Alexander Weissenburger, Austrian Academy of Sciences

Transcription

1 Death to America, Death to Israel, Damn the Jews, Victory to Islam : the Ḥūthī Movement s Framing of Localized Grievances in Terms of International Politics Alexander Weissenburger, Austrian Academy of Sciences In the early 2000s the northern Yemeni province of Ṣaʿda saw the emergence of a religio-political revivalist movement, which became known under the name of its founder Ḥusayn al-ḥūthī. Al-Ḥūthī was the scion of a highly respected family of fiver Shīʿite Zaydī ʿulamā. Zaydīsm was established in Yemen at the end of the ninth century and from that time until 1962 Zaydi Imams have ruled over the north of the country. According to the traditional Zaydī interpretation of Islamic scripture, this Imam has to be from amongst the sāda (sing. sayyid) who trace their lineage to the family of the Prophet. This means that they do not claim descendence from Yemeni tribes. While the Zaydī faith began to adopt many elements of Sunni Islam prior to 1962, this tendency became virulent and externally driven after the deposition of the last Zaydi Imam and the establishment of the Yemen Arab Republic in Especially the spread of more rigid forms of Sunni Islam and its progressive ingrainment in the political and especially the educational sphere led to the emergence of a Zaydī revivalist movement in the early 1980s. Out of this movement, the Ḥūthī movement emerged. 1 Even though the Ḥūthī movement is led by sāda, most of its adherents are tribesmen. 2 Since 2004, the movement has been engaged in a protracted, multilayered conflict with the government. 3 In September 2014 the Ḥūthīs occupied Sana a, and control now the most populous regions of Yemen. 4 When Ḥusayn al-ḥūthī was killed in the first round of the conflict in 2004, the leadership of the movement was first taken over by his father Badr al-dīn and then, until today, by his younger brother ʿAbd al-malik. Ḥusayn al-ḥūthī however remains extremely important for the movement. He is considered a martyr by the followers of the movement and his speeches, that constitute the ideological underpinning of the Ḥūthī movement, remain popular and readily available on the internet and continue to be broadcasted. 5 While many of the around 100 speeches concentrate on religious issues, which, in the context of a religio-political revivalist movement, are of course also inherently political, 1 Brandt, Marieke, Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict, London, Hurst Publishing, (forthcoming), Chapter 4. 2 International Crisis Group, Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb, Middle East Report, 86, (27.May 2009), p Salmoni, Barak, et al, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon, Santa Monica CA, RAND Cooperation, (2010). 4 BBC, Yemen crisis: Who is fighting whom?, (14. Oct. 2016), , (accessed 29. Jan. 2017). 5 Dorlian, Samy, The Ṣaʿda War in Yemen. Between Politics and Sectarianism, The Muslim World, 101/2 (2011), p

2 there are also several speeches with a primarily political focus. Some of these speeches will be analyzed here, trying to make sense of the paradox of al-ḥūthī s strong focus on international issues, despite leading a highly localized identity movement. For this analysis, this paper will rely roughly on the concept of frames as developed by Benford and Snow. Frames are essentially narratives that are created in order to production meaning that resonates with the target audience. These frames can be diagnostic and identify perceived injustices, they can be prognostic and propose solutions to perceived injustices or they can be motivational, providing a rational for participation. 6 For reasons of brevity, this paper will conflate motivational and prognostic frames, since they tend to be similar in content. The best-known piece of ideological output of the Ḥūthī movement is arguably their slogan: God is great, death to America, death to Israel, curse upon Jews, and victory for Islam. The identification of these two states as the main enemies of the Yemeni and in fact Arab people in general is a motive that runs through Ḥusayn al-ḥūthī s political speeches. While the movement s frames developed with its changing aims, 7 Western encroachment remains an important topic of Ḥūthī framing until today. 8 Even though frequently employing Ayatollah al-khomeini s phrase Great Satan when referring to the US and the concept of the mustakbirūn (oppressors) to denote the alleged aggressors in general, it seems that Ḥusayn al-ḥūthī in his diagnostic frames identified the neglect of religion as the ultimate reason for the problems facing Yemen and the Arab world 9, he blames The US and Israel for being responsible for immediate repercussions of this neglect. By equating the US, and to some extend the West in general, 10 with Christianity and Israel with Judaism, al-ḥūthī is able to link them to Islamic scripture. By quoting for example Quran, 2:120, For, never will the Jews be pleased with thee, nor yet the Christians, unless thou follow their own creeds, he infers that the relationship between Islam on the one side and Christianity and Judaism on the other can, as long as apostasy is not an option, only be antagonistic. Whatever the Muslims do cannot suffice in the eyes of their alleged oppressors. This becomes clear in his discussion of the so-called War on Terror, which for him is only a pretext to invade and colonize, to take over Mecca and Medina, to steal resources and to humiliate the population. Since leaders, and by extension their countries, will not be able to meet the 6 Benford, Robert D. and David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment, Annual Review of Sociology, 26 (2000), p Granzow, Tanja, Violent vs. Non-Violent Struggle. Investigating the Impact of Frames on Movement Strategies in Yemen, Civil Wars, 17/2 (2015), p. 171, Brandt, Marieke, Annäherung an einen Konflikt. Chancen und Begrezungen von Inter- und Transdisziplinarität in der Jemen-Forschung am Beispiel des Huthi-Konflikts, Jemen-Report, 46/1 (2015), p For example: Al-Yaman, al-sayyid al-ḥūthī: Amrīkā ʿalā ra s duwal al-ʿudwān wa-shaʿbunā mustahdaf bii tibārāt ʿadīda, [online video], (2017), (accessed 8 June 2017). 9 Al-Ḥūthī, Ḥusayn, Durūs min waḥy ʿĀshūrāʾ, Ṣaʿda, (23 March 2002). 10 Al-Ḥūthī, Ḥusayn, Al-Ṣarkha fī wajh al-mustakbirīn, Ṣaʿda, (17 January 2002). 2

3 expectations the US sets in them in this fight, they would be branded as supporters of terrorism and consequently invaded. 11 Al-Ḥūthī goes as far as to claim that the attacks of 9/11 were perpetrated by Jews in order to blame them on Muslims 12 and that al-qaida was an American invention in order to provide a reason to invade other countries. 13 Arab leaders like ʿAlī ʿAbd Allāh Ṣāliḥ and Yāsir ʿArafāt become almost tragic figures, which are in the end hated by the Americans as well as by their own people. 14 This appears to be the only instance in which he names Ṣāliḥ directly. In passages explicitly antagonistic to regional leaders and by extension to the domestic regime, al-ḥūthī refers to phrases such as a leader from amongst the leaders. These leaders are accused of being Jewish puppets, promising reform without delivering and keeping the population quiet in the face of mounting injustice. 15 Against this background al-ḥūthī portrays the Arab people as lacking knowledge 16, docile and divided. 17 We are wretched, we are weak, we have no ambitions, we have no objectives, we have no feelings of dignity or pride Where are the true achievements that preserve our dignity? Where is the economic basis and real development that makes us an umma that is able to stand on its own two feet. If you build a hospital here and a clinic there for any ailment we might feel, headache, a wound or congestion in our arteries or lungs, there will always be a hospital nearby. Yet we live in a state of psychological pain, a state of severe pain, not because of a lack of vitamins but due to a lack of dignity, of pride, a lack of the dignified live our religion seeks to provide us. 18 This, according to him, is an outcome of a loss of identity which comes to a large part from foreign influences. Here al-ḥūthī alleges that women were targeted specifically since the oppressors knew that they were easily corrupted. Through calls for women s emancipation and TV series, corruption would insinuate itself in the minds of women, which than would pass it on to the men and especially the children. 19 As a remedy to this al-ḥūthī s prognostic frames call for the return to Islam and its Quranic culture. People should return to real Islamic values such as mutual support, chivalry and honor in 11 Al-Ḥūthī, Ḥusayn, Wa-lan tarḍā ʿanka al-yahūd wa-lā al-naṣrā, Ṣaʿda, (10 February 2002); Al-Ḥūthī, Al- Ṣarkha fī wajh al-mustakbirīn ; Al-Ḥūthī, Ḥusayn, Khaṭar dukhūl Amrīkā al-yaman, Ṣaʿda, (3 February 2002). 12 Al-Ḥūthī, Al-Ṣarkha fī wajh al-mustakbirīn 13 Al-Ḥūthī, Khaṭar dukhūl Amrīkā al-yaman 14 Al-Ḥūthī, Wa-lan tarḍā ʿanka al-yahūd wa-lā al-naṣrā 15 Al-Ḥūthī, Al-Ṣarkha fī wajh al-mustakbirīn ; Al-Ḥūthī, Wa-lan tarḍā ʿanka al-yahūd wa-lā al-naṣrā. 16 Wa-lan tarḍā ʿanka al-yahūd wa-lā al-naṣrā ; Al-Ḥūthī, Ḥusayn, Man naḥnu wa-man hum, Ṣaʿda, (January 2002). 17 Al-Ṣarkha fī wajh al-mustakbirīn 18 Al-Ḥūthī, Ḥusayn, Lataḥdhunna ḥadhwa banī Isrā īl Ṣaʿda, (7 Februar 2002). 19 Lataḥdhunna ḥadhwa banī Isrā īl ; Man naḥnu wa-man hum 3

4 order to regain their former strength and leave the path of deviation that the umma set upon as Abū Bakr was chosen over ʿAlī as the first Caliph. Leaving this state of religious illiteracy 20, that according to him, is worse than in the times prior to the arrival of Islam, means returning to Islamic values and true human nature. But it is not enough to just pray, people have to follow their natural instincts and start to resist injustice. 21 Al-Ḥūthī calls on his audience to heed the example of Iran and Ḥizb Allah and take a stand against the mustakbirūn (oppressors, literally: the arrogant). 22 This should primarily be done by uniting and reminding oneself and others of the importance of calling out the real enemy, which according to al-ḥūthī is not terrorism per se but the two nations that spread it: the USA and Israel. By symbolic acts such as the chanting of the Ḥūthī slogan or the holding of International Quds Day, the fearful paralysis of the Arabic world would be overcome and the Americans and Israelis would be discouraged from interfering in Yemen and the wider Arabic world. 23 In all of this, the speeches do not call for the use of violence directly. Implicitly there are, however, signs that al-ḥūthī at least condoned violence as a political instrument. He for example refers favorably to the Quranic story of Moses killing one of the Egyptian oppressors in order to protect a fellow Jew. 24 While al-ḥūthī says that this happened before Moses became a prophet, he omits that in the story Moses ascribes this killing to the influence of the devil and asks God for forgiveness. 25 Al-Ḥūthī states that Islam is essentially a religion of peace, this peace, however, should be sought in the same way he sees Iran and Ḥizb Allah seeking peace. Who is getting painfully pounded by Israel today? Is it Ḥizb Allah or the Palestinian people? he asks rhetorically, the Americans understand this, they have a saying: If you want peace, carry a weapon. 26 So how to explain this focus on Israel and America instead of domestic issues? Rubin argues that sentiments like anti-americanism are used by oppositional forces in the Middle East in order to direct their anger against a government-approved target rather than risk criticizing injustices or failure at home. 27 While al-ḥūthī s vague language on violence and his almost complete refusal to address the regime directly, suggest that this could be a valid explanation, al-ḥūthī s criticisms of the 20 It is interesting to note that he seems to be at pains to avoid the word jāhiliyya. Maybe this is due to the fact that this word took on a specific meaning when Sayyid Qutb used it as one of his core concepts in his Ma ālim fī-l- ṭarīq. al-ḥūthī, however, also uses the concept of ḥākimiyya ( Maʿrifat Allah - niʿam Allah: al-dars al-khāmis Ṣaʿda, (21 January 2002).) which was used by Sayyid Qutb as well. 21 Al-Ḥūthī, Ḥusayn, Al-Thaqāfa al-qurʾāniyya, Ṣaʿda, (4 August 2002); Durūs min waḥy ʿĀshūrāʾ. 22 Al-Ḥūthī, Ḥusayn, Al-irhāb wa-l-salām, Ṣaʿda, 8 March 2002; Lataḥdhunna ḥadhwa banī Isrā īl ; Al-Ṣarkha fī wajh al-mustakbirīn 23 Al-Ḥūthī, Ḥusayn, Yawm al-quds al-ʿālamī, Ṣaʿda, (28 September 2002); al-ḥūthī, Al-Ṣarkha fī wajh almustakbirīn ; Al-Ḥūthī, Al-irhāb wa-l-salām. 24 Al-Ḥūthī, Lataḥdhunna ḥadhwa banī Isrā īl. 25 Quran 28:15 26 Al-Ḥūthī, Al-irhāb wa-l-salām. Al-Ḥūthī is probably referring to the saying Si vis pacem, para bellum (If you want peace, prepare for war), which is also the motto of several military units and organization of the USA. 27 Rubin, Barry, The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism, Foreign Affairs, 81/6 (2002), p

5 War on Terror, which at that point was also the adopted policy of the regime, 28 and agreed upon by virtually all other significant political actors, 29 point in a different direction. Anti-Americanism and the enmity towards the state of Israel and Jews in general are not only expedient substitutes for domestic issues, but also genuinely held feelings. Sartre in his preface to Fanon s The Wretched of the Earth identified the shame voiced by al-ḥūthī and others as a revolutionary sentiment. 30 It is no coincidence that al-ḥūthī s speeches, stripped of their religious reasoning, sometimes read similar to Fanon s writing about the influx of the colonizer s culture, the need to rise up against the oppressors, regain control, dignity, land and ones true identity. Seen from this point of view al-ḥūthī s references to the perennial pan-islamic identity manifested in the concept of the umma and his calls to unite against those he deems oppressors become highly relevant. That anti-americanism in the Arabic world is tightly connected to Americas support for Israel with all the consequent, real or assumed, inconsistencies in its behavior towards the Arab world has long been established in academic literature. 31 As Makdisi states: From an Arab perspective, the creation of Israel marked the triumph of Western colonialism over native Arabs The specific question of Palestine has always been a broader Arab one as well. 32 The same holds true for the war of 1967 and American troops entering Saudi Arabia during the 1991 Gulf war 33, the al-aqsa Intifada and the War on Terror which was still in its infancy in the early 2000s when al-ḥūthī gave his speeches, yet is a very prominent topic in them. Al-Ḥūthī s political speeches can therefore be seen as part of a wider pattern of discourse all over the Arab world. And while it must remain uncertain if the content of his speeches are the product of al-ḥūthī s genuine indignation, strategic calculation or both, this helps to explain why they resonated and still resonate so well with his audience. Al-Ḥūthī was playing on feelings widely shared in the Arab world and the success of his speeches is a reminder that in a globalized age, local events can have global repercussions and local movements may not always be fully explainable by a sole focus on local developments. 28 Seitz, Adam, Ties that Bind and Divide: The Arab Spring and Yemeni Civil-Military Relations, in Lackner, Helen (ed.), Why Yemen Matters: A Society in Transition, London, Saqi Books (2014), p Dorlian, The Ṣaʿda War in Yemen, p Sartre, Jean-Paul, `Preface` in Fanon, Frantz, The Wretched oft he Earth, New York, Grove Press (1963), Piscatori, James, Religion and Realpolitik. Islamic Responses to the Gulf War, Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 45/1 (1991), p. 27; Makdisi, Ussama, "Anti-Americanism" in the Arab World. An Interpretation of a Brief History, The Journal of American History, 89/2 (2002), p. 554, Rubin The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism, p Makdisi, "Anti-Americanism" in the Arab World, p Kepel, Gilles, Jihad: The Trails of Political Islam, London, I.B.Tauris (2006), p. 63 and 205; Piscatori, Religion and Realpolitik, p Hammami, Rema, and Tamari, Salim, The Second Uprising. End or New Beginning?, Journal of Palestine Studies, 30/2 (2001), p