THE MORAL FIXED POINTS: REPLY TO CUNEO AND SHAFER-LANDAU
|
|
- Ralf Shelton
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 DISCUSSION NOTE THE MORAL FIXED POINTS: REPLY TO CUNEO AND SHAFER-LANDAU BY STEPHEN INGRAM JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY DISCUSSION NOTE FEBRUARY 2015 URL: COPYRIGHT STEPHEN INGRAM 2015
2 The Moral Fixed Points: Reply to Cuneo and Shafer-Landau A CCORDING TO TERENCE CUNEO and Russ Shafer- Landau, moral nonnaturalists should accept that certain substantive moral propositions are conceptual truths. 1 They call these the moral fixed points, and offer examples like the following: It is pro tanto wrong to engage in the recreational slaughter of a fellow person. There is some moral reason to offer aid to those in distress, if such aid is very easily given and comes at very little expense. If acting justly is costless, then, ceteris paribus, one should act justly. I am sympathetic to moral nonnaturalism, but I am skeptical about the direction in which Cuneo and Shafer-Landau want to take it. We have reason to deny that those who reject the so-called moral fixed points are conceptually deficient, and this undermines the proposal that these moral propositions are conceptual truths. 1. The Proposal Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (411-12) offer the following proposal: There are nonnatural moral truths. These truths include the moral fixed points, which are a species of conceptual truth, as they are propositions that are true in virtue of the essences of their constituent concepts. This is designed to be compatible with any construal of the natural/nonnatural distinction. Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (401-02) prefer a metaphysical construal, on which moral properties and facts are sui generis. The provocative claim is that some nonnatural moral truths are conceptual truths. Conceptual truths are glossed as propositions that are true in virtue of the essences of their constituent concepts. It is of the essence of the concept being human, for example, that it applies to exactly those things that are human. On this view, a proposition [that x is F] is a conceptual truth if it belongs to the essence of F that, necessarily, anything that satisfies x also satisfies F. In the moral case, Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (410) suggest that the moral proposition [that recreational slaughter of a fellow person is wrong] is a conceptual truth in case it belongs to the essence of the concept being wrong that, necessarily, if anything satisfies the concept recreational slaughter of a fellow person, 1 T. Cuneo and R. Shafer-Landau (2014) The Moral Fixed Points: New Directions for Moral Nonnaturalism, Philosophical Studies 171(3): All page references are to this text.
3 it also satisfies the concept being wrong. 2 Cuneo and Shafer-Landau think that this proposal helps answer criticisms of nonnaturalism. 3 However, I am skeptical about there being substantive moral propositions that are conceptual truths. 2. Conceptual Deficiencies If a proposition is a conceptual truth, anyone who rejects it is conceptually deficient in some way. They fail to possess the relevant concepts, or they possess them but fail to understand them, or they possess and understand them but fail to appreciate their implications. To accept Cuneo and Shafer-Landau s proposal is thus to charge those who reject the moral fixed points with conceptual deficiency. However, it is not obvious that those who actually reject the moral fixed points are conceptually deficient. Error theorists, for example, reject the moral fixed points. Are they conceptually deficient? First, what is error theory? The error theorist agrees with the nonnaturalist about the nature of moral discourse, accepting that our use of moral terms involves a nonnegotiable commitment to nonnatural moral properties and facts. However, error theorists disagree with nonnaturalists about metaphysics. They reject nonnatural moral properties and facts, and thus say that moral discourse is in systematic error. The error theorist will thus reject any suggested moral fixed point, saying that it commits us to an unacceptable ontology. Now, if we have reason to deny that error theorists are conceptually deficient, we have reason to deny that the moral fixed points are conceptual truths. So, the key question is this: Are error theorists conceptually deficient in their rejection of the moral fixed points? Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (412-15, ) are sensitive to a version of this worry, acknowledging that their proposal may appear uncharitable to the error theorist. They respond as follows: Nonnaturalists hold that the degree to which the moral fixed points are evident is quite high. But nonnaturalists do not maintain that the moral fixed points are maximally evident. It is possible to wonder, for example, whether one has failed to appreciate the force of various antirealist arguments. It is also possible to wonder whether there is something deeply defective about our moral concepts, which we have not yet appreciated, which would render them incapable of referring to moral properties if any were to exist (414). Cuneo and Shafer-Landau are committed to the accusation of conceptual deficiency, but they allow that error theorists (and their arguments) can and should be taken seriously. They are thus not uncharitable. This response seems a respectable answer to the lack of charity objection, but the matter does not end there. We do not just want to know whether it is 2 Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (408-10) do not identify conceptual truths with analytic truths. They see analytic truths as formal and vacuous, but allow that conceptual truths (including the moral fixed points) can be substantive. 3 They think that it helps answer objections concerning moral disagreement, evolutionary debunking and moral supervenience. 2
4 uncharitable to accuse the error theorist of conceptual deficiency. We want to know whether the error theorist is actually conceptually deficient. Cuneo and Shafer-Landau do not, as far as I can see, address this more fundamental problem. We are dealing with different points here: To ask whether one can accuse error theorists of conceptual deficiency while taking their views seriously is one thing, but to ask whether error theorists are actually conceptually deficient is another. Even if Cuneo and Shafer-Landau are not being uncharitable, it is possible to deny that error theorists are conceptually deficient (and thus that the moral fixed points are conceptual truths). After all, nonnaturalists cannot charge error theorists with failure to possess or understand moral concepts both parties agree about the nature of moral discourse. Their disagreement is metaphysical rather than conceptual. So the accusation must be that error theorists fail to appreciate what their moral concepts imply. However, it is not enough to simply accuse error theorists of failing to appreciate what their concepts imply. One has to make the case for this accusation, otherwise it is just ad hoc. If the charge of conceptual deficiency remains unsubstantiated, we are entitled to deny that error theorists are conceptually deficient in their rejection of the moral fixed points. And this would entitle us to deny that the moral fixed points are conceptual truths. How, then, might one make a case for thinking that error theorists fail to appreciate the implications of their moral concepts? One suggestion that we might draw from Cuneo and Shafer-Landau s discussion is that error theorists are misled by sophisticated (but unsound) arguments. It is a mistake, Cuneo and Shafer-Landau say, to reject highly evident ethical propositions (like the moral fixed points) by appeal to highly controversial metaethical claims (like the claim that moral properties and facts are queer, or that moral beliefs can be debunked). Cuneo and Shafer- Landau diagnose error theorists as falling foul of this suspect philosophical methodology (438). What exactly they are getting at here is not clear, but they seem to be gesturing at the following line of thought. In philosophical inquiry, good practice involves seeking to accommodate our intuitions about our chosen topic by developing theories that vindicate these intuitions. The error theorist fails to follow good philosophical practice, for their theory repudiates our strongest intuitions by rejecting the moral fixed points. In other words, it is suggested that we can provide indirect support to the charge of conceptual deficiency by pointing to a questionable methodology. The error theorist misses the implications of their concepts as a result of a distorting process of philosophical reasoning, one that gives too much weight to contentious metaethical claims, and too little to first-order moral intuitions. The conceptual deficiency charge is thus not an ad hoc maneuver designed to save the proposal that the moral fixed points are conceptual truths, for the charge is supported indirectly by a methodological diagnosis of the error theorist s situation. However, if this is what Cuneo and Shafer-Landau are getting at, it is not compelling. First off, note that the methodology of which Cuneo and Shafer- Landau are suspicious is widely employed in philosophy. Claims that 3
5 seem intuitively plausible are often given up in light of deeper reflection and more considered argument. To give some examples, it is intuitively very plausible that time is real, that scientific investigation delivers true theories of reality, that human beings have free will and that moral agents have reasonably stable character traits. Yet, these claims are subject to apparently legitimate debate, and there are philosophers who reject them by appealing to controversial philosophical arguments. If this methodology is suspect when used by error theorists, then it is presumably suspect when used by any philosopher. Perhaps it is indeed a bad methodology wherever it is applied, but we should recognize that a wide range of fields in philosophy would be radically altered if philosophers were directed only to construct theories that accommodate our intuitions. More importantly, Cuneo and Shafer-Landau are wrong to suggest that error theorists operate with a bad methodology. Consider a rough guide to philosophical inquiry. Step one: Identify your intuitions and make them consistent. Step two: Develop a theory that can vindicate these considered intuitions. Test this theory by standard criteria for theory selection. If it passes, accept the theory. If it fails, move to step three. Step three: Revise your theory. If the theory remains problematic, move to step four. Step four: Acknowledge that the intuitions with which you started are in error. Explain why this so. We can understand error theorists as having undergone this process. Most people are likely to find that their moral intuitions, including the moral fixed points, are highly evident. So most error theorists start at step one by attempting to get their moral intuitions in order. They then proceed to step two, and find that nonnaturalism is the most compelling way to vindicate their moral intuitions. However, in testing this theory, error theorists judge it unacceptable. (Perhaps they find nonnatural properties and facts intolerably mysterious.) They thus move to step three, perhaps attempting to naturalize moral properties and facts. But they find that this theory fails to vindicate their moral intuitions. Despite their best efforts, they cannot find a theory that succeeds both in vindicating their moral intuitions and in being ontologically respectable. So, they move to step four. They acknowledge and explain the errors in those moral intuitions that seem highly evident. In short, they arrive at error theory. We can debate whether error theorists are correct. The nonnaturalist may say that the error theorist makes a mistake at step two in thinking nonnaturalism mysterious. Alternatively, one might suggest that the error theorist makes a mistake at step three. This is what expressivists and moral naturalists will say. Either way, there is nothing wrong with the error theorist s methodology. Indeed, it seems that they have proceeded entirely legitimately along our (admittedly rough) four-step program. Importantly, this removes the suggested support for the conceptual deficiency charge. Cuneo and Shafer-Landau lose their justification for saying that error theorists are conceptually deficient in rejecting the moral fixed points. This charge is unsubstantiated and ad hoc, so entirely deniable. 4
6 3. Conclusion If the charge that error theorists are conceptually deficient in their rejection of the moral fixed points is deniable, so is the claim that the moral fixed points are conceptual truths. Despite being sympathetic to nonnaturalism, I am therefore skeptical of the direction in which Cuneo and Shafer-Landau want to take it. 4 University of Sheffield Department of Philosophy stephen.ingram@sheffield.ac.uk 4 Thanks to Jimmy Lenman for discussion. Thanks also to Lizzy Kirkham, Denise Fox and Shirley Carter. This paper was written during an AHRC doctoral scholarship. 5
ARE THE MORAL FIXED POINTS CONCEPTUAL TRUTHS?
DISCUSSION NOTE BY DAAN EVERS AND BART STREUMER JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY DISCUSSION NOTE MARCH 2016 URL: WWW.JESP.ORG COPYRIGHT DAAN EVERS AND BART STREUMER 2016 Are the Moral Fixed Points
More informationMORAL FIXED POINTS AND CONCEPTUAL DEFICIENCY: REPLY TO INGRAM (2015)
DISCUSSION NOTE MORAL FIXED POINTS AND CONCEPTUAL DEFICIENCY: REPLY TO INGRAM (2015) BY CHRISTOS KYRIACOU JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY DISCUSSION NOTE MARCH 2017 URL: WWW.JESP.ORG COPYRIGHT CHRISTOS
More informationShafer-Landau's defense against Blackburn's supervenience argument
University of Gothenburg Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Science Shafer-Landau's defense against Blackburn's supervenience argument Author: Anna Folland Supervisor: Ragnar Francén Olinder
More informationSTILL NO REDUNDANT PROPERTIES: REPLY TO WIELENBERG
DISCUSSION NOTE STILL NO REDUNDANT PROPERTIES: REPLY TO WIELENBERG BY CAMPBELL BROWN JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY DISCUSSION NOTE NOVEMBER 2012 URL: WWW.JESP.ORG COPYRIGHT CAMPBELL BROWN 2012
More informationTWO ACCOUNTS OF THE NORMATIVITY OF RATIONALITY
DISCUSSION NOTE BY JONATHAN WAY JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY DISCUSSION NOTE DECEMBER 2009 URL: WWW.JESP.ORG COPYRIGHT JONATHAN WAY 2009 Two Accounts of the Normativity of Rationality RATIONALITY
More informationTerence CUNEO, The Normative Web. An Argument for Moral Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, 263 pp., 46.99, ISBN
Grazer Philosophische Studien 80 (2010), 333 337. Terence CUNEO, The Normative Web. An Argument for Moral Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, 263 pp., 46.99, ISBN 978-0-19-921883-7. 1. Meta-ethics
More informationThe Tempering of a Defense: Further Critiques Against Error Theory in Light of Russ Shafer- Landau s Ethical Nonnaturalism
DISCOVERY: Georgia State Honors College Undergraduate Research Journal Volume 1 DISCOVERY - Georgia State University Honors College Undergraduate Research Journal Article 6 2012 The Tempering of a Defense:
More informationWell-Being, Disability, and the Mere-Difference Thesis. Jennifer Hawkins Duke University
This paper is in the very early stages of development. Large chunks are still simply detailed outlines. I can, of course, fill these in verbally during the session, but I apologize in advance for its current
More informationDissolving the Debunker s Puzzle
[Expositions 8.2 (2014) 38 49] Expositions (online) ISSN: 1747 5376 Dissolving the Debunker s Puzzle TERENCE CUNEO University of Vermont There is a two-fold dynamic at work in chapter five of Thomas Nagel
More informationUnderstanding Truth Scott Soames Précis Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Volume LXV, No. 2, 2002
1 Symposium on Understanding Truth By Scott Soames Précis Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Volume LXV, No. 2, 2002 2 Precis of Understanding Truth Scott Soames Understanding Truth aims to illuminate
More informationRight-Making, Reference, and Reduction
Right-Making, Reference, and Reduction Kent State University BIBLID [0873-626X (2014) 39; pp. 139-145] Abstract The causal theory of reference (CTR) provides a well-articulated and widely-accepted account
More informationTHE UNBELIEVABLE TRUTH ABOUT MORALITY
THE UNBELIEVABLE TRUTH ABOUT MORALITY Bart Streumer b.streumer@rug.nl 9 August 2016 Forthcoming in Lenny Clapp (ed.), Philosophy for Us. San Diego: Cognella. Have you ever suspected that even though we
More informationDavid Enoch s Taking Morality Seriously (Oxford University Press 2011) is the latest in
Forthcoming in Journal of Moral Philosophy Enoch s Defense of Robust Meta-Ethical Realism Gunnar Björnsson Ragnar Francén Olinder David Enoch s Taking Morality Seriously (Oxford University Press 2011)
More informationSelf-Evidence and A Priori Moral Knowledge
Self-Evidence and A Priori Moral Knowledge Colorado State University BIBLID [0873-626X (2012) 33; pp. 459-467] Abstract According to rationalists about moral knowledge, some moral truths are knowable a
More informationEpistemic Normativity for Naturalists
Epistemic Normativity for Naturalists 1. Naturalized epistemology and the normativity objection Can science help us understand what knowledge is and what makes a belief justified? Some say no because epistemic
More informationOxford Scholarship Online Abstracts and Keywords
Oxford Scholarship Online Abstracts and Keywords ISBN 9780198802693 Title The Value of Rationality Author(s) Ralph Wedgwood Book abstract Book keywords Rationality is a central concept for epistemology,
More informationAGAINST THE BEING FOR ACCOUNT OF NORMATIVE CERTITUDE
AGAINST THE BEING FOR ACCOUNT OF NORMATIVE CERTITUDE BY KRISTER BYKVIST AND JONAS OLSON JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY VOL. 6, NO. 2 JULY 2012 URL: WWW.JESP.ORG COPYRIGHT KRISTER BYKVIST AND JONAS
More information2210 Speedway, Stop C3500, WAG 316, Austin, TX (936)
Justin Morton,, (936)615-6952 mortonjj@utexas.edu Areas of Specialization Ethics, Metaethics Areas of Competence Epistemology, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Religion Education PhD 2018 (expected) The MA 2015
More informationNon-naturalism and Normative Necessities
Non-naturalism and Normative Necessities Stephanie Leary (Forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Metaethics Vol 12) One of the most common complaints raised against non-naturalist views about the normative is
More informationHYBRID NON-NATURALISM DOES NOT MEET THE SUPERVENIENCE CHALLENGE. David Faraci
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy Vol. 12, No. 3 December 2017 https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v12i3.279 2017 Author HYBRID NON-NATURALISM DOES NOT MEET THE SUPERVENIENCE CHALLENGE David Faraci I t
More informationPhilosophical Issues, vol. 8 (1997), pp
Philosophical Issues, vol. 8 (1997), pp. 313-323. Different Kinds of Kind Terms: A Reply to Sosa and Kim 1 by Geoffrey Sayre-McCord University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill In "'Good' on Twin Earth"
More informationReview of Erik J. Wielenberg: Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism
2015 by Centre for Ethics, KU Leuven This article may not exactly replicate the published version. It is not the copy of record. http://ethical-perspectives.be/ Ethical Perspectives 22 (3) For the published
More informationDISCUSSION PRACTICAL POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY: A NOTE
Practical Politics and Philosophical Inquiry: A Note Author(s): Dale Hall and Tariq Modood Reviewed work(s): Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 117 (Oct., 1979), pp. 340-344 Published by:
More informationWorld without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Natural- ism , by Michael C. Rea.
Book reviews World without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism, by Michael C. Rea. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004, viii + 245 pp., $24.95. This is a splendid book. Its ideas are bold and
More informationOn Searle on Human Rights, Again! J. Angelo Corlett, San Diego State University
On Searle on Human Rights, Again! J. Angelo Corlett, San Diego State University With regard to my article Searle on Human Rights (Corlett 2016), I have been accused of misunderstanding John Searle s conception
More informationIs God Good By Definition?
1 Is God Good By Definition? by Graham Oppy As a matter of historical fact, most philosophers and theologians who have defended traditional theistic views have been moral realists. Some divine command
More informationHOW TO BE (AND HOW NOT TO BE) A NORMATIVE REALIST:
1 HOW TO BE (AND HOW NOT TO BE) A NORMATIVE REALIST: A DISSERTATION OVERVIEW THAT ASSUMES AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE ABOUT MY READER S PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND Consider the question, What am I going to have
More informationErgo JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
AN OPEN ACCESS Ergo JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Model Theory, Hume s Dictum, and the Priority of Ethical Theory JACK WOODS University of Leeds BARRY MAGUIRE University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill It is regrettably
More informationConditions of Fundamental Metaphysics: A critique of Jorge Gracia's proposal
University of Windsor Scholarship at UWindsor Critical Reflections Essays of Significance & Critical Reflections 2016 Mar 12th, 1:30 PM - 2:00 PM Conditions of Fundamental Metaphysics: A critique of Jorge
More informationNon-naturalism and Normative Necessities
Non-naturalism and Normative Necessities Stephanie Leary (9/30/15) One of the most common complaints raised against non-naturalist views about the normative is that, unlike their naturalist rivals, non-naturalists
More informationThe Puzzle of Pure Moral Motivation
The Puzzle of Pure Moral Motivation *Draft* 8/9/2016 Adam Lerner Dear CHillMeta readers: This is a long paper. For those of you who don t have enough time to read the whole thing, here is some guidance
More informationThe Nature and Explanatory Ambitions of Metaethics. By Tristram McPherson (Ohio State University) and David Plunkett (Dartmouth College)
The Nature and Explanatory Ambitions of Metaethics By Tristram McPherson (Ohio State University) and David Plunkett (Dartmouth College) Forthcoming in The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics (general introductory
More informationA Rational Solution to the Problem of Moral Error Theory? Benjamin Scott Harrison
A Rational Solution to the Problem of Moral Error Theory? Benjamin Scott Harrison In his Ethics, John Mackie (1977) argues for moral error theory, the claim that all moral discourse is false. In this paper,
More informationAnderson and Velleman s Kantian Thesis : A Case-Study in the Serpent Windings of Ethical Taxonomy
Anderson and Velleman s Kantian Thesis : A Case-Study in the Serpent Windings of Ethical Taxonomy In A Right of Self-Termination? David Velleman argues that personal well-being does not matter, and is
More informationHow Successful Is Naturalism?
How Successful Is Naturalism? University of Notre Dame T he question raised by this volume is How successful is naturalism? The question presupposes that we already know what naturalism is and what counts
More informationStang (p. 34) deliberately treats non-actuality and nonexistence as equivalent.
Author meets Critics: Nick Stang s Kant s Modal Metaphysics Kris McDaniel 11-5-17 1.Introduction It s customary to begin with praise for the author s book. And there is much to praise! Nick Stang has written
More informationTruly Normative Matters: An Essay on the Value of Truth
University of Kentucky UKnowledge Theses and Dissertations--Philosophy Philosophy 2012 Truly Normative Matters: An Essay on the Value of Truth Charles Kamper Floyd III University of Kentucky, kamperfloyd@gmail.com
More informationDebunking Evolutionary Debunking
4 Debunking Evolutionary Debunking Katia Vavova 1. THE EVOLUTIONARY CHALLENGE Worries about the compatibility of evolution and morality are not new even Darwin had them. A number of recent arguments revive
More informationWhat God Could Have Made
1 What God Could Have Made By Heimir Geirsson and Michael Losonsky I. Introduction Atheists have argued that if there is a God who is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent, then God would have made
More informationInsider and Outsider Scholarship in Bahá í Studies
Insider and Outsider Scholarship in Bahá í Studies Moojan Momen It is difficult to know whether, in discussing this subject, one should remain within the framework of the immediate matter at hand: that
More informationTruth At a World for Modal Propositions
Truth At a World for Modal Propositions 1 Introduction Existentialism is a thesis that concerns the ontological status of individual essences and singular propositions. Let us define an individual essence
More informationIntroduction. The Nature and Explanatory Ambitions of Metaethics
Introduction The Nature and Explanatory Ambitions of Metaethics Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett Introduction This volume introduces a wide range of important views, questions, and controversies in
More informationDivine omniscience, timelessness, and the power to do otherwise
Religious Studies 42, 123 139 f 2006 Cambridge University Press doi:10.1017/s0034412506008250 Printed in the United Kingdom Divine omniscience, timelessness, and the power to do otherwise HUGH RICE Christ
More informationPhilosophy 125 Day 1: Overview
Branden Fitelson Philosophy 125 Lecture 1 Philosophy 125 Day 1: Overview Welcome! Are you in the right place? PHIL 125 (Metaphysics) Overview of Today s Class 1. Us: Branden (Professor), Vanessa & Josh
More informationNON-COGNITIVISM AND THE PROBLEM OF MORAL-BASED EPISTEMIC REASONS: A SYMPATHETIC REPLY TO CIAN DORR
DISCUSSION NOTE NON-COGNITIVISM AND THE PROBLEM OF MORAL-BASED EPISTEMIC REASONS: BY JOSEPH LONG JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY DISCUSSION NOTE OCTOBER 2016 URL: WWW.JESP.ORG COPYRIGHT JOSEPH LONG
More informationCONCEPTUALIZING QUEERNESS
Faraci 1 CONCEPTUALIZING QUEERNESS David Faraci J. L. Mackie (1977) famously claims that there can be no objective values no objective moral properties or facts in part because such properties would be
More informationLuck, Rationality, and Explanation: A Reply to Elga s Lucky to Be Rational. Joshua Schechter. Brown University
Luck, Rationality, and Explanation: A Reply to Elga s Lucky to Be Rational Joshua Schechter Brown University I Introduction What is the epistemic significance of discovering that one of your beliefs depends
More informationTHE METAPHYSICS OF REASONS
THE METAPHYSICS OF REASONS Jonas Olson Stockholm University jonas.olson@philosophy.su.se 1. PRELIMINARIES It is a commonplace that there are many kinds of reasons. Most notably and fundamentally, there
More informationNeed Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Rely on a Particular Metaphysical Construal of Evaluative Facts?
Georgia State University ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University Philosophy Theses Department of Philosophy 8-7-2018 Need Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Rely on a Particular Metaphysical Construal of
More informationDO NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS AIM TO REPRESENT THE WORLD?
DO NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS AIM TO REPRESENT THE WORLD? Bart Streumer b.streumer@rug.nl Ratio 26 (2013): 450-470 Also in Bart Streumer (ed.), Irrealism in Ethics Published version available here: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/rati.12035
More informationPhilosophy 125 Day 21: Overview
Branden Fitelson Philosophy 125 Lecture 1 Philosophy 125 Day 21: Overview 1st Papers/SQ s to be returned this week (stay tuned... ) Vanessa s handout on Realism about propositions to be posted Second papers/s.q.
More informationMoral Objectivism. RUSSELL CORNETT University of Calgary
Moral Objectivism RUSSELL CORNETT University of Calgary The possibility, let alone the actuality, of an objective morality has intrigued philosophers for well over two millennia. Though much discussed,
More informationKantian Humility and Ontological Categories Sam Cowling University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Kantian Humility and Ontological Categories Sam Cowling University of Massachusetts, Amherst [Forthcoming in Analysis. Penultimate Draft. Cite published version.] Kantian Humility holds that agents like
More informationHybridizing moral expressivism and moral error theory
Fairfield University DigitalCommons@Fairfield Philosophy Faculty Publications Philosophy Department 1-1-2011 Hybridizing moral expressivism and moral error theory Toby Svoboda Fairfield University, tsvoboda@fairfield.edu
More informationREASON AND PRACTICAL-REGRET. Nate Wahrenberger, College of William and Mary
1 REASON AND PRACTICAL-REGRET Nate Wahrenberger, College of William and Mary Abstract: Christine Korsgaard argues that a practical reason (that is, a reason that counts in favor of an action) must motivate
More informationPrimary and Secondary Qualities. John Locke s distinction between primary and secondary qualities of bodies has
Stephen Lenhart Primary and Secondary Qualities John Locke s distinction between primary and secondary qualities of bodies has been a widely discussed feature of his work. Locke makes several assertions
More informationIntroduction to Cognitivism; Motivational Externalism; Naturalist Cognitivism
Introduction to Cognitivism; Motivational Externalism; Naturalist Cognitivism Felix Pinkert 103 Ethics: Metaethics, University of Oxford, Hilary Term 2015 Cognitivism, Non-cognitivism, and the Humean Argument
More informationThe form of relativism that says that whether an agent s actions are right or wrong depends on the moral principles accepted in her own society.
Glossary of Terms: Act-consequentialism Actual Duty Actual Value Agency Condition Agent Relativism Amoralist Appraisal Relativism A form of direct consequentialism according to which the rightness and
More informationSmith s Incoherence Argument for Moral Rationalism
DOI 10.7603/s40873-014-0006-0 Smith s Incoherence Argument for Moral Rationalism Michael Lyons Received 29 Nov 2014 Accepted 24 Dec 2014 accepting the negation of this view, which as Nick Zangwill puts
More informationAN ACTUAL-SEQUENCE THEORY OF PROMOTION
BY D. JUSTIN COATES JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY DISCUSSION NOTE JANUARY 2014 URL: WWW.JESP.ORG COPYRIGHT D. JUSTIN COATES 2014 An Actual-Sequence Theory of Promotion ACCORDING TO HUMEAN THEORIES,
More informationThe Limits of Normative Detachment 1 Nishi Shah Amherst College Draft of 04/15/10
The Limits of Normative Detachment 1 Nishi Shah Amherst College Draft of 04/15/10 Consider another picture of what it would be for a demand to be objectively valid. It is Kant s own picture. According
More informationNon-Realist Cognitivism, Truth and Objectivity
Acta Anal (2017) 32:193 212 DOI 10.1007/s12136-016-0300-5 Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truth and Objectivity Jussi Suikkanen 1 Received: 16 February 2016 / Accepted: 15 June 2016 / Published online: 12 July
More informationExplanatory Indispensability and Deliberative Indispensability: Against Enoch s Analogy Alex Worsnip University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Explanatory Indispensability and Deliberative Indispensability: Against Enoch s Analogy Alex Worsnip University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Forthcoming in Thought please cite published version In
More informationMAKING A METAPHYSICS FOR NATURE. Alexander Bird, Nature s Metaphysics: Laws and Properties. Oxford: Clarendon, Pp. xiv PB.
Metascience (2009) 18:75 79 Ó Springer 2009 DOI 10.1007/s11016-009-9239-0 REVIEW MAKING A METAPHYSICS FOR NATURE Alexander Bird, Nature s Metaphysics: Laws and Properties. Oxford: Clarendon, 2007. Pp.
More informationNATURALISED JURISPRUDENCE
NATURALISED JURISPRUDENCE NATURALISM a philosophical view according to which philosophy is not a distinct mode of inquiry with its own problems and its own special body of (possible) knowledge philosophy
More informationEthics of Justification A Defence of Contractualism
Jussi Suikkanen Ethics of Justification A Defence of Contractualism Philosophical Studies from the University of Helsinki 17 1 Filosofisia tutkimuksia Helsingin yliopistosta Filosofiska studies från Helsingfors
More informationEXTERNALISM AND THE CONTENT OF MORAL MOTIVATION
EXTERNALISM AND THE CONTENT OF MORAL MOTIVATION Caj Strandberg Department of Philosophy, Lund University and Gothenburg University Caj.Strandberg@fil.lu.se ABSTRACT: Michael Smith raises in his fetishist
More informationAN OUTLINE OF CRITICAL THINKING
AN OUTLINE OF CRITICAL THINKING LEVELS OF INQUIRY 1. Information: correct understanding of basic information. 2. Understanding basic ideas: correct understanding of the basic meaning of key ideas. 3. Probing:
More informationReview of Nathan M. Nobis s Truth in Ethics and Epistemology
Review of Nathan M. Nobis s Truth in Ethics and Epistemology by James W. Gray November 19, 2010 (This is available on my website Ethical Realism.) Abstract Moral realism is the view that moral facts exist
More informationMORAL CONCEPTS AND MOTIVATION 1. Mark Greenberg UCLA
Philosophical Perspectives, 23, Ethics, 2009 MORAL CONCEPTS AND MOTIVATION 1 Mark Greenberg UCLA 1. Introduction Abner s mother works for a regulatory agency. Abner overhears her talking with a colleague
More informationWhat is the "Social" in "Social Coherence?" Commentary on Nelson Tebbe's Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age
Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development Volume 31 Issue 1 Volume 31, Summer 2018, Issue 1 Article 5 June 2018 What is the "Social" in "Social Coherence?" Commentary on Nelson Tebbe's Religious
More informationEthical non-naturalism
Michael Lacewing Ethical non-naturalism Ethical non-naturalism is usually understood as a form of cognitivist moral realism. So we first need to understand what cognitivism and moral realism is before
More informationKant and the Problem of Metaphysics 1. By Tom Cumming
Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics 1 By Tom Cumming Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics represents Martin Heidegger's first attempt at an interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1781). This
More informationPostmodal Metaphysics
Postmodal Metaphysics Ted Sider Structuralism seminar 1. Conceptual tools in metaphysics Tools of metaphysics : concepts for framing metaphysical issues. They structure metaphysical discourse. Problem
More informationEthics is subjective.
Introduction Scientific Method and Research Ethics Ethical Theory Greg Bognar Stockholm University September 22, 2017 Ethics is subjective. If ethics is subjective, then moral claims are subjective in
More informationJudith Jarvis Thomson s Normativity
Judith Jarvis Thomson s Normativity Gilbert Harman June 28, 2010 Normativity is a careful, rigorous account of the meanings of basic normative terms like good, virtue, correct, ought, should, and must.
More informationLecture 2: What Ethics is Not. Jim Pryor Guidelines on Reading Philosophy Peter Singer What Ethics is Not
Lecture 2: What Ethics is Not Jim Pryor Guidelines on Reading Philosophy Peter Singer What Ethics is Not 1 Agenda 1. Review: Theoretical Ethics, Applied Ethics, Metaethics 2. What Ethics is Not 1. Sexual
More informationThe Rightness Error: An Evaluation of Normative Ethics in the Absence of Moral Realism
An Evaluation of Normative Ethics in the Absence of Moral Realism Mathais Sarrazin J.L. Mackie s Error Theory postulates that all normative claims are false. It does this based upon his denial of moral
More informationBOOK REVIEWS. The arguments of the Parmenides, though they do not refute the Theory of Forms, do expose certain problems, ambiguities and
BOOK REVIEWS Unity and Development in Plato's Metaphysics. By William J. Prior. London & Sydney, Croom Helm, 1986. pp201. Reviewed by J. Angelo Corlett, University of California Santa Barbara. Prior argues
More informationALTERNATIVE SELF-DEFEAT ARGUMENTS: A REPLY TO MIZRAHI
ALTERNATIVE SELF-DEFEAT ARGUMENTS: A REPLY TO MIZRAHI Michael HUEMER ABSTRACT: I address Moti Mizrahi s objections to my use of the Self-Defeat Argument for Phenomenal Conservatism (PC). Mizrahi contends
More informationON LEAVING ROOM FOR DOUBT: USING FREGE-GEACH TO ILLUMINATE EXPRESSIVISM S PROBLEM WITH OBJECTIVITY
Faraci 1 ON LEAVING ROOM FOR DOUBT: USING FREGE-GEACH TO ILLUMINATE EXPRESSIVISM S PROBLEM WITH OBJECTIVITY David Faraci [The Frege-Geach] problem itself, while possibly a devastating objection to expressivism,
More informationCHECKING THE NEIGHBORHOOD: A REPLY TO DIPAOLO AND BEHRENDS ON PROMOTION
DISCUSSION NOTE CHECKING THE NEIGHBORHOOD: A REPLY TO DIPAOLO AND BEHRENDS ON PROMOTION BY NATHANIEL SHARADIN JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY DISCUSSION NOTE FEBRUARY 2016 Checking the Neighborhood:
More informationThe Philosophical Review, Vol. 100, No. 3. (Jul., 1991), pp
Review: [Untitled] Reviewed Work(s): Judgment and Justification by William G. Lycan Lynne Rudder Baker The Philosophical Review, Vol. 100, No. 3. (Jul., 1991), pp. 481-484. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108%28199107%29100%3a3%3c481%3ajaj%3e2.0.co%3b2-n
More informationIn Defense of Culpable Ignorance
It is common in everyday situations and interactions to hold people responsible for things they didn t know but which they ought to have known. For example, if a friend were to jump off the roof of a house
More informationEpistemic Consequentialism, Truth Fairies and Worse Fairies
Philosophia (2017) 45:987 993 DOI 10.1007/s11406-017-9833-0 Epistemic Consequentialism, Truth Fairies and Worse Fairies James Andow 1 Received: 7 October 2015 / Accepted: 27 March 2017 / Published online:
More informationEthics (ETHC) JHU-CTY Course Syllabus
(ETHC) JHU-CTY Course Syllabus Required Items: Ethical Theory: An Anthology 5 th ed. Russ Shafer-Landau. Wiley-Blackwell. 2013 The Fundamentals of 2 nd ed. Russ Shafer-Landau. Oxford University Press.
More informationDebunking Evolutionary Debunking. Katia Vavova Mount Holyoke College
Debunking Evolutionary Debunking Katia Vavova Mount Holyoke College 1. e evolutionary challenge. Worries about the compatibility of evolution and morality are not new even Darwin had them. A number of
More informationIn this paper I will critically discuss a theory known as conventionalism
Aporia vol. 22 no. 2 2012 Combating Metric Conventionalism Matthew Macdonald In this paper I will critically discuss a theory known as conventionalism about the metric of time. Simply put, conventionalists
More informationDESIRES AND BELIEFS OF ONE S OWN. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord and Michael Smith
Draft only. Please do not copy or cite without permission. DESIRES AND BELIEFS OF ONE S OWN Geoffrey Sayre-McCord and Michael Smith Much work in recent moral psychology attempts to spell out what it is
More informationIN DEFENSE OF THE PRIMACY OF THE VIRTUES
BY JASON KAWALL JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY VOL. 3, NO. 2 AUGUST 2009 URL: WWW.JESP.ORG COPYRIGHT JASON KAWALL 2009 In Defense of the Primacy of the Virtues I N RECENT DECADES THERE HAS BEEN
More informationNozick and Scepticism (Weekly supervision essay; written February 16 th 2005)
Nozick and Scepticism (Weekly supervision essay; written February 16 th 2005) Outline This essay presents Nozick s theory of knowledge; demonstrates how it responds to a sceptical argument; presents an
More informationHas Nagel uncovered a form of idealism?
Has Nagel uncovered a form of idealism? Author: Terence Rajivan Edward, University of Manchester. Abstract. In the sixth chapter of The View from Nowhere, Thomas Nagel attempts to identify a form of idealism.
More informationMark Schroeder s Hypotheticalism: Agent-neutrality, Moral Epistemology, and Methodology
Mark Schroeder s Hypotheticalism: Agent-neutrality, Moral Epistemology, and Methodology Forthcoming in a Philosophical Studies symposium on Mark Schroeder s Slaves of the Passions Tristram McPherson, University
More information2210 Speedway, Stop C3500, WAG 316, Austin, TX (936)
Justin Morton 2210 Speedway, Stop C3500, WAG 316, Austin, TX 78712 (936)615-6952 mortonjj@utexas.edu Areas of Specialization Ethics, Metaethics Areas of Competence Epistemology, Metaphysics, Philosophy
More informationA DEFENCE OF METAPHYSICAL ETHICAL NATURALISM
A DEFENCE OF METAPHYSICAL ETHICAL NATURALISM RYO CHONABAYASHI This thesis is submitted to Cardiff University in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY February 2012 Philosophy
More informationBart Streumer, Unbelievable Errors, Oxford: Oxford University Press, ISBN
Bart Streumer, Unbelievable Errors, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. ISBN 9780198785897. Pp. 223. 45.00 Hbk. In The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, Bertrand Russell wrote that the point of philosophy
More informationThere is no need to explain who Hilary Putnam is in light of the sheer number of books and articles on his work that have appeared over the past
There is no need to explain who Hilary Putnam is in light of the sheer number of books and articles on his work that have appeared over the past several decades. For the sake of the youngest readers, it
More informationThe ontology of human rights and obligations
The ontology of human rights and obligations Åsa Burman Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University asa.burman@philosophy.su.se If we are going to make sense of the notion of rights we have to answer
More information2 Why Truthmakers GONZALO RODRIGUEZ-PEREYRA 1. INTRODUCTION
2 Why Truthmakers GONZALO RODRIGUEZ-PEREYRA 1. INTRODUCTION Consider a certain red rose. The proposition that the rose is red is true because the rose is red. One might say as well that the proposition
More informationThe Many Problems of Memory Knowledge (Short Version)
The Many Problems of Memory Knowledge (Short Version) Prepared For: The 13 th Annual Jakobsen Conference Abstract: Michael Huemer attempts to answer the question of when S remembers that P, what kind of
More information