The nelson touch: The evolution of nelson's tactics at Trafalgar

Transcription

1 Journal for Maritime Research ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: The nelson touch: The evolution of nelson's tactics at Trafalgar Colin White To cite this article: Colin White (2005) The nelson touch: The evolution of nelson's tactics at Trafalgar, Journal for Maritime Research, 7:1, , DOI: / To link to this article: Published online: 08 Feb Submit your article to this journal Article views: 976 View related articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at Download by: [ ] Date: 28 December 2017, At: 13:22

2 The Nelson Touch: The evolution of Nelson s tactics at Trafalgar Journal Issue: July 2005 Colin White National Maritime Museum NB a version of this article in Spanish has also appeared in Guimerá, Ramos and Butrón (eds.), Trafalgar y el mundo atlántico. Dinner in the Victory 123

3 '...Lord Nelson explaining to the Officers the Plan of Attack previous to the Battle of Trafalgar, and Position of the Combined Forces of France & Spain...' Repro ID PX9025 NMM London On 28 September 1805, the 100-gun British battleship HMS Victory arrived off Cadiz. She had come to join a special fleet that was being assembled by the British to deal with the 33 ships of the combined Franco-Spanish fleet which had taken refuge there in the middle of August. Although by now the British knew that the Emperor Napoleon had called off his threatened invasion of Britain and had marched his armies into Austria, the Combined Fleet still posed a considerable threat and the Government led by Prime Minister William Pitt was determined to deal with it. Every available battleship was being diverted to the fleet off Cadiz and now the British had sent out their most famous admiral to lead it. For, at her foremast, the Victory was flying the flag of Vice Admiral Lord Nelson the Hero of the Nile. The following day, 29 September, was Nelson s 47th birthday and he gave a dinner party for the admirals and captains of his new command in the spacious admiral s quarters of the Victory. Few of the captains in the hastily-assembled fleet had served with him before and so he needed to work quickly to establish the special personal rapport, which was one of his trademarks as a leader. After dinner, he described to them the plan that he had devised for fighting the Combined Fleet and two days later he wrote to his mistress Emma Hamilton, describing the effects of his speech: 124

4 ...when I came to explain to them the Nelson touch it was like an Electric Shock, some shed tears, all approved, it was new, it was Singular, it was simple and from Admirals downwards it was repeated it must succeed if ever they will allow us to get at them, You are My Lord surrounded by friends who you inspire with confidence.1 But what exactly were the main components of The Nelson Touch? And was it really as new as Nelson claimed? These questions have fascinated naval experts ever since 1805 and many books and articles have been written on the subject. But there are two particular reasons why a reassessment is appropriate now. First, over the last ten years or so, much new research has been published outlining the development of British naval tactics in the late eighteenth century. This has enabled us to put Nelson s tactics into their historical context with more precision than was possible before and to detect the influences on his thinking. Second, a recent study has established that there is still a large body of unpublished and largely untapped Nelson material in all the main archives in Britain, and indeed overseas as well, and so new primary evidence is constantly being unearthed.2 For these reasons, I have recently begun a study of Nelson s tactical memoranda and battle plans including a search for any which may not yet have been published or studied before. I hope to have the conclusions ready for publication in 2005: the purpose of this paper is to set out the material that has emerged already and to offer some initial thoughts on the subject for debate. The conversation with Captain Keats September

5 Rear Admiral Sir Richard Goodwin Keats, K.B. Engraved by Ridley & Blood from an Original Painting by H Matthews. European Magazine. Repro ID PU3467 NMM London What then were the main components of Nelson s plan? Sadly no record has survived of what Nelson actually said at that historic meeting. However, some three weeks before, while he was still in England, he had discussed his plan with Captain Richard Keats, a close friend and trusted colleague, who had served with him in the Mediterranean in the campaign of As the two men were walking together in the grounds of Nelson s house in Merton, a village to the south-west of London, Nelson began explaining how he proposed to fight his next battle. Many years later, in 1829, Keats told the story of that memorable walk to Edward Hawke Locker, a collector of naval anecdotes, who wrote it down: [H]e said to me, No day can be long enough to arrange a couple of Fleets and fight a decisive Battle according to the old system I shall form the Fleet into three Divisions in three Lines. One Division shall be composed of twelve or fourteen of the fastest two-decked Ships, which I shall keep always to windward, or in a situation of advantage With the remaining part of the Fleet formed in two Lines I shall go at them at once, if I can about one Third of their line from their leading ship. He then said, What do you think of it? Such a question I felt required consideration. I paused. Seeing it he 126

6 said, But I ll tell you what I think of it. I think it will surprise and confound the Enemy. They won t know what I am about. It will bring forward a pell-mell battle and that is what I want. 3 The accuracy of Keats s recollection of this important conversation was confirmed as recently as last year by the discovery in the archive of the National Maritime Museum of a rough sketch in Nelson s hand which appears to illustrate the same tactics as those Keats remembered.4 The 1805 battle plan Detail from Nelson's sketch of the Trafalgar battle plan. Repro ID E7102 NMM London The sketch, which was almost certainly drawn in England in early September 1805 clearly shows an attack in three divisions. One division 'contains' part of the enemy line, while the other two break through it in two places, dividing it into segments and thus bringing on Nelson's 'pell-mell' battle. It is even possible to sense the fervour with which Nelson has demonstrated the cutting of the centre of the enemy line his pen has dug deeply into the paper and the ink has flowed thickly.5 What makes this remarkable discovery the more fascinating is that this is not a finished drawing, with every line carefully worked out and accounted for. This is a swift doodle, drawn hurriedly by a busy man, to accompany an animated verbal description of his ideas. As such, it enables us to look briefly over Nelson s shoulder and to catch a faint echo of the excitement that reduced Captain Keats to stunned silence and some of the captains in the Victory's Great Cabin to tears. Clearly, therefore, by the autumn of 1805, Nelson had a good idea of how he would fight his next battle and he was sure enough of his plan to discuss, and even to demonstrate, it with colleagues and friends. And from Keats s description of the conversation in the garden at Merton and the newly-discovered plan, we can see there were three key elements to it: 1. An attack in three divisions 2. Cutting through the enemy line 127

7 3. A headlong attack ( I will go at them at once ) designed to confuse and confound the enemy and bring about a pell-mell battle. Attack in Divisions, Cutting the Line and Close Action HMS 'Victory' raking the Spanish at the Battle of Cape St Vincent, 14 February Robert Clevely. Repro ID BHC0485 NMM London In fact, none of these particular elements was particularly new. For example, at the Battle of Camperdown, fought against the Dutch in October 1797, Admiral Adam Duncan had launched his attack in two divisions.6 And earlier that same year, in February, at the Battle of Cape St Vincent, Admiral Sir John Jervis had at first attacked the Spanish fleet in a single line ahead but had then subdivided his line into three divisions halfway through the battle. And, of course, Nelson had been present at that battle as a Commodore and later wrote an appreciation of what he called Sir John s well-arranged designs. The Battle of the Saints, 12 April THomas Luny. Repro ID BHC0701 NMM London Cutting the line was an even older tactic. Most famously, it had been employed at the Battle of the Saintes in April 1782, when a shift in the wind enabled Sir George Rodney to order his fleet to cut through the French line in two places. Nelson had not himself served at that battle but his patron Samuel Hood had been Rodney s second-incommand and a number of Nelson s contemporaries had been present: notably William Cornwallis, who was a close friend, and James Saumarez who later served as Nelson s second-in-command during the Nile campaign in

8 Admiral Edward Hawke, Francis Cotes. Repro ID BHC2754 NMM London As for the pell-mell battle: Nelson has always been associated with close action. Indeed, one of his trademarks was the signal, Engage the Enemy More Closely. He flew it at all his main battles and, at Trafalgar, it was the last signal he made and he ordered it to be left flying from the Victory s mast throughout the battle. But he was by no means the only admiral to advocate close action. Nearly 50 years before Trafalgar, in November 1759, Admiral Sir Edward Hawke had defeated a French fleet at the battle of Quiberon Bay fought amidst dangerous rocks and shoals in the middle of an Atlantic gale. When the pilot on board Hawke s flagship the Royal George pointed out to his admiral the danger the vessel was standing into, Hawke made memorable reply You have done your duty in apprising me of the dangers. Now, lay me alongside the French admiral. 7 Two men who had an important influence on Nelson s career and professional development served with Hawke Edward Locker who was his captain in HMS Lowestoffe in the West Indies in the late 1770s and John Jervis, with whom he worked so closely and effectively in the Mediterranean in Interestingly, Jervis used the Close Action signal at the Battle of Cape St Vincent in exactly the same manner as Nelson was later to do. Having hoisted it at an early stage in the battle, he left it flying throughout the action. So, it can be seen that the three key elements of Nelson s plan, as sketched out to Keats, were not innovations of his own. Rather, they arose out of the experiments of his predecessors, some of which he had seen for himself but others of which he would have read about or discussed with close colleagues and friends. However, the Keats account is not the only description of Nelson s tactical ideas that has survived. Nelson himself wrote a number of tactical memoranda during his career, 129

9 including at least three during the period when he was almost daily expecting to fight the French fleet. Comparing these memoranda we can see how he constantly reflected on the tactics he might use and refined his plans to meet likely eventualities. The Nile Campaign battle orders 1798 Plan of the Battle of the Nile, August 1st Repro ID PU4026 NMM London Nelson s earliest tactical plan for a full-scale battle at sea to have survived dates from the summer of 1798, when he was in command of a detached squadron in the Mediterranean, tasked with tracking down and destroying the large expeditionary force that was known to be at large under the overall command of General Napoleon Bonaparte. The plan is outlined in a memorandum dated 18 June that appears in the special Order Book by means of which Nelson communicated with his captains almost daily throughout the campaign.8 Interestingly, it envisages an attack in three divisions. The opening words are, As it is very possible that the Enemy may not be formed in a regular Order of Battle on the approach of the Squadron under my Command, I may in that case deem it most expedient to attack them by separate Divisions.9 The first, and most powerful, division would be commanded by Nelson himself and the others by the two most senior captains, James Saumarez and Thomas Troubridge. The memorandum also made it clear that each division would be expected to act independently, When I make Signal No. 16, the Commanders of the Divisions are to lead their separate Squadrons and, to emphasise this devolution of command, the memorandum outlined special signalling arrangements to enable the subordinate commanders to send orders to the ships of their divisions only. Above all, the memorandum is pervaded by Nelson s aggressive determination to annihilate his opponent: a typical example is the phrase (which in the original is written in larger and bolder lettering than the rest of the text), the Destruction of the Enemy s Armament is the Sole Object. 130

10 The Battle of the Nile, 1 August Nicholas Pocock. Repro ID BHC0513 NMM London No written plan for the Battle of the Nile itself has survived but, from the various orders that Nelson issued to his captains in the weeks preceding the action, and from the signals he made on the day of battle, it is clear that he intended to concentrate his attack on one part of the French line and defeat it, before moving on to deal with the other ships. So, for example, in a Memorandum in the Order Book, dated 8 June 1798, he told his captains, I mean to press hard with the whole force on the enemy s rear. 10 In the event, of course, the opening British attack at the Nile fell on the French van and centre and one of the very few signals Nelson made as his ships sailed headlong into action was the order Engage the Enemy s Centre and Van.11 This change was dictated by the position of the French fleet and, above all by the direction of the wind, which was blowing directly down the French line. But the principle of the attack was the same as had been outlined two months before concentration on one part of the enemy line. The Copenhagen battle plan 1801 Battle of Copenhagen. Nicholas Pocock. Repro ID BHC0529 NMM London Similarly at Copenhagen on 2 April 1801, the detailed plan Nelson issued on the morning of the battle shows that he intended to use a similar tactic.12 He decided to attack from the southern end of the Danish line and overwhelm it with concentrated gunfire before moving on to attack the northern end. However, unlike at the Nile, it did 131

11 not appear possible for the British ships to get inshore of the Danes and take them between two fires. So Nelson planned to achieve the concentration he desired by using an ingenious tactic that had first been devised by Lord Howe. In essence, he planned to leapfrog his ships into action. His lead ship was ordered to pass down the Danish line, firing as she went, until she reached the centre of the Danish line. The next British ship would then pass on her unengaged side, to attack its allotted opponent and so on, each British ship moving into position under cover of the fire from the ships ahead of them until the whole of the southern end of the Danish line had been overwhelmed. Once this had happened, the ships were to move on up the line and bring a similar concentration to bear on the northern end.13 The orders and memoranda In May 1803, on the outbreak of war with France, Nelson took command of the Mediterranean fleet. He commanded this force for almost two years until he led it to the West Indies in the famous pursuit of the combined Franco-Spanish fleet in the summer of A number of his order books for that period have survived and from them it is clear that he thought constantly about ways in which he would fight his opponents when he encountered them. So, for example, on 23 February 1804, he issued instructions for fighting a night action;14 two months later, on 28 April, he gave very detailed orders for fighting at anchor, including a list of the special equipment that was required. As in all his battle orders the words convey his sense of urgency, speaking of his determination to attack the French fleet in any place where there is a reasonable prospect of getting fairly alongside them. 15 At some point, probably in the summer of 1803,16 he issued a full-scale memorandum in which he outlined his ideas for a fleet action at sea. He began by emphasising his main aim: The business of an English Comdr-in-Chief being first to bring the Enemy s fleet to battle on the most advantageous terms to himself, I mean that of laying his Ships on board that of the Enemy as expeditiously as possible, and secondly to continue there without separating until the business is decided 17 As in 1798 and 1801, he aimed to achieve this by concentrating his attack on one part of the enemy line, overwhelming it before the remainder could come to the aid of their comrades. As he put it, he would, engage with all our force the Six or Five Van ships of the Enemy, passing certainly if opportunity offered through their Line the second or third Rear-ships of the Enemy would 132

12 act as they please and our Ships would give a good account of them should they persist in mixing with our Ships. However he went still further, telling his subordinates that he was sure that they will, knowing my precise object that of a close and decisive battle supply any deficiency in my not making signals. Indeed, he went on, once the battle was joined, Signals from these moments are useless where every Man is disposed to do his Duty. And, speaking of the opening movements before the battle, he wrote, If the two fleets are both willing to fight but little manoeuvring is necessary, the less the better[;] a day is soon lost in that business. So, as with Keats s account of the 1805 plan, we have a clear statement that Nelson wants a close and decisive battle together with an indication that he will achieve this by cutting through the enemy line and concentrating his attack on some of their ships, leaving the rest out of the action. But two new elements are now present first, he wants to avoid any unnecessary manoeuvring before battle is joined and second, he tells his captains that they must not wait for his signals but act on their own initiative. Signalling and manoeuvring Nelson s battle experience Lord Hotham's Action, March 14th Whitcombe, Thomas [artist]; Sutherland, Thomas [engraver]. Repro ID PU4074 NMM London Where did these two concepts come from? To understand this, we need to look, briefly, at Nelson s own experience of fleet actions. Interestingly, he did not take part in a fullscale fleet action until the Battle of Genoa Bay in March 1795 when he was 37 years old and already a senior captain. Many of his contemporaries had taken part in fleet actions during the War of American Independence but Nelson had managed to miss every one. And this first experience in 1795 was not a happy one the admiral, William Hotham, handled his fleet very cautiously and broke off the action when only two French ships had been captured. Impetuous as ever, Nelson went on board the flagship to try to persuade Hotham to follow up his success but was told We must be contented, we have done very well. 18 Worse was to follow in July the same year at the Battle of Hyeres, when having wasted some four hours in a favourable wind making small adjustments to his line of battle, Hotham realised that he could not catch the French with his slower ships and signalled a general chase. The fastest-sailing British ships 133

13 then forged ahead and managed to catch up with the rearmost French ships, and a partial action ensued in which one French ship was set on fire and blew up. Other British ships were now arriving on the scene, among them Nelson s Agamemnon, and a decisive battle seemed imminent. But the wind was becoming fitful and by now Hotham himself was some eight miles astern and unable to see clearly what was going on. So he hoisted the signal of recall, allowing the French to escape back into Toulon.19 Nelson was very disappointed at this tame result and particularly critical of Hotham s insistence on forming his line perfectly before he attacked. He wrote to his wife, Had Lord Hood been here he would never have called us out of action, but Hotham leaves nothing to chance.20 It was surely this experience that led him to write in 1803 the less manoeuvring the better. Rear-Admiral Sir John Jervis, Sir William Beechey. Repro ID BHC3001 NMM London 'Plans of the Battle off Cape St Vincent'. Repro ID C1591 NMM London 134

14 As for the problems with signalling: Nelson had witnessed for himself in February 1797, what could happen when a vital operational signal was not seen in the middle of a battle. At a critical stage in the Battle of Cape St Vincent, Jervis in the Victory had signalled to Vice Admiral Sir Charles Thompson, commanding the rear division of his fleet in HMS Britannia, to tack immediately and join the action. For some reason, Thompson and his staff did not see the signal and continued on their original course. At almost exactly the same moment, the Spanish commander-in-chief, de Cordoba, ordered the main body of his fleet to move across the rear of the British so as to reunite with a group of their ships that had been separated by Jervis s earlier manoeuvre of breaking through their line. Luckily for the British, Nelson, whose pendant ship HMS Captain was in the rear of the British line, saw Jervis s signal, realised that Thompson was not obeying it, and decided to act on his own initiative. Wearing out of the line, he placed his ship across the path of the approaching Spaniards, thus turning them back onto their original course and allowing other British ships to catch up and begin the close action, which Jervis had ordered.21 Nelson had saved the day and he was justly praised for his courage and initiative but, clearly, he did not forget the lesson of that moment. Jervis, although in many ways an innovative and risk-taking admiral far more so, indeed, than the older accounts of the battle tend to suggest was nonetheless still trying to control the whole battle from his flagship. Nelson realised that this was always a difficult business and even more so in the sort of confused, close-quarters battle that he was seeking to bring about. And so he began to evolve a style of leadership that would enable him to do away with signals once the battle was joined. The missing memorandum We know that Nelson wrote another tactical memorandum in the middle of May 1805, just before he started on his long chase of the Combined Fleet to the West Indies and back. It would be fascinating to be able to see how his ideas, first sketched in the 1803 memorandum, had developed after a further two years of thought. But, sadly, no copies of the memorandum are known to have survived. However, since so much unpublished Nelson correspondence is now known to be in the various archives, it is possible that a copy may yet be found. What we do have, however, is the most famous memorandum of all the one he wrote shortly after the briefings he held in the Victory in late September 1805 and distributed to his captains on 9 October. It is the longest and most detailed of all his written plans and shows how he had refined and developed his tactical ideas.22 The Trafalgar memorandum, 1805 The main elements of the 1803 plan are still there: concentration on one part of the enemy line; the whole impression must be to overpower from 2 to 3 ships ahead of their commander-in-chief ; and an insistence on the need for close action. There is also the attack in three divisions foreshadowed in his talk with Keats, in the National Maritime 135

15 Museum sketch, and in the 1798 battle plan. But, interestingly, the two new elements introduced in the 1803 memorandum have now become even more prominent. The 1805 memorandum opens with a clear statement that, with a fleet of 40 battleships it will be impossible to form a traditional line of battle without such loss of time that the opportunity would probably be lost of bringing the enemy to battle in such a manner as to make the business decisive. It then goes on to say that for this reason the Order of Sailing is to be the Order of Battle. So, no time is wasted on manoeuvring as soon as the enemy are sighted, the British attack will begin. Again, as in 1803, Nelson insists that his captains must not look to him for signals once the action is joined indeed, he goes still further and says, in case Signals can neither be seen, nor perfectly understood, no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy a moving expression of trust which may explain why some of the captains listening to him in the Victory were in tears. He also introduces a further extension of this devolution of command by saying that the second in command will, after my intentions are made known to him, have the entire direction of his line, and he repeats this statement twice, thus emphasizing the point that he is decentralizing the control of the battle once it is actually under way. As it happened, his second-in-command off Cadiz was an old and close friend, Cuthbert Collingwood, and, in a letter sent with the memorandum, Nelson told him, I send you my Plan of Attack my dear friend, it is to place you perfectly at ease respecting my intentions and to give you full scope for carrying them into effect. No man has more confidence in another than I in you.23 And Collingwood replied, My dear Lord, I have a just sense of Your Lordship s kindness to me and the full confidence you have reposed in me fills me with the most lively gratitude. I hope it will not be long before there is an opportunity of showing Your Lordship that it has not been misplaced.24 With this characteristically warm and trusting exchange between two old comrades, we arrive at the heart of the Nelson Touch. The Nelson Touch 136

16 Nelson's Trafalgar signals. Repro ID D8080 NMM London As the British fleet sailed into action on the morning of 21 October, Nelson decided to amuse the fleet with a signal. After some discussion with his officers about the wording, he settled on England Expects That Every Man Will Do His Duty. The signal would have been made two words at a time and over in the Royal Sovereign Collingwood became impatient as the repeated flag hoists were made. I do wish Nelson would stop signalling, he remarked crossly, We all know what we have to do. However, when the actual words of signal were reported to him, and he realised it was not the operational signal he had supposed, he expressed delight and admiration and made it known to his officers and ship s company.25 But his first reaction had been significant. We all know what we have to do. That is the essence of The Nelson Touch and arguably that, more than any tactical innovation, is why the British won so decisively at Trafalgar. Nelson s tactical memoranda A list of Nelson s memoranda that have been examined in the preparation of this paper: 8 June 1798 Nile Campaign: Orders for a1798/9 Order BookBL: Add concentration on the enemymss f5/6 rear 18 June 1798 Nile Campaign: Plan for an1798/9 Order BookBL: Add attack in three divisions MSS f.3 1 April 1801 Plan for attack on the DanishNicolas Vol. IVpp line at Copenhagen 1803 Plan for attack on FrenchBL: Add MSS 36747f.55/6 fleet at sea 23 February 1804 Plan for a night action 1804 Order Book BL: Add MSS f April 1804 Plan for an attack on enemy1804 Order Book at anchor BL: Add MSS f.25 September 1805 Sketch of 1805 Battle Plan National Maritime Museum BRP16 137

17 9 October 1805 The Trafalgar Nicolas Vol. VII, pp memorandum Footnotes 1. Nelson to Emma Hamilton, 1 October 1805, British Library, Eg An edited version of this letter is printed in Sir Nicholas Harris Nicolas, Dispatches and Letters of Lord Nelson, (London ) Vol VII, p. 60. For the full, unedited version (from which this extract is taken) see Colin White, The Nelson Encyclopaedia (Chatham, 2002), p Colin White, The Nelson Letters Project, Mariners Mirror 87 (November 2001). 3. Nicolas, op. cit., Vol VII, p National Maritime Museum archives NMM: BRP/6. 5. For a full analysis of the evidence for dating the sketch, and the interpretation of it, see: Colin White, Nelson s 1805 Battle Plan, Journal of Maritime Research, May For the most up to date analysis of Duncan s tactics, see: Nicholas Tracy, Nelson s Battles (Chatham, 1996). 7. Ruddock Mackay, Admiral Hawke, Oxford 1965, p Nelson s Order Book, May 1798-April 1799, British Library, Add Mss /9 Order Book, f.5/ Nelson to the Respective Captains, 8 June 1798, 1798/9 Order Book, f T. Sturges Jackson, Logs of the Great Sea Fights, Vol II (Naval Records Society, 1900). 12. Nicolas, op. cit. Vol IV, pp For full details of Nelson s battle plan, and the way it worked out in practice, see Colin White, The view from Nelson s quarterdeck, Proceedings of the Copenhagen 200 Conference (Shelton 2003). 14. Order Book 30 May 24 October 1804, British Library Add Mss f Order Book, f Nicolas prints this undated memorandum in his Vol VI, among papers from May 1805, and suggests that this is the memorandum Nelson issued when he was preparing to chase the Combined Fleet to the West Indies. However, 138

18 most authorities agree and I concur that, from the internal evidence, the memorandum must have been written in 1803 (see, for example, Julian Corbett, The Campaign of Trafalgar, p.155). 17. Nelson s original draft is in British Library: Add Mss f.55/6. Nicolas prints a version published in 1809 by Nelson s biographers Clarke and M Arthur which, as so often with those editors has been improved. The text quoted here preserves Nelson s original phrasing and punctuation. (For comments on the dating of this memorandum see note 16 above.) 18. Nelson to his wife, 1 April 1795, G. Naish, Nelson s Letters to His Wife, (NRS 1958), p For the latest account of this battle, see Colin White, The Nelson Encyclopaedia, p Nelson to his wife, 9 July 1795, Naish, op. cit., p For a full analyisis and reinterpretation of this misunderstood battle and Nelson s role in it, based on new research, see Colin White, 1797: Nelson s Year of Destiny, pp Nicolas, op. cit., Vol VII, pp Ibidem, p Ibidem, p Newnham Collingwood, Correspondence of Vice Admiral Lord Collingwood, (London, 1828) p