British Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 80 October 2017, Vol. 18 (1)

Transcription

1 British Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 80 Qatar s Military Role and its Effect on the Annals of the First WW in the Arab Gulf Region in the Light of the British Documents Dr. Shadia Hasen Al Adwan Summary This research aims at highlighting the effect of the war operations carried out during the episodes of the First World War in ( G) on Qatar, which was under British domination in accordance with protection treaties at that time. The study focuses on the correspondence exchanged between Al-Sheikh Abdullah Bin Qasim Al Thani and the British Officials in Bahrain. The communications revolved around providing arms to the British forces. On another side the study discusses the after-effects of the First World War on the pearl market, the major source of income for the people of Qatar. The study attempts to explain the effect of the First World War on boosting the British influence in the Gulf area, after the allied forces victory and the defeat of Germany and the Ottoman Empire and Russia s engagement with its internal affairs, leaving the sole control of the Arab Gulf Region policy in the hands of Britain. The research will rely basically on British documents. Foreword: On the eve of the First World War, The Arab Gulf sheikhdoms were tied up with British protection treaties. Qatar was one of those entities although being under the Turkish rule until This study discusses the military aspect that left its effects on the Qatar-British relationship.

2 British Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 81 The Turkish government had a military presence in Qatar since the Nineteenth Century. This presence remained and was confirmed with the treaty ratified between British and Turkish governments. Therefore, the Turkish garrison remained in Al-Doha. This matter created great concerns to the British Officials. They tried to oust this garrison several times. The British government provided ships and soldiers to attack the fort where the Turkish garrison was stationed. When British force failed, in spite of their military superiority over the Turkish force, the task was assigned to Sheikh Abdullah Bin Jasim to solve this issue for good. Because Britain wanted to avoid confrontation with the Turkish Garrison, in order to evade any military casualties. The issue was solved when El-Sheikh Abdullahexecuted the mission. Preamble: In 1914G, the Turkish government asked for help from the nations under its domination against the allied forces. It sent letters to Arab Gulf Shiekhs such as IbnSuad, Ibn Rashid in Nagd, Al-Thani in Qatar calling them to proclaim holy war

3 British Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 82 Jihad against Britain 1. 2 Hael Prince, Saud Bin Abdelaziz Al Rashid 3 responded and joined the Ottoman State, and Prince Saud Bin Rashid sent a letter to the prince of Kuwait Alsheikh Mubarak Alsabah 4 confirming his loyalty to the Ottoman State, in spite of attempts made by certain British officials to dissuade him 5. In October 1914G, the British Government became convinced that the participation of the Ottoman State in the World War as an ally to Germany was confirmed and started to prepare the situation in the Arab Peninsula to suit its interests. It started to survey the trends of the other political powers in the Arab peninsula regarding the war; after many unsuccessful attempts the British Government excluded Ibn Rashid from being an ally, or atleast 6,being neutral. The British Government was able, through a number of its officers, to contact Ibn Saud in April 1914G, in the presence of the British Political Resident in Kuwait Grey 7, who asked Ibn Saud to promise todeclare war publicly against 4 Mubarak Alsabah: is the seventh Kuwait ruler. He assumed rule after killing his both brothers Mohamed and Jarah. He fought several battels against Al Rashid in Hael. He was courageous and was not in good 1 (RFA) Ruling Families of Arabia, Saudia Arabia: The Royal Family of Al-Saude, Vol 1,pp , [R/15/5/25], edited by A.de L Rush, archive additions 1991, col Knox to Government of India, 31 December 1914 referred to hereinafter as (R.F.A.). 2 Hael: Capital of Shammar Mountain located between Aja and Salma mountains. The city is surrounded with a fence. Look Wahba, Hafidh, Arab Peninsula in the Twentieth Century, T4 Egyptian Alnahdha Library, Cairo, 1961G, P65: MusilAlois, Northern Negd A Topographical Itinerary, Czech Academy of sciences and arts, New York 1928, p Prince Saud Bin Abdelaziz Al Rashid: Ruled in Hael in September 25, 1908G until he was killed in 1919G. He was the last son of Abdelaziz Bin MutibAl Rashid after the massacre perpetrated by Sultan Bin Hmoud. He survived the massacre with his mother who came from Al Alsabhan. He was raised by his uncles in the Holy City of Madina. When he was an infant, his uncle HmoudAlsabhan to revenge from the killer of Saud s father. He was able to attack Hael after paying some money to some of elders and he imprisoned Prince Saud Bin Hmoud when Saud Bin Abdelaziz was ten years old and he appointed his uncle Hmoud as a guardian on him. Then Hmoud informed the Ottoman of what was happening. A decree was issued confirming the leadership of Prince Saud Al Rashid over Hael and offered his father s salary. Look: Khaz al Husain, Kuwait s Political History, C5, Dar HelalBookshopK 1962G pp22-24: And look: about Bin Rashid s salary Ottoman Unity, u (156), February G, pp3-4.

4 British Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 83 terms with the Ottoman Turks. He was able to suppress a revolt against him by the people of Kuwait. He died in 1915G. Look: Alrashid, Abdelaziz, History of Kuwait, Alhayat Bookshop House, Beirut, 1978G, PP : Shliver, Hael, Islamic Knowledge House, V7, p279; Musil, Alois, NorthernNagd, p Alsaadoon, Khalid, Communications between Prince of Hael and the Sheikh of Kuwait, Al-Dara, Al- Riyadh, U 1, S13, June 1987G, P8. It will refer to hereinafter as: Alsaadoon, Communications. 6 Previous source, p11. 7 (R.F.A.), [R/15/5/25] col. Knox to Government of India, 31 December Vol. 1, p 161. the Ottoman State, in return of protection guarantees granted to him from Britain against any retaliation from the Ottoman State or a naval attack from the Arab Gulf; in addition to recognizing his existing situation in Nagd and Al-Ihsaa 8. At the same time a report sent by Grey to the British Political Resident in the Gulf 9 (Percy Cox)stated that Ibn Saud received recently a message from the Turkish Officer Anwar Pasha, asking him to prepare a military force and send it to Syria to help the Ottoman Government against the British. But, Ibn Saud apologized and did notcarry out the task citing the local situation in Nagd 10 which meant that Ibn Saud had no intention to join the Turks in the War. In the same context (Storss), the eastern writer in the British Consulate, Egypt mentioned As the Ottoman State broke its traditional friendship with 8 Arab Peninsula in the British Documents (Nagd Al-Ihsaa), V1, 1914G-1915G, Choice, Translation and Editing: NajdatFathiSafwat, V1, Dar Al-Saqi, Beirut, 1996G. (4m), m1, document number (145), Basra 4 January 1915G, p389. Shall be referred to hereinafter as: Arab Peninsula in the British Documents, number and date of the document. 9 Percy Cox: British Political Resident in the Arabian Gulf during the period He was the previous Assistant Political Resident in British Somalia between Then he became the British Consul in Masqat during the period , then he became a major political officer of the British Force in India during the period He was appointed as a High Commissioner in Iraq during the period King Abdulaziz Diplomatic History encyclopedia, a group of writers, King Abdulaziz Library, Al-Riyadh, 1999G, p Arab Peninsula in the British Documents, V1, document number (120), Kuwait 27 October 1914G, p337.

5 British Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 84 Great Britain and joined the Germans; Great Britain find itself free from the traditional ties that connect it to Turkey since a long time ago 11 referring to 1913 treaty signed between the governments of Britain and the Ottoman State related to Qatar which included an Article stating the Qatar should be ruled by Al Thani family by inheritance 12. As confirmed by Henry McMahon in his communications with Sheriff of Mecca Hussein Bin Ali 13 that the recognition of the potential independent Arab State of the treaties signed by Britain and Arab Gulf Sheikhdoms is settled 14. It is clear that 11 King Abdullah Bin Al-Hussein, The Full Effects, 2 nd edition, United Publishing House, Beirut, 1979G, p 111; Stross, Ronald, Orientations, definitive edition, Nicholson and Watson, London, 1949, p 149 Cleveland, L. William, A History of the Modern Middle East, second edition,: Look Westview Press, U.S.A., 1999, p Zahlan, Rosemarie Said, The Creation of Qatar, Croom Helm, London, 1979, p Look details of Al-Hussein-McMahon: Correspondence Sir Henry McMahon His Majesty High Commissioner at Cairo and the Sheriff Hussein of Mecca, July 1915-March 1916, London, 1939 pp. 2-18; Arab Dissident Movements , [CAB17.176], edited by A.L.P. Burdett, archive editions 1996, U.K. Vol, 1, P [CAB17.176], War Office; Memorandum of 1 July 1916, Documents and Treaties in the Arab Land, issued by Ayyam Newspaper, Damascus (d, t), pp Al-Juburi, Fathi Abbas, Ahmed Saleh, Arab Gulf History, 1 st edition, DarilFikr, Amman 2010G, p71.

6 British Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 85 the British Officials confirmed their devotion to maintain their interest in the Arabian Gulf area explicitly, especially after confirming that Turkey was joining the war as an ally to Germany. As for Qatar, after the end of the Turkish presence, the Arabian Peninsula became a British Protectorate in accordance to the treaties signed between the two parties in 1916G 15. The British Government used the names of Gulf Sheikhs including Sultan of Masqat and the Sheikhs of the tranquil coastin Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait who adhered to the protection treaties, which were dealt up with by the Political Resident in Bushahar area aided by the political representative in the region. The British Government had started to control the Arab Gulf before the beginning of the First World War. It provided guarantees to the Sheikhs of the Arab Gulf to maintain their freedoms, religions and their holy shrines and that they would not be affected by the war between Britain and the Ottoman Government as a result of the conflict 16. Arms Trade in the Arab Gulf: Arms trade thrived tremendously in the Gulf area during a short period before the outbreak of the First World War. It posed a major issue and apprehension to the British Government. It took measures to stop this trade within its sphere of influence. For this purpose the British Government signed agreements 15 Zahlan, The Creation of Qatar, P Al-Mansour, Abdulaziz Mohamed, Political Development of Qatar during the period G, 2 nd Edition, Serial Publications for Printing Publication and Distribution, Al-Kuwait, 1980G, p. 124.

7 British Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 86 With the Arab Gulf Sheikhs prohibiting arms trade. But, what cast a special doubt was the exemption of Qatar from that prohibition, because it was under the Turkish influence 17. This issue was the reason for the Government of Britain to be alarmed and also because of the Turkish presence in Qatar. If the weapons were available, they might fall in Turkish hands one way or another and enhancetheir military situation in the Gulf because of the availability of arms. Qatar s Role in the War Operations in the Gulf: It was mentioned before that Qatar was under the Turkish control. A Turkish garrison was set up as an indication of Qatarbeing a Turkish dependent state. This matter had subsequent consequences revealed by the First World War in the Arab Gulf. Both warring parties had different influence in the Gulf. It was mostly in favor of Britain, while the Turkish influence in Qatardiminished. It created some problems to the British Government, especially the arms trade. Therefore, the British Government did not disregard this matter when it signed the treaty with Sheikh Abdullah. This matter would be explained later. When the World War erupted, the British Government informed the Gulf Sheikhs of the beginning of the war operations against the Turkish Government. At the 17 Almansour, Qatar Political Development, pp

8 British Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 87 Same time the British Government reassured the sheikhs of its obligation to secure their entities in accordance with the existing treaties signed earlier between them. One of the documents contained the reply of the Sheikh of Qatar Abdullah Bin Jasem to a letter from the Political Resident in Bahrain Captain T.H. Keyss informing him of the arrival of the British Military Forces to Bahrain. The letter stated that the Sheikh of Qatar was waiting for orders from Britain and he was willing to move at the right moment 18. In the letter sent by Major S.G. Knox, the Political Resident in the Gulf, to the British officials in East India stating that Sheikh Abdulla Bin Jasim was informed that the War had started actually against the German forces, and the Political Resident discussed with Sheikh Khaled Bin Mohammed Al Thani the new situation 19. The armed Turkish Garrison remained in Qatar as an uncomfortable suspended issue for the British Government. In addition, it threatened the British move to complete itsfull control of the Arab Gulf. Therefore, the treaty included a basic condition to negotiate with the Sheikh of Qatar regarding the necessity of 18 Records of Qatar, primary documents , edited by Penelope Tuson, Vol 4, , Archive Editions 1991, [IOR; L\P&S\10\386 and IOR,R \15\2\30] 6 November 1914, p 420. And shall be referred to hereinafter as (R.Q.). 19 (R.Q.), [IOR;L\P&S\10386 and IOR,R\15\2\30] No. Cf. 203, Bushire, Ist September 1914, p.223.

9 British Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 88 driving outthe Turkish garrison, although its number was reduced to approximately ninety soldiers. The Sheikh was prepared to implement that, but the British Government informed him that it would not be able to provide a ship or personnel to transfer the Turkish garrison 20. For this purpose a Turkish representative, Officer Abdul JabbarAfandi, arrived to convince the Turkish garrison to surrender 21. A letter was sent to Sheikh Abdullah Bin Jasim stating that the Turkish Officer will meet with the Turkish garrison in the port of Doha. It also stated that the British commander in Qatar was not willing to send his soldiers and forces to the port. The British commander thought that the garrison, although small in number, would fight courageously although they were unable to resist. He expressed his intention not to spill blood in Doha port. That was the reason for sending the Turkish officer Abdul Jabbar. He hoped that the Turkish officer would be able to convince the garrison to leave Qatar to Bahrain and allow them to carry their weapons if they left peacefully. The Political Resident asked the Sheikh of Qatar to provide the garrison with boats and 20 (R.Q.),[IOR; L\P&S\10\386 and IOR,R \15\2\30] from Viceroy, 6 th May 1915, p (R.Q.), [IOR; L\P&S\10\386 and IOR,R \15\2\30] Telegram R. from Sir P. Cox, Basrah, to the secretary to the government of India, Simla, 11 th August 1915, p. 434.

10 British Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 89 anything they need when they leave and to keep him posted with any new happening through the Political Resident in Bahrain 22. It seems that the Turkish garrison did not respond to the negotiations aimed atremoved them from Doha. Therefore, a letter arrived from the officer Abdul JabbarAfandi stating that the British Forces seized Amara and Naseriya in Iraq, moreover there were no Turkish forces at all in Basra. Regarding the Turkish garrison, it had not left Doha until that time. The only way to escape was through the sea or land. In spite of their small numbers, the British officials still believed that they would fight courageously. At the same time the British officials were not willing to fight them. Abdul Jabbar promised the garrison to leave honorably with their weapons and ammunition under the mediation of the Political Resident in Bahrain, provided that they should head to Basra and then to Turkey without being exposed to harm or punishment 23. After all the attempts failed withturkish leaders to remove the Turkish garrison fortified in Doha, Sheikh Abdullah himself stated that he would handle this task. The British Government received a report that the Sheikh Abdulla declared that he was prepared to get rid of the Turkish garrison and confiscate its weapons, at 22 (R.Q.), [IOR; L\P&S\10\386 and IOR,R \15\2\30] Letter to Shaikh Abdullah Bin Qasem bin Thani 27 th June 1915, P (R.Q.), [IOR; L\P&S\10\386 and IOR,R \15\2\30] memorandum for Abdul JabbarAfandi, Bahrain 10:VIII:16p. 437.

11 British Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 90 thisinstance, Sheikh Abdullah was preparing to go to Baghdad, through Kuwait. It looks like there were consultation between Sheikh Abdullah and his brother Sheikh Khalifa, finally Sheikh Abdullah was able to appropriate the weapons of the Turkish garrison. The garrison was vacated practically and the weapons were removed without any complications 24. Sheikh Abdullah sent another letter to the Political Resident in Bahrain, Major Keyss and informed him of the weapons he had grabbed from the Turkish Fort, which was demanded by Percy Cox. The Sheikh mentioned that the British Forces in Qatar were in need of weapons. At the same time Keyss asked for the Turkish weaponswhichwas believed to be hundred and five boxes. The Sheikh stated that he was prepared to send the weapons to the British in spite of the problems he would bear in collecting and loading the weapons. But the Sheikh mentioned that the number was Ninety Five boxes only, and he would send Five more boxes of his own to raise the number to Hundred boxes full of weapons. About the missing cannons, they might be buried and the Sheikh s men are looking for them. If found would be sent immediately 25. In the morning of 23 rd August 1915 an armed British team landed in and appropriated the weapon magazines without any resistance. The appropriated weapons included a mountain machine gun and two wall penetrating machine guns and a number of tents. There were Fourteen rifles and hundred and twenty bullets and five hundred projectiles. 24 (R.Q.), [IOR; L\P&S\10\386 and IOR,R \15\2\30] memorandum for Abdul JabbarAfandi, Bahrain 10:VIII:16p (R.Q.), [IOR; L\P&S\10\386 and IOR,R \15\2\30] p Regarding the field weapons, no amounts of powder and ammunition were found. A part of the weapon magazines, which were under the responsibility of the Political Officer, was granted to Sheikh Abdullah in return for the assistance he had already provided to the British forces. The mentioned weapons were shipped on board the HM ship 26. It appeared later that all the Turkish forces had not departed from Doha; information was received that remnants of the Turkish forces were present, but their destination was unknown. In a wireless message sent by Percy Cox to the British Government in India in which Trevor suggested that the Royal Ship Pyramus, which was due to head to Kuwait and Bahrain in search for Turkish forces. It was decided that it would complete its journey to Qatar in accordance with the Political Resident in Bahrain. Negotiations will continue with Sheikh Abdullah with a view to get rid of the Turkish garrison and appropriate their weapons. A report was received from the Political Resident in Bahrain that the Sheikh approved the British demand. The remaining Turkish forces was estimated as two officers and Forty men who disappeared during the night after holding a meeting with the Sheikh in collaboration with a committee frompyramus and the Political Resident in Bahrain. The ship had docked in next morning and had arrived 26 (R.Q.), [IOR; L\P&S\10\386 and IOR,R \15\2\30] Telegram from Senior Naval Officer, Bushire to the government of India August 1915, p. 449.

12 British Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 91 inaugust 17, and a delegation from the ship inspected the fort looking for equipment and weapons. They found five hundred projectiles which was appropriated by the ship and the fort was handed over to the Sheikh. That way Qatar finally got rid of the Turks 27. After eliminating the Turkish presence in Qatar, the British Government decided to expedite the negotiations to sign a treaty with the Sheikh of Qatar. It became clear that Britain was supporting the Sheikh of Qatar and was eager to sign a treaty with him 28. The British documents emphasizethe importance of the assistance provided by the Sheikh Abdullah Bin Jasim to the British forces and his role in the elimination of the Turkish forces in Qatar. It considered the matter of arms trade issue as solved, but the British Government might turn a blind eye at any attempt to smuggle arms into Qatar. The treaty might not include a condition related to arms 29. This matter is of significant importance.the arms question is not important anymore for the British Government, because it is related to the elimination of the Turkish presence in Qatar. There s nothing to pose a threat to the British forces. This explains the exclusion of arms from the terms of the treaty. 27 (R.Q.), [IOR; L\P&S\10\386 and IOR,R \15\2\30] Telegram from P. Cox, government, 28 August 1915, p (R.Q.), [IOR; L\P&S\10\386 and IOR,R \15\2\30] Draft Agreement between the British Government and Sheikh Abdullah Bin Jasim Al-Thani Sheikh of Qatar, p (R.Q.), [IOR; L\P&S\10\386 and IOR,R \15\2\30] Telegram from P. Cox, to government, 28 August 1915, p. 451.

13 British Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 92 In fact the Turkish garrison issue had no great importance for the British Government, even though it pretended that it was, and expressed its concern for the existence of the garrison. The real reason for all the procedures taken by the British Government to oust the Turkish garrison was the determination to remove any manifestation of the Turkish existence in the Arab Gulf. It cited many excuses of which the arms trade was the most important. The most important aim of the British Government was to control the Arab Gulf completely. It would not allow any manifestation of Turkish military existence in the Gulf even though it was just a small garrison. Of course, it cannot be compared to the British military force. That aim was achieved through the Sheikh Abdullah Bin Jasim. Soon a British-Qatar treaty was ratified and it lasted for many years. Conclusion: The study discussed the Arab participation in the First World War in the Arab Gulf region. At the beginning the study mentioned the debates held between Britain and the Arab leaders before the outbreak of the war. As most of the Arab nation was under the Turkish domination, including the Gulf areas, competition there was tough between the British and the Turkish Governments. Britain was cautious to prevent the availability of weapons in the Arab Gulf. Through various treaties with the rulers of Gulf sheikhdoms Britain was able to prohibit arms trade. Britain made arms trade an important term of the treaties. But the problem faced by Britain was the Qatar issue, which was under the

14 British Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 93 rule of the Turkish government and arms trade was allowed there, in addition to the existence of a Turkish garrison stationed in a Doha fort. The garrison was of great concern to the British government. The British government took advantage of adeterioration of relationship between Turkey and Sheikh Jasim Bin Mohamed, then his son Abdullah. Many letters were exchanged between the two parties ending in a military collaboration to oust the Turkish garrison. Sheikh Abdullah was able to end the Turkish existence in Qatar for good. List of sources and references: The British documents: Arab Dissident Movements , [CAB 17/176] edited by: A.L.P. Burdett, archive editions 1996, U.K. Vol. 1 [CAB 17/176] War Office memorandum of 1 July Correspondence Sir Henry McMahon His Majesty s High Commissioner at Cairo and the Sheriff Hussein of Mecca, July 1915-March 1916, London Records of Qatar, primary documents , edited by Penelope Tuson, Vol 4, , Archive Editions 1991, [IOR;L\P&S\10\386 and IOR, R\15\2\30] 6 November (R.Q) [IOR;L\P&S\10\386 and IOR, R\15\2\30] Cf. 203, Bushire, 1 st September (R.Q) [IOR;L\P&S\10\386 and IOR, R\15\2\30] from Viceroy, 6 th May (R.Q) [IOR;L\P&S\10\386 and IOR, R\15\2\30] Telegram R. from Sir P. Cox, Basra, to the secretary to the Government of India, Simla, 11 th August (R.Q) [IOR;L\P&S\10\386 and IOR, R\15\2\30] Letter to Sheikh Abdullah Bin Qasem Bin Thani 27 th June (R.Q) [IOR;L\P&S\10\386 and IOR, R\15\2\30] Memorandum for Abdul JabbarAffandi, Bahrain, 10:VIII:16. (R.Q) [IOR;L\P&S\10\386 and IOR, R\15\2\30] Memorandum for Abdul JabbarAffandi, Bahrain, 10:VIII:16. (R.Q) [IOR;L\P&S\10\386 and IOR, R\15\2\30]. (R.Q) [IOR;L\P&S\10\386 and IOR, R\15\2\30] Telegram from the Senior Naval Officer, Bushire to the Government of India August 1915, p (R.Q) [IOR;L\P&S\10\386 and IOR, R\15\2\30] Telegram from P. Cox to Government, 28 August (R.Q) [IOR;L\P&S\10\386 and IOR, R\15\2\30] Draft Agreement between the British Government and Sheikh Abdulla Bin Jasim Bin Thani Sheikh of Qatar. (R.Q) [IOR;L\P&S\10\386 and IOR, R\15\2\30] Telegram from P. Cox to Government, 28 August (R.F.A.) Ruling Families of Arabia, Saudi Arabia; The Royal Family of Al-Saude, Vol 1 edited by A. de L, Rush, archive editions Translated British Document: Arab Peninsula in the British Documents (Nagd&Ihsaa), (4m), selection, translation and edition: NajdatFathiSafwat, Version 1, DarelSaqi, Beirut, 1996G. Arabic Documents: Documents and Treaties in the Arab Land, issued by Ayyam Newspaper, Damascus, (d.t) Arab Refrences: Al-Juburi, Fathi Abbas, Ahmed Salih, Arab Gulf History, Version 1, DarelFikr, Amman 2010G. Khaz al Hussein, Kuwait Political History, C5, Al-Hilal Bookstore, 1962G.

15 British Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 94 Al-Rashid, Abdulaziz, History of Kuwait, publications of Al-Hayat Bookstore House, Beirut, 1978G. Al-Saadoon, Khalid, Communications between the Prince of Hael and the Sheikh of Kuwait.Al-Dara, Al-Riyadh, A1, S13, June 1987G. King Abdullah Bin Al-Hussein, Full Effects, 2 nd ed., United Publication House, Beirut, 1979G. Al-Mansour, Abdulaziz Mohamed, Political Development of Qatar during the period G, 2 nd Edition, Serial Publications for Printing Publication and Distribution, Al-Kuwait, 1980G. Wahba, Hafidh, Arab Peninsula in the Twentieth Century, T4 Egyptian AlnahdhaBookstore, Cairo, 1961G Encyclopedias: Shliver, Hael, Islamic Knowledge House, S7. King Abdulaziz Diplomatic History Encyclopedia, a group of writers, KingAbdulaziz Library, Al- Riyadh, 1999G Newspapers: Ottoman Union, (Beirut), February 24, 1909G. English Sources and References: Cleveland, L. William, A History of the Modern Middle East, second edition,: Look Westview Press, U.S.A., MusilAlois, Northern NegdA Topographical Itinerary, Czech Academy of sciences and arts, New York Storss, Ronald, Orientations, definitive edition, Nicholson and Watson, London, Zahlan, Rosemarie Said, The Creation of Qatar, Croom Helm, London, 1979.