Transit to Paradise: IS Recruits and the Problem of Ideological Counter-Terrorism in Malaysia

Transcription

1 Transit to Paradise: IS Recruits and the Problem of Ideological Counter-Terrorism in Malaysia Dr. Dominik Müller Goethe University Frankfurt Official Self-Designation: Malaysia Capital: Kuala Lumpur Form of government: Constitutional monarchy (federal system) Head of state: King (Yang di-pertuan Agong), presently Tuanku Abdul Halim Head of government: Prime Minister, presently Najib Tun Razak Official language: Malay (Bahasa Malaysia) Languages of inhabitants: Malay, English, Chinese languages (Cantonese, Mandarin, Hokkien, Hakka, Hainan, Foochow), Tamil, Telugu, Malayam, Panjabi, various indigenous languages Religions: 61.3% Muslims, 19.8% Buddhists, 9.2% Christians, 6.3% Hindus, 1.3% Confucianism/Taoism/other Chinese religions/other indigenous religions; 1% unknown; 0.4% no religious affiliation Surface: 329,847 km 2 Population: 30.1 million Population density: 92 inhabitants per km 2 Population growth: 1.47% Average age: 27.7 Population under 25 years: 45.7% When 26-year old Ahmad Tarmimi Maliki steered a vehicle loaded with a ton of explosives into an Iraqi military facility in May 2014, blowing up not only himself but also 25 soldiers of an elite unit, he was hailed as a martyr by thousands of IS-sympathizers in Southeast Asia s Islamist social networks. The factory worker from Selangor became the first Malaysian suicide bomber of the Islamic State (IS/ISIS). In November Ahmad Affendi Abdul Manaff, a native of Kelantan, committed a similar bombing in Homs, killing 50 soldiers. At least three more Malaysians died in Syria and Iraq in This essay gives an outline of the involvement of Malaysian citizens in the civil war in Syria/Iraq, and explains why the structure of Malaysian state Islam is, to some extent, an obstacle to efficient deradicalization on the ideological level. that there were 45 Malaysians in Syria and 15 in Iraq. 1 Not much later, there were reportedly as many as 100 persons who had joined either the IS or other militias. 2 In contrast to Indonesia, Malaysia has not yet been the site of any major Islamist attacks. However, some members of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) which is among other things responsible for the Bali attack were either natives of Malaysia or spent a good length of time there. In the past, local militias such as the Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) were exclusively hatching their plots in the underground. From the 1980s onward, however, there were cases of individuals who joined armed groups abroad. Fauzi Ismail, for example, a member of the Islamic Party of Malaysia (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia, PAS), died in the struggle against the infidel Russian occupation forces in Afghanistan. According to the Minister of the Interior, 167 Malaysians were involved in militant activities abroad in The Phenomenon of Malaysian Foreign Fighters The number of Malaysian fighters in Syria and Iraq has increased in In July, Malaysian authorities reported 1 Malaysian Insider: Three Malaysians arrested over ISIS links, 11/22/ Star Online: Freelance jihadist fights for his cause, 07/07/

2 October Plans for terrorist attacks were allegedly thwarted in the most recent past; the targets included a beer brewery and night clubs. 4 The fighters in Syria include several individuals who were already active in Afghanistan in the 1990s. Some of them are said to have been members of the KMM which was smashed by the security forces in the 2000s. This is the case, for example, with Zainan Harith (aged 52) who was killed in the Syrian town of Arzeh in 2014, 5 and Zainuri Kamarudin (aged 47) who was injured in the same incident. The two Afghanistan veterans had served long prison terms for a bank robbery committed in Mohd Rafi Udin (aged 48) was injured, too. He had been arrested in 2003 for being involved in the Indonesian Poso conflict. After spending several years in prison without charge he left the country again in 2014 to join the jihad. A particularly prominent case is a lecturer at the University of Malaya who reportedly spent time at an al-qaeda camp in Afghanistan in the 1990s and fled to the southern Philippines in He is said to have recruited fighters for Syria, acting in concert with a copy-shop owner. A key role is played by the social media. Some individual actors are particularly conspicuous in that context, such as Akel Zainal who used to be the drummer of the rock band Ukays. He was one of the first Malaysians to fight in Syria and has published online accounts of his experiences since The popular Malaysian media preacher Azhar Idrus posted a photo of Akel Zainal on Facebook, posing in an Adidas jacket and holding a machine gun. The capture read: a Malay from Kelantan who is prepared to die a martyr s death. Prayers for him! Beneath, there were enthusiastic readers comments. 7 He has meanwhile been wounded, pictures show him smiling and wearing a head bandage. A female student who met him via Facebook is said to have travelled to Syria to marry him. 8 Most recently there has been media coverage on an IS shop that openly sold flags, clothing, and other memorabilia with IS and Taliban logos for months in the university city of Bandar Baru Bangi. 9 3 Star Online: White paper on militants in works, 10/29/ Malay Mail Online: Malaysia teams up with FBI to fight IS terror plot, 10/02/ Blog Cikgu Azli : Kisah mujahidin Mat Soh Abu Turab Paklong, 10/21/ Astro Awani: Suspek terbabit aktiviti militan, Dr Mahmud kerap ke luar negara - Keluarga, 07/03/ Facebook profile of Ustaz Azhar Idrus, 04/02/ Utusan: Lagi gadis Malaysia disunting ISIS, 10/12/ Malaysian Insider: Shop selling ISIS souvenirs in Bandar Baru Bangi, report says, 01/09/2015. The Prime Minister s Faux Pas: The IS as a Role Model? The IS movement was initially underrated by politicians. As late as in June 2014, Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak went as far as to admonish his party comrades to follow the example of the IS. At an event of his party (United Malays National Organisation, UMNO) he said: For example, when someone dares to fight to their death, they can even defeat a much bigger team. As proof whether we agree or not is another matter the group ISIL with the strength of just 1,300 people, can defeat an Iraqi army of 30,000 soldiers, until four, five generals with three, four stars run for their lives, jump out the window at night. Why? Because they are afraid of those who are brave. 10 His spokespersons later qualified that statement, asserting that the IS had just be mentioned in passing and not supportively. Beyond such populist polemics which did not really come as a surprise for people familiar with local politics the security authorities are working at full pressure on the surveillance and prosecution of foreign fighters and IS sympathizers. While their work is viewed as efficient, their methods and the power with which they are invested are controversial. The Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 rules that suspects can be held in long-term custody without charges. In the first half of 2014, 23 alleged IS supporters were arrested. The numbers of arrests increased in the months that followed. Some suspects were accused of recruitment and propaganda, others had been just about to leave the country. In May 2014, 11 Malaysians were arrested for allegedly being part of a network of 50 people who wanted to go to Syria. They said they wanted to provide humanitarian aid. 11 A cell crushed in June (11 people) had allegedly helped organize the journey of the first five fighters leaving for Syria, including the first Malaysian suicide bomber. 12 In November 2014, two men and the wife of an already imprisoned man were arrested for having collected money donations for travelers to Syria. Three other men who were arrested had already fought in Syria. They are facing up to 30 years in prison. The authorities suspect that 10 Malaysiakini: Is Najib a secret admirer of the ISIS jihadists?, 06/27/ Malaysian Insider: Three Malaysians arrested over ISIS links, 11/22/2014; Star: IGP: Militant group believed to have ties in Syria and southern Philippines, 05/03/ Z. Abuza: Joining the New Caravan: ISIS & the Future of Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Part I, Indo-Pacific Review, 07/18/

3 they returned to Malaysia with the intention of recruiting more fighters. 13 According to the authorities, the majority of those who left the country are supporters of the IS. This is denied, however, by some fighters interviewed by Malaysian media. One of them said he does not belong to any group; his intention as a freelance jihadist is to defend fellow Muslims who are being tortured, raped and slaughtered and to protect Islam against vilification by enemies. Before going to Syria he had been involved in humanitarian activities in several countries. He interpreted the war in Syria as a sign that Judgment Day is imminent. This idea is widespread among IS fighters, who believe that the conflict is the fulfillment of an eschatological prophesy. 14 The Problem of Ideological Deradicalization One of the weaknesses of counterterrorism is its ideological component. To explain this, it is necessary to contextualize Malaysia s Islam policy. The constitution stipulates that Islam is state religion. The governing party UMNO, which has so far provided all Prime Ministers, has long called Malaysia a secular state. This position was abandoned, however, during the term of Prime Minister Mahatir Mohamad ( ). His administration launched a state-run Islamization program and adopted a vocabulary that had formerly been used by the Islamist opposition only. Many Islamic laws were passed, and government agencies in charge of Islamic affairs were invested with more far-reaching power. This was initially a response to attempts of the Islamist opposition (PAS) to discredit the government as being un-islamic. Calls for more Islam were answered by offensive Islamic bills. While the governing party UM- NO continues to turn down calls for particularly strict shari a legislation (hudud), many Islamist positions are by now accepted by mainstream society, and are shared across parties by the governing party UMNO and the Islamic opposition party PAS. Alternative interpretations of Islam were criminalized from the 1990s onward. There are arrests, surveillance, and intimidation. Shiite Islam is prohibited by law in 11 out of the 14 provinces. Members of the Ahmadiyyah community are forbidden to refer to themselves as Muslims and to organize Friday prayers. Muslims have been arrested for deviance and committed to Faith Purification Centers. This happened, for example, to a self-appointed prophet 13 Malaysian Insider: Three Malaysians arrested over ISIS links, 11/22/ Star: Freelance jihadist fights for his cause, 07/07/2014. who denied the obligation to make a hajj to Mecca: he was sentenced to ten years in prison and six months of religious re-education. 15 As far as Muslim citizens are concerned, the consumption of alcohol, extramarital sex, improper conduct in public, and distortions of Islam have become punishable offenses. Outside the tourist areas, the Islam authorities raid hotels, night clubs, and private homes. Suspects are usually sentenced to fines. In 2011 there was the first whipping for illicit extramarital sex. 16 These measures are supported by the very government that stages itself as the spearhead of a Global Movement of Moderates, and is hailed as a shining example of religious pluralism by the U.S. Secretary of State. 17 In 2012, the Prime Minister proclaimed that liberalism and pluralism are the biggest threats. The Deputy Prime Minister argues that pluralism and liberalism are the causes of sins such as mixing of genders, same-sex marriages, apostasy, and deviant behavior. This is supported theologically by government ulama; for example, religious pluralism is theorized as being a satanic movement that makes Muslims into infidels. 18 It is true that there are voices in civil society, some of them even from Islamic ranks, which plead for tolerance, civil rights, and equality before the law. However, they are increasingly marginalized and get little visible support, in contrast to their Islamist foes. Despite considerable differences particularly in terms of the attitude towards violence, there are some disquieting overlaps of state Islam with IS ideology for example, with regard to constructing Shiism as a threat. A witch hunt has begun among the opposition, too, with politicians being accused by fellow party members of being secret Shiites. The Home Ministry has announced that it will take legal steps against one of the opposition leaders, claiming that there is A-grade evidence of his Shiite convictions. 19 Some members of the small Shiite community are making plans to leave the country. The Syria conflict has led to an exacerbation of anti-shiite tendencies. It is interpreted by many Malaysians as a struggle of oppressed Muslims against criminal Shiites 15 Malaysian Insider: Malay Prophet sentenced to 10 years jail, six lashes, RM16, 500 fine, 10/22/ Star: 3 women caned for having illicit sex, 02/18/ Malay Mail: Kerry lauds multi faith Malaysia for world, 10/11/ Cf. Müller: Paradox normativities in Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam, Asian Survey (forthcoming). 19 Malaysian Insider: Home ministry claims A-grade evidence on Mat Sabu s Shia link, 12/15/

4 (Assad regime, Iran, Hezbollah). Thus, they subscribe to a narrative also used by the IS to justify its violent acts. The government does not take any substantial measures to confront that attitude with a more complex perspective on the situation its anti-shiite polemics reinforces Malaysians conviction that Shiites are inherently harmful. In order to counter ideological sympathies that are conducive to Islamist recruitment, the government would need to critically reflect on its Islam policy and to tolerate more diversity in Islam. By banning books and events of liberaloriented Muslims, the government gives away the chance to take an active part in the popularization of inner-islamic counter-narratives that convincingly challenge Islamic justifications for discrimination and hatred of people of other faiths. In 2014, the Minister of Home Affairs warned of the threat posed by the IS, calling for united action against it. He gave that warning after a meeting with HAMAS representatives who had been invited as guests of honor. The fact that he was flanked by leaders of a group that has itself committed suicide attacks shows that his rejection of the skewed Islamic teachings 20 of the IS is a far cry from western premises of ideological deradicalization. The IS Problem of the Islamist Opposition The Islamist opposition party PAS distances itself from the IS, too, albeit inside Islamist paradigms and without internal consensus. I was witness when a PAS member an acquaintance of mine began to glorify the IS online, and to express his hope that Malaysian fighters will die a martyr s death. I mentioned this to another PAS member, a friend of his who is closely associated with the party leadership and admitted that we are worried about the IS. In March 2014, the PAS vice president Mohammad Sabu told me with obvious disapproval that some naïve PAS Youth activists had waved al-qaeda flags at demonstrations. The case of Mohd Lotfi Ariffin who died in Syria in 2014 is typical of the IS dilemma faced by the Islamist opposition party PAS. Prior to his departure he had been a respected member of the party. Among other things, he was head of the intelligence department of the PAS Youth in Kedah; later he was in the Ulama wing. After Lotfi left the country, the PAS Secretary General declared that he had been excluded from the party. Lotfi, in turn, commented from Syria that he had already resigned his membership two months before, so as to not jeopardize the party s stability. The leadership distanced itself from him; the party as a whole did not. Pro-PAS Websites glorify him as a martyr. At the annual meeting of the Ulama wing a minute of silence was held, followed by a prayer for the martyr Lotfi. The PAS Member of Parliament Nik Mohd Abduh a son of the party s spiritual leader spoke highly of Latfi, calling his actions jihad. 21 Abduh twittered a religious quote by Lotfi after the latter s death, commenting that it is good advice. However, he stressed that Lotfi had fought for a militia that objects to the atrocities committed by the IS. The sources on this incident are contradictory. Abduh s sympathy reflects his hardliner image; it may also be due to the fact that his own brother, Nik Abdi, served a prison term for having fought in Afghanistan. Abduh writes that he prayed for his brother to die a martyr s death. 22 As late as in November 2013, Mohd Lotfi had still lectured in Malaysia on the oppression of the Ummah in Syria, as well as on Islamic eschatological traditions (which are often cited by the IS to interpret the conflict). Later he used the Internet to post reports from the frontline. His Facebook page had 30,000 followers. He and other Malaysian fighters were seriously injured in a Syrian airstrike, and he died of his injuries. At an Islamic school in Kedah where Lotfi used to teach he is worshipped as a hero. The headmaster, Lotfi s elder brother, calls on the students to follow his example and to defend our religion. One of the students told journalists that he admires Lotfi for having put his religion into practice and for having done the right thing. 23 These students are by no means extremists in training camps; they are youths from mainstream local society. In late 2014 a Facebook tribute page for Lotfi was launched on which his brother s contact information is given. Among other things, the page features a t-shirt with a print idealizing Lotfi, who is shown holding a machine gun; the picture is accompanied by a calligraphy. Conclusion The IS will not be succeed in becoming a mass movement in Malaysia. There is but a small group of sympathizers, no more than several thousand people, most of whom will 21 Sinar Harian: Nik Abduh anggap Mohd Lotfi mati syahid, 09/16/ D.M. Müller: Islam, Politics and Youth in Malaysia (Routledge), p Malaysia Mail: In reminder to stay united, Zahid to screen IS beheadings at Umno assembly, 11/27/ YouTube: As Syahid Ustaz Mohd Lotfi Ariffin di TV Tokyo, 12/10/

5 give symbolic or financial support only this would be in line with the general pattern of Malaysian support of the HAMAS. Nevertheless, ideological support creates the breeding ground for new, tiny, violence-prone cells. Both the government and its Islamic bureaucracy deliver stereotyped messages in which they distance themselves from the IS. Beyond this, however, they lack more profound, powerful counter-narratives which efficiently undermine the claim of the IS to representing authentic Islamic values. The government is facing a dilemma: it supports the demonization and criminal prosecution both of Shiite Islam and other dissenting Muslims. In the name of a monolithic concept of true Islam, it promotes some of the ideological positions of the IS. This includes the sphere of shari a interpretation. At the same time, however, it views itself as a moderate force in spite of the fact that highest-ranking government representatives reject pluralism and liberalism for being un-islamic. This paradox stance, which is to some degree due to competition in terms of Islamic policy, is in the way of consistent countermeasures against pro-is tendencies in Malaysia. Compiled in February