FASHION MODELS AND MORAL REALISTS

Transcription

1 Draft 6/11/09 FASHION MODELS AND MORAL REALISTS CHARLIE KURTH UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO VERSION 2.0S Fashion models and moral realists make for uneasy bedfellows, or so I will argue. More specifically, my claim is that reflection on the nature of our fashion discourse reveals serious problems for a prominent form of argument for naturalistic moral realism. The argument call it the analogy argument claims that we have reason to endorse a realist account of moral properties in virtue of the similarities that our moral discourse has with the sciences and other intuitively paradigmatic realist discourses: In the sciences, we find certain features e.g., the acknowledgement that genuine error and disagreement are possible, the use of scientific facts in explanations for why something has happened that warrant a realist construal of the underlying properties. But morality displays these features just as well and so, by parity of reasoning, moral realism is also warranted. 1 Moral realists find the analogy argument attractive since, to the extent that the properties of science serve as a good model for how we should understand moral properties, they can set aside concerns about spookiness of their underlying metaphysical and epistemological commitments. 2 Furthermore, since it s an empirical question whether or not our moral discourse exhibits the same features that we find in our scientific practice (e.g., genuine error, informative explanations), the argument holds out the prospect of an a posteriori defense of 1 Analogy arguments of this sort are employed by realists like Richard Boyd (1988), David Brink (1989), Peter Railton (1986a, 1989), Nicholas Sturgeon (1985, 1986, 1994), and others. Michael Slote (1971) employs a similar type of analogy argument to make the case for aesthetic realism. 2 Witness Brink on this point: the metaphysical and epistemological commitments of moral realism are very similar to, and so no less plausible than, those of realism about commonsense physical theory and the natural and social sciences (1989: 12).

2 moral realism. 3 But the realists analogy argument is not without critics. The primary line of objection maintains that our moral discourse and practice is not meaningfully analogous with that of the sciences. 4 Yet realists have responded by arguing that these objections only seem to have force because they draw on an implausible and narrow conception of scientific practice; when science is suitably understood, the realists analogy holds. 5 But because assessing this debate requires determining what it is to be meaningfully analogous with science and what a suitable understanding of scientific practice involves, there s little reason to think that a principled adjudication is possible. My case against the realists analogy argument is significant in part because it demonstrates that their strategy of seeking parallels with the sciences fails to support a claim to moral realism even if we grant that moral discourse is analogous to science in that ways that the realists maintain. This is because paradigmatically constructivist discourses like our talk about what s fashionable evince the same parallels with science. But if a model of our fashion discourse can be shown to display these parallels, then there s no reason to take the analogy between morals and science as evidence for moral realism. The upshot is significant: not only do we have independent reason to reject a prominent form of argument for moral realism, but I will suggest we gain evidence that moral properties may be better understood on a constructivist model. 3 As but one example, consider Boyd s statement of his project [s]how that moral beliefs are much more like our current conception of scientific beliefs and methods (more objective, external, empirical, intersubjective, for example) than we now think. (1988: 184). 4 This line of argument is most prominent in the literature on moral explanation. See, for instance, Harman 1977, 1986; Mackie 1977; Wright 1992; Nichols 2004; and Rubin Realist replies of this sort can be found in Sturgeon 1985, Brink 1989, Shafer-Landau 2003, and elsewhere

3 1. THE REALISTS ANALOGY ARGUMENT Let s begin by taking a closer look at the realists argument. With this in hand, we can turn to an example of how realists employ it. The analogy argument proceeds like this: (1) There are certain features of the natural and social sciences that give credence to a realist construal of the underlying properties of those discourses (call these the telling features ). (2) Moral discourse displays similar telling features. (3) Therefore, we have good reason to endorse realism about the properties underlying our moral discourse. Premise (1) is a claim about what the features of scientific methodology and other similar forms of inquiry that, when present, sanction a realist construal of the underlying properties. These features the telling features of science include things such as: (i) The sciences support notions of error and improvement. (ii) They allow for the possibility of substantive disagreement. (iii) Inquiry within science is viewed as reasoned (a posteriori) deliberation. (iv) Scientific facts contribute to explanations of certain states of affairs. (v) Claims about the underlying properties of a science admit of predictive testing. And (vi) scientific properties provide feedback they have shaping influence on our thoughts about the area of science in question. 6 6 These telling features can be found, in various forms, in the works referenced in note 1. It is worth mentioning that the telling features cited in the text are those that naturalistic moral realists appeal to in order to vindicate their realism. These features can be distinguished from other features of our moral discourse e.g., declarative syntax, assertoric form, embedding within unasserted contexts, etc. that realists have employed in order to vindicate a more general claim to moral cognitivism. Since my concern is with the debate between realists and constructivist, in what follows, I will focus will be on the features that tell for realism

4 We can get a picture of how realists deploy the analogy argument by looking at Peter Railton s version of it. 7 Railton begins by noting that the presence of rich explanatory power tells for a realist construal of a discourse (1986a: 9). For instance, he notes that [w]e are confident that the notion of chemical valence is explanatory because proffered explanations in terms of chemical valence insert explananda into a distinctive and well-articulated nomic nexus, in an obvious way increasing our understanding of them. (17) The driving thought here is that it s because of this rich explanatory power that we re inclined to be realists about the property of valence. In fact, the case for realism about valence grows stronger once we notice that it exhibits other telling features. For instance, our scientific account of what valence is entails that water molecules form stronger ionic bonds than do molecules of ethanol. This allows us to predict that a volume of water will have stronger surface tension than ethanol, and we can run independent experiments to confirm this prediction. We can also see that chemical properties provide feedback in the sense that these properties have a shaping influence on our perceptions, thoughts, and action. Our thoughts about valence and bonding are shaped by our perceptions: because we see that the water-spider can walk on the lake surface, but sinks on the oil slick, we come to think that different fluids have different surface tensions. Having established that the presence of rich explanatory power via the telling features tells for realism, Railton turns to argue that moral concepts and 7 See Railton 1986a, Thought there would be variations in the details, a similar account could be told for most of the other versions of naturalistic moral realism cited in note 1. Brink (1989) may be an exception while he does appeal to the telling features to make a case for realism over constructivism, he uses these features more often as part of an argument against noncognitivist accounts

5 properties work in the same way as the properties and concepts of chemistry. To do this, Railton proposes the following definition for moral rightness (31): Right acts are those that would be rationally approved of were the objective interests of all potentially affected individuals counted equally under circumstances of full and vivid information. 8 He then maintains that moral realism is also warranted because this definition has the right sort of explanatory power. To demonstrate the explanatory power of his definition, Railton appeals to the telling features. For instance, he notes that his definition predicts that situations where a group s objective interests are not taken equally will spawn discontent. He then shows that there is reasonable historical evidence to support this prediction. He also demonstrates that moral properties participate in informative explanations. For instance, to explain the storming of the Bastille, we cite the fact that the political arrangement in France was wrong. Railton also maintains that his account of rightness gives a prominent role to feedback mechanisms: The discontent generated by, say, an oppressive political arrangement can produce feedback that promotes the development of norms that better approximate what would be approved of from the social point of view (24). Railton again points to historical cases e.g., the suffrage and civil rights movements as evidence for these social-psychological feedback mechanisms leading to better moral/political arrangements. The upshot of this investigation is that we have good (a posteriori) evidence for the claim that moral properties exhibit the same telling features as the sciences. So, in virtue of the analogy argument, we re warranted in endorsing realism here as well. 8 It s worth noting that Railton gives similar, antecedent arguments for a realist interpretation of objective interests and instrumental rationality

6 Importantly, the realists move to focus on very general features of scientific methodology suggests they can set aside some of the standard objections to their accounts. As noted above, objectors often seek to demonstrate that morality is importantly disanalogous with science e.g., the explanations and predictions it provides are not sufficiently robust. But because realists take their argument to be based on an abstract and general model of scientific methodology, they can respond that these concerns are misplaced. For one, given the level of abstraction at which they are working, detailed explanations and specific predictions are not required in order to secure a parallel with science. Rather, all they need to demonstrate is that science makes use of comparably general explanations and predictions to sanction conclusions about a mind-independent reality. Plausibly, they do e.g., the biologist takes her simplified model of a cell as telling us how cells really function THE CHALLENGE FROM FASHION Fashion offers a sharp contrast this with science: Intuitively, we take the facts of science to be independent of things like our thoughts and institutions. But we take the facts of fashion facts about what s chic or in bad taste to be determined by things like our fashion conventions and our own individual preferences. 10 Consider: short-hem lines wouldn t be chic unless we thought they were; but that electrons are negatively charged is in no way dependent on whether 9 See Godfrey-Smith 2006 for a nice discussion of the use of abstract models in science and its relevance for working metaphysics. 10 One might distinguish between two uses of fashionable : (i) the evaluative/aesthetic concept of what s fashion-worthy, and (ii) a descriptive/sociological concept that addresses, among other things, what individuals or cultures regard as fashionable, and how the associated fashion norms are transmitted. In this paper, I am concerned with only the evaluative/aesthetic version

7 or not we think they are. In short, it s because facts about what s fashionable are so intimately tied to our thoughts, tastes, and institutions that we take them to be paradigmatic examples of human constructions. This intuitive difference between the nature of fashion and science has an established place in commonsense. But what gets overlooked is the extent to which fashion properties exhibit the telling features. If we look closely at a paradigmatically constructivist discourse like fashion, we discover that it exhibits the telling features in a way that is on par with what we find in our moral discourse. So there s no reason to take the telling features to tell for realism. In fact, as will become apparent, looking to fashion provides us with better reasons to endorse a constructivist account of moral properties. 11 Consider the explanatory/predictive power and feedback mechanisms on which Railton and others rely: We can explain why George Clooney made People s annual best dressed list by citing the fact that he is a fashionable dresser. And, given that he dresses so well, we can predict that he will make the list again next year. 12 Furthermore, the accolades and condemnations that are elicited by instances of chic and unfashionable dress provide feedback that can shape thought and action: Comments and criticism from friends can influence the style 11 Might one employ the arguments of Slote 1971 to defend a claim of fashion realism? Perhaps, but aside from the intuitive implausibility of the suggestion, the move faces other serious problems. I will say more about this in It s worth noting that fashion properties and facts pass the counterfactual test that some naturalistic realists (e.g., Sturgeon 1985, Railton 1986a, Brink 1989) take as evidence for the robustness of a particular explanation or prediction. For instance, the claim were Clooney not such a fashion icon, he would not have received the accolades that he did seems just as true as Sturgeon s claim were Hitler not morally depraved, he would not have done all the evil that he did

8 of dress that one deems fashionable; fashion shows shape what designers and consumers take to be stylish. 13 But our fashion discourse doesn t just support substantive explanations, predictive testing, and feedback mechanisms. It also supports the other telling features: Error and improvement. One can be wrong about (say) what colors and patterns look good together. One s judgments about what s chic can get better. Consider: we say things like Bob used to have terrible style [error], but since he started dating Jessie, he s really learned how to dress well [improvement]. 14 Substantive disagreement. We disagree about what is (or is not) fashionable. If you need evidence, just survey the commentary and debates surrounding a fashion show or the debut of a new line of clothing. 15 Inquiry as reasoned deliberation. Some examples: One might ponder what to wear to tea with the Queen. We give reasons to, for instance, substantiate a critical judgment or justify a radical new look (e.g., Coco wears it, so it must be chic). Clearly such results are highly problematic for the moral realist s analogy argument: If paradigmatically constructivist discourses display the telling features just as well as moral discourse does, the analogy with science does nothing to help 13 It s significant that this shaping needn t be conscious: I might deliberately decide to change the way that I dress because of your critical comments; but your comments might also cause me to unknowingly start to mimic your style. C.f., Brink (1989: 188-9). 14 If you need more evidence, just notice that self-improvement books and fashion magazines are full of commentary on how to avoid fashion faux pas and improve one s style. Here are some representative titles: (1) Cosmo Fashion Expert Reveals How to Dress Better on a Budget (Douglass 2008) (2) The Twelve Simple Ways to Dress Differently and Better than Other Men (Chen 2008) (3) Dress Like A Million (for Considerably Less): A Trend-Proof Guide to Real Fashion (Feldon 2001) 15 Consider the following exchange from the New York Times blog coverage of the Fall 2008 Channel fashion show (Horyn 2008): Post 1: The show was full of energy and new, occasionally quirky ideas, like the twotoned black stockings that serve to take your eye away from the fact that the hemline of the skirt is short. Post 2: The fashion here reminds me of what my female students at Chinese Universities were wearing for the past four years. I do like the look, but it s nothing really new. Notice that not only is there disagreement about whether Channel s line really presents something new, but both commentators offer reasons to substantiate their claims

9 establish realism about morals. 16 Furthermore, if one s reason for rejecting constructivist accounts of morality is that they seem incapable of supporting a robust set of critical practices, 17 the case of fashion gives one good reason to reconsider. 3. A REALIST REPLY? Realists are likely to defend their analogy argument by pointing out important disanalogies in the ways that fashion exhibits the telling features. What follows examines some of the more plausible ways that realists might seek to establish a difference between fashion and morals. (3.1) Insufficient Substance. The realist might seek to dismiss the claim that fashion properties exhibit the telling features by claiming that in contrast to the cases of morals and science the substance of the story about our fashion discourse is insufficient: Its account of explanation, prediction, feedback, and the like is just too thin, too trivial, too platitudinous to do the needed work. 18 The implication is that, by contrast, the story about our moral discourse is suitably robust. It will be instructive to begin by looking at how Railton responds to a similar charge. He considers the complaint that the moral explanations and predictions that he provides in defense of his moral realism are insufficiently robust. His response is two-fold: First, he acknowledges that his account has but 16 At this point one might be concerned that the argument from fashion proves too much that, if we endorse it, we must endorse scientific anti-realism as well. This concern is misplaced, but postpone discussion of it until Sturgeon (1986), Railton (1986a: 4), Brink (1989: chap. 2), and others seem to be motivated at least to some extent by concerns of this sort. 18 The makings of this objection against the fashion story can be found in, for instance, Railton (1986a: 17) and Brink (1989: chap. 7)

10 a breezy plausibility by which he seems to mean something like an intuitive fit within our larger picture of the world (15). But, second, he denies that this is a problem because we re willing to endorse comparably breezy stories in the hard sciences. For instance, he maintains that his evidence for the claim that moral properties display feedback mechanisms has about the same status as the more narrowly biological argument that we should expect the human eye to be capable of detecting objects the size and shape of our predators and prey (15). However, if breezy plausibility is the standard, then the above fashion story certainly meets it just as well as Railton s story for morals. This shouldn t be surprising. Both morals and fashion play a broad, regulative role with regard to human social interaction. So it makes sense that fashion and moral properties exhibit the telling features that they do. Might a realist try appealing to a standard that is more robust than Railton s breezy plausibility? Perhaps, but there s good reason to think this won t work. In order to establish a more robust standard, the realist must (i) identify features of explanation, prediction, etc. the having of which would help substantiate a claim to realism, and (ii) demonstrate that these features are had by morals and science, but not fashion. But features that could arguably satisfy condition (i) don t seem able to meet (ii). Consider an example: One might maintain that the claim to realism requires explanations or predictions that involve (precise) cardinal measurement. Plausibly, cardinal measurement is a feature that satisfies condition (i). And, plausibly, it is a feature that we find in scientific explanations and predictions. But why think that moral explanations and predictions are any more susceptible to cardinal measurement than are the

11 explanations and predictions of fashion? Any tool one might employ to quantify/measure morals (e.g., hedons) could, it seems, be mimicked for fashion (e.g., glamour points). 19 So condition (ii) is not met. 20 In the absence of something that meets (i) and (ii), the realist has no basis for denying the sufficiency of the explanations, predictions, and feedback mechanisms that we find in our fashion discourse. In light of this, the realist might retrench. He might grant that the fashion story gives a substantive explanatory role to the properties in question, but deny that it does so within a sufficiently broad range of phenomenon. More specifically, the claim would be that moral properties do, but fashion properties do not, play a role in explanations that range across a diverse array of subject maters: psychology, sociology, political science, economics, etc. 21 But the fact that fashion properties are human constructions does not prevent them from figuring in explanations of a diverse range of phenomena. Witness: Psychology: That exotic items were considered fashionable explains why hats with feathers from rare birds were desired by women of the UK during the early 1900s. Biological: That these brightly feathered hats were fashionable explains the decline in species of birds with florid plumage. Economics: This fashion trend explains why an entire industry developed to manufacture the hats. Socio-political: The concern with the decline bird species as a result of this fashion trend also explains why the British outlawed commercial hunting of certain exotic birds It s worth emphasizing that the argument in the text does not rely on the claim that morals does not allow for cardinal measurement (though highly controversial, some typically consequentialists argue the morals can be measured in such a way). Rather, the claim is that whatever one might propose for measuring morals could be copied for fashion. 20 I think a similar problem arises for an appeal to a discourse s ability to confirm hypotheses with concrete (as opposed to thought) experiments: Though condition (i) is likely met, condition (ii) is not. 21 See Railton (1986a: 39n24) for the makings of this sort of reply. 22 Holland

12 The upshot is that there is also no basis for the concern that fashion facts do not participate in a sufficiently broad range of explanations. (3.2) A Limited Account of Error. If the realist must concede that fashion properties display the telling features with sufficient depth and breadth, he might instead try arguing that fashion discourse only supports a limited notion of error. Importantly, the realist can grant that it s reasonable to talk of fashion errors in the sense that one s fashion judgment is incorrect just in case it fails to correspond with the (ideally justified) set of beliefs or conventions that are constitutive of the relevant fashion facts. Such an account of error is, after all, available for any constructivist area of discourse. But, having granted that this sort of fashion error is possible, the realist could insist that it must leave out a distinctive, and decidedly realist form of fallibility. More specifically, a realist area of discourse allows for deep error it allows that any of one s views about that area [of discourse] might in principle be mistaken. 23 So while a constructivist account of fashion properties can explain errors that result from not having one s fashion judgments conform to the relevant set of (perhaps, ideally justified) beliefs, she cannot explain the possibility that one could be mistaken about the beliefs that make up that set. According to the fashion constructivist, any belief that is a member of that set is (partially) constitutive of the associated fashion property. But, if one can t be mistaken about the beliefs of this set, then genuine fallibility about fashion is not possible The quote is from Sturgeon (1986: 127, emphasis added). A similar form of argument can be found in Brink (1989: 31, 88-9) and Railton (1986a: 9-10). 24 See Sturgeon 1994 for a similar line of argument to the conclusion that constructivist accounts of tastes (including, presumably, fashion tastes) cannot explain genuine disagreement. Since I believe this objection falls to concerns analogous to those I will develop against the deep error charge, I will not address it separately

13 However, unless more is said to explain in a principled manner why morals, but not fashion, admits of deep error, this realist argument just begs the question. Developing an observation from Michael Smith might give the realist the independent grounding he needs. Reflecting on the nature of disagreement, Smith notes that we readily take instances moral disagreement to entail that at least one of the disagreeing parties is mistaken. By contrast, with paradigmatically constructivist discourses like fashion and aesthetics, we re more inclined to appeal to mere difference in taste: Suppose A says Φ-ing is worthwhile and B says Φ-ing is not worthwhile. If the value in question is moral value, then we seem immediately to conclude that at least one of A or B is mistaken. Indeed, this seems to me to be partially constitutive of moral value, as against values of other kinds. Suppose A and B disagree over some aesthetic matter: the relative merits of, say Turner and Pollock. In this case we seem much happier to rest content with bafflement at why someone likes what we can t stand; much happier to admit that, since there s no accounting for taste, we have a mere difference in taste. (1989: 98-9, original emphasis) Given this datum, the realist could argue that the difference in the ways that we react to disagreements about matters of morals and fashion supports his contention that morals unlike fashion allows for deep error. For morals, but not fashion, we won t rest content in the face of disagreement, and we can (best) explain this if we assume that moral disagreement concerns a mindindependent reality, but that fashion disagreement does not. The realist could bolster this claim by noting that moral disagreement is, in this way, analogous

14 with disagreement in the sciences: in disagreements about (say) whether light is a wave or a particle, the presumption is that at least one side is mistaken. 25 But this realist argument works only if constructivism proves unable to provide an equally plausible explanation of both (i) why we treat moral disagreement differently than fashion disagreement, and (ii) why this makes us more likely to attribute error in the fact of moral disagreement. But constructivists can do this. To see how, consider a conventionalist variety of constructivism. The conventionalist holds that moral facts are fixed by social conventions, conventions that we develop in order to solve certain coordination problems. 26 Fleshing this out, the moral conventionalist can explain that we typically treat moral disagreement more seriously than fashion disagreement by appealing to differences in the psychological significance of morals and fashion: it s because moral issues are (in a sense to be explained) more psychologically significant than issues of fashion or aesthetics that we typically treat moral conflict more seriously. The conventionalist can then argue that to say that something is psychologically significant is not to say, in the first place, that it has a certain kind of (mindindependent) value. Rather, it is to say that it has a distinctly entrenched place in one s mental life. 27 Something (e.g., a piece of content, an emotional response) is psychologically significant to one s mental life to the extent that it would be difficult or impossible to get rid of it. If this is right, then explaining why we typically take moral agreements more seriously than disagreements about matters 25 This line of though can be found in Brink (1989: 7, 24, 29-30) and Sturgeon (1986: 123-4, 128) among others. 26 See, for instance, Harman 1977 and Wong See D Arms & Jacobson 2006 and Wong 2006 for more on how a constructivist could flesh out the argument sketched in the text

15 of fashion needn t make appeal to a mind-independent moral reality. Facts about our psychology can do the needed work: we typically treat morality more seriously than fashion or aesthetics because moral matters have greater psychological significance they have a more entrenched place in our mental lives. Furthermore, since moral conflict presents us with (psychologically) significant coordination problems, we have developed robust conventions to address them. It s because we have these robust moral conventions that we, when confronted with a moral disagreement, presume that at least one of the disagreeing parties must be wrong; at least one of them is mistaken about which moral convention applies to the situation at hand. Though more would likely be needed to flesh out this conventionalist proposal, 28 what we have is sufficient to demonstrate pace the realist s contention that a constructivist can provide a plausible account of Smith s datum about disagreement. The upshot is that we still don t have a reason to buy the realist s claim about the nature of deep moral error morals and fashion remain on par. (3.3) Proves Too Much. If the realist can t demonstrate that there s a disanalogy between the manner in which morals and fashion display the telling features, he might instead try to defend his analogy argument by suggesting that the argument from fashion is implausible because it proves too much. One way the realist might seek to establish this is by claiming that, if the argument from fashion were right, then we should reject not just moral realism but scientific realism as well. After all, according to the argument from fashion, fashion displays the telling features not only just as well as morals, but also just as well as science. 28 See Wong 2006 for one way this could be done

16 So it seems a claim to scientific realism would be just as unfounded as a claim to moral realism. But, goes the objection, such strongly skeptical results show that something must be wrong with the argument from fashion. Clearly, the force of this realist reply turns on the significance one places in preserving scientific realism. Though some will be willing to accept scientific anti-realism, it s worth demonstrating that this conclusion does not follow from the argument from fashion alone. The reason is that scientific practice is importantly different from that of both morals and fashion. First, as we noted above ( 3.1), the explanations and predictions of science are susceptible to (precise) cardinal measurement in a way that those of morals and fashion are not. So there s an important difference in the manner in which they display the telling features. Second, scientific investigation is primarily concerned with descriptive claims; but the investigation in morals and fashion is typically of a prescriptive or practical nature. 29 Finally, morality and fashion differ from science in the manner and extent to which they involve affective responses: feelings of pride, shame, and the like are deeply integrated in our moral and fashion discourse, but they play little if any role in science. 30 Taken together, these features indicate that despite their similarities with regard to the telling features, there are important differences between science on the one hand, and morals and fashion on the other. Because 29 In support of this it s worth distinguishing between what scientists do in the lab and what they do with regard to science policy (e.g., decisions about how to distribute research funds). Though the later is generally practical in nature, the former is not. 30 Two points: (1) The argument in the text relies merely on a comparative claim about the role of affective responses; it makes no claim about whether this role is constitutive, epistemological, or psychological. (2) If the affective aspect of morality and fashion is constitutive, that could help explain why they resist cardinal measurement

17 these differences support a claim to scientific realism, the argument from fashion does not prove too much. 31 An alternative form of the proves too much strategy holds that the argument from fashion doesn t give us reason to reject moral realism, but rather reason to endorse fashion realism! After all, fashion supports the telling features in the very same way that science does. But this line is problematic for a variety of reasons. First, fashion realism is deeply implausible. 32 Second, we ve just seen that there are important differences in the manner in which science, one the one hand, and fashion and morals, on the other, exhibit the telling features. So there s no reason to grant the inference from scientific realism to fashion realism THE (BRIEF) CASE FOR CONSTRUCTIVISM If my arguments so far are on track, then we have no reason to take the analogy argument as evidence for moral realism. But, looking at our fashion discourse, and comparing it to our moral and scientific discourse, suggests that morals is better understood on a constructivist model. For one, the discussion so far gives 31 See Shafer-Landau (2003: 59-60) for additional ways to mark off what s distinctive of science. 32 Any credence this claim might appear to have likely rests on a confusion: We can grant that it s reasonable to hold that there are objective facts about which shades of blue are most similar to one another, or whether one pattern is busier than another. But it is a further subjective matter whether being similar in color, or having a busy pattern, makes something fashionable. It s with regard to this further issue, after all, that we distinguish the fashion iconoclasts from the rest. 33 The realist might seek to bolster this version of the proves too much reply by modeling a fashion realism along the lines of Slote s (1971) case for aesthetic realism or Railton s (1986b) realism about an individual s non-moral good. A couple comments: (1) I do not see how this move would address the two concerns raised in the text. (2) Both Slote and Railton appeal to a variety of ideal observer dispositionalism, and this bring additional difficulties. For one, there are significant objections to the coherence of such accounts (see, for instance, Velleman 1988, Sobel 1994). For another, a fashion realism of this sort would seem to face a dilemma: Either the idealization will preserve the high degree of fashion diversity that we observe, or it won t. If it does, then the resulting account of being chic will be so strongly relativistic, that it would seem a very uncomfortable fit with the sort of moral realism that the advocate of the analogy argument wants to defend (see, for instance, Brink [1989: 26], Sturgeon [1994]). If it does not, the realist seems forced to understand the fashion iconoclast s style as wrong, not merely different

18 us a powerful demonstration that a constructivist metaphysics can support a rich set of critical practices. Contrary to what many suppose, constructivism allows for error, improvement, reasoned deliberation, and the like. So a constructivist account of morality seems just as capable of making sense of the objective features of our moral discourse that realists take as evidence for the need to posit mind-independent moral facts. That alone is significant. But when combined with general theoretical considerations of simplicity and conservatism, we see that constructivism could provide us with a more metaphysically austere account of the objectivity of ethics. 34 Furthermore, the discussion of 3.3 demonstrates that there are important differences with regard to the way that science displays telling features, and the way that morality and fashion do; these differences suggest that we understand morality and fashion in the same manner. To the extent that we emphasize the manner in which morality and fashion engage our affective responses, we get another reason to treat them both on a constructivist model. In short, looking to fashion provides an unappreciated set of considerations in favor moral constructivism. I close by noting a disanalogy between morals and science, one that I think gives us further reason prefer a constructivist account. Implicit in the realist s endorsement of the analogy argument is a commitment to thinking (i) that we can t make sense of the rich critical practices that we see in our moral discourse unless we assume that moral realism is true, and (ii) that we have reason 34 Though I won t make the argument here, I believe that this upshot of the argument from fashion (namely, the ability to secure a rich set of critical practices from a weak set of metaphysical and epistemological assumptions) also gives us reason to favor moral constructivism over other robustly objectivist account of morality e.g., intuitionism, ideal observer accounts, Kantian theories, etc

19 to believe moral realism is true in virtue of the analogy argument. These commitments, after all, help explain his resistance to a constructivist account of moral properties and facts. But combining this pair of commitments with an important disanalogy between morals and science, leads to trouble. The disanalogy is that, unlike scientific judgments, moral judgments have a special motivational element: making a moral judgment brings with it at least some motivation to act in accordance with that judgment. However, assuming the realist is right both that securing the critical practices requires moral realism, and that establishing realism requires a strong analogy with science, then he must endorse judgment externalism. That is, he must endorse the controversial claim that moral judgments are not necessarily motivating. To claim otherwise (i.e., endorse judgment internalism) would seem to compromise the strength of the analogy between science and morals, and so compromise the legitimacy of the realist s claim to be able to accommodate the critical practices of our moral discourse. 35 This points to a further benefit of constructivism: The argument of this essay demonstrates that a conventionalist can reject the assumption that one can secure a robust set of critical practices only on the assumption of moral realism. So, unlike the realist, the conventionalist is not compelled to endorse judgment externalism. The ability to stay neutral on matters of moral motivation is a point in favor of constructivism especially for anyone who is worried about whether 35 A couple of points: (1) A realist could argue that accepting judgment internalism does not compromise their ability to secure the critical practices. But it s worth noting that realists that advocate the analogy argument don t do this, but instead seek to defend a claim to judgment externalism. (2) Realists provide independent arguments for thinking judgment externalism is true. But it is also worth noting that some of the dominant ones (e.g., arguments about the conceivability of amoralists [Brink 1989]) are a priori. So there s reason to worry whether, in light of the need for this argument, an a posteriori defense of moral realism is possible

20 the internalism/externalism debate could be settled in a way that is both principled and naturalistically acceptable. 36 Though more would need to be said, we have seen that fashion models not only give us reason to reject the realists analogy argument, but also give us reason to favor a constructivist account of our moral discourse and practice. REFERENCES Boyd, Richard. (1988) How to be a Moral Realist. In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Brink, David. (1989) Moral Realism and the Foundation of Ethics. Cambridge University Press. Chen, Ivan. (2008) The Twelve Simple Ways to Dress Differently and Better than Other Men. Scotts Valley, CA: CreateSpace. D Arms, Justin and Daniel Jacobson. (2006) Anthropocentric Constraints on Human Value. In Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 1. ed. Shafer-Landau. Darwall, Stephen. (1996) Review of The Moral Problem. Philosophical Quarterly 46: Dreier, James. (2000) Dispositions and Fetishes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61. Douglass, Alexandra. (2008) Cosmo Fashion Expert Reveals How to Dress Better on a Budget exclusive/ Feldon, Leah. (2001) Dress Like A Million (for Considerably Less): A Trend-Proof Guide to Real Fashion. Bloomington, IN: iuniverse. Godfrey-Smith, Peter. (2006) Theories and Models in Metaphysics. Harvard Review of Philosophy 14: Harman, Gilbert. (1986) Moral Explanations of Natural Facts Can Moral Claims be Tested Against Moral Reality? Southern Journal of Philosophy 24, Supplement (1977) The Nature of Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Holland, Jennifer. (2007) Feathers of Seduction National Geographic July 2007: Horyn, Cathy. (2008) In the Big House The New York Times. Mackie, John. (1977) Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. New York: Penguin. Nichols, Shaun. (2004) Sentimental Rules. New York: Oxford University Press. Railton, Peter. (1986a) Moral Realism. Reprinted in Facts, Values, and Norms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1986b) Facts and Values. Reprinted in Facts, Values, and Norms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1989) Naturalism and Prescriptivity Social Philosophy and Policy 7: Rubin, Michael. (2008) Is Goodness a Homeostatic Property Cluster? Ethics 118: Shafer-Landau, Russ. (2003) Moral Realism: A Defense. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Slote, Michael. (1971) The Rationality of Aesthetic Value Judgments. Journal of Philosophy 68. Smith, Michael. (1989) Dispositional Theories of Value. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. LXIII, supp.: Michael Smith (1995) claims to have come up with a non-question begging way of settling the internalism/externalism debate. Unfortunately for the realist, Smith comes down on the side of internalism. Against Smith, Jamie Dreier (2000) and Stephen Darwall (1996) suggest that there may be no principled way of adjudicating this debate

21 . (1995) The Moral Problem. Oxford: Blackwell. Sobel, David. (1994) Full Information Accounts of Well-Being. Ethics 104: Sturgeon, Nicholas. Moral Disagreement and Moral Relativism. Social Policy and Philosophy 11.1: (1986) What Difference Does it Make Whether Moral Realism Is True? Southern Journal of Philosophy. 24, supplement: (1985) Moral Explanations. In Morality, Reasons and Truth, ed. D. Copp and D. Zimmerman. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allenheld. Velleman, J. David. (1988) Brandt s Definition of the Good. Philosophical Review 97: Wong, David. (2006) Natural Moralities. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wright, Crispin. (1992) Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press