric. According to Iran s leaders, Britain and the United States are in the vanguard of "global arrogance" and seek to control the resources of developing nations. Yet Iran s hostility has its roots in the long history of British intervention in Iranian affairs. Indeed anti-british sentiment is not limited to Iran s ruling elite. It is, rather surprisingly, shared by the vast majority of ordinary Iranians, both inside and outside the country. Historical Overview In 1553, King Edward VI hired the wealthy merchant and explorer Sebastian Cabot to establish the Moscow Trading Company. To the south of Moscow was the wealthy Persian Safavid Empire. Both Cabot and the British Monarch saw a profitable market in Persia and began to penetrate its bazaars by establishing contacts with the business elite. i In 1597 Shah Abbas I, who was fighting against rebellious Uzbeks in Eastern Khorasan, received an official delegation from Great Britain. The delegation sought to convert Persia into a British ally against the Ottoman Empire. Shah Abbas agreed to the alliance and to British assistance with organising and training Persia s Royal Cavalry and army. The British East India Company also sent representatives to Persia, and trade routes for silk were established along the Strait of Hormuz in Anglo-Persian relations remained stable as the Safavid Empire eventually gave way to the Qajar dynasty. However competing colonial powers also sought to establish a foothold in the region. Towards the end of the 19 th Century Iran became a pawn in the great game between Britain and Tsarist Russia. Britain sought to use Persia to bolster its position in India against the Russian Empire. This resulted in London increasing its involvement in Persian politics and the monopolising of its natural resources. Page 1 of 13

2 Successive Qajar monarchs granted economic concessions to British entrepreneurs in return for financial reward. In 1872, Nasser Al-din Shah granted Baron Paul Julius de Reuter exclusive rights over parts of the Persian economy and infrastructure. This included railways, roads, tramways, irrigation works, and mineral extraction. This was an agreement that Lord Curzon famously called "the most complete and extraordinary surrender of the entire industrial resources of a kingdom into foreign hands that has ever been dreamed of". ii The Reuter concession was denounced by all ranks of Persian society leading to its eventual cancellation. In 1896 the Shah granted British Imperial Tobacco rights for the production, sale and export of Iranian tobacco. The agreement led to the declaration of the "Tobacco fatwa" by Grand Ayatollah Mirza Hassan Shirazi. The fatwa triggered mass protests led by Iran's Shia clergy and was supported by merchants in the bazaars. Amid the outcry, the concession was cancelled, leaving Iran with its first foreign debt 500,000 borrowed to compensate the British Tobacco Company and a deep reservoir of anti-british feelings. Yet by the end of the 19 th Century, Britain's dominance had nevertheless become so pronounced that Khuzestan, Bushehr, and a number of other cities in southern Persia were effectively ran by London. As Imperial Russia was also largely left unchallenged it was able to establish dominance over Persia's northern territories. Central government in Tehran was even unable to select its own ministers without the approval of the Anglo-Russian Consulates. Public outcry against the inability of the throne to maintain independence gave rise to idea that the only way to save the country from foreign dominance was to make the Shah accountable to a written code of laws. By 1905 popular sentiment gave way to the Constitutional Revolution. Following a year of demonstrations and strikes, Muzaffar al-din Shah was forced to agree to the creation of an elected Parliament (the Majlis).This was accompanied by a constitution that limited royal power and defined the role of the legislature. Fearing that a strong Persian government might act too independently and threaten their regional interests, Britain and Russia agreed in 1907 to divide Persia into spheres of influence. Russia then encouraged Mohammad Ali Shah, Muzaffar s successor who resented the constitutional limits on his authority, to dissolve the Majlis. In 1908 the Shah attempted a coup against the elected government, bombing Page 2 of 13

3 the Majlis building and dissolving the assembly. After a year of fighting between supporters of the constitution and forces loyal to the Shah, the constitutionalists prevailed and deposed Mohammad Ali, who fled to Russia. His young son Ahmad Shah, vowing to respect the constitution, was installed under a regent. The restoration of the Majlis and constitutional government, however, failed to end foreign influence and Anglo-Persian relations became increasingly strained at the beginning of the twentieth century. In 1901, William Knox D'Arcy, a London-based lawyer and businessman, was granted exploration rights for most of Iran's oil fields for the sum of 20,000. It took several years for D'Arcy's investment to bear fruit. But after D Arcy struck oil in Masjid-e Suleiman in 1908 Britain was effectively in control of the world's largest oil field. In 1909 D'Arcy's concession was merged into the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC). British strategy in the Middle East sought to prevent adversarial penetration of the Persian Gulf. This would safeguard the principal lines of communication and supply between Britain and India and prevent Persian oil from falling into enemy hands. A central theme of this strategy was to keep Persia weak and humiliated. This was evident in 1904 with the British government's securing of Persia's consent to remove its flag from islands of Great Tonb and Abu Musa by a combination of threats and naval demonstration. In 1913, with war clouds gathering in Europe, the British admiralty discarded coal in favour of oil to power its battleships. This led to the government buying a 51% stake in APOC. The importance of oil and Iran to British imperial expansion was now explicit. APOC ensured that Britain remained close to the heart of Persian political and economic life for the next four decades further adding to national resentment. The birth of the Pahlavi Dynasty Worried by its incompetency, corruption, and lack of control over its territories, the British searched for a strongman to replace the teetering Qajar dynasty. In 1921 Britain threw its weight behind a charismatic colonel and commander of the powerful Cossack brigades, Reza Khan. iii Within four years, Khan had seized power, anointed himself Reza Shah and instituted the Pahlavi monarchy. With British acquiescence he ushered in a period of repressive modernisation. Measures included the banning of the hijab for women and the repression of the clergy. Page 3 of 13

4 Whilst Reza Shah gained absolute power with British assistance, he nevertheless strived to lessen foreign interference in Iran s legal, political and economic sectors. The influence of the British-controlled Imperial Bank was a particular concern. The Imperial Bank was founded in London in 1889 after the Iranian government granted to Baron Julius de Reuter the right to issue banknotes and administer its accounts. Between 1903 and 1919 British government loans to Iran were also supervised by the Bank. This allowed London to use its loans as an instrument of diplomacy. Yet with the establishment of National Bank of Iran (Bank Meli) in 1928 the Imperial Bank began lose many of its duties. Five years later the Imperial Bank was also forced to relinquish its note issuing powers. In the 1930s foreign exchange and barter agreements became increasingly centralised by Tehran leaving the Bank's extensive provincial branch network to waste away. As a result, the Imperial Bank rapidly lost its market dominance to Bank Meli and by 1939 held only 9% of Iranian bank deposits. During the 1920s opposition to the D'Arcy oil concession, whereby Iran only received 16% of net profits, had become widespread. As Iran s industrial development was dependent upon oil revenues, the government's lack of control over the industry raised suspicions concerning the manner in which APOC conducted business. Moreover, owing to the introduction of reforms that improved fiscal order in Iran, APOC's practice of cutting off royalty advances were beginning to lose their effectiveness. Attempts to revise the terms of the oil concession on a more favourable basis led to protracted negotiations between the Iranian government and APOC. The main argument for revising the D'Arcy Agreement was that Iran s national wealth was being squandered by a concession granted under duress. Tehran demanded a revision of the terms whereby Iran would be granted a 25% stake in APOC. To counter British objections, the Iranian government claimed that had this been a new concession, they would have insisted upon an equal partnership. Iran also asked APOC to reduce its existing area of oil production to the south west of the country. This would allow Tehran to approach other international companies to develop oilfields in Iran. Apart from demanding a more equitable share of the profits of the Company, Iran also demanded that APOC register as a company in both Tehran and London, and that the exclusive rights of oil transportation be cancelled. It was anticipated that Page 4 of 13

5 these proposals would allow Iran to gain an accurate and reliable appreciation of transactions between APOC and its subsidiaries. Matters came to a head in 1931 when the combined effects of plentiful oil supplies and the global economic depression led to fluctuations which drastically reduced annual payments accruing to Iran. APOC informed the Iranian government that its royalties for the year would amount to a mere 366,782 while in the same period the company's income taxes paid to the British Government amounted to approximately 1,000,000. Unhappy with the lengthy negotiations, Reza Shah asserted his authority. At a meeting of the Council of Ministers in November 1932, the Shah ordered the cabinet to cancel the D'Arcy Agreement. Rejecting the cancellation, the British government brought the dispute before the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague. Yet after the dispute was taken up at the Hague, Reza Shah suddenly acquiesced to British demands. He feared that British could easily facilitate his demise in the same way that they brought him into power. This led to a new agreement with APOC which was ratified by the National Consultative Assembly on 28th May The terms of the new agreement provided for a new 60-year concession. The agreement also reduced the oilfields under APOC control to 100,000 square miles, required annual payments in lieu of income tax, and guaranteed a minimum annual payment of 750,000 to the Iranian government. In return, Iran surrendered its right to annul the agreement, and settled on a complex arbitration process to settle any disagreements that could arise in the future. Reza Shah also sought to counter British and Soviet influence in Iran by forming alliances with other countries. He embarked upon an ambitious regional project to establish a confederation of Middle Eastern states led by Turkey and Iran. Turkey's founder Kemal Ataturk and Reza Shah were like-minded in their desire for Westernisation and modernisation. They also saw their economies as complementary to each other and capable of acting as transit hubs for the passage of goods. Between 1926 and 1932 Iran and Turkey signed two treaties of friendship. The basic principles of the treaties were based upon neutrality and non-aggression. They also included possible joint actions against agents seeking to disturb domestic and/or regime security, a policy that was indirectly aimed at Kurdish activist groups. In June Page 5 of 13

6 1934 Reza Shah visited Turkey seeking further cooperation with Ankara. During his stay, he discussed the idea of a confederation of Middle Eastern states with his Turkish counterpart. Dialogue resulted in the Treaty of Saadabad (1937), a document that was also signed by Afghanistan and Iraq. In keeping with previous initiatives, the Saadabad Treaty was also a pact of friendship and solidarity that called for cooperation to safeguard domestic security. Reza Shah also undertook diplomatic initiatives with the United States, Italy and Germany that came to be known as the third power policy. Reza Shah hired American consultants, for example, to develop and implement Western-style financial and administrative systems. Convinced that Britain was not committed to the modernisation of Iran's armed forces, Reza Shah began purchasing ships from Italy and hired Italians to teach his troops naval warfare. Of particular concern to both Britain and the Soviet Union was Iran s relation with Germany. Reza Shah s decision to replace the Imperial Bank of Persia with an Iranian-owned bank was made under the guidance of German economists. Germany also advised Reza Shah on the use of taxes to help modernise Iran. On the eve of the Second World War Germany was Iran s largest trading partner accounting for 40% of Iranian exports. Two years into the war Britain and the Soviet Union insisted that Iran sever all ties with Germany. Following his refusal, the Allies invaded Iran on the 16th September 1941 and overthrew Reza Shah. The reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi The British and Soviet allies replaced Reza Shah with his 21 year old son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Despite his accession to the throne, the young monarch along with many other Iranians - never forgave his benefactors for their treatment of his father. From the outset Mohammad Reza Shah was under pressure to align Iran s foreign and domestic policies along Western lines. This prompted growing popular discontent and the eventual election of Dr Mohammad Mossadegh in Mossadegh assumed leadership of Iran at a time when calls for oil nationalisation and altering the terms of concessions were being made in many oil producing countries. Anger over the behaviour of the AIOC was leading to confrontation between Britain and Iran. Resentment over Iran's paltry share of company profits had festered for Page 6 of 13

7 years. In 1947, for instance, out of an annual profit of 40m, Iran received just 7m. Anger was also fuelled by the treatment of Iranian workers restricted to low-paid menial jobs and kept in squalid living conditions. In October 1947, the Majlis passed a law rejecting a proposed Iran-Soviet oil venture in the north of the country. Instead the Majlis instructed the government to regain national rights by renegotiating the 1933 Agreement with the AIOC. The AIOC was presented with a list of 25 points for discussion which had been drawn up by the Iranian government. However, over the next year both sides managed to narrow negotiations down the three issues: higher royalty payments, lower prices for products sold on the domestic market, and increased employment for Iranians at senior and middle-management levels. Successful negotiations resulted in the signing of the Supplemental Agreement in However, the political environment in Iran had changed drastically and both the government and the AIOC underestimated the extent of the Majlis opposition to the Supplemental Agreement. Indeed the Majlis eventually refused to ratify the Agreement. The struggle for power between the Majlis and the Shah had intensified with oil being the focal point. The various nationalist groups - of which Mossadegh became leader - and pro-communist Tudeh party were set against the pro-shah government of Prime Minister Ali Razmara. At the 1949 elections, the nationalist parties made big electoral gains. When the Majlis reconvened in June 1950, the Supplemented Agreement was submitted to a specially appointed Oil Committee of the Majlis headed by Mossadegh. In December, the Committee reported to the Majlis that it had rejected the Agreement. The Government s decision to withdraw the Agreement prompted Mossadegh to propose that the oil industry be nationalised. Prime Minister Razmara's response was to refer the proposal to a panel of government experts. On the 3rd March 1951 the experts reported that Mossadegh s proposal was neither practical nor legal. Yet four days later Razmara was assassinated by a member of the religious nationalist party, the Feda'iyan-e Islam. The following day saw the Oil Committee accept the proposal that the industry be nationalised. Shortly thereafter, Mossadegh became Prime Minister heading a coalition of secular nationalist and religious parties. Finally, on 15th March 1951, a single-article bill was passed in the Majlis approving the principle of nationalisation. A nine-article bill Page 7 of 13

8 providing for the implementation of the principle of nationalisation was passed on 1st May before receiving royal assent. Mossadegh s decision to nationalise Iran s petroleum sector angered Britain. The Attlee Government imposed a naval blockade in the Persian Gulf and asked the United Nations Security Council to condemn Iran s actions. Instead, the Council embarrassingly came out in favour of Iran. Attlee rebuffed AIOC's clamour for a coup to overthrow Mossadegh. However, when the Conservatives returned to power in October 1951 their call fell on more sympathetic ears. But with British power in decline Churchill was unable to mount such a venture without American assistance. Operation Ajax was a CIA/MI6 inspired coup that co-opted a loose coalition of monarchists, nationalists, conservative mullahs and street thugs to overthrow Mossadegh. The Shah - who had initially fled to Rome fearing that the coup would fail - returned to install a brutally repressive regime. As a result, the coup rejuvenated Iran s monarchical autocracy at the expense of democratic politics. The Islamic revolution Britain's reputation within the general Iranian population suffered as a result of its support for the Shah s regime. In the final days of his reign, the Shah told the U.S. ambassador William Sullivan, that he "detected the hand of the English" behind the demonstrations. The Shah believed that the British Broadcasting Corporation s (BBC) Persian Service s coverage of events helped to galvanise the opposition and provide impetus for the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Indeed this is an opinion which is still held by royalists in exile in Europe and the United States. After the Revolution, the Islamic authorities drew upon centuries of resentment to label Britain as the "little Satan". iv Initially the number of staff at the British Embassy in Tehran was reduced but the Ambassador stayed in place until the spring of In April 1980, the Iranian Embassy in London was occupied by a group of Iraqi and Saudi-backed Arab-Iranians demanding autonomy for their region in the southwest of the country. The occupation was eventually ended by the SAS storming the building. A member of the Embassy staff was assassinated, while a second was killed during the operation. Although Tehran thanked London for ending the occupation was, there were some influential figures who blamed the whole episode on the British Page 8 of 13

9 government s failure to provide inadequate protection to the Embassy in the first place. There was also a demonstration outside the American Embassy in London later that year. The demonstrations eventually turned violent and led to the arrest of a number of Iranian students. This prompted demonstrations outside the British Embassy in Tehran and its eventual closure. After receiving a warning from the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that it could not guarantee its safety a British interest section was established with the Swedish Embassy. Yet this was interpreted as an act of solidarity with the Americans over the hostage crisis and further undermined Britain s image among the Iranian public. Resentment was also fuelled by British support for Saddam Hussein during the First Gulf War ( ). The international community s silence over Saddam s use of chemical weapons also angered Iran. Indeed many Iranians remain angry with the inaction of the United Nations regarding the payment of war reparations by Iraq. v Yet it nevertheless suited Iran to keep Britain, and other Western countries, at arm s length. The lack of diplomatic ties and perceived Western hostility towards Iran enabled the regime to eliminate political opponents and consolidate power. vi The end of Iran-Iraq war and the subsequent drive to improve relations with the outside world led to the British Embassy s eventual reopening in Yet improved Anglo-Iranian relations did not last long. In February 1989, Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa sentencing the author Salman Rushdie to death for blasphemy in his novel, The Satanic Verses. A month later, Iran formally broke diplomatic relations with Britain. There were also a number of other issues that strained Anglo-Iranian relations. These included Tehran s support for terrorism, the abduction of British hostages by Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran s policies on weapons of mass destruction and a perceived lack of support for the Middle East peace process. Iranian grievances focussed upon the presence of members of the Islamic-Socialist anti-regime Mojahedin-e Khalq in Britain and the government's perceived double standards in its Middle East policies. According to various Iranian politicians and academics many Western governments fail to condemn human rights violations in Gulf Cooperation Council states and Israel s disproportionate use of force against Palestinians. vii The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990) helped to improve Iran s diplomatic relations with the West. Iran provided coalition forces with intelligence on the logistics of Iraqi Page 9 of 13

10 troops located along the border with Kuwait. Tehran calculated that cooperation with the West would bring considerable benefits. Not only would it weaken Iran's main regional adversary, it would also help the regime to improve its relations with the Gulf States and the wider international community. viii Yet Anglo-Iranian relations remained relatively poor until 1997 when the reformist President Mohammad Khatami was elected to power. The following year London and Tehran agreed to exchange ambassadors. A solution was found to the Rushdie affair with the Iranian government disassociating itself from Khomeini s fatwa. Between 1998 and 2000 there was a gradual improvement in bilateral relations. In 2000 the Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi visited London. This was followed in 2001 by the first visit by a British cabinet minister to Iran since the revolution. Trade delegations also helped to improve economic relations. London also provided Tehran with counter-narcotics assistance and support for refugees from Afghanistan. There were also exchanges between universities and the British Council resumed activities in Iran. With the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005, however, ties began to deteriorate. Ahmadinejad s inflammatory rhetoric regarding Israel alongside Tehran s reluctance to make compromises over its nuclear programme, resulted in renewed tensions between Iran and Great Britain. Hostility resurfaced most recently in March 2007 when British sailors were seized and paraded blindfold on state television after allegedly straying into Iranian waters. Then came the disputed presidential election of 2009 and the subsequent worsening of relations between Tehran and London. Again, the BBC s Persian service was at the centre of the dispute due to its coverage of the post-election protests. Meanwhile, Iran is extremely concerned about the status of Nasrollah Tajik, Iranian Ambassador to Jordan between 1999 and Tajik was arrested in England in 2006 for allegedly brokering the purchase of US-made military night vision systems for Iran while on an honorary fellowship at the University of Durham. Since then, Tajik has been under house arrest. On 5th July 2011 the British charge d'affaires to Tehran was summoned to Iran's Foreign Ministry to give what the Iranian media called proper explanations about Britain's refusal to extend the visa for Tajik's family to remain in the country. ix Page 10 of 13

11 Conclusion Many Iranians continue to base their perception of the power and influence of Great Britain upon historical events. This includes Britain s involvement in Iran and third world countries over the course of the past two centuries. Many also remain critical of London s direct role in the overthrow of Mossadegh. Academics argue that, prior to the coup, the combination of a weak, inexperienced monarch and a strong Majlis had put Iran on the path towards parliamentary democracy. Yet the overthrow of Mossadegh revived the declining monarchical autocracy and dealt a hammer blow to aspirations for a truly democratic Iran. Indeed many Iranian intellectuals argue that Iran might have escaped the revolution of 1979 had Mossadegh remained in power. x Iranian perceptions of Great Britain have also transcended the latter s historical decline as a world power. History has ingrained within the Iranian psyche a sense that London is behind every key event in the Middle East. This is further reinforced by the special relationship between the United States and Great Britain. Resentment also remains regarding the West s support for Saddam Hussein during the First Gulf War. This in turn explains why many Iranians continue to support the development of nuclear weapons. Today, few Iranian politicians can expect to survive politically if they are perceived to favour improved relations with Britain. Indeed history suggests that it may take generations to alter the nature of Anglo-Iranian relations. In this respect, soft diplomacy may offer some interesting alternatives to more established approaches. The Iranian youth s love of popular Western culture and sport may provide opportunities for Britain and the West to change perceptions at the grassroots of society. This could lead to the British Council, academia and the Department for International Development playing a greater role in improving relations with Iran than other Government departments. About the author Nima Khorrami Assl is Research Associate for the UK Defence Forum and a freelance contributor to the Middle East Future Network, The Majalla, and Kanal PIK. Nima has carried out a number of projects for both governmental and private clients in the Middle East and has published op-eds in The Guardian, Open Democracy, and Defence IQ. Currently based in China, his main areas of interest and expertise include political Islam and extremism, Iran, Gulf Cooperation Council states, Turkey, energy security in Central Asia, Middle East diplomacy and geopolitics. He is a graduate of the London School of Economics and the University of Nottingham. Page 11 of 13

12 Disclaimer The views of authors are their own. The UK Defence Forum holds no corporate view on the opinions expressed in papers or at meetings. The Forum exists to enable politicians, industrialists, members of the armed forces, academics and others with an interest in defence and security issues to exchange information and views on the future needs of Britain s defence. It is operated by a non-partisan, not for profit company. UK Defence Forum papers are archived at - the last three years being accessible only to members and subscribers. Prior to that they are in the public domain subject to usual conventions. Members wishing to comment on papers can access a noticeboard via the members area of the website December 2011 Selected publications Ansari, A nd Ed. Modern Iran since 1921: The Pahlavis and After. Essex: Pearson Education Limited Azimi, F The Quest for Democracy in Iran: A Century of Struggle against Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Bayman, D, S, Chubin, A, Ehteshami, and J, Green. Iran s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era. Rand Corporation. Available from Cronin, S The Army and the Creation of the Pahlavi State in Iran, London: I. B. Tauris. Daniel, E.L The History of Iran. Westport and London: Greenwood Press. Gonzalez, N Engaging Iran: the rise of a Middle East powerhouse and America's strategic choice. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group. King, R The Iran-Iraq War and the First Gulf War. Adelphi Papers, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies. Ramazani, R.K The Foreign Policy of Iran: A Developing Nation in World Affairs Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia. Zarif, M.J "Tackling the Iran-US Crisis: The Need for a Paradigm Shift." Journal of International Affairs, 60 (2), pp Zarif, M.J and M.R. Alborzi "Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iran's Security Paradigm: The Case of Chemical Weapons." The Iranian Journal of International Affairs, XI (4), pp Page 12 of 13

13 References 1 i Ruhollah K. Ramazani The Foreign Policy of Iran: A Developing Nation in World Affairs Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia. ii Elton L. Daniel The History of Iran. Westport and London: Greenwood Press. P. 129 iii Stephanie Cronin The Army and the Creation of the Pahlavi State in Iran, London: I. B. Tauris. iv See Ansari, A nd Ed. Modern Iran since 1921: The Pahlavis and After. Essex: Pearson Education Limited AND Gonzalez, N Engaging Iran: the rise of a Middle East powerhouse and America's strategic choice. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group. v See Ansari, A nd Ed. Modern Iran since 1921: The Pahlavis and After. Essex: Pearson Education Limited. vi See for example Bayman et al Iran s Security Policy in the Post- Revolutionary Era. Rand Corporation. vii For news reports see "The west's silence over Bahrain smacks of double standards" Available from OR "Iran thwarted in bid to join UN Women board" Available from For Academic papers see Mohammad, J. Zarif "Tackling the Iran-US Crisis: The Need for a Paradigm Shift." Journal of International Affairs, 60(2), pp OR Mohammad, J. Zarif et al "Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iran's Security Paradigm: The Case of Chemical Weapons." The Iranian Journal of International Affairs, XI(4), pp viii Ralph King The Iran-Iraq War and the First Gulf War. Adelphi Papers, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies. ix "Iran raps ex-envoy house arrest in UK". Available from x Fakhreddin Azimi The Quest for Democracy in Iran: A Century of Struggle against Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. P.13 1 Page 13 of 13