ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IN EGYPTIAN POLITICS

Transcription

1 ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IN EGYPTIAN POLITICS

2 Also by Barry Rubin REVOLUTION UNTIL VICTORY? The History and Politics of the PLO 1ST ANBUL INTRIGUES MODERN DICTATORS: Third World Coupmakers, Strongmen, and Populist Tyrants SECRETS OF STATE: The State Department and the Struggle over U.S. Foreign Policy THE ARAB STATES AND THE PALESTINE CONFLICT PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS: The American Experience and Iran THE GREAT POWERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST : The Road to Cold War HOW OTHERS REPORT US: America in the Foreign Press INTERNATIONAL NEWS AND THE AMERICAN MEDIA THE POLITICS OF TERRORISM: Counterterrorist Policies (editor) THE POLITICS OF TERRORISM: Terror as a State and Revolutionary Strategy (editor) BOOKS ON ISRAEL, ESSAYS ON POLITICS, CULTURE AND SOCIETY (co-editor) CENTRAL AMERICA CRISIS READER (co-editor) THE ISRAELI-ARAB READER (co-editor) THE HUMAN RIGHTS READER (co-editor)

3 Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics updated edition by Barry Rubin

4 * ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IN EGYPTIAN POLITICS Copyright Barry Rubin, All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. First published in 2002 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y and Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS. Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN IS THE GLOBAL ACADEMIC IMPRINT OF THE PALGRAVE MACMILLAN division of St. Martin's Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN ISBN (ebook) DOI / Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data available from the Library of Congress. First Palgrave Macmillan edition: September

5 Contents Preface to the Updated Edition VII Preface to the Original Edition ix Overview 1 Introduction 3 Factors Promoting Fundamentalism 4 Factors Opposing Fundamentalism 5 Prospects for Fundamentalism 6 Organization of this Study 6 2 Contemporary History of Fundamentalism in Egypt 10 The Fall of the Muslim Brotherhood 10 The Second Round 14 Sadat Revives the Brotherhood 16 Confrontation and Assassination 19 Mubarak Tames the Opposition 23 Conclusions 26 3 The Muslim Brotherhood: Ideology and Program 28 Al-Tilimsani's Policy 29 General Strategy and Electoral Politics 31 Attitude toward Radicals, Violence and Demonstrations 35 Internal Factions 38 Conclusions 39 4 The Jama'at 41 General Ideology 43 Al-Jihad's Ideology 44 Sayyid Qutb 49 The Critique of Jahiliyyah 50 Motives 53 The Islamic Liberation Organization and A1-Takfir Wal-Hijrah 56 Al-Jihad 57 Survivors from [Hell] Fire 59 Rivalry among the Jam' at 60 Conclusions 61

6 5 The Radical Jam'iyat 63 Jam'iyat on University Campuses 63 The Jam'iyat's Appeal 65 Islamic Action in Asyut 67 Student Elections 69 Reasons for Jam'iyat's Growth 70 Community-Based Jam'iyat 72 Charismatic Preachers 75 6 Popular Islam and Official Ulama 79 Al-Azhar and State Control over Religion 80 The Debate with the Radicals 83 How Should Al-Azhar Counter Extremism? 86 The Mainstream Clergy and the Shari'ah 88 The Popular Moderate Islamic Revival 88 7 Attitudes toward Foreign Policy Issues 93 Stages of Egyptian Foreign Policy 96 The Fundamentalists and the United States 98 The USSR 106 Israel 107 Iran and the Arabs 115 The Arabs and Arab Nationalism Strategy and Doctrine 125 Muslim Brotherhood: Political Party or Electoral Alliance? 126 Critics of Brotherhood Strategy 130 The Shari'ah as Rationale 131 How to Implement the Shari'ah 132 Reform or Revolution? Assessments and Conclusions The Islamist Revolt 156 Problems within the Revolutionary Movement 157 The Anti-Tourist Campaign 161 The Muslim Brotherhood 162 Government-Appointed Leaders 169 Appendix 174 Notes and References 186 Bibliography 206

7 Preface to the Updated Edition Islamic radical fundamentalist political movements have a long history in Egypt, where they have posed as the most important alternative vision and ideology to the dominant, state-sponsored Arab nationalism. These groups have challenged the Egyptian state but have failed to take over either the regime or the society. Their defeats have arisen from the success of governmental policies, including repression and cooptation; internal ideological and organizational divisions among the fundamentalists themselves; and the Egyptian people's rejection of their radical message and interpretation of Islam. One of the most important ideological debates has been whether the primary target of fundamentalist action should be the Egyptian regime or an anti-western campaign. This book examines Egyptian fundamentalist groups, with particular emphasis on how ideological differences have led to distinctive attitudes towards violence and terrorism. Chapter 10, new to this edition, analyzes how internal debates, coupled with the defeat of the anti-government insurgency, led many Egyptian radical fundamentalists to join Usama bin Ladin and focus on attacking America. A new appendix includes excerpts and an analysis of the writings of Ayman al-zawahiri, a veteran leader of the Egyptian movement who became Usama bin Ladin's right-hand man and helped plan the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. Events in the 1990s and afterward confirmed the correctness of this book's original analysis. The revolutionary Islamists in Egypt were defeated; they were unable to overcome their own organizational, doctrinal, and strategic divisions; and they certainly failed to win mass support among Egypt's people. The Egyptian government clearly won the war launched by the Islamists though, of course, it could neither destroy these forces entirely nor dismantle the factors which inspired them in the first place. At the same time, as this book explains, the government's triumph was based in part on its own extensive Islamic assets and its ability to show that the regime was pious. This was achieved through various social, cultural, and intellectual concessions to Islam and Islamic activists (though not to radical Islamists). It could be said that these actions constituted a sort of surrender to the opposition or an extension of its influence. In fact, though, the government's strategy was also highly successful in preserving a safety valve to diminish dissent and reduce the level of

8 viii Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics violent conflict. Of course, government-sponsored religiosity and Islamic measures also maintained a milieu capable of giving rise to future insurgencies and maintained the status of Islamism as the main opposition ideology in Egypt. Government policy also constrained the regime regarding closer relationships with the United States or contributing to furthering the Arab-Israeli peace process. The broader result of government actions in domestic terms was to preserve stability while blocking democratic and other modernizing developments. BARRY RUBIN, 2002

9 Preface to the Original Edition Following the Victory of Iran's Islamic revolution in 1979 and the murder of Egypt's President Anwar al-sadat in 1981, many studies were undertaken and published on radical Islamic fundamentalist movements in the Middle East. Given these events, that research stressed the importance of such groups, focusing on reasons for their rise and possible future success. During the following decade, however, Islamic fundamentalist movements did not come to power in any country. Furthermore, they failed to show the kind of growth in power, size or influence which many observers had expected. Consequently, it is necessary to analyze why the fundamentalists have not done better. This study deals with Egypt, the most important country in the Arab world. Certainly, Egypt had many problems in the 1980s which might conceivably have strengthened radical Islamic groups, whose apparent assets seemed to include a long-established Muslim Brotherhood and a revolutionary underground capable of murdering the country's ruler. This book considers why other, contrary, factors remained uppermost in Egyptian politics. The book began as a research project for the Orkand Corporation. Raymond Stock did a massive amount of translation with admirable speed and accuracy. Dr Ami Ayalon and Professor Jerrold Green read the manuscript and made extremely helpful suggestions. Enthusiastic support from Simon Winder is also acknowledged with pleasure. BARRY RUBIN lx