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2 1 TURKEY AND Who QATAR: 3D DEAL-MAKERS Prints What in OR 2033? DEAL-BREAKERS? INTRODUCTION Ever since the Arab Spring provided an opening for the mobilization of Islamist political movements across the Middle East and North Africa, Turkey and Qatar have developed significant connections with a range of violent and nonviolent Islamist groups across the region. These strategic initiatives have often put them at odds with their traditional regional allies, and many have called into question the durability of Turkish and Qatari alliances with the United States (U.S.), NATO, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Their strategies since 2011 have made Turkey and Qatar key players in a variety of regional conflicts and controversies: post-morsi Egypt, the Syrian civil war, post-qaddafi Libya, Israel-Palestine, the Iranian nuclear issue, and others. Turkey and Qatar have been able to operate independently because their governments have enjoyed public support, their economies were growing, they boasted high revenues, and their core leadership was confident in their distinctive roles in regional politics. The costs and benefits of these independent initiatives are certain to be recalculated under different global and local conditions. Will Turkey and Qatar continue to strike out on their own? Will they rejoin their traditional allies? Will they look farther abroad for new allies and strategic opportunities? Will their economic or regional position change, thus forcing shifts in Turkish and Qatari foreign policy? This report examines various possibilities for both countries through 2017, and the kind of policy options they might pursue to consolidate or change their position at that point. ABOUT US Wikistrat is the world s first crowdsourced consultancy. It leverages a global network of subject-matter experts via a patent-pending Collaborative Competition methodology to provide a variety of analytic services. Scenario generation, policy planning, risk assessment, and red-teaming exercises are conducted by Wikistrat on a realtime, interactive online platform.

3 2 SIMULATION BACKGROUND Turkey and Qatar are pivotal swing states within the broader Middle East. Each possesses firmly rooted ties with the broader West. Qatar has transformed its tremendous resources into a sustainable economic vehicle by acquiring a large stake in developed businesses. Cooperation with the West also extends to defense and security issues, with the capital Doha emerging as a leading purchaser of American-made military equipment in recent years. Similarly, Turkey has long sought greater economic integration with the West. Despite not securing admission to the European Union (EU), that bloc has become Turkey s biggest import and export market. Turkey also remains a full member of NATO, cooperating with allies on terrorism and Syria. At the same time, both countries have maintained foreign and internal policies that set them apart not only from the West, but also from their regional neighbors. Though Qatar has adopted liberalizing reforms 2004 saw the passage of a constitution that recognized women s suffrage it remains a conservative country, using its Al-Jazeera media outlet to promote a distinctly Islamic identity. Likewise, Doha sought an organizing role in the chaos that emerged following the Arab Spring, providing extensive support to Islamist groups in both Libya and Syria. Turkey, on the other hand, has impeded efforts to isolate Iran, maintaining high volumes of trade in the face of international sanctions. Moreover, its response to the regional turmoil wrought by the Arab uprisings which included the provision of political support to the Morsi regime in Egypt led to a rupture in ties with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. Both countries now stand at a crossroads. In 2013, Sheikh Hamad abdicated his position to his 35-year-old son, Sheikh Tamim, leaving it to him to guide Qatar in the decades ahead. Meanwhile, Turkey s evolution will be presided over by increasingly autocratic state structures this following constitutional changes that enabled the Justice and Development Party (AKP) s political domination. The path each adopts will have significant ramifications for the region, especially for the future of radical Islam. Qatar s support for religious-based groups, and Turkey s faith in the notion of Islamic democracy both hold promise to groups seeking a broader role for religion in politics. At the same time, Turkey and Qatar s high level of cooperation with the West are likely to see them come under pressure to do more to stem the advance of groups that mobilize religion as a motivator for violence (e.g. ISIS). SIMULATION OVERVIEW In October, 2014 Wikistrat ran a two-week long simulation entitled Turkey and Qatar: Deal-Makers or Deal- Breakers?, aiming to identify what the regional positions of these two countries will look like in 2017 as well as the ways in which they will use those positions to influence each other, the region, and radical regional Islamist groups. The simulation was conducted in two phases with over 60 analysts of all ranks taking part. In Phase I, analysts explored 40 different scenarios depicting events shaping Turkey and Qatar s regional position in the next three years. In Phase II, analysts created 24 proactive strategies Turkey and Qatar may pursue in 2017 and beyond to affect their own positions, each other s power in the region, or radical Islamist groups in and beyond 2017.

4 3 MASTER NARRATIVES A Master Narrative (MN) consists of a distinct grouping of individual Scenarios submitted during the simulation, together forming a foresight of four possible futures for Turkey and Qatar, guided with the question What will Turkey and Qatar s regional position and their relationships with radical Islamist groups look like in 2017?. The Lead Analyst identified two axes that set the terms for evaluating the results of the simulation, which were then used to create an X/Y Matrix (Figure 1) as a means of visualizing the discussion, encompassing and positioning the various scenarios and outcomes in relation to each other. The matrix creates four quadrants that reflect the major possible outcomes of international relations in Turkey and Qatar. The lower left quadrant represents the worst-case MN, in which the two countries isolate themselves and alienate their allies, while the top right quadrant represents a best-case scenario, in which the two countries become productive members of the global community. Figure 1 - Master Narrative Matrix Cooperative MN III: The Sublime Porte MN IV: Justice and Construction Global Regional MN I: The Lonely Sultans MN II: The Regional Challengers Confrontational The X-axis focuses on external factors: Will regional or global developments primarily shape Turkey and Qatar s positions over the next three years? The Y-axis focuses on internal reactions: Will Turkey and Qatar s relations with neighbouring states become more cooperative or more confrontational?

5 4 MASTER NARRATIVE 1: THE LONELY SULTANS (GLOBAL, CONFRONTATIONAL) Turkey and Qatar are able to thrive despite such challenges as Europe s economic malaise and the spillover of the Syrian conflict onto Turkish soil. Although rebuffed again by the EU, Turkey s economy continues growing rapidly, and its trading ties shift eastward. Based on mutual commercial interests and a shared skepticism of Europe, Turkey, Russia, and Iran develop closer economic and political ties. Strong economic growth cements President Erdoğan and the AKP atop Turkey s political system, and his centralizing constitutional reforms easily pass in a referendum. Qatar, meanwhile, continues deepening its commercial and financial ties across the world: Even if other countries resent it, Qatari business efforts in the region and abroad are highly successful. It continues to diversify its economy, and after a momentary drop in liquified natural gas (LNG) prices, these rebound based on strong global demand. The emirate s treasury is flush with cash. As both countries perceive themselves as outcompeting their neighbors, they give up any pretext of acceding to the demands of the GCC, Egypt, or other states with interests in the region. Instead, they aggressively pursue their distinctive foreign policy agendas, often over strong objections from their traditional allies. Their increasingly independent course is viewed by Western and regional countries alike with suspicion and alarm. With their domestic, political, and economic positions secure, Qatar and Turkey are free to pursue pro-islamist foreign policies. Their relationships with militant groups deepen across multiple theaters. Turkey establishes a more robust rebel safe haven along its border with Syria, provides a base for Turkish and Qatari special forces to train, and arms rebels to fight Assad. Even though the U.S.had declared its intention to increase support for moderate Syrian rebel groups, it balks when it realizes the high percentage of extremists who are going through training in the Turkish sanctuary. Indeed, Turkey is taking all comers: it only superficially vets the new fighters, and actively encourages defectors from ISIS to join its proxy army. Factions linked to the Nusra Front and Al-Qaeda are frequently seen in the new sanctuary. While Turkey claims it is still fighting ISIS, those efforts are clearly of secondary importance to deposing Assad. Turkey and Qatar also deepen their ties to Islamists in Libya. After Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) intervene in eastern Libya, Turkey and Qatar send arms and advisors to Muslim Brotherhood (MB)-affiliated Islamist groups based in central and western Libya. Though Turkey and Qatar strongly deny it, Western analysts are convinced that the weaponry they are sending has also reached jihadists. Libya grows increasingly unstable, creating volatility in the global energy markets, and instability is increasingly spreading into both Tunisia and Egypt. Turkish and Qatari support for Hamas also becomes a major diplomatic flashpoint, with Israel, Egypt, and the U.S. vehemently objecting. Turkey and Qatar have become willing to accept isolation from their traditional security partners, NATO and the GCC. Qatar brushes off threats of a World Cup boycott from figures in Washington and London, and both countries increasingly acting in concert declare that they will remain champions of their own national interests and their own values.

6 5 MASTER NARRATIVE 2: THE REGIONAL CHALLENGERS (LOCAL, CONFRONTATIONAL) While enthusiastic early support of anti-assad rebels in Syria once seemed likely to enhance their regional position, Turkey and Qatar find themselves weakened and isolated as the Syrian regime appears poised to survive and extremists increasingly dominate the rebels. Rather than align their policies with those of their neighbors, Turkey and Qatar escalate their support for the Syrian rebels. They also end their controversial support for MB-aligned parties, and tensions with other states in the region rise even as the positions of both countries decline. In the early 2010s, Turkish and Qatari foreign policies were underpinned by strong economic growth. That has changed, however, as regional instability and strategic competition inhibit economic growth throughout the Middle East. Turkey is hit particularly hard due to an influx of refugees from Syria as global financial instability and negative European growth severely strain the Turkish financial sector and depress Turkish exports. Qatar s economy is harmed by plummeting natural gas prices due in part to the spread of hydraulic fracturing around the world. Though Qatar remains prosperous, and continues to provide a lavish standard of living to its tiny population, its declining buying power dampens one of its key strengths. Additionally, support of opposition factions in Syria and Libya consumes its energy both politically and financially. The weakened Turkish and Qatari governments redouble their investments in regional Islamist groups and increase their support to jihadist factions, desperate to maintain strong positions. With local challenges consuming their focus, relations with outside powers stabilize. Seeking support for its regional actions, Turkey mends fences with the EU and its NATO partners. Qatar also moves to consolidate its Western investments, aware that this stream of income is slowly transforming from a boon to a dependence. Although concerned by the company both states keep, the U.S. and EU seek to cooperate with Turkey and Qatar, aware that the countries increasingly heavy involvement in the region s affairs make them key players in any future political solutions. Despite its hyperfocus on Syria and Libya, Qatar increases its support to Islamist groups across the region, including the MB and Hamas though less than it might have otherwise. There are also rumors of Qatari support for jihadists in North Mali, though outside analysts do not consider them sufficiently proven. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is accused of a series of bombings against government targets, as well as against Coptic churches and Christian-owned businesses. Egyptian dragnets push the group further underground, but Qatari support prevents it from being buried altogether. Hamas refuses to demobilize and, after a relatively minor dispute with Fatah, once again expels the Palestinian Authority from Gaza. Israel accuses Hamas of rebuilding its extensive tunnel network and stockpiling missiles, and observers fear that it will make another major military incursion into Gaza. Libya s interim government has all but collapsed, and extremist Salafi groups dominate in Benghazi and Dernah. Further, these radical factions earn over $100 million a year from their sale of oil, magnifying fears of terrorism and instability. In particular, Tunisia s once-bright future appears increasingly threatened by the deteriorating situation in Libya. Because of these aspects of Qatari foreign policy, the emirate s relations with key regional actors, including Egypt and the GCC, are at a breaking point. In the past, Qatar managed to cultivate relationships on both sides of many regional conflicts, but now Middle Eastern governments and investors are reassessing their relationships with the emirate. Several major construction projects fall through. Turkey has taken an increasingly Islamist turn domestically, hastened by its growing regional isolation. There is also growing concern in Turkey about the rise of Kurdish militant groups, which won a significant victory against ISIS at Kobane in Most observers now believe that an independent Kurdish state has become a fait accompli, weakening Turkey s regional position and enraging its political class. In a final effort to avert the emergence of an independent Kurdish state in northern Syria, Turkey channels covert aid to jihadist groups on condition that they target Kurds; Turkey occasionally supplements their efforts with the deployment of its own special forces. When this secret policy goes public, Kurdish groups begin to secure support from Turkey s regional rivals. The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) announces an end to its most recent ceasefire. Turkish and Qatari support for Islamist and jihadist groups has thus accelerated the decline of their regional position and influence. The Turkish regime increasingly adopts authoritarian domestic policies to maintain control, and while Qatar is in a better position than Turkey, it is expected that the emirate will be forced to significantly adjust its foreign policies.

7 6 MASTER NARRATIVE 3: THE SUBLIME PORTE (GLOBAL, COOPERATIVE) Turkish and Qatari regional positions decline as sliding LNG prices take their toll on the once unrivalled Qatari economy, and Europe s economic woes significantly harm Turkey s economy. Furthermore, the allies that both countries carefully cultivated rebel factions in Syria, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and Hamas are also growing weaker and more vulnerable. Rather than reinforcing what they see as losing bets, Turkey and Qatar respond by altering their foreign policy, limiting their support for Islamist and jihadist groups. This shift dramatically improves their relationship with regional and extra-regional allies, including the GCC countries and Egypt, though many of these former rivals remain wary of Turkish and Qatari intentions. Stagnant economic growth and a series of political missteps induce the AKP to adopt more conciliatory politics at home and abroad. Massive refugee flows from Syria and Iraq force Turkey to ask for international humanitarian assistance, which increases the leverage that outside states hold over its government. Renewed violence from the PKK which has both been empowered by Kurdish successes in the Syrian conflict and also enraged by Turkey s macabre unwillingness to stop the slaughter of Kurds at its border compels the Turkish government to focus more energy and resources on internal security threats. Turkey thus scales back its support for Islamist and jihadist groups across the region. Qatar too decides to focus more on domestic politics, and on reducing conflict with neighbors and patrons like the U.S. International media have continued to focus on the World Cup bribery scandal and poor working conditions for construction teams, as well as Qatari support for jihadist groups. Qatar is forced to address these issues to avoid relocation of the tournament. Turkey and Qatar react to their weakened circumstances by moving away from their highly independent and pro- Islamist foreign policy course, instead deepening cooperation with their neighbors. Turkey allows the U.S. and NATO to use Turkish air bases to launch strikes against ISIS, even with armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Turkey closes migration and smuggling routes into ISIS-held territories, stopping the inflow of weapons and recruits and reducing the illegal outflow of oil. The blockade also reduces the Nusra Front s ability to operate in Turkish territory. Turkey also extends diplomatic support for Fatah s plans to reintegrate Gaza into the Palestinian Authority, and it follows Egypt s lead in isolating Hamas politically. Turkey and Qatar use their influence to help the international community divide Libyan Islamists into moderate and extremist camps. Libya Shield Forces withdraw to central Libya and allow the interim government, allied brigades, Egyptian special forces, and Egyptian and Emirati airpower to fight Salafi militias in eastern Libya. With their external patrons gone, the situation for Salafi militias appears increasingly dim, and most observers believe that the change in circumstances on the ground sets the stage for a peace conference among other factions in Libya. Qatar and Turkey will have to resolve potential problems with their economies and populations, and in their reliance on natural resources. Qatar s reliance on natural gas exports in a time of slowing markets is a vulnerability. Qatar needs a robust natural gas exports market for international influence in addition to financial wealth. A 25 percent decrease in the value of natural gas would mean a 15 percent drop in Qatar s budgetary revenue, and a percent decrease in its national gross domestic product (GDP). Furthermore, the financial burden of hosting the 2022 World Cup with costs now projected to reach $200 billion along with pressure resulting from corruption charges and claims of human rights abuses, may severely tarnish Qatar s regional strength, thus making it more cooperative with foreign powers like U.S. and the EU.

8 7 MASTER NARRATIVE 4: JUSTICE AND CONSTRUCTION (LOCAL, COOPERATIVE) As Turkey and Qatar grow more powerful regionally, they grow increasingly secure that they can maintain a strong international position without a foreign policy that rankles their neighbors. Their prestige in the region grows even as their foreign policy increasingly resembles that of their neighbors. The precipitating event for Turkey was coordinated terrorist attacks in Ankara, Bodrum, and Antalya in summer Those attacks were apparently carefully calculated to avoid hitting targets associated with the government of Turkey, but the harm done to Turkish civilians and foreign guests prompts Turkey to turn away from support of Islamist and jihadist groups in the region. Instead, it begins working more closely with its neighbors on security issues and intelligence sharing. Chastened by protests following another corruption scandal implicating his inner circle, President Erdoğan adopts a conciliatory approach in his domestic politics, and tackles the corruption in a series of public investigations. His popularity recovers, which allows the AKP to build cross-party support for Erdoğan s preferred constitutional amendments. After a successful referendum, Turkey transitions to a presidential system and adopts a liberal constitution, but Erdoğan and the AKP remain firmly in command, with a firmly established place for religion in the public sphere. Turkey s economy is also on the rise after President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Davutoglu conclude lucrative trade deals with the EU. Prospects are boosted further after a Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot consortium is formed to explore natural gas deposits in the eastern Mediterranean. As its Syrian proxies become bogged down in the fight against Assad and appear increasingly difficult to control, Qatar also recalculates its interests. With Europe investing in LNG infrastructure to diversify its natural gas supplies, Qatar enjoys continued high demand for its LNG exports. Strong government revenues keep construction for the 2022 World Cup on track, and allow better conditions for its workers. Even though critics contend that many of the improvements are merely cosmetic, Qatar does enough to avoid potentially embarrassing protests and boycotts. For Turkey and Qatar, economic growth and interdependence with European and global markets prove too valuable to risk by supporting violent extremists, and they become even more hesitant about supporting Islamist political groups. Economic growth allows both countries to make this strategic pivot with minimal political opposition at home, and minimal loss of prestige. Their strategies shift instead to brokering ceasefires across the region. Qatar is able to use its influence with Libyan Islamist groups to help establish a ceasefire there. Most factions in Libya agree to a political timetable for a constitutional referendum and early elections, though a number of jihadist groups considered irreconcilables continue to fight, often employing guerrilla tactics. The U.N. prepares to deploy an observer force once the irreconcilables diminishing strength makes it safe to insert international forces. Turkey and Qatar use their influence with Hamas to help broker a ceasefire agreement with Israel. With its finances at the lowest ebb in years, Hamas appears increasingly willing to enter negotiations in good faith and make significant compromises. For the first time in recent history, there is optimism that comprehensive peace talks can recommence.

9 8 PROACTIVE STRATEGIES In Phase II, the Lead Analyst summarized Policy Options proposed during the simulation into four Strategies, led by the question How would Turkey and Qatar exploit their regional and global position to further improve or maintain their positions in 2017 and beyond? and built around the following two parameters: 1. Strategic goal, determined by answering question: Would Turkey and Qatar focus on improving their positions on their own or aligning with the positions of their neighbours? 2. Methodology used to accomplish those goals, determined by answering question: Would Turkey and Qatar use more security or politically heavy instruments to achieve their goals? Figure 2 - Proactive Strategies STRATEGY 3 Know When to Walk Away STRATEGY 4 Know When to Run STRATEGY 1 Know When to Hold Em STRATEGY 2 Know When to Fold Em

10 STRATEGY 1: KNOW WHEN TO HOLD EM Sensing their economic and diplomatic might, Turkey and Qatar have spent 2015 through 2017 pursuing foreign policies at odds with the interests of their neighbors and Western patrons, including support for Islamist and jihadist groups around the region. They are perceived as unbound by their traditional allies, who are wary of a Turkish-Qatari gamble for regional hegemony. Having suffered few costs for adopting these policies, Turkey and Qatar will likely strengthen their independent foreign policies. Their precise policies in Syria will depend upon the state of the insurgency, and the extent to which it can be manipulated to advance Turkish and Qatari interests, but in any case the two states will take an increasingly active role. Their options for doing so include expanding their financial and logistical support for anti-assad forces and sending military advisors into Syria (similar to Qatar s aid for anti-qaddafi forces during the Libyan war). They will attempt to control the rebel movement directly by cultivating a new generation of rebel leaders without the damaged public image of ISIS. Perhaps paradoxically, this outcome will improve the prospects of a negotiated peace agreement. If Turkey and Qatar succeed in stabilizing the position of the anti-assad rebels, and it appears that Assad is unlikely to fall, both sides will consider accepting a ceasefire with a decentralized, power-sharing constitution, similar to the Dayton Accords in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Turkey and Qatar will increase their support for MB affiliates in Egypt and Libya. Qatar will support jihadist groups in Libya as well. Conflicts in both countries will deepen as a result. Playing to their domestic audience, leaders in Turkey will adopt ever more stridently anti-israeli and anti-american rhetoric. Given the already poor state of the U.S.-Turkish alliance, these policies will put increasing strain on this key regional alliance. The bonds between the U.S. and Turkey are unlikely to snap entirely, however, due to the areas of mutual interest in the region that both countries see as high priorities. Any hopes to resurrect a working relationship between Turkey and Israel will be quashed. Turkey and Qatar will also adopt economic policies to further bolster their positions, and reduce the costs of independence.

11 STRATEGY 2: KNOW WHEN TO FOLD EM Turkey and Qatar have broken with their regional allies, instead investing in Islamist and jihadist groups across the region. From , they moved aggressively to revise the local strategic circumstances to mitigate their stagnant or even declining economic and political positions, believing that incorporating extremist groups into their own orbits would enhance their strategic positions. However, by 2017, these policies have not yielded positive results. Turkey and Qatar are both isolated and weaker than before. They must consider foreign policy strategies that reverse these outcomes. Turkey and Qatar will respond by re-engaging their traditional allies and reorienting their foreign policies to be more in line with their neighbors. In order to ensure that Qatar is not seen as an outlier or a rogue nation, Sheikh Tamim significantly reduces Qatar s involvement in the affairs of other Arab states, and launches a comprehensive reconciliation process with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Maintaining Qatar s role as a powerbroker will fall a distant second to Tamim s top priority: preserving Doha s ability to operate as a fully accepted member of the Gulf Arab community. Under this strategy, Qatar defers to its GCC partners in most diplomatic initiatives, and lends a hand in bringing Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and various Libyan groups to the bargaining tables in their respective conflicts. Doha will cut support to the Nusra Front in 2017, and announces its support for a general ceasefire in Syria. Similarly, Turkey employs more explicitly anti-jihadist policies in the face of international pressure. It does not do so quickly or entirely willingly, but by 2017, Kurdish protests across Turkey force the AKP government to make a public break with extremist Sunni groups in Syria. Turkey will actively target jihadists operating in its territory, capturing or killing dozens of suspected militants, trainers, facilitators, and smugglers, as well as purging jihadist-aligned figures who have managed to infiltrate themselves into local or national Turkish politics. Violence in Syria increases in the short term as rebel groups scramble to grab territory for their camps, and as Assad s regime takes the opportunity to pound the rebel groups.

12 STRATEGY 3: KNOW WHEN TO WALK AWAY Leading up to 2017, Turkey and Qatar were faced with economic stagnation, and they responded by forging stronger links with their regional allies: NATO, the GCC, and Egypt. They limited their support for Islamist and jihadist groups from 2015 through 2017, which made them a target for the hostility of disaffected, formerly allied groups. Turkey and Qatar have also pursued an increasingly globalised foreign policy, looking for strategic and economic opportunities in regions that were previously far beyond their horizons. With mounting threats at its southern border, Turkey started in 2014 to build a new wall along its border with Syria in an attempt to protect its citizens and territory against terrorism, smuggling, and illegal migration. By 2017, the border with Syria is walled, and Ankara decides to extend this project along the Iraqi border due to continuing instability in Iraq. By 2019, Turkey s southern borders have a continuous security barrier with a few highly policed crossing points. Relevant global actors generally support the project, since it addresses many security issues that will have an impact on Europe as well. In pivoting away from an Islamist foreign policy, the AKP feels threatened internally from constituents who supported the previous policies. This political risk, as well as emerging evidence of radicalization among personnel in the country s military, security, and intelligence services (which outside observers believe is over-hyped by the AKP) precipitates a purge of those who do not follow the AKP line. As it tries to secure its southern border, Ankara tries to finalize a comprehensive peace agreement with the PKK. Forced to confront the reality that the Assad regime is now likely to survive, and that the cost of maintaining support for the rebels may now outweigh any advantage they might gain, policy-makers in Doha and Ankara are forced to shift their goals and strategy in Syria. They try to salvage what they can in terms of a face-saving outcome for both domestic and international audiences by offering back-channel concessions to Iran and Russia in return for support negotiating a ceasefire partially beneficial to Syrian rebels, while at the same time labouring to persuade regional and Western allies that their support for Syrian rebels is unabated. However, Turkey and Qatar are beginning to suspect that collaborative policies will not result in economic growth and increased power and prestige. Thus, both countries are considering again turning away from their traditional allies, and moving back toward more independent, pro-islamist policies. Specifically, Turkey and Qatar s willingness to reduce support for jihadist groups in Syria is wavering as the situation has collapsed into unrestrained mass killing of Sunni civilians.

13 STRATEGY 4: KNOW WHEN TO RUN Turkey and Qatar have responded to their increasing power and prestige by collaborating more closely with their traditional allies. Turkey and Qatar assessed that their interests lay in continuing the favorable present trends, and that independent initiatives and support for Islamist and jihadi groups put key economic and security relationships at risk. Having ended support for the most extreme groups, Turkey and Qatar put pressure on moderate Islamists to come to terms with their adversaries in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. Turkey and Qatar s progress from 2015 to 2017 makes them recommit to this cooperative strategy in Turkey and Qatar continue to look to their traditional allies for strategic and economic opportunities. Turkey hedges against Russian expansion in Southeastern Europe and the Caucuses by aligning with Romania on pipeline and territorial access issues. Because Romania doesn t allow Russia to access its territorial waters, Russia will be forced to continue cooperating with Turkey. Already favorable socio-cultural ties between Turkey and Romania aid cooperation between the two countries, as fear of increasingly bold Russian moves in Eastern Europe drives Romania to strengthen ties with equally concerned NATO allies. Turkey will also deepen its political and economic relationships with the EU. From a position of strength, Qatar continues its bold and frequently contradictory foreign policy of befriending foes. For example, the emirate revives relations with Israel, while simultaneously continuing to back Hamas and contributing to the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. Another diplomatic initiative for Qatar is continuing its policy of being an intermediary between Sunni and Shia states and the U.S. Qatar works with Egypt to help stabilize Libya, as it ceases its previous financial and military support to Libyan Islamists. Turkey and Qatar also facilitate the P5+1 1 negotiations with Iran: Turkey uses its position within NATO to push for a pragmatic Iranian policy in Western capitals, while Qatar offers concessions to Iran in support of Turkish diplomatic overtures. Operating from a position of strength and out of a desire for collaboration allows Turkey and Qatar to innovate new multilateral institutions. They formalize their alliance in a joint economic council that guides investment decisions in both countries as well as with Iraq and Iran. Turkey and Qatar create a joint market for agricultural and consumer goods, while new pipeline and construction projects are concluded. 1 P5+1 refers to the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (U.S., Russia, China, U.K., and France) plus Germany, who joined diplomatic efforts regarding Iran s nuclear program.

14 13 STRATEGIC TAKEAWAYS Turkey and Qatar have pursued strikingly independent and controversial foreign policies since the onset of the Arab Spring, which have involved support for Islamist groups both violent and nonviolent. Whether they are able to continue this independent course depends on both countries strength and regional position, and whether they see their pro- Islamist policies as yielding benefits. A few key drivers will be most influential in determining possible shifts in Turkish and Qatari policies. Several of these drivers can be anticipated, while others depend on the uncertain outcomes in Syria and elsewhere: The Syrian civil war will likely be the most critical determinant of Turkish and Qatari foreign policies in the near term, over and above domestic economic performance, regional trade opportunities, or diplomatic pressure by traditional allies like the U.S., NATO, or the GCC. The Libyan conflict will also have an impact on their foreign policy decisions, but more so on Qatari than on Turkish thinking. If the initiatives by Turkey and Qatar in Syria and Libya are unsuccessful, they will likely reassess their strategies. The assertiveness of the foreign policies of Turkey and Qatar since 2011 depended in part on robust economic growth and revenues. Their economic position over the next few years is a key factor in their regional strategies. Should their economies stagnate or their revenues become constrained, Turkey and Qatar can be expected to align themselves with their traditional allies and closest trading partners, the U.S., Europe, and the GCC especially. However, if economic conditions remain favorable, Turkey and Qatar will be more likely to continue moving away from their traditional allies and playing an assertive and confrontational role in regional politics. The ability of traditional allies to shape Turkish and Qatari strategic behavior is limited because Turkey and Qatar can relatively easily hedge against external diplomatic pressure by cultivating new relationships with Russia, Iran, and China. To further insulate themselves from foreign pressure, Turkey and Qatar can develop their economies and invest in technologies that make them less vulnerable to changes in the oil and gas markets. Whether or not Turkey and Qatar adopt more collaborative or more confrontational policies in the near term, trends point to increased coordination and cooperation with each other in the long run. The Turkish and Qatari governments have worldviews at odds with those of their neighbors, but they have also acted pragmatically and deliberately. Thus, while Turkey and Qatar have placed bets on Islamist and even jihadist groups across the region, their continued support for these organizations will depend in large part on their performance. If the anti-assad opposition in Syria or the Islamist parties in Libya collapse, or if they become so toxic that Turkey and Qatar cannot continue to support them without incurring significant costs, these countries may reassess their support for Islamists elsewhere.

15 14 ATTRIBUTIONS [cover] This work, cover, is a derivative of Flag of Turkey, by Armagan TEKDONER, licensed under CC; Qatar Flag - Doha - Qatar, by Bruno befreetv, licensed under CC; and World Map from the CIA World Fact Book, released under the public domain. cover is licensed under CC by Sheila Elizan.

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