The Broken Staffs: Disinheritance in Emar in the Light of the Laws of Ḫammurabi 169 and the Nuzi Texts

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1 ORIENT Volume 49, 2014 The Broken Staffs: Disinheritance in Emar in the Light of the Laws of Ḫammurabi 169 and the Nuzi Texts Masamichi YAMADA The Society for Near Eastern Studies in Japan (NIPPON ORIENTO GAKKAI)

2 The Broken Staffs: Disinheritance in Emar in the Light of the Laws of Ḫammurabi 169 and the Nuzi Texts Masamichi YAMADA* In the Emar texts, there are found two references to giš ḫaṭṭa šebēru, to break a staff, a symbolic act denoting disinheritance of a son. Here, the staff seems to represent the status of son who supports his parent(s). Among them Emar VI 256 is particularly noteworthy, since it suggests that a certain Addu broke two staffs in total to disinherit his son Ḫulaʾu. This reminds us of the Laws of Ḫammurabi 169, which prescribes that father may disinherit his son only if he commits a grave offense a second time. The present writer posits that this pardon once of son s grave offense before disinheriting him was a desirable practice, though not an institution, in Emar as it was in Nuzi. The above equation between giš ḫaṭṭu and the status of son in general has hitherto been attested only in Emar, not in OB Sippar as well. Keywords: Emar, disinheritance, staff, Laws of Ḫammurabi 169, Nuzi I. Introduction In the Akkadian texts from Late Bronze Emar (and Ekalte), 1 the following symbolic acts for disinheritance of a son (or a daughter) are attested: A) ṣubāta ina/ana litti šakānu(ma) ašar libbišu alāku, (to cause a son) to put a garment on a stool (and) to go to where he likes (e.g., Emar VI 112: 17f.); B) lēta maḫāṣu, to slap a cheek (e.g., RE 15: 26); C) ištu/ultu X qāta šūlû, to cause to raise a hand from X denoting to cause to forfeit X (e.g., Emar VI 202: 6f.); D) giš ḫaṭṭa šebēru, to break a staff (see below). 2 In wills and other legal documents concerning the inheritance of property, A and B are prescribed as punishments against a son who does not care for his parent(s), although A is applied also to a widow who follows (i.e., remarries) a stranger (e.g., RE 8: 42f.) and to other exceptional cases. D, and possibly C as well, are attested as disinheriting acts actually performed. Note also that whereas A and B are well known in other Akkadian (and other ancient Near Eastern) texts, probably C and certainly D are characteristic of the Emar texts. As for C, in view of the occurrences cited in CAD and AHw, this causative expression (with šūlû) is quite rare in Akkadian texts (e.g., ABL 416 r. 5), although its archetype (with elû) is quite common. 3 However, D is particularly significant, since this expression is attested as an act symbolizing disinheritance *Lecturer, Chuo University 1 The abbreviations used in this article follow M. T. Roth (ed.), The Assyrian Dictionary of the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago 20: U and W, Chicago, 2010, vii-xxiv, with the following exceptions in reference to texts from Emar, Ekalte, and Ugarit: ASJ 13-T = Tsukimoto 1991; AuOr 5-T = Arnaud 1987; Ekalte II = Mayer 2001; Emar VI = Arnaud ; KTU 2 = Dietrich et al. 1995; RE = Beckman 1996; Sem. 46-T = Arnaud 1996; SMEA 30-T = Arnaud 1992; TS = Arnaud See Yamada For other textual references to A-C, see ibid., Vol. XLIX

3 for the first time in the Emar texts. The phrase, to break a staff, occurs in two legal documents of the Syrian type: AuOr 5-T 17 (= ASJ 13-T 28) and Emar VI Let us examine the texts, considering how this expression is used in the given contexts. 5 II. The Broken Staffs in Emar 1. AuOr 5-T 17 This is a will of Ištabu, in which he declared as follows: 6 ḫu-ḫa ú-ul ma-ri (7) GIŠ.ḫa-aṭ-ṭa-šu še-eb-re-et (8) m zu- d a-ba 4 d da-gan-a-bu (9) ù ia -ri-ib- d da-gan DUMU.MEŠ-ia (10) i-na ar-ki-it u 4 -mi (11) i-na mar-ši-ti ḫu-bu-ul-li (12) ù i-na mi -im-me-e (13) ša iš-ta-bu m ḫu-ḫa (14) ú-ul ba-li-il (15) ša ur-ra-am še-ra-am (16) [i-na a]r-ki-it u 4 -mi ma-am-ma-a-an (17) [... ](-) it -ti 7 (broken) (18 ) [... ] x x [... ] (19 ) [it]- ta-ša-ab ù a-na pa-ni a? -b[i? -šu? ] 8 (20 ) me-gi-ir-ta 5 id-bu-ub (21 ) [aš]-šum ki-a-am GIŠ.ḫa-aṭ-ṭa-šu (22 ) iš-bi-ir i-na DUMU-ru-ti-šu is-sú-uḫ-šu (23 ) NA 4.bi-ú ù du-un-nu-tu 4 (24 ) lu-ú ḪA.LA-šu ù šum-ma m ḫu-ḫa (25 ) it-ti DUMU.MEŠ iš-ta-bu di-na 7 i-gi-ir-ri (26 ) 1 li-im KÙ.BABBAR Ì.LÁ.E Ḫuḫa is not my son. His staff has been broken. (Only) Zu-Aba, Dagan-abu and Yarib-Dagan are my sons. In the later time, Ḫuḫa has no share (lit. is not mixed) in the property, debt and whatever of Ištabu. In the future, [in the la]ter time, anyone (broken) [he s]at and spoke an insult in the presence of [his] fa[ther(?)]. [Th]erefore he (i.e., Ištabu) broke his staff and disinherited him from the status of his son. May a drainage opening and a fortified area(?) 9 be his share. If Ḫuḫa institutes a suit against the sons of Ištabu, he shall pay 1,000 (shekels) of silver. What is to be noted here is the unusual association between the giš ḫaṭṭu, staff (if not scepter or stick ), and the mārūtu, status of son. Breaking the former means the annihilation of the latter, i.e., disinheritance. This, due to the similar expression and the same meaning, reminds us another symbolic act of disinheriting a son, kirbāna ḫepû, to break a clod (of earth), attested in the texts from Nuzi and Susa. 10 A clod and a staff why were they chosen as the objects to be broken in this context? 3 For this idiom ina X qātu elû, to forfeit, lose X (lit. to rise from X, a hand ), see CAD E, 125a (s.v. elû, mng. 3b- 3 ); AHw, 208a (s.v. elû(m) IV, G mng. 8b); Malul 1988, 397f., The above-mentioned text of ABL 416 r. 5 is cited in CAD E, 135a (mng. 11f); AHw, 210a (Š mng. 9g). 4 Perhaps it may also be found in a fragmentary text, Emar VI 250: (4 ) a-nu-u[m-ma... ] (5 ) GIŠ.ḫa! -a[ṭ-ṭa... ] (6 ) 1 li-im [... ] (7 ) ú -[u]l i-[... ]. 5 The following is an expanded version of Yamada 2008, , 195f. nn , with revisions and new discussions (esp. section III). 6 For the readings of ll. 7, 16, 18, 19 a, see Tsukimoto 1991, 290. But it seems likely that the adverbial phrase l. 10 should also be restored at the beginning of l. 16 (cf. Arnaud 1987, 240). 7 Cf. [a-na muh-hi mar-ši-]it-ti (Arnaud, ibid.). 8 A possible reading on the basis of the handcopy (Tsukimoto 1991, 320). Cf. pa-ni l[ú.meš ah-he-šu] (Arnaud, ibid.). 9 Cf. la détresse (ibid., 241). One must admit that the combination of a concrete object, drainage opening, and an abstract situation, distress (i.e., hunger, cold/hot weather), does make sense to us. Nevertheless, I am inclined to assume here a combination of two concrete objects, since usually the share (ḪA.LA/zittu) denotes concrete properties in the ancient context of inheritance. Therefore, for the second word, dunnu/ūtu, in view of the meanings of its cognates dannatu and dunnu, I would suggest the meaning fortified area or the like (in contrast to a residential area). Perhaps, this corresponds to the shadow of a (city) wall (ṣilli dūri) in the Descent of Ishtar to the Netherworld (Nin. l. 106; see Borger , 101), which is, along with the threshold (l. 107), mentioned as the station of Aṣušunamir under a curse, who in my view is depicted as a homeless or generally socially alienated person (cf. Kilmer 1971, 301 n. 17). For the translation of this text, see, e.g., Foster , For this idiom, see Malul 1988, (with previous literature). Six examples in the Nuzi texts (HSS V 7, 21, 73; XIX 19; IM 6818; JEN 657) will be cited in section III below. 172 ORIENT

4 The Broken Staffs: Disinheritance in Emar in the Light of the Laws of Ḫammurabi 169 and the Nuzi Texts According to M. Malul, the clod symbolized the son s personality, and its breaking brought about a personality change, rendering the son as a stranger to his family. To explain this, he notes that kirṣu, a pinch (of clay, earth), was known as a surrogate for a man (Dream-book, 339, ll ) and as the basic substance used in the creation of man (e.g., Lambert-Millard Atra-hasīs, 60, ll. 256ff.). Then he writes: This kirṣu, which is the common substance of both the clod and the human being, provides the logical link between the two and shows the inherent connection which exists between a symbol and its symbolized entity (Malul 1988, 91f.). However, would this not mean that the clod actually represents the body of a son rather than his personality or legal status? If so, breaking it would symbolize his physical cancellation. 11 Furthermore, it is obvious that a similar explanation by a common substance cannot be applied to the case of a wooden staff (with the determinative GIŠ). Then, what was the common factor in the above two expressions? When considering this problem, it must be kept in mind that any explanation based on a direct equation between a clod/staff and a son (as a physical existent) by, e.g., metaphorical association between them will result in the above cancellation of the son, too. We need another kind of explanation. In my opinion, the most noticeable common attribute between a clod and a staff is the impossibility of mending: breaking a clod/staff indicates that just as it cannot be mended once it is broken, the decision of disinheriting a son is irreversible. 12 However, there seems to be a difference between the natural clod (of earth) and the artificial staff. In the former case, it is worth noting that although the same phrase kirbāna ḫepû is used for describing the symbolic act of annulling a debt document, it has no connection there with disinheriting a son (see Malul 1988, ). Probably this indicates that a clod, which must have been easily available to everybody, was a versatile substance for symbolization. Then, what about the case of the staff? In this respect, the Jewish image of the son as the staff of his parent(s), which is shown by J. C. Greenfield, is noteworthy. He points out that the wife of Tobit called her son Tobias the staff of our hand (Tob. 5: 18) and that a woman described her child as a staff for her hand (ḥwṭr lydh) and a hoe for her burial (Babylonian Talmud, Yeb. 65b). 13 Furthermore, he points out the similarity between the words of an adoptive father on the candidate for his adopted son, [l]ū māru ṣābit qātīni šū, he will be the son who will hold our hand, i.e., support and sustain us (Nbn. 380+: 11) 14 and the description of Jerusalem as a mother without, maḥăzîq bǝyāḏāh, one who takes her by the hand (Isa. 51: 18; // mǝnahēl lāh, one who guides her ). 15 Although all of these occur in later texts, it is worth noting that a similar image of a son is found in the Late Bronze Ugaritic epic, Aqhat, too. In this text, one of the duties of the son of Daniel is described as follows (KTU I 30-31a): 11 Cf. Malul s own criticism of the theory that maintains that kirbānu stands for the property, mainly the land: viewing it as a property symbol would result in an absurd outcome, since it would symbolize a destruction of the property itself! (ibid., 89). 12 In this regard, cf. Jer. 19: 11 on breaking a clay vessel. 13 Greenfield 1982, 309, For this text (= Moldenke, CTMMA II 54), see Moldenke 1977, , esp. 154, 156 n Greenfield 1982, 312f. For a passage in which heḥĕzîq bǝyāḏ means to take hold (in order to lead one) as here, see also Jer. 31: 32 (Brown et al. 1906, 305a [s.v. ḥāzaq, Hiph. mng. 6a]). Vol. XLIX

5 aḫd. ydh. b škrn. To grasp his arm when he s drunk, m msh / [k ]šb. yn To support him when sated with wine. 16 On the basis of the above, I would suggest that a staff was chosen as the symbol of a son in the Emar texts because of this special image of a son who leads and supports his parent(s) by the hand Emar VI 256 This is an adoption document of Abi-kapi. In the former part, Addu, the grandfather of the adopted children, said as follows: (4) m ḫu-la-ú DUMU-ia (5) 2 GIŠ.ḫa-aṭ-ṭá-šu (6) še-eb-ra-at ù ul DUMU-ia šu-ut (7) ù i-na-an-na m ḫu-la-ú e-mu-ut (8) ù MÍ.NITA.MEŠ-šu (9) a-na re-bi-ti ṣa-al-ú (10) a-na MU.KAM ša KÚR.MEŠ nu-ku-ur-ti (11) ù a-bi-ka-pí DUMU ḫa-am-s[í i/e]-mi-du-ni 18 (12) MÍ.NITA.MEŠ-šu ša m ḫu-[la]- ú [DUMU ad]- du (13) iš-tu re-bi-[ti] (14) iš-ši-šu-nu (15) ù šum-ma ur-[ra-am] (16) še-ra-am ŠE[Š-šu] (17) ša m ḫu-la-[ú] (18) DUMU.MEŠ a-ḫi-šu (19) ú-pa!? -ṭ[e 4? -er? ] (20) 1 li-im KÙ.BA[BBAR] (21) ip-ṭe 4 -ri-šu-nu (22) li-id-dì-[in ù lil-qè] As for Ḫula u, my son, 2 his staff has (already) been broken and he is not my son. Now, Ḫula u died. His children 19 were thrown out in the square in the year of hostility (i.e., war). Then Abi-kapi, son of Ḫams[u, on whom] the children of Ḫu[la ]u, [son of Ad]du, [r]elied, picked them up from the squa[re]. If in the f[ut]ure, the broth[er] of Ḫula[ u] relea[ses(?)] the sons of his brother, he shall pa[y] 1,000 (shekels) of silv[er] (as) their ransom money [so that he may take (them)]. Following this part, it is written that Abi-kapi adopted the children, i.e., one son and two daughters, of Ḫula u (ll ). In this text, the enigma is how to understand the numeral 2 (= MIN) at the beginning of l. 5 (Durand 1990, 76). In view of the verbal form šebrat in l. 6 (šebēru G st. 3.f.sg.), the number of the staff(s) broken at this time must have been one, not two (cf. also AuOr 5-T 17: 7 above). This fact leaves us no choice but to take the 2 as an adjective, second, modifying the staff, 20 or an adverb, twice, again, although this would be orthographically exceptional. 21 In this case, Ḫula u s first staff must have been broken by his father Addu further in the past. So we have a total of two broken staffs. Why did Addu break his son s staff twice in order to disinherit him? In my opinion, the Laws of Ḫammurabi (henceforth = LH) 168f., which deal with the 16 The translation follows Parker 1997, 53. I wish to thank Dr. Matahisa Koitabashi, who kindly called my attention to this text in a personal communication. 17 Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the formal assistant of an old official of the highest rank or, although attested only in one text, the substitute for an old soldier in both cases a son was appointed to the position was called the Staff of Old Age in Egypt. For this institution, see McDowell 1998, This suggests that the image of a son as the staff of his parent(s) may have been widely prevalent and not restricted to the (West) Semitic world. 18 For the reading of this verb, see Durand 1990, 76 and n Cf. m Ḫa-am-s[í i-la-]mi-du-ni (Arnaud /3, 251). 19 On MÍ.NITA(.MEŠ), children, in the Emar texts, see Yamada 1995, 302 n. 23 (with previous literature and textual references). Add the following occurrences: MÍ.NITA-šú (SMEA 30-T 8: 12); also MÍ.NITA.M[EŠ-š]ú (RE 10: 28; cf. Beckman: <níg.>sal.ús.s[á! -š]ú). 20 Although perhaps one may read DUMU-ia 2, as my second son, this is quite unlikely. Firstly, in view of the handcopy (Arnaud /1, 69 [Msk ]), the 2 is written at the beginning of l. 5, although there is enough space for writing it after DUMU-ia at the end of l. 4. Secondly, the ordinal position of Ḫula u among the sons of Addu is not the point; the problem is simply whether he is Addu s son or not. 21 In view of the occurrences cited in CAD and AHw, when the numeral 2 (= MIN) is used, the adjective šanû and the adverbs šanîš (CAD Š/1, mng. 1; šanîš I in AHw) and šinīšu are written with a phonetic complement (e.g., 2-ú for šanû); and there is no example of the adverbs šaniānu or šanītam being written with the numeral ORIENT

6 The Broken Staffs: Disinheritance in Emar in the Light of the Laws of Ḫammurabi 169 and the Nuzi Texts issue of disinheritance of a son (māra nasāḫu; cf. AuOr 5-T 17: 22 ), provide the key to solving this problem. According to 168, if a father wants to disinherit his son from the status of his heir (aplūtum), the judges shall investigate his case and if the son is not guilty of a grave offense deserving the penalty of disinheritance, the father may not disinherit his son. 22 Now, 169 adds one more condition: (xxxv 25) šum-ma ar-nam kab-tam (26) ša i-na ap-lu-tim (27) na-sa-ḫi-im (28) a-na a-bi-šu (29) it-ba-lam (30) a-na iš-ti-iš-šu (31) pa-ni-šu ub-ba-lu (32) šum-ma ar-nam kab-tam (33) a-di ši-ni-šu it-ba-lam (34) a-bu-um DUMU-šu (35) i-na ap-lu-tim (36) i-na-sà-aḫ If he should be guilty of a grave offense deserving the penalty of disinheritance by his father, they shall pardon him for his first one; if he should commit a grave offense a second time, the father may disinherit his son. 23 Can we not assume a situation parallel to this behind Emar VI 256: 5f.? If Addu had once pardoned Ḫula u s grave offense deserving the penalty of disinheritance, i.e., an offense serious enough to break his staff, 24 but did not pardon him the second time, the text of Emar VI 256 would be fully intelligible. That is, in the above-cited text Addu confirms that Ḫula u, his son, had earlier been completely disinherited after committing a grave offense twice, so when Abikapi picked up Ḫula u s children there was no legal problem in his adoption of them. Thus Emar VI 256 and LH 169 seem to have in common the point that the first grave offense by a son is to be pardoned but the second is not; he is to be disinherited. 25 Admittedly, this claim remains hypothetical; and in addition, it is difficult to say that this way of disinheritance was institutionalized in Emar, since there is no reference to second or twice, again when referring to the broken staff in the will quoted above (AuOr 5-T 17: 7, 21 ). Then, viewing LH 169 as just an ideal prescription, not a real description, of disinheritance, one may argue that AuOr 5-T 17 calls into doubt the above interpretation of Emar VI 256. It is in this regard that we will look below at the Nuzi texts, which will provide us with comparative cases on how the disinheritance of a disobedient son could be avoided. Before examining the texts, however, it is necessary to clarify the nature of the grave offense deserving the penalty of disinheritance. In this respect, D. Marcus study (1981) on juvenile delinquency is noteworthy. In this article, based on the analysis of adoption contracts and other related texts in the ancient Near East, he classifies the major offenses bringing about disinheritance or a severer punishment. The followings are those types of acts in the area of the civil or status offenses committed by an adopted son toward his adoptive parent(s): (1) absconding; (2) failure to perform duties; (3) contempt: a) the declaration You are not my parent ; b) rejecting (zêru) a parent; c) disrespect or disobedience The translation follows Roth , Borger , 33; Roth, ibid. 24 If our reading is correct, AuOr 5-T 17: 19 f. gives an example: a son s insulting his father. This would indeed be a grave offence according to Marcus classification (type 3c; see the end of this section). 25 This is ignoring any involvement of judges, since we do not know what legal procedure was taken for disinheritance in Emar. Cf. Yamada forthcoming, n Marcus 1981, Needless to say, since an adopted son was regarded as a legitimate son by his parent(s), there is no doubt that these were regarded as grave offenses in the case of a natural son, too (cf. ibid., 36). Vol. XLIX

7 III. Avoidance of disinheritance in Nuzi In the four texts which we will mainly examine below (HSS V 7, 73; XIX 19; IM 6818), the offenses of a son/daughter toward his/her parent(s) are expressed in the following two phrases (X = his/her parent[s]): (1) not to obey X (ina pî ša X lā šemû) in all the texts (2) not to serve (lit. fear) X (X lā palāḫu) only in HSS XIX 19. Apparently (1) belongs to Marcus type 3c, disobedience (1981, 41f.). However, the fact that the general term to serve X is used in all four texts negatively in HSS XIX 19 and as a positive injunction in the others suggests that the range of his/her offenses was not necessarily restricted to disobedience alone. Observing this point, let us see how the following Nuzian parents (especially fathers) were expected to manage their disobedient children. The first to be taken up is HSS V 7, 27 an adoption document of Akap-šenni. In this text, Akap-šenni, at the instance of his father Zike, son of Akkuya, adopted his own brother Šelluni as his son (ll. 1-15) and nominated his wife Pekušḫe as Šelluni s father, i.e., guardian (ll. 16f.). As long as his adoptive parents are alive, Šelluni shall serve them (ll ). However, (21) šum-ma m še-el-lu-ni i-na pí-i (22) ša m a-kap-še-en-ni ù f pè-ku-uš-ḫé (23) la i-še-em-me šum-ma a-na pa-ni DI.KU 5. MEŠ (24) ú-še-el-lu-šu-nu-ti (25) šum-ma ša-ni-a-na šum-ma 3-ši-šu (26) ú-še-el-lu-šu-nu-ti (27) ù ki-ir-ba-an-šu ša (28) m še-el-lu-ni m a-kap-še-en-ni (29) ù f pè-ku-uš-ḫé (30) i-ḫé-ep-pè-šu-nu-ti in case Šelluni does not obey Akap-šenni and Pekušḫe, if he causes them to appear before the judges he causes them to appear either for the second time or for the third time, Akap-šenni and Pekušḫe may break the clod of Šelluni (i.e., disinherit him). As Marcus observed, this text clearly shows that Šelluni is to be disinherited only if he becomes a habitual offender of disobedience to his parents; 28 they had to be ready to pardon a grave offence at least once or at most twice. 29 However, after that they could disinherit him. A number of Nuzi texts show that parents could discipline their disobedient sons/daughters by physical punishment. Let us look at HSS V 73, 30 a will of the above-mentioned Zike. According to this text, he gave all his property to his wife Zilip-kiaše (ll. 5-9) and nominated her as the father(!) of his sons 31 (ll. 10f.). As long as she is alive, his sons shall serve her (ll. 12f.), and when she dies, they may divide the property (ll ). However, as for anyone among them who does not obey Zilip-kiaše (ll a), ù f zi-líp-ki-a-še (21) i-na É-it nu- pá-ri i-na-an-din (22) ab-bu-ta-šu-nu ú-maš-šar-šu (23) [GI]Š i-na GÌR-šu-nu i-na-an-di-nu (24) ù šu-ú ki-ir-bá-na (25) la i-ḫé-ep-pè Zilip-kiaše may put (him) in jail, place the(!) slave mark upon him (and) place a [fett-]er (lit. wood) upon his(!) foot See Speiser , 34f. (no. 4). 28 Marcus 1981, 42. He considers that Šelluni is to be disinherited only after the third court appearance. 29 Note that this generous treatment of Šelluni may be due to the personal insistence of his father Zike, who arranged this adoption. Cf. below on HSS V 73 and See Speiser , 51f. (no. 20); Paradise 1972, (no. 25). 31 We accept J. S. Paradise s reading (ibid., 110): a-na (11) a! (DIŠ)-bu! (MÍ)-ti [a-na] DUMU.MEŠ i-te-pu-uš. Cf. 1 sinništi ti [ ] mārū pl (Speiser , 51). 32 For this set of punishments, together with ḫuddumumma epēšu (see below), attested in several Nuzi texts, see Dosch 1987 with previous literature, esp. pp. 79f. on HSS V 73: ORIENT

8 The Broken Staffs: Disinheritance in Emar in the Light of the Laws of Ḫammurabi 169 and the Nuzi Texts But as for him, she shall not break the clod. Since she may discipline a disobedient son but is forbidden to disinherit him, Zike s intention is clear-cut: to prevent her from disinheriting his sons. 33 The fact that discipline and disinheritance are contrasted here indicates that the actual purpose of the former is not torturing the son, but urging or even in view of the severeness of those physical punishments forcing him to repent of his offense. He must be pardoned after his repentance. In this respect, IM 6818, 34 a will of Unap-tae, is noteworthy. In a parallel context, if Šilwaturi, a daughter nominated as his son, 35 does not obey Šakutu, his wife nominated as Šilwaturi s father (ll. 25b-27), Šakutu may [place a fetter upon (her) foot], place the slave mark (upon her) and put (her) in jail (ll. 28f.). The text continues further: (30) a-dì-i ḫu-ud-du-mu-um-ma DÙ-uš (31) ki-ir-ba-an-šu la i-ḫé-ep-pé (But) as long as she disciplines 36 (her), she shall not break his (= her) clod. It is most probable that if Šilwa-turi repents during the period of discipline, she will be pardoned. Then, what happens, if she does not repent but is still disobedient? The text suggests that she will be disinherited as a habitual offender. 37 In this context, the discipline is to be understood as substantially synonymous with a pardon for this once. If this is correct, IM 6818: 30f. can be recognized as a disinheritance prescription like LH 169. Thus these three texts demonstrate that there were cases in which sons grave offenses deserving the penalty of disinheritance were expected to be pardoned, particularly at least once (HSS V 7, IM 6818), in Nuzi. Although these texts are still prescriptive, there is no doubt that they reflected some social reality. However, one may argue that these cases are not necessarily 33 His protective attitude toward a son who is being placed under the authority of another member of his (father s) family can also be observed in HSS V 67 (see Speiser , [no. 2]; Paradise 1972, [no. 5]). In this text, when Zike gave his son Šennima to his (Zike s) brother Šuriḫil as an adopted son, he nominated Šatim-ninu, Šuriḫil s daughter(?), as the father of Šennima but forbade her to disinherit him (ll ). It is worth noting that as a result of this adoption, Zike deprived Šennima of the inheritance right to his family property in another will HSS V 72 (see Speiser , [no. 21]; Paradise 1972, [no. 19]): 24-30a. This suggests that Zike himself, as the natural father (in contrast with the above female fathers ), did not abandon the right to disinherit his disobedient sons. 34 Lacheman 1976, , 133f. (no. 2). For ll , see Dosch 1987, 78, The nomination of a daughter as a son is attested also in YBC 5142: 7f. (Lacheman & Owen 1981, 386, 413) and EN 10/ HSS XIX 60: 9-13 (Fincke 1998, 381). Note that a parallel practice is known in Emar and Ekalte: the nomination of a daughter as a man and woman or as a woman and man. See Yamada 1995, 305 and n. 37, for previous literature and textual references. Add the following occurrences: MÍ.MEŠ ù NI[TA.MEŠ] (RE 15: 11; with šakānu); MÍ ù NITA (23: 14; with šakānu); NITA ù MÍ (85: 14; with epēšu); MÍ u NITA (Sem. 46-T 2: 19; with šakānu); MÍ ù NITA (Ekalte II 65: 15; nominal sentence); cf. also DUMU-ut-ti-ia (Emar VI 31: 9; with epēšu); DUMU.NITA (TS 72: 3; 74: 2; both with epēšu); NITA-ma ka-lu-šu! -[nu] (Emar VI 184: 17 ; nominal sentence; cf. Arnaud: uš-ta! -ka-lu-šu-[nu-ti]). Note also that ASJ 13-T 30 (with MÍ.MEŠ... ù NITA.M[EŠ] in l. 15), formerly treated as an Emar text (ibid., 305), may be regarded as an Ekalte text. See Yamada 2003, For the phrase ḫuddumumma epēšu, to discipline, see Speiser 1963, Although the etymology of ḫuddumumma is still unknown, in view of its use in the context of punishing a disobedient son/daughter, occurring alone or at the end of the list of punishments, this general meaning seems to be most likely. Cf. to muzzle, reading ḫuṭṭumumma (Akk.) deriving from *ḫṭm (Dosch 1987, 86f.). 37 A similar situation is found in the case of a stubborn and rebellious son who does not obey his father and mother ( ênennû šōmē a bǝqôl āḇîw ûḇǝqôl immô; cf. phrase 1 at the beginning of this section) in Deut. 21: Although the nature of the vb. yissēr, to discipline, (v. 18) in this context, whether physically or verbally, remains unclear, here too he will be disinherited (in fact, executed) only after the failure of discipline by his parents (and after their appeal to the city elders). On this text see, e.g., Bellefontaine 1979; Marcus 1981, 46-50; Fleishman Vol. XLIX

9 normal, but rather exceptional, pointing out that all of them (including HSS V 7) are concerned with women nominated as fathers, i.e., guardians, not with (only) male and natural fathers. 38 Then, how did Nuzian fathers deal with their disobedient sons? Although only indirect evidence is available, 39 let us tackle this problem, considering how the cases of avoidance of disinheritance (at least once) are to be evaluated. Concerning adoptive fathers, the following two patterns of prescriptions are to be noticed: (1) Disinheritance only (without any reservation): e.g., HSS XIX 9, 40 a will of Ar-šatuya If Ḫampizi (his eldest son) does not serve him, he may adopt another son and may disinherit (ú-kàaš-ša-ad) Ḫampizi from the fields and houses (ll ). 41 (2) Discipline only (without any mention of disinheritance): e.g., JEN 572, 42 an adoption document in which Ḫui-tilla gives his son Naniya to Tirwiya [If N]aniya does [no]t [se]rve Tirwi[ya], j[ust] as a man would disc[i]pline his son (ù! k[i-m]e-e LÚ DUMU-šu ḫu-ud- Du - mu-um-ma i-pu-uš), s[o] shall Tirwiya disciplin[e] Naniy[a] (ll ). 43 It is interesting to note that both these patterns of treatment are found side by side in HSS XIX 19, 44 a will of Tarmiya. The beginning part of this text is heavily damaged. From l. 12 on we can see that he nominated his wife Tieš-naya as the father of all his property and children (ll ). As long as she is alive, his sons shall not lay claim to inheritance of any share (ll a), (since) she retains all granaries and the storehouse (ll. 20b-22a). After an unintelligible part (ll. 22b-24a), the text reads: 38 It is known that the powers of a woman nominated as a father were limited in comparison with those of a normal father: e.g., prohibition of alienating the property. Although she might discipline a disobedient son, only rarely she was given the right to disinherit him (e.g., HSS XIX 19 below). See Paradise 1972, , esp. 290f.; also Paradise 1980, 195 n. 25, 197 n. 35 (esp. on IM 6818). Cf. also HSS XIX 16 and 28 (n. 41 below). Although one might suggest also that HSS V 7 and 73 reflect Zike s peculiar personality (cf. Paradise 1972, ), the restrictions on his wife s authority in the latter text do not seem to be special, since most probably we can find a parallel case in HSS XIX 6 (see ibid., [no. 26]), a will of Ḫutiya, son of Ḫašiya. 39 We have no direct evidence on this issue, since a natural father had no need to draw up a document prescribing what to do with disobedient sons; it was enough for him to do it. Note also that several Nuzi texts mentioning the disinheritance of a son by his father gives reasons other than disobedience (cf. Paradise 1972, ). But in Emar we have an example of disobedience in TS 78, in which Ili-abi disinherits his sons, saying because they aba[n]doned (lit. released) me (and) did not serve me (um-<te>-š[i]r 9 -ru-ni-ni la -a ip- la -ḫu-ni-ni); there is no one who serves me (ll. 2-4a). Cf. Yamada 2008, 196f. n See Paradise 1972, 29f. (no. 1). 41 As Paradise notes, although not explicitly mentioned, Ḫampizi seems most likely to be an adopted son of Ar-šatuya (1972, 33; cf. also pp ). Cf. two wills concerning women: HSS XIX 16 (see ibid., 149f. [no. 35]), in which the testator allows his wife to disinherit a disobedient son (ú-ka 4 -aš-[ša]-as-[sú]; ll. 32b-34); and no. 28 (see ibid., [no. 28]), in which the testator gives his wife the dispositional right to a part of the inheritance share of his disobedient son, which means he will lose it (ll. 24b-34). In neither text is the wife nominated as the father, at least in the preserved part, although in HSS XIX 28 we see that the testator s sons are made as the sons of his wife (ll ). For the verb kuššudu, to disinherit in Nuzi, see CAD K, 280b (s.v. kašādu, mng. 4b); AHw, 461a (s.v. kašādu(m), D mng. 1f). 42 See Speiser 1963, 68, A similar text (referring to a citizen of Arrapḫe and his son) is also found in another adoption document HSS XIX 39: (see Speiser 1963, 69). Cf. two wills concerning women nominated as fathers : HSS XIX 7 (see Paradise 1972, [no. 27]) and no. 17 (see Speiser 1963, 65f., 70f.; Paradise 1972, [no. 14]); in both of these the testator prescribes that his wife/daughter nominated as the father may discipline any disobedient son (HSS XIX 7: 40-43; 17: 23-27, respectively); also HSS XIX 37 (see Paradise 1972, [no. 30]): 32-38a. 44 See ibid., (no. 16). 178 ORIENT

10 The Broken Staffs: Disinheritance in Emar in the Light of the Laws of Ḫammurabi 169 and the Nuzi Texts iš-tu (25) [ŠÀ-bi DUMU.MEŠ]-ia i-na KA-i (26) ša f [ti-e-e]š-na-a-a ša la i-še-em-mu (27) i-bá-aš-š[i/u] ù la i-palla-ḫu-ši ù (28) f ti- e -[eš-n]a-a-a GIŠ GÌR i-na-an-din-š[u] (29) ab-bu-ut-ta ú! -maš-šar-šu i-na É ki-l[i] (30) i-na-andin šum-ma ḫa-ši-iḫ-šu ki-ir-bá-[an-šu] (31) i-ḫé-ep-pè ù ú-ka 4 -aš-šá-as-sú k[i-ma] (32) ia-ši e-te-pu-uš Am[ong] my [sons], (if) there i[s] (anyone) who does not obey [Tie]š-naya and does not serve her, Tie[š-n]aya may place h[im] a fetter upon the foot, place the slave mark upon him (and) put (him) in jai[l]. (But) if she so desires, she may break [his] clo[d] and disinherit him, (since) I have made (her) a[s] myself. Although Tieš-naya herself is still only a woman nominated as the father, since she is made the same as Tarmiya, in other words, given the authority of the natural father, it is reasonable to assume that the ways she can treat a disobedient son presented here are like, if not completely the same as, his. On how to deal with such a son, Tarmiya presents two options to Tieš-naya in juxtaposition: discipline (ll a) or disinheritance (ll. 30b-31a). 45 If this reading is correct, at first glance the most striking point to be noted on this text is that Tieš-naya can in theory disinherit him at his first grave offence (cf. HSS XIX 9 above). 46 Furthermore, the following points are to be noted: Firstly, there is apparently a difference between the two options in terms of preference: the first option of discipline 47 must be recommended though not required by Tarmiya. In addition, in view of the phrase in the above-cited adoption document, j[ust] as a man would disc[i]pline his son (JEN 572: 28f.), one may assume this option to be the normal treatment by a natural father. Secondly, however, the obvious difference with the cases of the other female fathers in HSS V 7, 73 and IM 6818 is that Tieš-naya may disinherit her disobedient son immediately. 48 Since this must be due to the fact that she was given the same authority as Tarmiya, one may regard this option as the characteristic and even normal way a natural father treated his disobedient son. Thirdly, in any case, the ultimate decision whether to disinherit or not is highly subjective, simply depending on the degree of Tieš-naya s personal patience. Note that when she is confronted by a disobedient son, if she so desires (i.e., if his grave offense is unendurable for her), she can immediately disinherit him; but if she does not so desire (i.e., if it is endurable for her), she will discipline him. In view of the above, it seems to be clear that both options, discipline (i.e., pardon one time, in my opinion) and immediate disinheritance, are regarded as legitimate, even normal, means 45 As E. A. Speiser correctly understood (1963, 70). For examples of a conditional clause introducing an optional case (l. 30), see LH 129 (xxviii 50f.), 148f. (xxxii 1-4), 172 (xxxvi 27-30) (Roth , 105, 109, 114, respectively). Although Paradise reads the text sequentially, i.e., discipline and then (i.e., following its failure) disinheritance (1972, 291), this is not preferable. Note that the above conditional clause cannot be paraphrased well in this case: what will Tieš-naya do, in case he does not repent, if she does not desire (to disinherit him)? It is hardly conceivable that Tarmiya intended her to permit him to inherit the property in such a case. This difficulty indicates that the sequential reading is defective. 46 We do not know what further legal procedure was necessary in this case. Note that although HSS V 7 refers to the parents appeal to the court (see above), at least to my knowledge, no court case text from Nuzi deals with a suit for disinheritance of a son. 47 There is no doubt that if Tieš-naya takes this option, if her discipline of the son does not work, she may disinherit him. In this case, the discipline is substantially synonymous with a pardon for this once, as we remarked on IM 6818 above. Note that the prescription in HSS XIX 19: 24b-30a is substantially the same to that in JEN 572: (discipline only). This suggests that the text of JEN 572 can be interpreted likewise. 48 See also n. 38 above. Vol. XLIX

11 for a natural father. According to Marcus, in the ancient Near East as in modern times juvenile delinquency in the realm of civil or status offenses was a habitual condition: (only?) habitual offenders, mostly those guilty of contempt towards their parents, deserved the punishment of disinheritance. 49 Although Marcus presented as evidence only HSS V 7 and LH 169, his claim may reach the point in principle. As no father would desire to disinherit his own son, it is not difficult to assume that Nuzian fathers were ready to avoid disinheriting their sons when they could. However, the decision was basically a matter of degree of their patience. This suggests that sometimes they could not pardon, and disinherited on the first occasion of a grave offense. Therefore one may conclude that in Nuzi avoiding disinheritance at least once (cf. LH 169) was at most a desirable practice, not a compelling rule. Now, in the light of this point, we may make this comment on the Emar texts: the lack of reference to second or twice, again in AuOr 5-T 17 does not contradict our interpretation of Emar VI 256; rather, as a set they suggest the possibility that on the matter of disinheritance a social situation parallel to that of Nuzi is found in Emar, too. Before closing this section, however, we have to deal with one more Nuzi text, HSS V 21, 50 in which Kipal-rumti declares as follows: DUMU-ia (3) m zi-ir-te-šub ki-ir-bá-an-šu (4) i-na pa-na-nu eḫ-te-pè (5) ù i-na-an-na a-na ma-ru-ti-im-ma (6) ut-te-eršu ù DUMU GAL šu-ú As for my son Zir-Tešub, I formerly broke his clod but now I have restored him to the status of (my) son. He is the eldest son. Zir-Tešub will take a double share, whereas his other brothers will take their shares after him according to their rank (ll. 7-11). Based on this text, one might argue that the first breaking of Ḫulaʾu s staff by Addu assumed in Emar VI 256 indicates an actual disinheritance. 51 However, the restoration of a disinherited son in HSS V 21 is the only case attested in Nuzi and so must be exceptional. 52 Indeed, observing that the people of Nuzi and Emar were very sensitive on the matter of inheritance, it is difficult to believe that they frequently annulled their decisions of disinheritance. But the above argument assumes what would be the far rarer case that such a restored son repeated a grave offense and then was disinherited again! Although I do admit that this possibility cannot be excluded, in view of the other Nuzi texts above, it seems less likely. 49 See Marcus 1981, 41f. (on HSS V 7), 43 (on LH 169), See Speiser , 38f. (no. 8); also Paradise 1972, To support this interpretation, one may point out the fact that no disciplinary clause on a disobedient son is attested in the Emar texts. But this does not mean that every Emarite father automatically disinherited a son at his first grave offense. It seems to be rather reasonable to assume that if it was endurable for him, he would pardon him (after disciplining him) as in Nuzi, although there must have been the cases where he disinherited immediately. 52 On this point, it is interesting to note JEN 657, a court case which a woman named Ḫašu-kelte brings against Šurkitilla. According to her, Paziya, her husband(?), had disinherited his son Šurki-tilla and then adopted two men as his sons, nominating her as their father (ll. 8b-13; cf. also ll a), but Šurki-tilla drove her out of the (Paziya s) house (ll. 14f.). Finally she won the case, it being confirmed by the judges that Paziya had indeed nominated her as the father (ll ); Šurki-tilla was ordered to pay her damages (ll. 47 ff.). In between, a part of the statement of Šurki-tilla, not of Ḫašu-kelte (so Paradise 1972, 311), is preserved: (Paziya) had broken my [c]lod (but then) [re]stored [m]e [to the status of (his) son] ([... k]i-ir-bá-ni iḫ-pé [a-na ma-ru-ti ut]-te-er-ra- an-ni ) (ll. 19b-20). Although this claim is parallel to HSS V 21: 2b-6a, we do not know if it was confirmed as fact by the judges due to the poor state of preservation of the text. 180 ORIENT

12 The Broken Staffs: Disinheritance in Emar in the Light of the Laws of Ḫammurabi 169 and the Nuzi Texts IV. The Scepter Received by Ur-Utu in Sippar Concerning the giš ḫaṭṭu, staff, symbolizing the mārūtu, status of son, in the Emar texts, D. Charpin (1994) suggests that another parallel case is found in Di This is an Old Babylonian letter uncovered at Tell ed-dēr (Sippar-Amnānum), belonging to the family archive of Ur-Utu, the chief lamentation-priest (GALA.MAḪ) of Annunītum. 53 In this section, let us examine this text, asking if a parallel case can really be observed. According to Ur-Utu, the addresser of this letter, his father Inanna-mansum did not agree to divide his property (ḪA.LA/zittu, lit. share ) during his lifetime (ll. 2f.). But one of Ur-Utu s brothers, Kubburum, without authorization took five shekels of gold as his share and visited Sin-naṣir on the matter of dividing Inanna-mansum s property (ll. 4-8). Then Sin-naṣir sent Warad-ibari to inquire of Inanna-mansum on this issue, but Inanna-mansum did not approve it, rather calling Kubburum, Ili-iqišam and Ḫuzalum strangers or bastards (ll. 9-15). 54 His speech continues: (16) ḪA.LA ú-ul a-za-ás-su-nu-ši-im UR- d UTU ma-ri (17) ša ḫa-aṭ-ṭi im-ḫu-ra-an-ni šu- ú -ma ú-ga-am-ma-ar I will not divide the property for them (i.e., the three sons). (Only) Ur-Utu is my son who received my scepter from me. (It is) he (who) will give a final decision (on the division of my property). Cf. C. Janssen: à eux je ne laisserai pas l héritage. Ur-Utu est mon fils, celui qui de moi a reçu mon sceptre; c est à lui que je donnerai tout 55 (1992, 24f.; also Tanret 2011, 274). In view of the substantial difference in the translations, the first problem to be discussed is how to understand the third sentence (l. 17b). This then will lead us to realize where the stress of the first sentence (l. 16a) is. Finally, the second sentence (ll. 16b-17a), our target, will be treated. Janssen (1992, 27) takes šū-ma (l. 17) as the indirect object of ugammar, regarding Inannamansum as its subject (in 1.c.sg.). However, it is of course natural to see šū-ma as the subject of the verb, and the reason why Inanna-mansum (or the addresser Ur-Utu) bothered to say (or write) this pronominal subject can easily be explained: since ugammar can be taken either as 1.c.sg. or as 3.c.sg. (of gamāru D pres.), he explicitly and with emphasis showed that the latter was meant in order that Warad-ibari (or the anonymous addressee) not be confused. To clarify the meaning of this ugammar, it is necessary to take into account the whole process of the inheritance dispute among the sons of Inanna-mansum. The following is a revised version of Janssen s reconstruction of the dispute process (1992, 43-47). 56 The pertinent parts to the following discussion are as follows: 1. Later Years of Inanna-mansum A) Inanna-mansum divided his property for Ur-Utu (cf. Di 932): 57 toward the end of Aṣ 4 This advance inheritance (or assignment of Ur-Utu s share) must have accompanied his 53 Janssen 1992, The following documents belonging to the same archive were published in this article, too: Di 167 (pp ), Di 1784 (pp. 35f.); cf. also Di 932 (p. 37). 54 Although they were actually Inanna-mansum s legitimate sons (e.g., Di 1784: 11 f.). See ibid., 32-34, 37f.; for a detailed analysis see Barberon 2005, also Tanret 2011, On these renderings of the verb ugammar, cf. CAD G, 30 (s.v. gamāru): to render a final verdict (mng. 3f) and to pay or deliver in full (mng. 3c), respectively. 56 The major differences are the property-centered arrangement and the insertion of phase 2A, which was ignored in her version. 57 See n. 62 below. Vol. XLIX

13 succession to his father s office of chief lamentation-priest of Annunītum (cf. Di 1194: 16f.). 58 B) Inanna-mansum refused to divide his property for the other three sons (Di 1194: 1-18; 59 cf. 167: 1-8): the end of Aṣ 4 to 5/X-XII 2. After the Death of Inanna-mansum (Aṣ 5/X-XII) A) Ur-Utu inherited the whole property of Inanna-mansum (cf. Di 1784: 16 f.): right after Aṣ 5/ X-XII When a certain Šamuḫtum demanded that the sons of Inanna-mansum repay seven shekels of silver, the parṣum-money given to Inanna-mansum, Ur-Utu alone repaid it by the agreement of his three brothers (ll ). 60 B) Inanna-mansum s four sons divided the property (Di 1194: 20, 22): Aṣ 6 But the house of Inanna-mansum in Sippar-Yaḫrurum was left undivided (ll. 20b-21). 61 C) The three sons of Inanna-mansum committed robbery on this house (Di. 1194: 22-30): Aṣ 7 D) They committed robbery on this house again (Di. 1194: 32-36): Aṣ 7, 9 or 10 This occurred when they deprived(?) Ur-Utu of the abarakkum-office (Di 167: 6-10 ; 1194: 31). process omitted X ) Settlement of the dispute: the final judgment (Di 932): Aṣ 12 Ur-Utu was allowed to inherit his share as Inanna-mansum had originally divided it for him in phase 1A. 62 The following questions remain to be answered: (1) While the whole property of Inanna-mansum was inherited by Ur-Utu (phase 2A), it was divided by Ur-Utu and his three brothers (phase 2B): how can we understand rationally these apparently contradictory cases? (2) Ur-Utu repaid seven shekels of silver from the property by their agreement (phase 2A): why was the agreement of his three brothers necessary, if he legally inherited the whole property of Inanna-mansum? (3) The three sons of Inanna-mansum committed robbery twice (phases 2C and D): why were they so unsatisfied, after they had divided the property with Ur-Utu (phase 2B)? However, all these questions can be answered satisfactorily, if we interpret Di 1194: 17 to 58 As Janssen correctly considered (1992, 44). 59 See above. 60 Kubburum, Ili-iqišam and Ḫuzalum refused to pay it saying to Ur-Utu: The silver is not (the matter) of our payment. Inanna-mansum, our father, gave you his property ( md INANNA-MA.AN.SUM a-bu-ni ḪA.LA-šu a-na ka-šum id-dina-ak-ku). Then the silver is (the matter) of your payment (ll ). Ur-Utu repaid the seven shekels of silver from the property by their agreement (iš-tu ḪA.LA i-na mi-it-gu-ur-ti-šu-nu) (ll. 19 b-24 ). 61 This must be the house of the father, the whole of which was finally to be assigned to Ur-Utu in phase X : cf. ù kani-ik É A.BA ša i-il-li-a-am ša UR- d UTU-ma GALA.MAḪ, the sealed document of the house of the father which will (someday) turn up is (the possession) of Ur-Utu, the chief lamentation-priest (Di 932). See Janssen 1992, At least, as far as the former part of Di 932 is concerned: (after the list of properties) all this is the share of Ur-Utu, the chief lamentation-priest, which Inanna-mansum, his father, divi[ded for him] during his life time (mi-im-ma anni-im ḪA.LA UR- d UTU GALA.MAḪ ša d INANNA-MA.AN.SUM a-bu-šu i-na ba-al-ṭu-ti-šu i-zu-[zu-šum]). In the future, his brothers will not lay clai[m] (to it). In the second part, two parcels of land and the house of the father (see the preceding note) are assigned to Ur-Utu. See Janssen, ibid. 182 ORIENT

14 The Broken Staffs: Disinheritance in Emar in the Light of the Laws of Ḫammurabi 169 and the Nuzi Texts mean that Inanna-mansum entrusted to Ur-Utu the final decision on the division of his property after his death: (1 ) Ur-Utu inherited the whole property with the understanding that he would divide it with his three brothers. (2 ) Because those seven shekels of silver belonged to the inherited property that was to be divided by Ur-Utu and his three brothers. (3 ) Because the terms of that division were decided by Ur-Utu, although his three brothers tried to interfere. If my rendering of the ugammar in Di 1194: 17 is accepted, it would then lead us to reread the first sentence as this: I will not divide the property for them (l. 16a), the I contrasting with (It is) he (l. 17b). Although when reading ll. 1-16a of this text, one might think that Inanna-mansum intended to disinherit the three sons, this is doubtful; he must have been aware of difficulties of doing so without a more legitimate reason (Janssen 1992, 33f., 39). The matter is simple, as Ur-Utu wrote: Inanna-mansum, our father, did not agree to divide the property during his life time (i-na ba-al-ṭú-ti-šu) (ll. 2f.). 63 Inanna-mansum entrusted its division after his death into the hands of Ur-Utu, in his words, my son who received my scepter from me (ll. 16b-17a). As Janssen pointed out, this transmission of a scepter must be a symbolic act for succeeding to office (1992, 36, 43). Then, what does this scepter symbolize here? I think, the status of the eldest son and successor, or, more accurately, the office of Inanna-mansum, seeing that he referred to it as my scepter (ḫaṭṭī). 64 Upon receiving it from his father and predecessor, Ur-Utu assumed the status of his eldest son and successor. In any case, since it does not symbolize the status of son in general, it is difficult to find here symbolism parallel to the staff of the cases in Emar. V. Conclusions On the basis of the above discussions, the following points can be made concerning the Emar texts, AuOr 5-T 17 and Emar VI 256: (1) Among the cuneiform texts known thus far, the symbolism of giš ḫaṭṭu, staff, representing mārūtu, status of son in general, has been attested only in Emar. (2) In Emar the idiomatic phrase giš ḫaṭṭa šebēru, to break a staff, denotes to disinherit. (3) In Emar VI 256, if the first breaking of Ḫula u s staff indicates a pardon of his first grave offence, then that text can be regarded as the first descriptive attestation of avoidance of disinheritance as prescribed in LH 169 (cf. IM 6818, also HSS V 7 and XIX 19). (4) However, disinheritance only upon a second offense was probably not institutionalized in Emar (and Nuzi), since there must have been the cases in which fathers disinherited their sons on the first occasion of a grave offense (cf. AuOr 5-T 17, also HSS XIX 9, 19). 63 Except for the advance inheritance of Ur-Utu, his successor (phase 1A), of course. 64 Although I have not commented on the translation in Di 1194: 17 of the word ḫaṭṭu (it is translated staff in the Emar texts), Janssen s choice of scepter is perfectly appropriate for the symbol of Inanna-mansum s high-ranking religious office of chief lamentation-priest of Annunītum. Vol. XLIX