SECULAR ELITES - RELIGIOUS MASSES; RELIGIOUS ELITES - SECULAR MASSES: THE TURKISH CASE

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1 SECULAR ELITES - RELIGIOUS MASSES; RELIGIOUS ELITES - SECULAR MASSES: THE TURKISH CASE Dr. Resit Ergener Bogazici University resit.ergener@boun.edu.tr Abstract: Secularism is often associated with the decline of religion. It may be more accurate to associate secularism with decline in the role of religion in areas other than otherworldly salvation. It is quite possible for demand for religious products with regard to afterlife to be on the rise, while the practice of resorting to supernatural beings in order to solve earthly needs such as health, education and welfare, is on the decline. What may be more interesting is the rise in the share of goods and services not supplied by resorting to religious channels (secular goods and services) in the consumption packages of those who display religious stigma. When the supply of products of health, education and welfare and of other goods and services produced through non religious channels are limited, elites can reduce the supply of such goods for the religious by making the not wearing of religious stigma as the precondition for their consumption. The demand of the religious for secular products will be suppressed by the supply of cheap substitutes (prayer rather than antibiotics). As the supply of secular goods and services rises and as the demand for their substitutes among the religious declines (with the proliferation of information channels), the screening of those wearing religious insignia from consuming secular goods can cease to be tenable. The paper will discuss this model in relation to the recent Turkish experience. This paper is an attempt to apply two approaches in the study of religion and economics to the study of secularism, with a particular reference to the Turkish experience. The approaches we will apply are what we will call the signaling approach and the exchange approach. According to the signaling approach (Iannaccone, 1992, 1994), religious symbols are messages not only to god, but to other humans as well. Wearing of religious insignia (such as head cover, turban, long hair, long beard, or no hair, hat, tail coat, turban) that mark one s outward appearance and the practice of rituals and of rules such as abstention from alcohol or various kind of food, various types of fasting, sexual restrictions, signify one s membership in a group. The difficulties one is willing to put up with in order to wear the insignia are correlated with the strength of one s commitment. The wearing of insignia will therefore enable believers to screen those who are less enthusiastic. This will raise the intensity of worship and also lead to 1

2 worldly benefits. Wearing of insignia allows one to identify altruism partners and makes it difficult for group members to survive out of the community that wears the insignia, contributing to the retention of human capital within the group. If the wearing of the religious insignia is correlated with strong moral codes, as it usually is, wearing of insignia can also signal trustworthiness to group members and to others. Non religious insignia can also serve similar purposes. Non religious insignia can be part of the identity one is born with, such as race, ethnicity, nationality or language. Refusal to wear religious insignia, which is commonly accompanied with the wearing of insignia which are usually associated with modernity and western life styles, can also imply membership in other (not religious) groups. According to one definition, secularism is understood as not religious. (Bailey 1998; Casanova 2003; Yinger, 1957) According to this approach, the rise of religiosity with regard to matters related to after life and spiritual well being is understood as a decline in secularism. Again, according to this approach, the wearing of religious insignia can be regarded as anti - secular. This was the opinion of the Turkish Constitutional Court which convicted the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2008 for breach of the secularism clause of the constitution because the government had attempted to legalize the wearing of head cover for female university students. Today, the laws and regulations enforcing dress codes for female civil servants and students are still in effect, though not commonly observed. We shall argue below that the higher visibility of religious insignia in daily life as well as the rise of religiosity with regard to matters related to after life and spiritual well being, need not imply the expansion of the religious sphere, and could rather paradoxically go along with a reduction of the role of religion in society. Before we proceed, let us briefly discuss what we mean by the approach to religion as exchange. According to this approach, religion is exchange with gods. Humans will exchange with gods only for what they cannot obtain through exchange with others. One can exchange with gods through religion. Afterlife will always remain in the realm of religion as no human can credibly provide goods and services for afterlife. Inner peace and morality issues can also remain in the realm of religion, irrespective of whether other humans can offer credible services in these 2

3 areas. Other goods and services will be demanded from the religious establishment to the extent one cannot obtain goods and services from other humans. For example, to the extent that humans lack the opportunity to obtain such services from other humans, education, health, social security and law can all come under the realm of religion. In order to meet the demand for various types of goods and services, religious establishment can produce real goods and services (missions for example provide education, health care, and other real services) or compensators. Compensators are substitutes for rewards and are defined as postulations of rewards according to explanations that are not readily susceptible to unambiguous evaluations. (Stark and Bainbridge1987, p. 30) With regard to matters pertaining to afterlife, only compensators are available, and only the religious establishment can provide such compensators. When available, consumers will prefer what we shall call real goods and services to compensators. For example, irrigation is preferred to prayer for rain, antibiotics is preferred to prayer for health or healing magic. Let us assume that consumption packages of households consist of a) Otherworldly goods which are related to afterlife and spiritual well being, and b) Worldly goods, such as health, education, housing, transportation, travel, leisure, etc. There will be real and compensator versions of worldly goods. Compensators can be supplied at a cheaper cost as compared with real worldly goods We will define secularism as the decline in the share of religious compensators in the total consumption of worldly goods. (According to this definition, rise or drop in demand for otherworldly goods does not affect secularism.) There are two groups of consumers, religious and non religious. Religious consumers wear religious insignia and have a larger share of their consumption of worldly goods made up of compensators. Non religions consumers do not wear religious insignia, wear insignia associated with modernity and the West and have a relatively smaller share, if any, of their demand for worldly goods as compensators. 3

4 There will be two firms, which are religious and non religious. Religious firms can produce both compensators for (such as prayer for health) and the real versions (hospitals) of worldly products. Non religious firms can produce real versions of worldly goods only. Both firms can sell to consumers of both groups. However, insignia worn by producers and consumers will promote trust in exchange relations between buyers and sellers. Therefore, religious consumers will prefer religious suppliers and the same will be true for non religious buyers and suppliers. Both religious and non religious consumers will purchase otherworldly products (which are compensators) from religious producers, as they are the only producers. Demand for real worldly goods will be correlated with the availability of information (about the existence of such goods) and income levels (real goods are more expensive.) Availability of information will be correlated with improvements in communication and transportation and with education. Markets for religious and nonreligious consumers will be segmented. Segmentation will be reflected in the insignia worn and will be related to income levels and geographic dispersion. Non religious groups will be better informed, more educated, and higher income as compared with religious groups. The demand for real worldly goods of religious consumers will rise as education and income levels rise and as overall communications and transportation improves. Religious producers of compensators can aim at suppressing the demand for real worldly goods and stimulate their demand for compensators (for worldly goods.) However, as the demand for real worldly goods rises, religious producers will produce more of the real worldly goods. Political authority can raise or lower the supply of real goods and compensators in either market. For example, the requirement not to wear head cover for female students will lower the supply of real education services for religious female students who insist on wearing head cover. Choice of locations for investments in health, education and transportation services will also affect the supply of real goods. If the supply of real worldly goods is inelastic, the choices of the political authority will have a significant impact on allocation. Political authority can pursue four different policies: 4

5 1. Maintain the supply of real goods low for religious consumers Maintaining supply of real goods low for religious consumers, by retaining rules such as ban on head cover in higher education, despite the surge in demand, can lead to social unrest 2. Enforce the consumption of compensators only for all consumers This option is not really viable as it would eliminate international competitiveness. 3. Raise the supply of real goods for religious consumers while lowering it for non religious ones As the demand of religious consumers for real worldly goods rises, political authority can raise the supply of real worldly goods for religious consumers. This can lead to a reduction in the supply of real worldly goods for non religious consumers and make them unhappy. (One way of changing supply is altering the rules and regulations associated with stigma. For example, relaxation of the rule with regard to the ban on head cover for female students will raise the supply of education for religious consumers, while reducing the supply for non religious ones, if the number of places remain limited.) 4. Raise the supply of real goods for religious consumers and also raise the supply of real goods Alternatively, the political authority can affect an increase in the total supply of real worldly goods, while at the same time further raising the supply for the religious consumers by relaxing the rules and regulations associated with religious stigma. This policy will raise the share of real products in relation to compensators in the total consumption of worldly goods and is a step toward secularization, even though religiosity will be seemingly on the rise, as religious symbols such as head scarves will be more visible. Political authority will be formed by religious elites, made up of the representatives of the religious consumers and producers, who wear religious insignia, and the nonreligious elites, made up of the representatives of non religious consumers and producers, who do not wear religious insignia, but wear modernist or western insignia instead. First option can be tried by non religious elites and would create unhappiness (for the religious masses). 5

6 Second option can be tried by religious elites, and is not sustainable. Third option can be tried by religious elites and create unhappiness (for non religious masses). Fourth option can be pursued by either religious or non religious elites or by a coalition of the two. The fourth option would make all happy while secularizing the country, according to our definition (by raising the share of real goods in the total consumption of worldly goods.) In the last decades of Ottoman Empire, large segments of the population had no choice but consume compensators produced by the religious establishment to meet their demand for worldly goods and services in basic areas such as education, health and law. Founders of the Turkish Republic made a genuine attempt to raise the supply of real versions of worldly goods in all areas. An ambitious development program was pursued. Efforts were made to penetrate all segments of society through institutions such as Village Institutes, which were designed to train rural boys and girls not only as teachers but also as community leaders. Efforts were also made to curb the ability of religious authorities to provide compensators in lieu of real worldly goods, as well as curbing religiosity in general. However, as real goods remained limited in supply, segmented markets for religious and non religious consumers evolved, as described in the model above. Rise in levels of income and education of religious consumers and the rising awareness by religious consumers of the availability of real worldly goods, raised the demand for real worldly goods by religious consumers. Following the introduction of the multi party system in 1950, the rise in demand for real goods by religious consumers was signaled to the political authorities through the elections. Popular governments (Democratic Party in the 1950s, Justice Party through 1960s and 1970s, Motherland Party in 1980s and Justice and Development Party during the last decade) have since made efforts to raise the total supply of real worldly goods while at the same time taking measures to further raise the supply of real goods for the religious market, through strategic choice of investment decisions and also through relaxation of the conditions related to certain stigma, such as head cover. These popular movements have also relaxed the constraints on religiosity in general. The net outcome has been more religiosity and more visible presence of 6

7 those wearing religious stigma, leading to concerns about the decline of secularism. (See for example Reed, 1954; Stirling, 1958; Rubin, 2008; Krespin, 2009) If however, secularism is defined, as we did above, as the growth of the real component in the total consumption of worldly goods that is not the case. References: Bailey, Edward, Implicit religion : What might that be Implicit Religion 1998, vol. 1, p Casanova, Jose, RELIGION, EUROPEAN SECULAR IDENTITIES, AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, Paper presented at the Mellon Sawyer seminar at Cornell University On October 7, 2003 Iannaccone, L. R. (1992). Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-Riding in Cults, Communes, and Other Collectives. Journal of Political Economy. 100(2): Iannaccone, L. R. (1994). Why Strict Churches are Strong. American Journal of Sociology. 99(5): Krespin Rachel, Sharon, Fethullah Gulens Grand Ambition Turkey's Islamist Danger, Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2009, pp Reed, Howard A., Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey, Middle East Journal, 1954, vol. 8, p.267 Rubin, Michael, Turkeys Turning Point Could there be an Islamic Revolution in Turkey? National Review Online April 14, 2008 Stark, Rodney and Bainbridge, Williams Sims, A Theory of Religion, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1987 Stirling, Paul, Religious Change in Republican Turkey, Middle East Journal, 1958, vol. 12, p William H Yinger, J. Milton, Religion, Society and the Individual, New York: Macmillan, 1957, p