9 EYLUL UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT ADVANCED ISSUES IN TURKISH POLITICS

Transcription

1 9 EYLUL UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT ADVANCED ISSUES IN TURKISH POLITICS NURCU MOVEMENT IN TURKISH POLITICAL SYSTEM AND FETHULLAHÇILAR AS A BY-PRODUCT PREPARED BY MEHMET TANSEL DEMIR JUNE 17, 2005 IZMIR 1

2 NURCU MOVEMENT IN TURKISH POLITICAL SYSTEM AND FETHULLAHÇILAR AS A BY-PRODUCT THE AIM : THE AIM OF THIS RESEARCH IS TO REVIEW WHAT THE FRAMEWORK OF POLITICAL ISLAM IS IN TURKEY, NURCU MOVEMENT AS AN INFLUENTIAL TARIKAT IN TURKISH POLITICAL SYSTEM, FETHULLAHÇILAR AS A BY- PRODUCT, AND FINALLY, THE PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE OF NURCU MOVEMENT. SUMMARY : THE POLITICAL ISLAM IS AN OUTLET TO EXPRESS POLITICAL DISSATISFACTION WITH THE EXISTING ORDER ON THE PART OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL PERIPHERY AND SPECIFIC SOCIAL GROUPS AND CLASSES WITH GRIEVANCES OR DIFFERENT INTERESTS. THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT IN TURKEY EMERGED SOON AFTER THE FOUNDING OF THE SECULAR TURKISH REPUBLIC IN AS A RESULT OF TURKEY S SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS, WHICH DIFFER FROM THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE REGION, A BRAND OF PURELY TURKISH ISLAMISM HAS EVOLVED. THROUGHOUT THE YEARS, ISLAMIC REVIVALISM IN TURKEY SPECIFICALLY HAS CHALLENGED MODERNIZATION AND NATIONALIST MODELS FOR THE FUTURE. THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL CRITICISM OF THE KEMALIST REGIME WAS ARTICULATED BY THE RELIGIOUS LEADER SAID NURSI ( ), WHO BECAME THE SYMBOL OF RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION AGAINST THE SECULAR TURKISH NATION-STATE. HIS CRITICISM FOCUSED ON THE STATE'S IMPLEMENTATION OF SECULARISM AND NATIONALISM. HIS WRITINGS, MOSTLY FROM THE 1920S, REMAIN VERY POPULAR AMONG PEOPLE, EVEN THOUGH BY THE END OF HIS 2

3 LIFE HE HAD REJECTED NATIONALISM IN FAVOR OF A MODERN OR REFORMIST ISLAMIC SYNTHESIS. AFTER NURSI'S DEATH IN 1960, THE NURCU MOVEMENT FRAGMENTED INTO SEVERAL SUB-COMMUNITIES WITH DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF RELIGION, DIFFERENT GOALS AND DIFFERENT POSITIONS ON POLITICAL ISSUES. NOWADAYS, FETHULLAH GULEN CONTROLS THE MOST POWERFUL OF THESE GROUPS. IT IS ALLEGED THAT BASICALLY, FETHULLAH GULEN'S IDEAS SERVE TO ACCOMPLISH THREE INTELLECTUAL GOALS: THE ISLAMIZATION OF THE TURKISH NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY; THE TURKIFICATION OF ISLAM; AND THE ISLAMIZATION OF MODERNITY. METHODOLOGY : THE REVIEW OF THIS RESEARCH IS DIVIDED INTO SEVERAL PARTS. THE FIRST PART ADDRESSES WHAT THE POLITICAL ISLAM IS IN TURKEY AND ITS CHARACTERISTICS. THE SECOND PART OF THIS REVIEW NURCU MOVEMENT AS AN INFLUENTIAL TARIKAT IN TURKISH POLITICAL SYSTEM AND FETHULLAHÇILAR AS A BY- PRODUCT, OUTLINING THE KEY ISSUES AND DEBATES ADDRESSED IN THE LITERATURE. UNDER THE LIGHT OF AFORE-MENTIONED INTERROGATION, A CONCLUSION ON THE PROSPECTS OF NURCU AND FETHULLAHÇI MOVEMENTS IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH TURKISH POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND TURKISH STATE IS DRAWN IN THE THIRD PART OF THE REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH. THE BIBLIOGRAPHY IS FOURTH AND FINAL PART OF THE REVIEW OF RESEARCH. THE LITERATURE REVIEWED IN EACH SECTION WAS COMPILED FROM VARIOUS SOURCES. SEVERAL TITLES WERE CONSULTED. IN SELECTING TITLES FOR 3

4 REVIEW, ONLY THOSE ARTICLES WERE CHOSEN THAT PAID SUBSTANTIAL ATTENTION TO THE TARIKATS. OUTLINE : 1. POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY 5-10 A. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND B. THE CHARACTERISTICS NURCU MOVEMENT AS AN INFLUENTIAL TARIKAT IN TURKISH POLITICAL SYSTEM, AND FETHULLAHÇILAR AS A BY-PRODUCT A. SAID-I NURSI AND NURCU MOVEMENT B. FETHULLAHÇILAR CONCLUSION BIBLIOGRAPHY 29 4

5 What leaks out is what is inside. Yunus Emre 1. POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY In recent years, Islamic revivalism in Turkey specifically and the Middle East in general has challenged (and for some, seemingly threatened) modernization and nationalist models for the future. Far from being reactionary opponents of secular Kemalist modernization, Islamic social movements in Turkey offer important agents for promoting pluralism and democracy and are not fueled by a deep-seated rage and frustration with the authoritarian policies of the secular elites. Islamic norms and traditions are being simultaneously preserved yet substantially altered to assimilate and participate in the discourses on nationalism, secularism, democracy, human rights, the liberal market and personal autonomy. The main premise of "Turkish Islam" is moderation. Since people of Turkish origin first accepted Islam, they perceived and practiced it under the influence of Sufi ideas. Bulent Aras and Omer Caha.highlight that Sufi-oriented Islamic movements kept a certain distance from the politics of their times in contrast to other Islamic movements. For example, the Shiites or Haricis defined themselves according to an imagined other (those who do not support the truth) and became associated with specific political stances over the proper nature of the state and who should hold power. Sufi tradition, however, has described itself as being based on the philosophy that all creatures should be loved as God s physical reflection and objects of the Creator s own love. There is no place for enemies or "others" in this system. Islam in Turkish political history, during the reigns of both the Seljuks and the Ottomans, remained under the state s guidance and as a matter for the private sphere. The dominant belief was that a truly religious sultan would govern the state according to the principles of justice, equality, and piety. This approach of keeping religion apart from worldly affairs led to a collective memory that regarded Islam as a flexible 5

6 and tolerant belief system. Thus, it was assumed that religious institutions should adopt flexible attitudes toward the changing situations of their times. In the Ottoman era, there was never a fullfledged theocratic system. While the principles of Shari'a (Islamic law) were applied in the private sphere, public life was regulated according to customary law formulated under the authority of the state. This aspect of the Ottoman political system made religion s role less rigid. Moreover, the empire accepted it would be a multi-religious state, in which Christian and Jewish subjects would continue to be governed by their own laws. 1 Ibrahim Kalin gives a brief summary of the life of the Prophet to show its relevance for Muslim political thought, and refers to din wa dunya as religion and politics, which should be translated more properly as religion and the world because politics is only one of the ways in which one manages his/her worldly life. The complimentarity thesis, i.e., religion and politics or religious and political institutions play complimentary roles in the pursuit of human happiness. The sphere of mescid, medrese and cami regulated by the ulama as the closest analogy in classical Islam to civil society With this, the relation between the ulama and the caliphate is presented as the main parameters of an analysis of civil society in classical Islam. Although this approach has some merit, it disregards other aspects of classical Muslim life such as the Sufi orders and the networks of professional organizations or lodges (esnaf). In discussing the 19th century transition of Muslim politics from the classical hilafet to modern republicanism based on the nation-state model, Kelsay mentions Ali Abd al-raziq and outlines his defense of the abolishing of the caliphate. A more interesting case that Kelsay does not mention in his chapter is the Ottoman scholar and politician Seyyid Bey who gave a famous speech in the first Turkish parliament in In that speech, Seyyid bey argued against the caliphate and claimed that the function of the caliphate is included in the republic (cumhuriyet), thus making a case for religious republicanism. Even though Kelsay seems to overemphasize the ulama-khilafat dichotomy, his essay makes a strong case for the existence of civil society in the Islamic tradition. 2 The history of post-1980 Turkey is about the formation of opportunity spaces and their 1 Bulent Aras and Omer Caha. December 2000 Fethullah Gulen And His Liberal Turkish Islam Movement. Middle East Review of International Affairs Volume 4, No. 4 2 Ibrahim Kalın Islam and Civil Society: From the Paradigm of Compatibility to Critical Engagement. Sohail H. Hamsi (ed.), Islamic Political Ethics: Civil society, Pluralism, and Conflict. College of the Holy Cross. Princeton University Press. 6

7 sociopolitical implications. The social movements have resulted from the opening and shrinking of the opportunity spaces and have led to neoliberal economic policies, the expansion of the public sphere, and the opening of political participation. These opportunity spaces have enabled the conscious agents - Naksibendi Sufi brotherhoods, new prototypes of politicians, the Anatolian bourgeoisie and intellectuals - to take an assertive stance and move into the available spaces to assert their identity and rights in the evolving domestic market, civil society, and public and political spheres. Although religious intolerance and fanaticism cannot be absolutely prevented, the theological foundations and cultural experiences of Muslim societies enable them to foster a genuine culture of pluralism and co-existence. It can be said that Islamic movements in Turkey is double-faceted. They seek to express willingness for democracy and economic development, but also remain conservative in calling for a strict moral-religious code in society. Since the secular Turkish state began conceding new liberal political openings in the 1960s, Islamic groups subsequently were able to appropriate them. The late Turkish president Turgut Ozal's policies of political and market liberalization in the 1980s helped create a new class of Muslim entrepreneurs that were able to circumvent state controls by creating its own alternative schools, printing presses, newspapers, journals, and radio and television stations. Within this context, Naksibendi Sufi order served as the matrix for contemporary Turkish Islamic political and social movements. The Nurcu movement of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi and its offshoot, headed most prominently by Fethullah Gulen, exhibited this. Overt Islamist parties, led first by Necmettin Erbakan (the first Islamic prime minister of modern Turkey, ) and his successor, Recep Tayyip Erdogan (AKP prime minister of Turkey since March 2003), followed. These movements have not been one steady line of success; all the Islamist leaders just mentioned have at one time or another run afoul of the secular Kemalist state. The Turkish military, for example, forced Erbakan to resign in June 1997 after only a little more than a year in office, while his eventual successor, Erdogan, only assumed his present position as prime minister after serving a brief prison term for reciting an Islamist poem deemed inflammatory to the secular order. The resons underlying the rise of political Islam in Turkey can be stated as summarized by Jorgen 7

8 Christensen-Ernst below : a. Social reasons : Since the middle of the 20th century, there has been a development of industrial capitalism in Turkey. As a result many have left the villages and migrated to the big cities. The development of capitalism resulted in loss of income and status to a large group with a traditional Islamic background who came to blame the West and westernised institutions in Turkey for their problems. They felt that the changed situation in the country and the increase of dishonesty and loose conduct was brought about by Western decadence. Their reaction against the West came to be a reaction in favour of Islam and in favour political parties who promised a return to lost traditional values.this has not just been interpreted as the underprivileged finding comfort in religion. Religion has also provided them with an identity and with a network of social relations. b. Political reasons : When speaking of the political reasons behind the resurgence of Islamism in Turkey, a phenomenon based on clientelism called kadrolaşma in Turkish should be discussed. This institution works the following way: When a person comes into power, he tries to get as many of his people as possible into a position of responsibility under him. When a political party comes into power, it is a normal procedure that it tries to replace civil servants with its own people.... When RP was in power in the middle of the nineties, this party is said to have instituted a wholesale change of personnel in the bureaucracy, even trying to replace judges and prosecutors. In 1998 it was closed down by the Constitutional Court and was replaced by Fazilet Partisi (FP), and when this was closed the Saadet Partisi (SP, the Prosperity Party) followed. c. Ideological reasons : The Kemalists wanted ethics based on nationalism, and although nationalism has been widely accepted on the expense of the ümmet idea, this has not been enough to provide a social ethos that appealed to the heart. This resulted in a mental bifurcation of society: The Westernisers, mostly concentrated in the bigger cities, who looked ahead optimistically expecting a future in a modern secular society where religion would have the same functions and influence as in Protestant Western countries, and the traditionalists whose world view and ethics were based on their historical background and who were mainly concentrated in the countryside. In this section of the population Islam remained unreformed. When these people moved into the big cities due to changes in the economical situation in the country, they took with them their traditional ways, their ethics and to some extent their ümmet oriented world view.this found together with an ideology based on the concept of Turkish-Islamic synthesis that had been developed in the This ideology where the religious aspect was highlighted saw the 8

9 uniqueness of Turkish culture in its synthesis of sunni Islam and the historical heritage of Turcic peoples: a synthesis of family, the mosque, and the barracks. At the same time and for the reasons mentioned above, a hidden Islamic discourse in the state ideology should serve to unify the society.in this way the radical secularism of the republicans was to some extent abandoned. Consequently the state itself became the planner of the religious life of the population with the ümmet-idea as the foundation. d. Education : With the closing of the medreses in 1924 all education came to be in the hands of the government.... In spite of a lot of efforts and good intentions on the part of politicians, civil servants and teachers, the results were as weak as the basis.... The other side of the coin is the religious education: The imam-hatip schools. These schools should supply traditional religious education to men who were going to serve in the mosques. The curriculum was traditionally Islamic and thus a continuation of the medrese tradition from the Ottoman period.... These schools, that especially have been popular among parents of with a rural or lower-middle-class background who want their children to learn the traditional values, have served a purpose beyond the original intention.... This, combined with the institution of kadrolaşma described above, has prompted concern in secular circles.by the year 1999 it was recommended that at least the middleschool part of these schools be closed.... Another way of Islamic education in Turkey has been provided is by the private Koran Courses. These courses are regarded as a potential danger for the secular republic and are monitored closely. e. The tarikats and other Islamic movements : The tarikats or religious brotherhoods, many of them of Sufi orientation, were banned in 1925 and have been illegal ever since. However, the growing permissiveness of the state has made them surface again.... It is mainly the Nakşibendi groups that give reason for concern, partly because they functions well without the lodges and rituals used by other tarikats, and therefore thrive very well under cover. There has been some disagreement on the extend to which these groups have political ambitions. Some find that the groups are harmless, only interested keeping Islam within orthodoxy. f. Globalisation and post-modernism : It has been held that religion will decline as a result of economic development and Islam has been viewed as an ideology of protest as small traders and artisans loose income and status due to globalisation.... In the 1980s, the locus of decisionmaking shifted from the traditional bureaucratic elites to the political elites, and now there was a constant and particularistic state invention, despite the rhetoric of free interprise, market liberalism and so on. At the same time the country has witnessed a series of corruption scandals.... Also immigrants from the countryside who have been unable to find work after moving to the cities have been attracted by the message of political Islam, partly due to its populist propaganda. 9

10 Apart from this there are the influences of postmodernist tendencies. Modernism has been described as a Western project, forward looking, progressive, scientific, rational, universal and with no room for religion. Postmodernism is anti-authoritarian and sceptical. It does not accept the grand narratives, theories which claim to provide universal explanations and trade on the authority this gives them. In several Muslim countries scepticism about modernism has developed since the 1960s, often because of disappointment over the outcome. This coincides with the development of radical Islam in countries as Egypt and Syria, and with the organisation of political Islam in Turkey. Until then Kemalism had been the grand narrative, with its goal of making Turkey a modern country at all costs. During the last thirty years Turkey by means of television has been bombarded with Western values, Western lifestyle and Western opinion. To the extent people already have accepted the discourse of modernism, this has been a reinforcement of their ideals, but to the extent people have kept their traditional values, the grand narrative of Western modernism is met with scepticism and is rejected. 3 Wendy Kristianasen argues that As a result of Turkey s special characteristics, which differ from the other countries of the region, a brand of purely Turkish Islamism has evolved. Recently in government, the Islamists pose a serious threat to the secular establishment. Through their energetic grassroots activities they have won over both the poor and the middle classes of Anatolia. In response to this challenge, the secular middle classes have started rebuilding their own civil society. 4 The contemporary Turkish state is simultaneously experiencing political democratization as well as economic liberalization and development within the context of Islamic-identity resurgence. A. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Thomas W. Smith, states that The secular model, if ever accurate, has been in decline since the late 1960s. Rather, a variety of Islams co-exist uneasily, from the Taliban-like dictates of M. Düzdağ s Müslüman Aile (The Muslim Family) which aims,to replace Atatürk şeriat with Allah s, to Fetullah Gülen s flourishing Nurcu movement, a New Age syncretism of Islam and 3 Jorgen Christensen-Ernst. The Background For The Resurge Of Islamic Self-Assertion In Turkey 4 Wendy Kristianasen. July No Delight For Turkey:New faces of Islam. Le Monde diplomatique 73169;

11 science which enjoys the support of some of the country s staunchest Republicans and modernizers. 5 After the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 Mustafa Kemal started a project of reducing the power of traditional Islam in the lives of the Turks. Atatürk had the opinion that if religion was allowed to play the same role as before, the country would not be able to modernise. He himself had been referring to Islamic values to mobilise the nation during the war of liberation from 1920 to 1922, but after he came to power he began to have Islamic institutions removed and certain traditional Muslim habits prohibited. In 1924 the Caliphate was abolished and the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the religious schools (medrese) and the religious courts closed. In this way he neutralised the ulema class of scholastic Muslim scholars and jurists who had been monitoring the tradition in Islam. The reaction came immediately. Already next year a rebellion in Eastern Turkey led by a sheikh of the religious Nakşibendi brotherhood had to be suppressed, and shortly after the lodges of the Sufi brotherhoods were closed and the tombs used for popular worship and the religious brotherhoods themselves were banned. These steps taken by Atatürk and his men have been interpreted as anti-religious and even atheistic, but evidently it was not religious faith and worship that was the target. In his handwritten notes on the subject Freedom (dated 27 January 1930) he wrote under the subheading Tolerance : In the Turkish Republic everybody worships god [sic.] the way he wants. Nothing is done to anybody because of his religious ideas. The Turkish Republic has no official religion. In Turkey there is nobody who tries to impose the religious ideas of anybody on anybody else by force. This will not be tolerated. What Atatürk and his associates were after, was a sort of Islamic reformation where faith - brought into harmony with its original sources - was a personal conviction which in no way could be forced upon or directs the state and its subjects. In Atatürk s opinion it was the scholastic interpretation of Islam and the irrational approach to religion that were to be blamed for the fall of the Ottoman Empire, and in order to break with the past he went even further: In 1926 a secular Civil Law code was adopted. In 1928 the Arabic alphabet was replaced by the Latin alphabet. The year 1932 saw the foundation of Türk Dil Kurumu (The 5 Thomas W. Smith. June Islam, Kurds and the Turkish Nation State.Berg Publishers, The Global Review of Ethnopolitics, Vol. 1, no

12 Turkish Language Society). One of the purposes of this institution was to clean out Arabic and Persian words with their connotations from the language of the Turks and replace them with words of Turkish or Western origin and thus sever the mental and emotional ties to the past. In 1937 the state was called laik/secular by amendment to the constitution. After the death of Atatürk in 1938 the reforms were carried on, but already before the party he had founded, the Cumhuriyet Halk partisi (CHP), lost the election to the liberal Demokrat Partisi (DP) in 1950 the strong secular stand of the state was relaxed. The new government was more inclined to follow a religious discourse although the tarikats, or religious brotherhoods, were still suppressed. However, during the 1957 elective campaign the party made an alliance with the religious Nurcu movement, but on the 27 th of May 1960 the military made a coup and closed the DP. In 1961 a new constitution reaffirmed the secular stand of the Republic. The successor of DP was Adalet Partisi (AP) which also had a relaxed attitude towards religion. In 1970 the Millî Nizam Partisi (MNP) was founded by Mr. Necmettin Erbakan. This party was sponsored by the Naki bendi ş tarikat and was closed down by the constitutional court in 1971 after a second military coup. In 1972 it was resurrected with the name Millî Selamet Partisi (MSP) which functioned until it was closed down by the military coup on the 12 th of September During this period Islamism had been active, but not overwhelmingly so. This changed when the military stepped down and the country returned to democracy with the new constitution in Some still supported the successor of AP, as did people from the Nurcu movement. Others from this movement supported the new Anavatan Partisi (ANAP) or the heir of MSP, the Refah Partisi (RP) which was founded in The first party to win an election after the coup was ANAP whose founder Mr. Turgut Özal became prime minister. Later, during the election in 1995 RP managed to get 22 percent of the votes and Necmettin Erbakan became prime minister, partly because of his religious programme. Finally, the Justice and Development party (AKP) had a victory in the Turkish general elections on November 3, During the 20 years since the return to democracy after the coup in 1980, Islam has become increasingly visible in the public sphere in Turkey. That one must have an Islamic background to be regarded as a Turk was highly encouraged. Like DP and its successor AP, their successor has 12

13 been supported by people from the religious Nurcu movement while others from this group have supported ANAP. Necmettin Erbakan was in the beginning supported by the İskender Paşa group of the Nakşibendi tarikat. Later this tarikat group fell out with Mr. Erbakan and started to support another political party. Turgut Özal is said to have been a member of the Nakşibendi tarikat. B. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF TURKISH POLITICAL ISLAM Jorgen Christensen-Ernst suggests that two aspects of the situation be taken into consideration: The basis, or breeding ground, for the development, and the stimulants. (1) The Basis: The carriers of the ideology of Kemalism were mainly concentrated in the towns. Although efforts were made to reach people in the villages, the influence was not strong enough to change the world view, ethos and values there. One of the reasons was that this task was too overwhelming for the educational system. Since 1932 Türk Dil Kurumu has been working to change Arabic words in the Turkish vocabulary into Turkish words. For some time Turkish was even used when calling to prayer from the mosques. In spite of that, many Arabic words relating to religion were kept and even used in the by the administration of the secular republic. As a result especially people in the countryside kept to their tradition which they regarded as Islamic. When people from this group later moved into the big cities due the changes in the economic situation, they were confronted with the modern ethos and discourse that were the natural consequence of Kemalism s idea of a modern society, and they reacted against it. Some of the immigrants landed in the lowest social stratum of society loosing both income and status. Others managed to become self-employed and run their businesses according to traditional values. Both groups were for different reasons ready to support a party that was promising a just system based on traditional values. This historically meant support to a party with an Islamic programme. This again would give this party a change to develop its influence in governmental institutions by means of kadrolaşma and thus prepare an Islamist breeding ground in the country. This was facilitated by the ideology of Turkish-Islamic synthesis which had been present since the 1970s. (2) The Stimulants: After the coup in 1980 the traditional values (manevî erler ğ de ) were promoted as a weapon against communism. As the traditional values had not changed a lot since Ottoman times, these meant Islamic values. These have been promoted partly by the importance given to religious education in popular schools, in the imam-hatip schools and in the private Koran-courses, partly by the more relaxed attitude towards the tarikats. At the same time radical Islam celebrated its successes in neighbouring countries, and many articles of foreign radical Islamists were translated into Turkish. 13

14 In the West the scepticism of the grand narratives started to let itself be heard. To people with a traditional Muslim background in Turkey the grand narrative was Kemalism. It is true that it was mainly university students and intellectuals who were aware of postmodernist scepticism, but they in turn as new Muslim intellectuals made this way of approach available to others. This was done by means of the numerous Islamic periodicals and magazines that started to be published by radicals and by traditionalists in the 1980s. Many of the articles in these magazines were written by graduates from the imam-hatip schools. Other graduates from these schools found their way into the educational system and governmental institutions where they functioned as stimulants of Islamic ethos and discourse NURCU MOVEMENT AS AN INFLUENTIAL TARIKAT IN TURKISH POLITICAL SYSTEM, ITS RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC ROOTS AND FETHULLAHÇILAR AS A BY-PRODUCT The recent researches on the rise of Islam in many different parts of the Muslim world are focused particularly on the appeal of Sufism to urbanites and others at the forefront of modernising social changes in Muslim communities across the globe. Azyumardi Azra, Martin van Bruinessen and Julia Howell state that in the two countries with which the convenors are most familiar, Indonesia and Turkey, Sufism has become a conspicuous aspect of urban middle class religiosity, although in different ways. The classical Sufi orders such as the Naqshbandiyya and the Qadiriyya, remain influential in both countries, and appear even to find new adherents in circles that previously appeared highly secularised. Besides, religious movements that are not Sufi orders in the strict sense but share certain characteristics with them and have distinctive devotional and disciplining practices, such as the Nurcu movement of Turkey and a whole series of smaller mystical movements in Indonesia, appear to be experiencing significant growth. Many believers who do not themselves follow a specific spiritual discipline express their interest in and sympathy with the mystical tradition of Islam, which they believe to be more open, inclusive and tolerant of others and contrast favourably with fundamentalist versions of their religion. Discussion circles, journals and books disseminate Sufi ideas to larger audiences than ever before. Sufi groups cover the entire spectrum from the strictly shari`a-oriented to the latitudinarian, from Muslim puritan to perennialist. It is impossible 6 Jorgen Christensen-Ernst. The Background For The Resurge Of Islamic Self-Assertion In Turkey 14

15 to make a strict separation between Sufi groups and New Age-type movements which raises questions of conceptualisation as well as sociological explanation. 7 A. SAID-I NURSI AND NURCU MOVEMENT This is not a tarikat, but the truth. Bediuzzaman Said-i Nursi While Western domination of the Islamic world during the nineteenth century led some Muslims to reject Western ideas, the Ottomans adopted many Western innovations. For example, they opened Western-style schools (for women too), promulgated major programs for reform and human rights (the Tanzimat Fermanı in 1839 and Islahat Fermanı in 1856), developed a constitution, and opened a parliament in Said Nursi became one of the most insistent supporters of the parliamentary system at that time and later of the republican regime in Turkey 8 The Kemalist principles met by considerable resistance both within and outside the political system.the most fundamental criticism of the Kemalist regime was articulated by the religious leader Said Nursi ( ), who became the symbol of religious opposition against the secular Turkish nation-state. His criticism focused on the state's implementation of secularism and nationalism. Nur (Light) movement (also known as the Risale-i Nur movement) was organized around Said Nursi ( ), and his writings, the Risale-i Nur (Letters of Light). It spread throughout Turkey after 1950, despite the state's efforts, and had special success among the young and those educated in Turkey's secular education system mainly because Nursi argued that there was no contradiction between religion and science. The Risale-i Nur is well thought of by religious moderates because of its emphasis on the links between Islam and reason, science, and modernity. It also rejects the idea that a clash between the "East" and "West" is either 7 Azra, Azyumardi, Martin van Bruinessen and Julia Howell. 4-7 September Sufism and the Modern' in Islam. An international conference organised by Griffith University (Brisbane), the International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM, Leiden), and the Centre for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM, Jakarta), Jakarta. 8 Bulent Aras and Omer Caha. December 2000 Fethullah Gulen And His Liberal Turkish Islam Movement. Middle East Review of International Affairs Volume 4, No. 4 15

16 necessary or desirable and advocates the use of reason and in issues related to Islamic belief. 9 Camilla Trud Nereid highlightes that Said Nursi was committed to restoring the Islamic faith by renewing the understanding of religious knowledge as presented in the Holy Book. Thus Islam could become the framework for the encounter with the modern world. His methods were nonviolent and individualist in character, but the state responded with persecution throughout his life. He was harassed by the police and the military, prosecuted by the courts and proclaimed a heretic by the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi, the Directorate). The actions against him were sanctioned by the legal authorities, who took him to court for violation of the Constitution and of the Penal Code against such violations, including the crime of organized religious opposition. One way of seeing the conflict between Said Nursi and the Kemalist authorities is to view it as an expression of a general conflict between religion and secularism. On this basis, it is expected to find that the Turkish state showed a similarly negative attitude towards all religious movements. But this turned out to be wrong. At the same time that Said Nursi and his followers were being persecuted, members of another religious group, the Naksibendi brotherhood, held important positions in parliament and in the state bureaucracy of the Republic. 10 F. Atacan suggests that Islamic movements have traditionally defended the idea of the broader Islamic community (ummet) while rejecting various forms of nationalism. However, since the formation of nation-states in the Middle East, nationalism has become a latent or open component of Islamic discourse. Said Nursi ( ) is the originator of the Nurcu movement in modern Turkey. Med-Zehra is a split from the Nurcu movement and it emphasizes Nursi's Kurdish background. It openly criticizes Turkish nationalist interpretation of Nursi's writings. In other words, Med-Zehra is not only an important Nurcu group in Turkey but also an important representative of Kurdish Islamic movements Ibid. 10 Camilla Trud Nereid. In the Light of Said Nursi: Turkish Nationalism and the Religious Alternative. C. Hurst & Co (Publishers) Ltd. 11 Atacan F. July A Kurdish Islamist Group in Modern Turkey: Shifting Identities. Frank Cass Publishers. Middle Eastern Studies,, vol. 37, no. 3, pp

17 C. FETHULLAHÇILAR Bediuzzaman had a great influence on my ideas. Fethullah Gülen The Nurcu movement founded by Said Nursi ( ) is probably one of the most important religious organizations in Turkey. After Nursi's death in 1960, the Nurcu brotherhood fragmented into several sub-communities with different interpretations of religion, different goals and different positions on political issues. Nowadays, Fethullah Gülen controls the most powerful of these groups. It is led by Fethullah Gulen, and they follow the thoughts of a very popular person in Turkey, Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (famous for his writings Risale-i Nur ) who has a Nakşi background. They publish a lot, have many schools and wants to give an image of Islam as modern and scientific and positive, but it no longer sees itself as a tarikat. This movement has been supported from several Turkish governments, who seem to see it as a "milder" form of Islam than the other tarikats. The rapid geographical expansion of the Fethullah Gülen branch of the Nurcu movement, though not a Sufi order strictly speaking, represents a highly successful adaptation of a Sufism-inspired movement to the opening of the former socialist bloc. 12 Bulent Aras and Omer Caha highlight that the Turkish Islamist movement of Fethullah Gulen is one of the most interesting examples of liberal Islamist thinking in the Middle East. Gulen and his followers have tried to produce a religious-political movement favoring modernism, Turkish nationalism, tolerance, and democracy without sacrificing religious precepts. The structure and philosophy of this movement and its leader have been manifested in many groups and 12 Azra, Azyumardi, Martin van Bruinessen and Julia Howell. 4-7 September Sufism and the Modern' in Islam. An international conference organised by Griffith University (Brisbane), the International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM, Leiden), and the Centre for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM, Jakarta), Jakarta. 17

18 educational institutions. Part of the Turkish secularist elite views Gulen as a progressive development, though others see him as a threat in moderate garb.the community that has developed under the influence of Fethullah Gulen, a prominent religious leader in Turkey, simultaneously has Islamic, nationalist, liberal, and modern characteristics. Its ability to reconcile traditional Islamic values with modern life and science has won a large, receptive audience. The group has even brought together divergent ideas and people, including the poor and the rich, the educated and the illiterate, Turks and Kurds, as well as Muslims and non-muslims. 13 Fethullah Gülen was born in Erzurum in eastern Turkey in Deeply influenced by his family, his religious environment and by the writings of Nursi, Gülen began his career as an official preacher for the government in In 1966, he was sent by the direction of religious affairs to Izmir, where he created a brotherhood with a small group of students and disciples. His community, or cemaat, is designated as the Fethullahçı movement, alhough its members do not appreciate this term. Bayram Balci states that no one knows exactly the size of Gülen's enormous community of followers and sympathizers, but it is agreed on an average estimate of 3 million members. The movement obtains much of its support from young urban men, especially doctors, academics and other professionals. The movement has grown in part by sponsoring student dormitories, summer camps, colleges, universities, classrooms and communication organizations. Without any doubt, education is central to the identity of the community and favoured its growth in the Balkans, Central Asia and the Turkic world in general. 14 Wendy Kristianasen highlightes that the Fethullah phenomenon relies on elitism and lots of money (the movement has its own vakif). This has gone into setting up schools, charities and companies in Turkey and beyond, in Central Asia.... His schools, some 50 in Turkey and over 200 abroad, have become bastions of the Turkish elite. Then there is publishing: the Zaman newspaper, a TV channel, videos, cassettes, books, magazines. This former preacher, now in his sixties, does not describe himself as an Islamist. He prefers to be known as a devout Muslim who 13 Bulent Aras and Omer Caha. December 2000 Fethullah Gulen And His Liberal Turkish Islam Movement. Middle East Review of International Affairs Volume 4, No Bayram Balci. April Central Asia: Fetullah Gülen's Missionary Schools. ISIM Newsletter, 9/02 On RELIGIOSCOPE. 18

19 opposes political Islam. He wants to see the full integration of Islam in the political system, the economy and society. From the Balkans to China, he wants to see elites formed with Turkey as their model. A new Ottoman empire of sorts, dominated by the Turks, under which different faiths would cohabit. Would he be the new sultan? There is no answer as yet, but one seasoned observer declares him not entirely innocent. He is busy trying to create a parallel world, ready to take over when all is in place. In the last four years he has consolidated his ties with all the parties, except for Refah. But he could be the victim of his own charisma. Fethullah Gulen s parallel world is mirrored, on a wider, more popular scale, by the myriad activities of the Islamists of Refah - schools, charities, clinics, self-help organisations of every sort. Energetic and honest, they have laid down their roots like good Islamists everywhere. The most significant sector has been education. Gulen favors education that leads to integration into the modern world. According to Holly Book Kur an, the basic principle of Islam is to seek knowledge. The government-established imam hatip schools, now well over 400, were designed to train Islamic clerics. The funding of much of their operation by the Islamic foundations has opened up education to the poorer members of society whose schooling would otherwise have stopped after five years state education at age eleven. This success did not produce a surfeit of clerics, but an entire generation qualified to enter the universities or public service. 15 Gulen is influenced by Said Nursi. While Nursi believed that some actions of non-believers harmed humanity s future, he advocated cooperation among believers of all religions as a counter-measure. Gulen goes a step further and extends his tolerance toward secularists and nonbelievers in Turkey. He sees this approach as a way to revive the multi-culturalism of the Ottoman Empire, secure Turkey s stability, and prevent conflicts between several fractions of Islam such as Sunnis and Alevis. In comparison to so-called "fundamentalist" Islamic groups, Gulen's movement's views on Islam are surprisingly liberal and tolerant of non-islamic lifestyles. However, this approach may be the result of the long-term, specific experience of Anatolian people and the unique historical dynamics of Turkish socio-cultural life. For example, the movement is influenced by the concept of Turkish Islam formulated by some nationalist thinkers, and also the Nurcu or Nur (Light) movement that developed around the writings of Said Nursi. The movement was organized around Said Nursi ( ), a prominent religious 15 Wendy Kristianasen. July No Delight For Turkey:New faces of Islam. Le Monde diplomatique 73169;

20 authority, and his writings, the Risale-i Nur (Letters of Light). It spread throughout Turkey after 1950, despite the state's efforts, and had special success among the young and those educated in Turkey's secular education system mainly because Nursi argued that there was no contradiction between religion and science. The Risale-i Nur is well thought of by religious moderates because of its emphasis on the links between Islam and reason, science, and modernity. It also rejects the idea that a clash between the "East" and "West" is either necessary or desirable and advocates the use of reason and in issues related to Islamic belief. 16 Gulen does not favor the state applying Islamic law, the şeriat. He points out that most Islamic regulations concern people's private lives and that only a small portion of them concern the state and government. These latter provisions need not be enforced because religion is a private matter, and its requirements should not be imposed on anyone. He looks at Islamic regulations bearing directly on the government--such as those related to taxation and warfare--in the context of contemporary realities. 17 Concluding that the democratic form of government is the best choice, Gulen is very critical of the regimes in Iran and Saudi Arabia. He accepts Said Nursi's argument that the idea of republicanism is very much in accord with the idea of "consultation" discussed in Islamic sources. Moreover, he fears that an authoritarian regime would impose strict control on differing ideas. At the same time, though, Gulen views the state s role as important in protecting stability. Bülent Aras and Ömer Çaha suggest that Gulen s goals are simultaneously to Islamize the Turkish nationalist ideology and to Turkify Islam. He hopes to re-establish the link between religion and state that existed in the Ottoman era, when leaders were expected to live their private lives based on Islamic regulations. Such an approach, he argues, would strengthen the state, and thus protect society by widening the state's base of legitimacy and enhancing its ability to mobilize the population. Gulen holds that the Anatolian people's interpretations and experiences of Islam are different from those of others, especially the Arabs. He writes of an Anatolian Islam based on tolerance and excluding harsh restrictions or fanaticism and frequently 16 Bulent Aras and Omer Caha. December 2000 Fethullah Gulen And His Liberal Turkish Islam Movement. Middle East Review of International Affairs Volume 4, No Ibid. 20

21 emphasizes that there should be freedom of worship and thought in Turkey. He proposes two keys to provide peace in society - tolerance and dialogue. "We can build confidence and peace in this country if we treat each other with tolerance." In his view, "no one should condemn another for being a member of a religion or scold him for being an atheist. 18 His ideas about tolerance and dialogue are not restricted to Muslims but also extend to Christians and Jews. Gulen met twice with Patriarch Bartholomeos, head of the Greek Orthodox Fener Patriarchate in Istanbul, and has also met several times with Christian and Jewish religious leaders to promote interreligious dialogue. In February 1998, for example, he visited the Pope in Rome and received a visiting chief rabbi from Israel. The meeting between the Pope and Gulen was not received positively by some circles in Turkey. Some argued that this meeting created the impression that Gulen wanted to become the leader of Islam in the world. Others argued that the meeting was a plot to portray him and his community as embracing all sections of society and as enjoying a status higher than the state. On the question of women's rights, Gulen has progressive views. He believes that the veiling of women is a detail in Islam, and that "no one should suppress the progress of women through the clothes they wear." Gulen also states that, "no one should be subject to criticism for his or her clothing or thoughts." Furthermore, he says, "women can become administrators," contradicting the views of most Islamic intellectuals. Despite these views, modern professional women in Turkey still find his ideas far from acceptable. 19 Gulen has had considerable success advancing his aim to create a Muslim community that opposes politicized Islam.... It draws much of its support from young urban men, with a special appeal to doctors, academics, and other professionals. It has grown in part by establishing student dormitories, summer camps, high schools, universities, educational and cultural centers, and publications. Although Gulen is its sole leader, a number of his long-time devotees run the community. He has considerable political weight on the right of the political spectrum, which explains why party leaders are eager to maintain close contacts with him. Since 1994, he has met with a president, a prime minister, the leaders of many parties, and important businessmen. He 18 Bulent Aras and Omer Caha. December 2000 Fethullah Gulen And His Liberal Turkish Islam Movement. Middle East Review of International Affairs Volume 4, No Ibid. 21

22 regularly gives interviews to the country's leading media outlets. In 1997, Turkey's President Suleyman Demirel accepted an award from one of Gulen's organizations and praised the movement's educational activities. Gulen also met with Bulent Ecevit, the long-time leader of Turkey's left and the current prime minister, after which Ecevit reported that their meeting involved a "conversation that focused entirely on religion and philosophy. The meeting had no political dimensions. I found Gulen to be a sincere and candid person. Our meeting was useful." This exchange was remarkable in that it showed Gulen's ideas could also find a receptive audience on the left. 20 The Gulen community owns and runs about 100 schools in Turkey. These institutions use the same curriculum as state schools and are under tight state control, but they also emphasize conservative values such as good manners and respect for elders. The schools are funded by the community and instructors are graduates of some of the best Turkish universities. Once the schools began functioning they became the focus of further fund-raising efforts and are regarded as providing a high-quality education. 21 In keeping with his Turkish orientation, Gulen encourages paying attention to the Turkishspeaking republics of the former Soviet Union, where he has gained many loyal followers. In October 1996, Gulen's followers financed a non-interest bearing bank, Asya Finans, backed by 16 partners and $125 million in capital, which aims to raise funds for investments in the Turkic republics. In this way, Gulen hopes to draw the attention of Turkish businessmen to these new countries and in doing so solidify links to them. Followers of Gulen have also founded more than 200 schools around the world, but mostly in the Turkic republics. The schools in the Turkic republics support a philosophy based on Turkish nationalism rather than on Islam. From the Balkans to China, he wants to see elites formed with Turkey as their model. In Gulen's view, Turkey's virtues include its Ottoman heritage, secularism, market economy, and democracy. These schools also admit non-muslim students, and because of their high quality, and perhaps use of English as the primary language of instruction, they attract children of the elites and government officials in various countries. The community supports a secular state model in both 20 Bulent Aras and Omer Caha. December 2000 Fethullah Gulen And His Liberal Turkish Islam Movement. Middle East Review of International Affairs Volume 4, No Ibid. 22

23 Azerbaijan and Central Asia. The Turkish analyst, Sahin Alpay, noted that graduates of these schools will go on to hold important positions in all walks of life in these newly independent states. 22 Gulen takes particular care not to antagonize the army. In fact, he tries hard to persuade the military leadership that his activities do not challenge the status quo and should not be regarded as reactionary (a code word for Islamist). For example, he says that, if need be, he would turn over his community's schools to the state. When asked about the threat of reactionaryism being on the agenda of the army-dominated National Security Council (MGK), he replied: The MGK is a constitutional institution. It is a part of the state. I have never believed that a threat of reactionaryism exists in Turkey. Turkey needs enlightenment. Reactionaryism means going backward. In an enlightened era which has experienced democracy and secularism, it is impossible for the Turkish people to go back.. While the Turkish army appears to accept Gulen and his followers as a domestic movement, not inspired by any foreign influence such as Iran or Saudi Arabia, the suspicion still exists that he may seek to subvert the military from within by sending his followers to the military academies. If this is true, it means that the community will have a difficult relationship with the military leadership. This may already be the case since it is known that the West Working Group in the Office of the Chief of the General Staff, has prepared a file dealing with the activities of Gulen's followers focusing on their educational institutions abroad.... Furthermore, the military leadership has shown no desire to be seen with Gulen, unlike secular politicians and intellectuals..... Gulen's June 1999 emergence upon the political scene triggered much controversy among secularist intellectuals, a considerable number of whom have suspected him of using different tactics to reach the same goal as the Islamists. They worry that behind his benign facade, Gulen hides ambitions to turn the country into an Iranian-style Islamic state. The insecurity and intolerance of some secularists causes them to accuse Gulen's community of being the enemy of the Turkish republic. They also worry that secularist parties have offered Gulen support in exchange for a promise on his part not to endorse the Refah Party. On the other hand, Gulen has obtained the support of a number of well-known liberal intellectuals who argue that the solution 22 Bulent Aras and Omer Caha. December 2000 Fethullah Gulen And His Liberal Turkish Islam Movement. Middle East Review of International Affairs Volume 4, No