Understanding Conflicts in Southeast Asia

Transcription

1 Chapter 1 Understanding Conflicts in Southeast Asia 1.1 Background Conflicts leading to political violence and terrorism were a consistent feature of Southeast Asia long before the events of 11 September 2001 (hereinafter referred to as 9/11 ). The region has witnessed several protracted insurgencies in which militant groups have resorted to acts of violence, including the use of terrorist tactics to achieve political objectives. In almost all cases, these conflicts have strong local roots, although the roots and nature of the conflicts differ from country to country in the region. Some of the persisting conflicts, such as those in southern Thailand and southern Philippines and in many parts of Indonesia, are old-fashioned nationalist or ethno-nationalist movements. In many cases, such as in southern Thailand and in Indonesia (for example in Aceh, Ambon and Maluku), these are often layered over communal issues. But not all conflicts are inherently religious, as it has conventionally been made out to be. Thus, although the overwhelming concern is particularly about Islamist terrorism, not all political conflicts or ideological contestations lead to terrorism in the region. In many cases, violence is associated with issues of political participation, communal relations, resource competition or identity and the quest for autonomy. How then do we account for terrorism in Southeast Asia? There are in fact several perspectives the influence of transnational Islamist movements like al-qaeda or the changing nature of Islam itself to name a couple which are discussed in Chapter 2. This 1

2 2 Whither Southeast Asia Terrorism? chapter, however, deals with the question by locating the conflicts in Southeast Asia in their respective historical political and sociocultural contexts. From a historical perspective, many conflicts in the world, especially those in the global South, have often been an unwelcome consequence of colonialism. In fact, it is possible to trace the roots of some of the conflicts in Southeast Asia to when the colonial powers began to alter the region s social, political and economic structures in order to consolidate their rule in the respective colonies. Among the sweeping changes introduced during the colonial rule was the redrawing of the political boundaries of some of the key countries of the region. These almost artificial boundaries amalgamated diverse groups into new political entities without much regard to their distinct ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic roots. An unintended consequence was the dilution of the demographic balance and the appearance of new identities, which subsequently came to be at loggerheads with each other. In fact, the emergence of majority and minority dynamic and identity dissonance has been at the root of much of the conflicts in Southeast Asia, irrespective of underlying objectives. As Nicholas Tarling argued, the frontiers drawn up in imperial Southeast Asia were originally intended to prevent the outbreak of war among the rival colonial powers in the region. 1 However, their retention in the post-colonial era complicated the principles of selfdetermination and nationality. 2 Southeast Asian states did not undergo the kind of culturally homogeneous national assertiveness that broke up empires in Europe and the Americas under the pressures of industrialization and print capitalism. 3 Instead, the territorial and demographic predicament of the post-colonial states, especially the lack of fit between the territorial boundaries and 1 Nicholas Tarling, Imperialism in Southeast Asia: A Fleeting, Passing Phase (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), p Ibid., p Anthony Reid, Imperial Alchemy: Nationalism and Political Identity in Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 1.

3 Understanding Conflicts in Southeast Asia 3 ethnic, cultural and religious composition of new states in Southeast Asia, underpinned these nations quest for national security. 4 Additionally, the concern for regime survival and the need for consolidation on the part of the states in the region exacerbated this dynamic. The evolution of the international system into one based on the sovereign equality of nation-states also provided a degree of external pressure on the emerging countries to vigorously defend their new-found sovereignty and territorial integrity. 5 Thus, in the post-colonial era, nations in Southeast Asia, including those that were never colonized, e.g. Thailand, were confronted with the need to build effective state structures and cohesive national identities simultaneously. 6 However, in multi-ethnic, multireligious and multi-cultural societies, attempts at state consolidation also came face to face with resistance, often in the form of armed rebellion, from groups seeking self-determination for one reason or another. 7 Even though the roots of the quest for self-determination varied from minority concerns over their share in the political space to control over resources almost all of these issues led to political violence and terrorism in the region. 8 The historical roots of some of the communities or groups in conflict are also of particular importance in the Southeast Asian context. Many of these communities or groups mostly minorities in terms of ethnicity, religion, language and the like had previously been proud subjects of independent kingdoms, sultanates or even colonial powers before being confronted with challenges of integration into much larger and often alien political entities. 4 See Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995). 5 Nicholas Tarling, Nationalism in Southeast Asia: If the People are With Us (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), p E. A. Henderson and J. D. Singer, Civil War in the Post-colonial World, , Journal of Peace Research, 37:3 (2000), p See D. L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1986). 8 See T. R. Gurr, People versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001).

4 4 Whither Southeast Asia Terrorism? Additionally, they had to contend with regimes dominated by other ethnic and religious groups which were in the majority. As Jack Snyder points out such conditions invariably provoke a tendency to define national identity in terms of the dominant group s (the majority) values and culture, with other groups (the minority) tending or perceiving to be left on the periphery. 9 This becomes more problematic when ethnic or religious minorities are seen as potential threats to national integration by the ruling elite, drawn, as mentioned above, from the majority community. 10 Domination, as Snyder points out, works if the power of the dominant group is so overwhelming as to preclude rational resistance or when it is tolerated by those who are deprived of power yet decide that being second-class citizens is better than being first-class rebels. 11 In an ethno-nationalist or religious context, conflict and strife are the outcome if domination fails or is not tolerated by the minority community. Prevailing scholarship on the roots of conflicts in post-colonial states informs that there is a strong and positive correlation between ethnic conflict and ethnic nepotism expressed in terms of ethnic heterogeneity, albeit in particular contexts. 12 The same is also the case when religion is implicated in these conflicts. 13 With religious polarization, conflicts tend to get protracted, as there could be a perception that the conflicting issues are indivisible and hence not amenable to settlement through political means or negotiations Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000), pp A similar analogy can be drawn from the conflict in southern Thailand, where ethnicity has been at the root of a historical sense of vulnerability among Siamese rulers. See Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1994). 11 Ibid. 12 See T. Vanham, Domestic Ethnic Conflict and Ethnic Nepotism: A Comparative Analysis, Journal of Peace Research, 36:1 (1999), pp M. Reynal-Querol, Ethnicity, Political Systems and Civil Wars, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46:1 (2002), pp Isak Svensson, Fighting with Faith: Religion and Conflict Resolution in Civil Wars, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51:6 (2007), pp

5 Understanding Conflicts in Southeast Asia 5 There are also other factors, not the least of which are linguistic and cultural diversity and economic disparity, that cut across all these fault lines. It is also well established that minority grievances over the lack of political and civil rights, income inequality and social and cultural marginalization perceived or otherwise are especially conducive to internal unrest and violent conflicts. In almost all cases, such grievances, especially in newly emerging societies, relate to state consolidation. Though not an exclusive regional issue, state consolidation impacts on the existing state, society and institutional arrangements which, in the situation of a minority majority dynamic, invoke uncertainty in the minority about their status, rights and remedies. Besides, as Holsti notes, there is a tendency on the part of the state authority to use harsh measures, as leaders entrapped in such situations often experience a state strength dilemma, 15 in which, rather than seeking legitimacy through the due political process, there would be a preference to achieve assimilation through harsh policies and measures. 16 This, in turn, provokes even stronger resistance from the minority communities, which often has led to civic strife and even conflicts involving terrorism. In the Southeast Asian context, the conflicts in southern Thailand and southern Philippines attest to this logic; though this has also manifested in Indonesia and Malaysia, albeit in a more mild form, especially involving the contestation for political space and resources between the people of Chinese origin and the majority Muslim population. 17 The sensitivity to sovereignty and territorial integrity is a well-established normative consideration both among the scholars and political elites of the region, to the extent that protection and preservation of 15 K. J. Holsti, The State, War and the State of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p See S. C. Poe, C. N. Tate and D. Lanier, Domestic Threats: The Abuse of Personal Integrity, in C. Davenport, ed., Paths to State Repression: Human Rights Violations and Contentious Politics (Latham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000). 17 See Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, Indonesian Political Thinking (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1970); Leo Suryadinata, Chinese and Nation- Building in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Marshall-Cavendish International, 2004), p. 18.

6 6 Whither Southeast Asia Terrorism? both has become a mantra and a fait-accompli for the countries in Southeast Asia. Both involve a focus on the security of the state as a territorial entity. However, as others, especially those belonging to the Copenhagen School, argue, there is always a tension between a state s striving for security and a society s craving for self-preservation, as both the issues are linked to concerns for their respective survival. Accordingly, the survival of the state relies on the maintenance of its sovereignty, whereas the survival of the society depends on the maintenance of its identity. 18 In other words, state security is generally concerned with protecting the sovereignty of the state from external threats, while societal security concerns situations in which certain societies perceive threats to their existence and decide to do something about it. 19 As Michael Clarke noted, If a state loses its sovereignty it will not survive as a state, while if a society loses its identity it will not survive as a society. 20 In this context, policies and practices of governance in these states were found to have brought different ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic groups to loggerheads. In many cases, as with southern Thailand, for example, the desire of particular minorities to protect their identity often comes into conflict with the demands of loyalty to the state which is dominated by the majority group. It is the contradiction in these two desires that constitutes the root cause of many conflicts with ethno-religious connotations. In most cases minorities find themselves in disadvantageous positions vis-à-vis the majority in their respective states, 21 with threats of political marginalization, economic deprivation, forced assimilation, cultural oppression and physical oppression, to name a few. 22 Additionally, in many cases, minorities in a particular nation do not perceive their current political status as legitimate, which 18 O. Waever, B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup and P. Lemaitre, Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter, 1993), pp Ibid. 20 Michael Clarke, China s War on Terror in Xinjiang: Human Security and the Causes of Violent Uighur Separatism, Terrorism and Political Violence, 20:2 (2008), p Zhu Yuchao and Blachford Dongyan, Ethnic Disputes in International Politics: Manifestations and Conceptualizations, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 12:1 (2006), p Ibid.

7 Understanding Conflicts in Southeast Asia 7 explains their demand for national self-determination and even the resort to armed rebellion under particular circumstances. 23 Such a demand could be due to demographic imbalance as a result of arbitrary demarcation of boundaries, as in the case with Malay Muslims that find themselves on the wrong side of the Thailand Malaysia border. It could also be a reaction to the nation-building process of the particular state, which is seen as an exercise of state power dominated by the majority to build a cohesive national identity. 24 In a state-building process, assimilation is often a national demand, and minorities rights and interests are compromised as they have to be subordinated to the dominant political entity. 25 Evidently, some policies and commitments of nation building can be perceived to be not only violations of human rights but also threats to minority identity. It is these real or perceived threats that generate the discontent of the disadvantaged minorities at the very root level. 26 Thus, to a great extent, ruthless or indiscriminate pursuit of nation building and modernization and legitimacy through whatever means by many Southeast Asian states have contributed to the hardening of identities of certain social entities vis-à-vis the concerned state. Although ethno-nationalist and minority conflicts are usually rooted in the perception of threat and marginalization, such perceptions do not always lead to conflict or terrorism. As Ernie Regehr puts it, Conflicts in which the rights and political/social viability of particular communities are central issues are not evidence of ethnic chauvinism or of hatred for the other. However, conflicts emerge with intensity when a community, in response to unmet basic need for social and economic security, resolves to strengthen its collective influence and to struggle for political recognition. 27 Such conflicts are reflections of a more fundamental social distrust, borne out of a 23 Walker Connor, Nationalism and Political Illegitimacy, in Daniele Conversi, ed., Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World (New York, NY: Routledge, 2002), p Zhu Yuchao and Blachford Dongyan, Ethnic Disputes in International Politics: Manifestations and Conceptualizations, p Ibid. 26 Ibid., p Ernie Regehr, It s not Really a Matter of Hate, Disarming Conflict, 9 May 2007.

8 8 Whither Southeast Asia Terrorism? community s experience of economic inequity, political discrimination and human rights violations, to name a few. 28 In this respect, conflicts in Southeast Asia are no exception. At the same time, however, not all conflicts involve minority concerns. As briefly mentioned in the Introduction and described in some detail in Chapter 3, Southeast Asia also experiences conflicts that involve a tussle over resources and what could be termed communal and/or sectarian conflicts. In fact, the demand for self-determination has been a major source of conflict in Southeast Asia. These include demands for independence and/or for significant autonomy. A desire for greater autonomy includes demands by local populations to have a province or a distinct political unit of their own, or the right to choose their leaders without interference from central government, a more generous share in the resources and more importantly the opportunity to determine how local resources are used and for whom. In most cases, these conflicts are associated with concerns over the exploitation of local resources or the unfair distribution of the proceeds of such resources. This is manifested in centralized and elite ownership and control of natural resources, displacement and the transmigration typical to many countries of Southeast Asia. 29 Transmigration has been particularly problematic in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and Thailand to be specific, where the relocation of populations has been a deliberate state policy. The Self-Help Land Settlement Project of the Thai government led to the mass migration of Thai Buddhists from other regions to the south, which was resented by the Malay Muslim community as it was a manifestation of cultural colonization by means of the deliberate dilution of the local demography. 30 In Indonesia, the transmigration of the 28 Ibid. 29 See C. M. O Connor, Effects of Central Decisions on Local Livelihoods in Indonesia: Potential Synergies between the Programs of Transmigration and Industrial Forest Conversion, Population and Environment, 25:4 (2004), pp See Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002).

9 Understanding Conflicts in Southeast Asia 9 Madurese to Kalimantan was part of the national relocation policy from the high-density areas of Java to islands that were sparsely populated. 31 The Dayaks, who are the indigenous population in Kalimantan, felt displaced and threatened by the large migration of the Madurese. 32 Apart from the dilution of the demographic mix due to spontaneous migration, the Dayaks were also disturbed by government s handing out of vast parcels of Kalimantan s forests to logging companies, many of which were connected to members of the Suharto family, his cronies or the military. The result was that many forest-dwelling Dayaks were driven from their traditional environment. A 1979 law, which provided for uniform structures of local government throughout Indonesia, had the effect of undermining the authority of traditional village leaders and the cohesion of Dayak communities. Accompanying this dislocation was a widespread feeling among Dayaks that they were often looked down on by other communities as backward and uncivilized. 33 The outcome was a particularly large outbreak of riots in 1987 in which hundreds allegedly died. A few ethnic riots also broke out in the 1990s. In 1999 to 2000, this area witnessed some of Indonesia s most vicious ethnic killings. The initial conflict had been between Madurese and Malays both Muslim communities with the non- Muslim Dayaks joining later on the Malay side. 34 It was only after virtually all Madurese had fled from Sambas that order was restored. Notwithstanding the reason, both types of transmigration in Thailand and Indonesia have been implicated in conflicts involving identity and resources in the respective countries. Grievances over resource allocation and use have often been expressed in violent 31 International Crisis Group, Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons from Kalimantan, Asia Report No. 19 (27 June 2001), p. 14, asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/communal%20violence%20in%20indonesia%20 Lessons%20from%20Kalimantan.pdf 32 John Gershman, Indonesia: Islands of Conflict, Asia Times (26 October 2002), 33 Ibid. 34 A detailed account can be found in Edi Peterbang and Eri Sutrisno, Konflik Etnik di Sambas ( Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi, 2000).

10 10 Whither Southeast Asia Terrorism? terms in many other parts of the region as well. Historically, violence has been more common in areas that were not deeply integrated into the former colonies. For example, at the time of independence, East Timor and West Papua were not part of Indonesia. Aceh was only weakly integrated into the Netherlands East Indies during Dutch colonial rule. After independence, the Achenese engaged in a campaign to establish an Islamic republic until they could be brought to the mainstream through negotiation. There were armed secessionist movements in East Timor before it received independence. West Papua has also been involved in armed insurgency, demanding independence. 35 One of the more recent examples of grievances over the exploitation of resources leading to terrorist attacks was the attacks on 17 July 2009 targeting J. W. Marriott and Ritz Carlton hotels in Jakarta. In a statement on 26 July 2009, the mastermind of the attack, Noor din Top, claimed that the attack against J. W. Marriott was designed to target the KADIN Amerika (US Chamber of Commerce and Industry), referring to the main target of the attack: the meeting of top Indonesian functionaries and foreign businesses organized by Castle Asia Group. 36 The meeting also featured top Indonesian businessmen, mostly of Chinese origin. The deeply entrenched historical animosity of the majority Muslims towards Indonesians of Chinese origin due to their relative wealth is well known in the region. For example, during the All-Indonesian National Importers Congress in March 1956, a speech entitled The Chinese Grip on Our Economy put this hostility in rather stark terms: The power of the exclusivist and monopolistic Chinese in the economic field is far more dangerous for the progress of the Indonesian people, but that power is not regulated in any agreement [ ] it has been rooted and entrenched in society for 35 Gershman, Indonesia: Islands of Conflict. 36 Situs Internet yang Memuat Pernyataan Noordin M Top, tvone (29 July 2009). Translated at ICPVTR.

11 Understanding Conflicts in Southeast Asia 11 centuries. Therefore, liquidation of this legacy of Dutch colonialism is very difficult. We must face this danger together. The entire people and the government must face it consciously and systematically, as we have struggled to liquidate all other aspects of Dutch colonialism. 37 Similar sentiments can also be seen in Malaysia, where a number of policies, such as the preferential treatment of Bumiputras (Malay Muslims), attempt to counter the relative wealth of those of Chinese origin Democracy and Conflicts Related to the issues discussed above is a discourse about the democracy or, more specifically, democratization of the society and politics in Southeast Asia. Prior to 9/11, debates about democratization in Southeast Asia featured the following questions: Is democracy good for development? Are democratic transitions, such as the one unfurling in Indonesia, a catalyst for regional disorder? 39 However, the regional debate over democratization has undergone a marked shift to focus on two questions: Is the lack of democracy a root cause of terrorism? Does democracy limit the ability of states to effectively respond to it? 40 Before his surprise release from prison in September 2004, Anwar Ibrahim, the deposed and jailed Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia and current leader of the opposition political party in Malaysia, observed, Osama bin-laden and his protégés are the children of 37 See Feith and Castles, Indonesian Political Thinking See Collin Abrahim, The Naked Social Order: The Roots of Racial Polarisation in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Pelanduk Publications, 2003), pp Amitav Acharya, Southeast Asia s Democratic Moment? Asian Survey, 39:3 (May June 1999). 40 See Amitav Acharya, State-Society Relations: Asia and the World after September 11, in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, eds., World s In Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order (London: Palgrave, 2002); Amitav Acharya, One Result: The Retreat of Liberal Democracy, International Herald Tribune, 17 September 2002.

12 12 Whither Southeast Asia Terrorism? desperation; they come from countries where political struggle through peaceful means is futile. In many Muslim countries, political dissent is simply illegal. 41 Farish Noor, a Malaysian scholar of Islam, makes a direct link between terrorism and authoritarian politics in Malaysia: It is the absence of [ ] democratic culture and practices in the Muslim world in general that leads to the rise of self-proclaimed leaders like the Mullahs of Taliban, Osama bin laden and our own Mullahs and Osama-wannabes here in Malaysia. And as long as a sense of political awareness and understanding of democracy is not instilled in the hearts and minds of ordinary Muslims the world over [ ] we will all remain hostage to a bunch of bigoted fanatics who claim to speak, act and think on our behalf without us knowing so. 42 However, democratization has also been seen as the part of the problem, rather than a solution, especially by the region s political elite. Most blame democratization for the rise of terrorist activity in Indonesia. It is being argued that the failure of both Indonesia and the Philippines to rein in terrorism in their respective countries could be due to the absence of robust legal regimes like the Internal Security Act (ISA), which Malaysia and Singapore have used effectively against terrorism. Indonesia s efforts to bring the perpetrators of the Bali bombings to justice suffered a setback when, in an order in July 2004, the Constitutional Court held the retroactive application of Indonesia s anti-terrorism law, implemented after the October 2002 Bali bombings, as unconstitutional. 43 While safeguards 41 Anwar Ibrahim, Growth of Democracy Is the Answer to Terrorism, International Herald Tribune, 11 October Farish Noor, Who Elected You, Mr Osama? Malaysiakini.com (10 October 2001), p. 4, 43 Topo Santoso, Anti-Terrorism Legal Framework in Indonesia: Its Development and Challenges, paper presented at the 9 th Asian Law Institute Conference, National University of Singapore (31 May 1 June 2012), ugm.ac.id/index.php/jmh/article/viewfile/421/267

13 Understanding Conflicts in Southeast Asia 13 against the creation of ex-post facto laws is not uncommon, what was important here was the opinion of the court that bombings such as in Bali could not be classified as extraordinary crime in order to warrant a retroactive application. Similarly, after much haggling, Manila enacted the Philippines Human Security Act 2007 to deal with terrorism in the country. Even though a large number of safeguards to prevent its abuse have made the enactment virtually toothless, human right and advocacy groups in the Philippines argue that the law forms the building blocks of martial law, widespread political killings, the militarization of Metro Manila. 44 At the same time, the war on terror rhetoric has produced support for seemingly draconian legislations feared by pro-democracy forces in the region. The most significant source of this support is the US. For example, after his meeting with then US Attorney General John Ashcroft, Malaysia s legal affairs minister Rais Yatim claimed that Ashcroft had endorsed the significance of the ISA. 45 As Rais Yatim explained, After today s talks, there is no basis to criticise each other s systems. If they do that, they could jeopardise the credibility of the PATRIOT Act. 46 Thus, democratization in Southeast Asia has been implicated in fostering unmanageable dissent that has led to political violence and terrorism. Theories on democracy highlight the fact that the democratization process is rather painful and turbulent, which explains the emergence of voices of dissent in various manifestations. For example, many of the structural ills and conflicts in Indonesia are attributed to the country s painful transition to democracy after the Suharto era. Democratic transition is also implicated in the political chaos and impasse in Bangkok and the 44 Juliet Labog-Javellana, Anti-terror law: For bombers only, Inquirer (7 March 2007), 45 John Roberts, The Bush Administration Embraces Malaysian Autocrat, World Socialist Website (28 May 2002), 46 Ibid.

14 14 Whither Southeast Asia Terrorism? reluctance on the part of the Philippines government to implement counterterrorism measures with some teeth, as is the case with Indonesia. The same has been the case with Malaysia, with the government repealing the ISA, which was castigated as being an example of extreme violation of human rights and liberties and due process. 1.3 Global Connections As Noor din Top s statement indicates, and as exemplified by a number of incidents in Southeast Asia, conflicts, especially those with ethnic and more specifically religious undertones, unfortunately could not remain isolated from events in the broader international system. A number of factors could explain this congruence. First, there was a deliberate attempt on the part of al-qaeda to coopt conflicts involving Muslims anywhere in the world in its purported jihad against the West, particularly the US and what it viewed as the corrupt or apostate governments in Muslim majority countries. As Bruce Hoffman put it, Al Qaeda [had] deliberately sought to exploit local causes and re-align mostly parochial interests with its own transnational, pan-islamist ideology. 47 In a similar vein, an article in al-qaeda s military journal Al-Battar asserted that al-qaeda s strategy was to break out into the entire Islamic world and establish an international movement in several countries. 48 Al-Qaeda s strategy was largely utilitarian: the aggregation of dispersed local groups, issues and motivations that could lead to a united global fight (jihad). 49 Second, the region has been host to several homegrown Islamic terrorist groups. Many members of these groups participated in jihad in Afghanistan and subsequently received training in camps 47 Bruce Hoffman, The Changing Face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 27:6 (2004), p David J. Kilcullen, Countering Global Insurgency, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 28:4 (2005), p Ibid., p. 597.

15 Understanding Conflicts in Southeast Asia 15 set up by al-qaeda in Afghanistan. This created an ideal environment for al-qaeda to exploit and entrench its influence in the region. This was further facilitated by the prevalence of what Surin Pitsuan, the former Secretary General of ASEAN and former Thai foreign minister, called a strong sense of primordial resentment that exists among all Muslims around the world, particularly here in Southeast Asia, rooted in the belief that their sentiments about Jerusalem, which after Mecca and Medina is the third holiest site in Islam, have never been seriously accommodated. 50 Third, Southeast Asia s large Muslim population, porous borders, failed societies and weak governance helped external entities like al-qaeda to not only coopt the local groups but also alter their objectives and world view to the extent that the groups that espoused local concerns and confined their activities to the concerned states began to adopt the universal agendas of global jihad, broadly, and the establishment of an Islamic state, regionally. It also spawned the emergence of hybrid groups like Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), an Islamist group of Indonesian origin that could position itself as a regional network spanning Southeast Asia and Oceania (Australia). 51 JI s pan-islamic objective to establish an Islamic state ( Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara) encompassed countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Brunei. The roots of JI and its organization also demonstrate its transnational characteristics, which al-qaeda exploited in many ways. JI is an offshoot of the much more extensive and penetrative movements in Indonesia Darul Islam (DI) which fought to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia immediately after the end of the colonial rule in the country in DI was founded by Sekarmadji Maridjan 50 Surin Pitsuwan, Strategic Challenges Facing Islam in Southeast Asia, lecture delivered at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies and the Centre for Contemporary Islamic Studies, Singapore (5 November 2001). 51 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2002), p White Paper The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and The Threat of Terrorism, Ministry of Home Affairs, Singapore ( January 2003), p. 6, get_blob.aspx?file_id=252_complete.pdf

16 16 Whither Southeast Asia Terrorism? Kartosuwiryo in 1949, with the proclamation of Indonesia Islamic State ( Negara Islam Indonesia; NII). The movement spread rapidly and by 1955 rebel movements in Aceh, south Sulawesi and south Kalimantan aligned themselves to DI. 53 The key leaders of the organization, Abu Bakar Bashir and the late Abdullah Sungkar, trace their roots to DI. Although both Sungkar and Bashir fled to Malaysia in 1985 to avoid prosecution by the Suharto regime, by May 1996 Sungkar had consolidated the structure of JI (formally created in January 1993), 54 as evidenced by JI s constitution, General Guidelines for the Jemaah Islamiyah Struggle or PUPJI. 55 In many ways, the emergence of JI as a formal organization merely institutionalized a network that already existed. 56 Most JI leaders went back to Indonesia after the end of Suharto government in 1998, during the Reformasi transition. 57 Additionally, the DI milieu became the recruitment base of JI and most of its subsequent incarnations, such as Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), especially after JI splintered into at least two main factions over the issue of the use of violence to achieve political ends. It is important to note that almost all of JI s top leaders and many of the men involved in JI bombings trained in Afghanistan. The process of sending recruits to Afghanistan began at least seven years before JI formally came into being. The jihad in Afghanistan had a huge influence in shaping their worldview, reinforcing their commitment to jihad and providing them with training in terrorist tradecraft See C. Van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981). 54 See International Crisis Group, Indonesia Backgrounder, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, Asia Report No. 74 (3 February 2004), p. 2, Files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/074_jihad_in_central_sulawesi_mod 55 Pedoman Umum Perjuangan al-jamaah al-islamiyah (PUPJI). 56 International Crisis Group, Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous, Asia Report No. 63 (26 August 2003), p. 2, org/~/media/files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/063%20jemaah%20islamiyah%20 in%20south%20east%20asia%20damaged%20but%20still%20dangerous.pdf 57 White Paper, Ministry of Home Affairs, Singapore, p International Crisis Group, Indonesia Backgrounder, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, p. 2.

17 Understanding Conflicts in Southeast Asia 17 Before arrests in Singapore and Malaysia brought the group to public attention, JI s structure spanned the archipelago and beyond, betraying its transnational character. Several functional committees and four mantiqis (loosely translated as regional brigades) that were defined by not only geography but also functional roles, including fundraising, religious indoctrination, military training, and weapons procurement, were led by a five-member Regional Advisory Council. The main function of Mantiqi 1 composed of west Malaysia, Singapore and southern Thailand and was to provide financial support, as business and employment opportunities were plenty in these countries. Mantiqi 2, composed of most parts of Indonesia except Sulawesi and Kalimantan, was used for the main operations of JI because the majority of the members were based in these territories; it was the most efficient and the fastest in recruiting members and also had a vast network of sympathizers and supporters. 59 Mantiqi 3 controlled Kalimantan and Sulawesi in Indonesia and Mindanao in the Philippines. These territories were used for military academic purposes, which included infantry skills and bomb-making classes, and to provide ammunition, weapon and explosives materials for the group s use. Mantiqi 4 was composed of Australia. 60 The function of this mantiqi was solely to provide financial support to the group. However, JI s expansive structure has been dealt a severe blow by the counterterrorism operations in the respective countries. As JI s leadership structure is dismantled, institutional identities become less important, with greater emphasis being placed on personal bonds. This essentially meant that individuals in JI might decide to splinter off on their own without reference to the central command structure. 61 They can pull together the foot soldiers required in an 59 Rohaiza Ahmad Asi, JI Tapping Islamist Groups for Recruits, The Straits Times, 8 July Michael Vincent, Australian Terrorist Suspect Questioned in Indonesia, Transcript taken from The World Today, ABC Local Radio (16 July 2004), Derwin Pereira, JI Cells Still as Deadly, The Straits Times, 1 April 2005.

18 18 Whither Southeast Asia Terrorism? ad hoc fashion, cobbling together the critical mass for an operation from their own personal networks. This has, nevertheless, reduced the ability of the organization to function as a centralized entity and carry out highly-coordinated attacks, and has severed its links with groups like al-qaeda. Finally, the interaction of these organizations with developments in the Islamic world, facilitated in part by the proliferation of communications technology, 62 led to local groups imbibing the radical Islamist ideologies. This transformation further consolidated, especially after 9/11, with the emergence of a broader militant jihadist movement led by al-qaeda. One of the negative outcomes of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in response to the 9/11 attacks was the physical dispersal of the al-qaeda threat from a centralized location in Afghanistan to what came to be known as a worldwide network. In Southeast Asia particularly, this manifested not only in the flow of funds and training 63 but also in the hardening of the ideology in more religious terms. This led to a widening of the list of enemies to fight and to an increasing lethality of attacks by local groups. It is to be noted that before 9/11, JI attacks in the region were primarily directed against local (2000 Christmas Eve bombings) or at most regional (attacks against the Philippine Ambassador to Indonesia) targets. After 9/11, attacks became indiscriminate in terms of targets and tactics: large-scale, intended to inflict mass casualties and indiscriminate in terms of attacking civilians and foreigners foiled attempts in Singapore; the Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005, J. W. Marriott bombings in 2003, Australian Embassy bombing in 2004, bombing of SuperFerry14 in Manila Bay in 2004 mirroring the same image of global jihad that al-qaeda has been propagating. The attacks also reinforced the perception that al-qaeda was an invisible hand 62 Carlyle A. Thayer, Radical Islam and Political Terrorism in Southeast Asia, in Terence Chong, ed., Globalization and its Counter-Forces in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), p Damien Kingsbury and Clinton Fernandes, Terrorism in Archipelagic Southeast Asia, in Damien Kingsbury, ed., Violence in Between: Conflict and Security in Archipelagic Southeast Asia (Melbourne: Monash University Press, 2005), p. 9.

19 Understanding Conflicts in Southeast Asia 19 guiding Southeast Asian militant groups, particularly since some of these attacks were financed by al-qaeda and were justified in terms of the same narrative that al-qaeda used. Imam Samudra s justification of the October 2002 Bali bombings reinforces this point. In a book entitled Aku Melawan Teroris ( I am Fighting for Terrorism ), Samudra explained that the main targets of the Bali bombing were the US and its allies the UK, France and Australia, to name a few the ones guilty for attacking the helpless and the innocent, including children in Afghanistan and Iraq. Samudra argued that globalization has changed the character of the conflict between Muslims and non-muslims and that Islam is currently being attacked on a global scale. Hence, Muslim responses to this hostility should be in kind, and not be restricted to the occupied territories such as Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir or Iraq. Geographical considerations in this fight are moot. The only requirement is to attack Western and crusader interests Religious Schools in Conflict Critical in helping JI to consolidate its sway in the region were a group of Islamic schools, or pesantrens, which were empathetic to the JI s objective of establishing an Islamic state in Southeast Asia. The common thread that runs through these schools is the teachings of Salafism, a movement that seeks to return to what its adherents perceived as the purest form of Islam, asserted to have been practiced by the Prophet Muhammad and the two generations that followed him. They reject what they see as unwanted innovations brought to the religion in the later years. These schools, spread across the archipelago, helped JI replenish its ranks with young jihadists See Mohammad Haniff Hassan, Unlicensed to Kill: Countering Imam Samudra s Justification for the Bali Bombings (Singapore: Peace Matters, 2006). 65 International Crisis Group, Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don t Mix, Asia Report No 83 (13 September 2004), p. I, org/~/media/files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/83_indonesia_backgrounder_ why_salafism_and_terrorism_don_t_mix_web.pdf

20 20 Whither Southeast Asia Terrorism? In Indonesia, pesantrens, mosques and university campuses have become the main vehicles for spreading Salafi teachings, with the pesantrens being the most important. The Afghan veterans of Southeast Asia set up small networks of pesantrens, to espouse jihad. Similarly, the JI directly owns a number of Islamic boarding schools, and has been affiliated with a number of others. The most important of them in Indonesia is the al-mukmin (Pondok Ngruki of Abu Bakar Bashir) pesantren in Solo, Indonesia. Others are Pesantren Hidayatullah in Balikpapan, Kalimantan, Pesantren Darul Aman, in Gombara, Ujung Pandang and the al-islam School. These schools, as well as spreading Salafi teachings, became the centers of recruitment, indoctrination and operations for the JI. The Hidayatullah pesantren was used as a training camp for JI recruits after Abdul Hadi and Syawal Yasin (Abdullah Sungkar s son-in-law) had gone to Balikpapan to establish a training school for terrorists. This school was also used by Omar al-faroq for training for the Laskar Jundullah members. It is also alleged that the Hidyatullah pesantren became a place of shelter or transit for JI members on different occasions. 66 The DI movement was already committed to the use of violence against the Indonesian government, but was working slowly until JI was formed from its renegades. The Afghanistan experience married the commitment to jihad of the old DI members with the Salafi Islam of their Afghan mentors. The fall of Suharto (May 1998), the return of the JI leadership to Indonesia (late 1999) and the outbreak of communal conflict in Ambon (early 1999) made it possible for the radical Salafists to consolidate their position not only in Indonesia but also across the region. However, despite the use of violence, which included acts of terrorism, the objectives of the militant groups in the region have not been entirely zero-sum. This is evident from the inclination by most of the groups involved in conflicts in the region to resolve their respective disputes through negotiations. For instance, in 66 Matthew Moore, Rising Ranks of JI Killers Uncovered, The Sydney Morning Herald, 27 August 2003, html?oneclick=true

21 Understanding Conflicts in Southeast Asia 21 Aceh, Indonesia, the Free Aceh Movement ( Gerakan Aceh Merdeka; GAM), which fought for the independence of the province since 1976, signed a peace agreement in 2005 and entered politics. Similar situations are unfolding both in Thailand and the Philippines, with a gradual progression to autonomy instead of separation and groups in conflict participating in negotiations with their respective governments. In a region where the roots of conflict run deep, the peace processes in the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand present interesting implications. Foremost is what they suggest about the nature of militancy itself, which stands apart from the type of violence espoused by the al-qaeda-led jihadist movement. This also challenges the discourses that emerged after 9/11 in relation to the conflicts in Southeast Asia, the links of the groups in these conflicts to the broader militant jihadist movement and the assumptions made about the nature and role of Islam in the region, which is discussed in the next chapter.