The Association of Southeast Asian Nations Plus Three Secondary issue: The Question of Formulating Responses to Extremist Groups in ASEAN

Transcription

1 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations Plus Three Secondary issue: The Question of Formulating Responses to Extremist Groups in ASEAN

2 I. Introduction The recent events in Marawi, specifically its capture by the Maute Group and the ensuing battles fought between the Filipino government forces and militants pledging allegiance to ISIS is all but another manifestation of the issue of violent extremism plaguing the region since ASEAN s inception. The two Muslim-majority states Indonesia and Malaysia, as well as long-present Muslim minorities all the other ASEAN member states may have contributed to ASEAN being seen as a key Islamic region, with only the Middle East getting more attention from the Islamic community. Therefore, the rise of extremist violence is no surprise; but a call to action for the ASEAN community, which because of the ASEAN non-interference principle has thus far had limited political will and impetus to act. Would the recent events be enough to convince member states to take multilateral action to address the threats to their territorial integrity, national sovereignty, and fundamental rights of their citizens to live in a safe and secure environment? II. Background Information perpetrating terrorism would depend on the type of extremist group. Characterising terror networks Extremist groups can be characterized by the geographic area they wield power on which relates to their founding motives. The three main types are as follows: Nationalistic groups, as the name suggests, are in a single country, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines. These groups are founded on the central tenet of fighting political injustices such as institutional discrimination, however, despite societal development, these groups continue resorting to violence thus one can indeed question their true motives. Regionalist groups such as Jemaah Islamiah (JI) wield significant power in Southeast Asia, despite various governmental crackdowns on them. Unlike nationalistic groups, these groups are not founded on the principle of eradicating social ills against certain sects of society but instead they aim to have only Islamic leaders in the world. These groups have similar principles as globalist groups but they still have differences. Terrorism is a widely used term and thus its true definition is often subject to debate. However, there is a general consensus that it is the use of illegal force by non-state parties. Thus, the motives of Globalist groups such as Al-Qaeda, strive towards a global caliphate where Sharia is practised by every living soul. These groups have no hesitation to use violence and would not mind collateral loss of

3 Muslim life as long as they are able to achieve their aim. All these groups have one thing in common, that is, the belief that the current political system cannot address their grievances. This is shown by the blatant refusal of JI to engage in politics, thus they opt for violence to achieve their goal. Historical grievances caused by colonization, has indeed spurred strong anti-western sentiments, which perpetuates hatred towards others who seem to be embracing the Western way of living. In fact, the counter-terrorism measures taken within Southeast Asia is largely seen as the second front on the Global War on Terror. With most analysts subscribing to the globalist school of thought, it is argued that organisations such as JI are simply transferring the jihadist sentiments in the Middle East to the second largest Islamic population in Southeast Asia. 1 This framework indeed coheres with the rise of the Islamic State in Southeast Asia, but neglects other more nationalist terror groups as espoused below. It is also worth mentioning that there exist four class divisions of engaging in terrorist activities separatist, marginalised from society and regarded as victims of political exclusion, they pose the greatest challenge to the legitimacy of existing regimes in the region; armed anti-government opposition, wishing to address some deeply-rooted political, economic and social grievance; radical Islamist, or wishing to impose a variant of Sharia law and other radical religious policies; and overt religious organisations, largely peaceful that appear to be education centres except promoting radical interpretations of Islam, typically operating out of Indonesia. 2 Regional terrorist networks in Southeast Asia The latest worry with regards to regional extremism is the external threat posed by the prominent Islamic terrorist group, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS); specifically, if it is capable and interested in setting up a caliphate, or a province ( wilayat ) within the region. Most experts consider that a caliphate in and of itself is not a plausible outcome, but it would be far more likely that Southeast Asia houses ISIS-aligned groups which support ISIS as well as conduct operations within the Southeast Asian region. 3 Particularly with ISIS military victories and rapid territorial expansion in the late 2013 and 2014, many thousands of Southeast Asians have pledged loyalty to al-baghdadi and probably between Muslims from the region joined the ISIS war effort in Syria and Iraq. This is also reflected in the ISIS leadership towards the Southeast Asian region between 2014 and 2015, their primary concern was maximising recruitment of fighters for the war in Iraq and Syria. This is despite two pro-isis groups the Eastern Indonesia Holy Warriors (MIT) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), led by, among others, Hapilon in

4 the southern Philippines having claims to territorial control and the possession of fighting forces. It is likely that ISIS did not have significant interest in wilayat status of either group given that neither properly controlled territory within the country; a feat more attributed to the successes of local security forces rather than the cooperation between ASEAN member states. Yet a June 2016 video which appeared on ISIS Furqan website naming ASG leader Isnilon Totoni Hapilon as an ISIS emir in Southeast Asia and the mujahid authorized to lead the soldiers of the Islamic State in the Philippines showcases ISIS commitment to the symbolic expansion of territory and legitimacy of its claims to power by empowering others outside of its territory in Iraq and Syria as well as needing to intensify jihadist operations in other parts of the world due to major military reversals within the region. 4 However, ISIS is only a recent development. The extremist, and sometimes separatist groups operating within Southeast Asia have far longer histories. Thailand The 2015 Global Terrorism Index s (GTI) main message that terrorism is on the rise and its reach is widening chimes with a new assertiveness from political leaders who have competed to emphasize that the values of liberty must be preserved and, somewhat in contradiction, that terrorists should be rooted out by military or other means. Notably in the case of Thailand, it ranks it as tenth in the GTI, as an insurgency in the Deep South has ebbed and flowed for more than a decade, claiming over 6,000 lives. One problematic issue is that the report employs a definition of terrorism that conflates many types of violence by many types of non-state groups, including sub-national secessionist movements, ideologically-motivated insurgents and political protesters. This is dangerous given how states, particularly since 9/11, have consistently used counter-terrorism rhetoric to repress dissent at the expense of finding political solutions to complex problems. 5 This example of a flawed assessment of Thailand s terrorism situation betrays the more pernicious harm to reduce violence and acts of terror, the Thai government needs to engage the groups responsible for such attacks. But by wrongly characterising them as terrorists which they are not; Thailand s political history showcases a routine uptick in violence during major power shifts the Thai government quickly turns rhetoric into one of anti-terrorism. This, therefore, is one of the greatest obstacles to peace within the region, and makes it harder to differentiate between the actual terrorists and political groups that indeed utilise the element of terror. This definitional challenge also

5 plays out in the Philippines, and is equally relevant there. The Southern Thailand conflict is instead an ethno-nationalist movement. Since 1902, the Thais have attempted to forcibly assimilate the Malay Muslims in the south into the Thai political structure. 6 Successive Thai governments have sought to build a strong and unified state without any regard for the culture, language, and religion of the local community. The language barrier, income disparity, and the discrimination have only heightened the feeling of alienation in the face of overreaction by the government and insensitivity to minority issues. The problem is aggravated by the following factors: The Thai Government s heavy handed response in the form of extrajudicial killings, large scale mass arrests and holding innocent individuals without charge; failure to re-establish trust with the Muslim community by adopting fair and transparent policies such as inquiries into police or military excesses; and failure to create mechanisms to allow political grievances to be addressed. The Thai insurgency has also received assistance, directly and indirectly from external elements by way of training, indoctrination, and resources. The situation could change dramatically if the so-called plight of the Thai Muslims were to be picked up by Al Qaeda and international jihadists, making the Southern Thai conflict a rallying point for overall global jihad and a destination for foreign jihadi fighters. The insurgent groups in Southern Thailand may not be expected to bring the Thai Government down through terror attacks, but rather to ultimately prevail in achieving a change in Bangkok s policy in respect of the three Southern provinces. Major actors in Southern Thailand include the National Revolutionary Front and the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO). However, the group that is most active in Southern Thailand now appears to be BRN Coordinate, one of the factions within Barisan Revolusi Nasional. 7 Among the groups, there is lack of clear leadership. Membership across the groups often overlap. In recent waves of violence, civilians along with government officials and security personnel have been routinely targeted. However, the conflict is still very much localized and there is no concrete evidence of the Indonesian Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) or other outside groups participating in the conflict. Nevertheless, the nationalist-separatist struggle in Southern Thailand is rapidly transforming into a politico-religious conflict. Insurgent ideologues are increasingly politicizing and mobilizing the target audience, using religion rather than nationalism. The character of the insurgent campaign is changing from guerrilla warfare into urban terrorism. In the past, the insurgents targeted military, police, and government officials. Today, the targets are mostly civilians and civilian infrastructure.

6 Cambodia Cambodia is one of Southeast Asia s biggest terrorist hotbed Limited democratic freedom, community tensions and a lack of resources mean it sits fourth in the region in the Global Terrorism Index. There is wide anti-government sentiment in modern Cambodia. This is due to the fault lines laid down in the country s recent bloody history. Terrorist groups such as so-called Islamic State (IS) take advantage of this and use Cambodian territory as a base for operations, as a refuge, and to radicalise its residents. While Cambodia has not historically been a hotbed of Muslim jihadist activity given its rather small Muslim population of about 500,000, more radical religious teachings funded with Middle Eastern money have been increasing in impact. 8 Cambodian Muslim youths go to Kelantan in Malaysia and to Pakistan to study Islamic teachings, and Thai authorities have noticed an increase in the number of Cambodian Muslims entering Thailand on their way to the South. Recently, life sentences were handed out by the Cambodian court against three Islamists on charges of plotting attacks against the British Embassy in Phnom Penh. 9 While Cambodia, given its small Muslim population, will not be subject to Taliban-like control by a group of jihadists, it is appropriate to consider the country as the wild West. With poor governance and lax border control, the country could become a place where radical teaching, covert training, planning, and recruitment occur. The community could easily become a haven for regional and international terrorists. Philippines The insurgency in the Philippines is a domestic phenomenon with deep historical roots and an unsuccessful integration of the Muslim population into the Christian dominated state. The conflict in Mindanao is largely due to the imposition of the mainstream culture/religion on the minorities and due to uneven government policies. There is also a sense of perceived repression from the Central Government. The Bangsamoros feel that their rights as a minority in the country are not fully recognized and they have been deprived of political participation and economic advancement. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), and the Rajah Suleiman Movement (RSM) are three major actors in the Philippines. 10 Currently, organizational distinctions have blurred within these groups, and new alliances have come into being. The MILF and ASG, for instance, have had a relationship of convenience in which one group taps into the resources of the other and vice versa. The key leaders of ASG and RSM are also related by kinship apart from ideology. The ASG has been recognized widely as a bandit group.

7 However, the group also comprised of leaders who were more ideologically attuned. The leader of ASG Khadaffy Janjalani had a hard time in making the group more ideologically oriented due to the presence of leaders who were driven by financial motives, such as Commander Robot alias Galib Andang. With Galib Andang and several other leaders either arrested or dead, the present leadership is trying to reinvent the group into a jihadi organization. The threats from ASG should not be underestimated, as the group is more capable than is widely perceived. It is also enhancing its capabilities to launch new types of attacks. Even with factionalism within the group, the MILF leadership remains strong and in control. The group controls a large territory with hard-line commanders in charge. However, with the gradual decline of resources and war fatigue among the community, the dividend from peace would appear to be more attractive for the group and its supporters. MILF s links with other groups appear to be at the level of its field commanders. There is continuing cooperation at the training and operational levels among the JI structured factions in Indonesia and the ASG, MILF and the RSM in the Philippines. 11 There are tensions, however, as the agenda of different groups become more difficult to fit together. RSM, a relatively new actor, now helps these groups to expand their theatre of operations beyond Southern Philippines. This was evident from the Valentine Day attacks in Manila. RSM has an advantage over other groups because its members are familiar with the environment in Luzon and can blend into the surroundings without much difficulty. In addition, the New Peoples Army (NPA) significantly undermines governance in a large part of the country. The NPA has a presence in most of the Philippines. It is believed that the Philippines government s priority now is to reach a peaceful settlement with the MILF so that they can commit resources to fight the NPA. In the Philippines, the main problem is that the government has not been able to put in place robust counter-terrorism mechanism. There is no budgetary allocation by the government for intelligence and law enforcement even though a multi-agency Anti-Terrorism Task Force has been set up to fight against terrorism. There is also little cooperation among different government agencies. Indonesia Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is the most dangerous group after Al-Qaeda. The group is heavily influenced by Al Qaeda s ideology and modus operandi. JI emerged out of the Darul Islam Movement due to disagreement among leaders about the political objectives to pursue. After bombings in Bali and Jakarta, there was dissatisfaction among the group members about pursuing Al Qaeda s global jihad agenda. However, there is no agreement yet to return to the old Darul Islam struggle, id est, establishment of Islamic

8 law in Indonesia. JI now functions in a decentralized manner with a significant degree of fluidity in its membership. This horizontal structure provides JI with ample opportunities to tap into a vast network of jihadists, or other Islamist militant groups, that operate on the same ideological premise. The radical Islamists have become increasingly ideologically driven and group affiliations have become less significant. With its broader agenda, JI has tried to win over groups with local agendas, into the umbrella of radical global Islamist movements. This is often done through the provision of financial and technical assistance. Cooperation of local groups with JI has often led to the former to conduct more deadly attacks on targets. Structured and unstructured factions of the JI are also working with the MILF and the ASG in the Philippines. For example, Indonesian radical Muslims have responded to the war in Iraq by organizing protests and openly voicing their opinion against the US and its allies. In the long run, there is a high possibility that the political faction of JI, also commonly referred to as the JI mainstream, would pose the greater danger. Although the JI mainstream places a high emphasis on proselytization, they also provide military training to their members and most of its senior figures are Afghan veterans. Over time, their consolidated strength would be greater than the decentralized and ad hoc factions such as the one formed by Noordin Top. The failure of the Indonesian government to ensure that an adequate punishment is meted out to Ba asyir, has once again, proved the weaknesses in its legal system when dealing with terrorists who kill innocent civilians. Furthermore, JI poses a greater danger to the region as compared to other groups like in the Philippines and Southern Thailand. This is mainly because of the resilience of its ideology. Individuals such as Imam Samudra and Noordin Mohd Top distort and manipulate certain concepts of the Islamic teachings to win new recruits. Compounded with historical events, such as the persecution of Darul Islam figures and the sense of injustice and repression because of the policies of the central government has become the rallying point for committing violent acts, cause volatile sentiments within the radical Islamist population. With the largest Muslim population in the world, Indonesia would have to focus on civil society and religious group to develop counter-terrorism narratives for mitigation. This comes together with the strengthening of pluralism in Indonesia s domestic politics to enfranchise those that might turn to extremism. 12 III. ASEAN actions The ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime (1997) was the precursor to all other ASEAN efforts to target terrorism, and

9 several efforts have since been implemented building upon the 1997 Declaration. The 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism (2001) 13 was issued just months after the September 11 th attack to condemn such terrorist actions, but the practical measures were disappointingly, inter alia, to review and strengthen and to study. Hence the effectiveness of this Declaration is questionable. The 2002 Declaration 14 was in response to the Bali bombings as well as attacks in the Philippines which had, in total, claimed the lives of over 216 civilians. Yet the wording was such that ASEAN is determined to carry out and build on the specific measures outlined in the [ASEAN 2001 Declaration]. This suggests continued lack of implementation of tangible measures. Yet another document was released in 2007, named the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism 15, that provided the framework to implement practical measures as well as covering pertinent issues such as defining the term of terrorism, addressing the issue of sovereignty and non-interference and outlining areas of cooperation such as extradition. Even then, it took 6 years for ratification by all 10 ASEAN member states. More statements were released in 2014 condemning ISIS, 16 but in 2015 the Special Ministerial Meeting on the Rise of Violent Extremism did not yield any official results. It is therefore clear that the efforts to counter the threat of terrorism have indeed been met by a number of challenges that limit what ASEAN can do, and that the ASEAN states often acted independently, and there was little substantial counterterrorism cooperation among ASEAN states. There is continued treatment of terrorism as a domestic issue, and international criticism of member states handling of the situation has led to diplomatic spats rather than an impetus for greater counterterrorism work. Furthermore, the violation of state s sovereignty remains a huge concern that causes reluctance to further international instruments, despite the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism already being in place. 17 However, frameworks can be modelled upon the multilateral counter-piracy approach instituted between Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. The Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP) have succeeded in bringing together the navy, air force, and intelligence sectors of all participating countries, widely credited with containing piracy and armed robbery between the straits. Ironically, it faces the exact same challenges as existing counter-terrorism frameworks that of an unwillingness to concede sovereignty for foreign military vessels participating in patrols. 18

10 IV. Scope Delegates are expected to debate both on the principled level with regards to the level of cooperation required between countries with respect to the norms and conventions of the ASEAN way as well as how the abovementioned frameworks can be implemented. Increasing checks and balances, and providing incentives are strategies to increase cooperation. V. Potential Solutions The solutions to reduce violent extremism are the same in Southeast Asia as they are in the rest of the world reducing the chance of radicalisation by working with a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach; reducing the networking capabilities of terrorists by increasing intelligence-sharing and gathering capabilities; reducing the strike capabilities of terrorists, and increasing international police and military operations against the terrorists. 19 The challenge, therefore, is integrating presently fragmented institutions both internally and externally. For example, Singapore and Malaysia use the police force as the main means of internal security control, whereas in countries with established separatist movements, the responsibility falls on both the military and the police force. Therefore, these institutional obstacles are the barriers to cooperation. Finally, the added threat of returning ISIS fighters mandates that the ASEAN member states take a quick and decisive action against the ever-increasing internal threats, notwithstanding the fact that each country has its own interpretation of the non-interference policy and need for maintaining a level of state sovereignty. VI. Key Questions 1. What are the guidelines for cooperation that respect individual country s sovereignty and generates buy-in? 2. What are the ways to enforce the mechanisms that have already been developed in previous ASEAN proposals? 3. How can a whole-of-government approach to the rise of radical groups be incorporated to target terrorism from its societal roots to its violent manifestation? VIII. Conclusion The threat of domestic and international terrorism has never been new to ASEAN. Yet the developments in the political and security terrain have made it that current mechanisms are not enough to completely prevent a terrorist attack. It is an imperative that a response is formulated just as the Islamic State is in its final moments of survival and the threat of lone-wolf attacks are already increasing fast.

11 BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Gershman, John Is Southeast Asia the Second Front? Foreign Affairs, July. 2. Banlaoi, Rommel C Counter Terrorism Measures in Southeast Asia: How Effective Are They? Manila: Yuchengco Center. 3. Fealy, Greg Is an ISIS Caliphate Possible in Southeast Asia? Discussion Paper, Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute. 4. Rood, Steven Southern Philippines: The Challenges of Extremism and Terrorism. Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute. 5. Barron, Patrick Who Is a Terrorist?: Lessons from Thailand and the Philippines. The Diplomat, 13 January. 6. Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies; Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Threat and Response. Washington D.C.: US Department of State. 7. Human Rights Watch A Brief History of Insurgency in the Southern Border Provinces. New York City: Human Rights Watch. 8. Pennington, John Is Cambodia an easy target for terrorists? ASEAN Today, 20 April. 9. Meyn, Colin Cambodia s Long Battle Against Terrorist Groups. The Cambodia Daily, 14 April. 10. Kam, Stefanie, and Rohan Gunaratna Handbook of Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific. Singapore: World Scientific. 11. Human Rights Watch Lives Destroyed: Attacks on Civillians in the Philippines. New York: Human Rights Watch. 12. ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute Indonesia: Looking Outward, Turning Inward? ISEAS Monitor. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute ASEAN Secretariat ASEAN Declaration on Join Action to Counter Terrorism. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat. 14. ASEAN Secretariat Declaration on Terrorism. Phnom Penh: ASEAN Secretariat. 15. ASEAN Secretariat ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat. 16. East Asia Summit Secretariat East Asia Summit Statement on the Rise of Violence and Brutality Committed by Terrorist/Extremist Organisations in Iraq and Syria. Nay Pyi Taw: East Asia Summit Secretariat. 17. Almuttaqi, Ibrahim Countering ISIS in Southeast Asia : ASEAN s Efforts at the Regional Level. Jakarta: The Habibie Center. 18. Graham, Euan Expanding Maritime Patrols in Southeast Asia. RSIS Commentary, 7 April. 19. Singh, Jasminder The 2017 Marawi Attacks: Implications for Regional Security. Commentary, Singapore: RSIS Publications.