General Mohamnmed Nu Galal, a Hawie, from the Habr Ghedir tribe

Size: px

Start display at page:

Download "General Mohamnmed Nu Galal, a Hawie, from the Habr Ghedir tribe"

Paula Atkins
5 years ago
Views:

1 Interview... with General Mohammed Nur Galal General Mohamnmed Nu Galal, a Hawie, from the Habr Ghedir tribe and more precisely from the Air group, is a legend in Somalia and the entire Horn of Africa. At the military museum of Addis Ababa, next to the photos of the Marshalls of the Empire Badoglio and Graziani, his picture can be found above the caption The men that invaded Ethiopia. In fact, he was the planner of the Ogaden Operations, the long conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia from 1976 to General Galal attended the Red Army s military academy, living for five years in the then Soviet Union. Returning to his native land, he distinguished himself in the Somali army until becoming one of the most important generals during the Siad Barre s government. His exceptional personal and professional traits brought General Galal to serve important political and administrative positions, such as the Minister of Public Jobs and, finally, Vice-Minister of Defence. After the fall of Siad Barre, Galal always tried to oppose, first, the power and the influence of the men of war and, after, the Islamic courts, hoping for Somalia s return to normality and, above all, unification. General Galal is now 66 years old; he fluently speaks various foreign languages, including Italian and English, and lives in Mogadishu. Who is responsible for the current conditions in Somalia? The current Somali situation is not the product of these last fifteen years. It is the fruit of a process that began with my country s independence. The sum of the errors, the omissions, and the mistakes has brought about this result. After independence there was a government and a civil administration. There was corruption, there was nepotism and also injustice; in a tolerable amount, however. At that time, the State had democratic tones. A transformation of society was in progress, though slow. Nonetheless, it was an inexorable transformation towards the development of an ever more democratic and civilian system. There was, in short, a maturation of the people, the institutions, and the country in a generalized manner towards a democratic culture. However, when Siad Barre rose to power, every attempt or drive in this direction was cancelled. Siad Barre did not want to allow the development of the country in this direction. Instead, he wanted to transform his presidency in a sort of reign to pass down to his son. He abolished political parties, suspended the constitution, and established a dictatorship that he then called Scientific Socialism. 135

2 Journal of Middle Eastern Geopolitics What were the opposition forces to Siad Barre? There were many opposition forces to Siad Barre, and they all competed in kicking him out of power. However, many errors have also been done. Some even tried to obtain merits that they did not have. For example, the case of General Aidid; it is not at all true that he was the one who kicked Siad Barre out of Mogadishu. In those days, Aidid was in Ethiopia, and did not participate in any way to the fall of Siad Barre in the final phase of the regime s collapse. All the men of his movement, the Somali National Congress, were in Ethiopia at that time. They were preparing and organizing for action and they still did not have a strong enough structure. In Mogadishu, Siad Barre was overturned by a popular insurrection; a revolution by the common people, a revolution provoked by Siad Barre. He had begun to arrest and to make around 10 people disappear every day, every night. Intellectuals, journalists, politicians. Anyone that was contrary to the regime risked being arrested during the night and brought who knows where to be killed. In three months, there were more than 150 dead. Then the population rebelled, with stones, with sticks, with any weapon. It was no longer possible to stop this insurrection. Siad Barre tried, but was not successful. Was Siad Barre weakened politically and militarily after the Ogaden War? Yes. The armed forces, above all, were weakened after that war. But the cause was political. The Armed Forces were very strong and well equipped before the Ogaden War. Even after the withdrawal from the frontlines, in spite of the outcomes of the war, the forces were still strong enough, disciplined and very equipped. At that time, however, Colonel Abdullah Yussuf tried to make a coup d état. And he failed. Siad Barre then understood that the army could be dangerous for him. From that moment, he systematically began to dismantle the cadres and the leadership. He destroyed the army. He removed all the valid personnel and transferred many of them to civil roles. At the same time, he put many worthless people in the ranks of the army. The army was weakened; as was the State. And this weakness was soon perceived in Somalia. This is the reason why he allowed the opposition forces to play a role and to organize themselves. If the army would have still been in place, this would have not happened. What was the perception of the role played by external forces? Somalia was allied with the Soviet Union at the beginning of the Ogaden War. And the United States, and therefore Italy, supported Ethiopia. It was the 136

3 Mohammed Nur Galal Cold War. Then everything changed during the course of the war. The Soviets supported Menghistu in Ethiopia; the United States and Italy changed sides and supported Siad Barre. What role did tribalism play in the civil war and the disintegration of the country? Somali society is tribal. The tribe, in Somalia, is above every thing, above political parties, above religion, above any ideology. The membership is ethnic, but not necessarily territorial. Various groups are part of the same tribe, but they do not necessarily live on the same territory. Take the case of the Irir, which are born from the union of the Hawia and the Isaq that are Abgal. The first live in the north, the others in the south. But when they speak about Irir, they are rock-solid, they side with each other, even if the Darood are in the middle. The Somalis are practically indistinguishable in terms of their physical aspect, aside from the Bantù group, but in terms of tribes they are very diverse and divided. Regarding today s Somalia, the Islamic courts seem to dominate. Who are they? Each of these courts usually originates from a certain tribe. For example, the Islamic court of Ifqa Alan belongs to the Air tribe, a tribe of the Habr Gedir, of the Sa,ad tribe. The Circle court belongs to another tribe under the Habr Ghedir, the Soleiman. The Milk Farm court is tied to another tribe under Habr Ghedir, the Duduble. The Islamic court of Yakshid instead belongs to the Abgal, a tribe under the Daramdolle. Also the Hurua court, I believe, belongs to the Duduble. While the Kilometre Four court belongs to a tribe under the Habr Ghedir, the Saad. Lastly, the Hararialle belongs to the Murosade tribe. However, the Islamic courts are different from the tribes. Moreover, they have existed for a long time. They were also present in the colonial period and after independence. They were given minor jurisdiction, especially religious and for the use of citizens, for example in the cases of weddings, inheritances, etc. Then, with the civil war, they began to have an ever greater importance. When the lords of war gangs raided the whole city and there was no longer any authority and the police had dissolved, the courts began to create a system to manage the order and security. They organized the militia that essentially had police tasks for the security of the population in a certain area. However, they began to give even more orders and dictate even more laws. Based on the religion of Islam, they gradually acquired an always greater power. Then they began to also manage the judicial system, which generally and gradually dealt with every aspect, from civil justice 137

4 Journal of Middle Eastern Geopolitics to penal justice. Paradoxically, the tribes themselves conferred the power to the courts, in order to be protected, in order to guard themselves against the arrogance and superpower of the militias belonging to the lords of war gangs. The latter were essentially bandits, and the courts answered to the people s need for security. The courts soon understood, however, that their role could also have political relevance. And in order to dominate politically, they also had to be militarily strong against the lords of war. It is for this reason that the courts decided to create the umbrella, a sort of strategic alliance for control of the territory and in order to kick out the lords of war gangs. Are the courts in a position of exercising control over the whole city of Mogadishu? It cannot be said that they are in a position of exercising total control. Today, the courts have control of some parts of the city, but not all. The new element, however, is that today they are in a position of expanding their role. Never as in this moment, has it been possible for the courts to succeed in imposing their dominion on areas ever more vast; an expansion that will happen, or will be able to happen, as damage to the lords of war gangs and to the anarchy. The zones outside their control are virtually lacking in authority, usually in the hands of gangs, or often, nobody. There are usually problems in these areas, and then the courts militias intervene, like emergency squads. What is the nature of the relationship between the lords of war and the courts? There is no agreement between them, but not even a real war. The power of the lords of war gangs has greatly diminished during recent years. They have lost their original purpose and vocation, in order to gradually transform themselves into groups dedicated essentially to banditry or political homicide. At one time Mogadishu was divided in two parts, north and south. Every part was dominated and controlled by a lords of war and by their many faithful subgroups. Historically, the northern part of the city was controlled by the Abgal, and the south was controlled by the Habr Ghedir, of the Hawia group. Today the lords of war are much weaker compared to the past, and the courts are becoming stronger. Still today, many of the lords of war try to publicly demonstrate their ability to control the northern or southern part of the city. But this no longer corresponds to the truth. They have been fragmented, fought off and, substantially, progressively weakened over the course of a war without meaning. While 138

5 Mohammed Nur Galal amongst the courts there is agreement, amongst the gangs there is no definition of alliances. They are all against each other. The courts sometimes let them go, however after a certain limit they intervene with their militias. The rest of the time, they cohabit. And how does the population react to all this? The people do not like this situation. The risk and the damages provoked by the lords of war gangs have been too large. Today people find themselves forced to accept the role of the courts and to accept their expansion. It is acknowledged like the price to pay for greater security, as a form of guarantee that allows them to not constantly be victims of the violence and the abuses of power by the lords of war gangs. The courts are very rigid and are becoming always more strict. The Somalis do not like rigidity. Thus the strictness of the courts is only tolerated. How are the courts organized and what is their heritage? The courts are double-faced, especially to the eyes of the population. On one side they take care of justice and security. On the other side, they are proselytizing for Al Qaeda, for Jihad. Religion in Somalia has always been part of the society, but not in an important way, without a political role. The courts existed in order to manage small crimes, modest roles and relationships between the citizens. There was no political and administrative role for religion. People learned the Koran, but more as an expression of cultural continuity, without really understanding the meaning, without any political role. And this was true until a little while ago. Immediately after independence, the clergy began to open relationships with the outside, above all with the Arab countries. However, this was done in such a way that it could never be transformed into a threat or a type of competition with the State. Instead during Siad Barre s regime, religion could no longer play a role, not even a small one. The clergy could not speak. But after the fall of the regime, religion tried to once again play a role. Many advocates of the clergy have appeared, and each one has tried to demonstrate the goodness of its creed and its own educational structure. In that moment, the great differences between our religious experts began to emerge. Those who studied in Egypt proved to have received a much less radical and more tolerant education compared to those who studied in Wahhabi schools in Saudi Arabia. Therefore they began to discuss religion amongst themselves; allowing the emergence of remarkable differences in their thinking and, above all, in their interpretation of Islam. 139

6 Journal of Middle Eastern Geopolitics If the power of the courts is limited to the city of Mogadishu, who rules in the rest of the country? The courts only have a role inside the city of Mogadishu. Their power is practically null outside of the city. The rest of the country is dominated by groups with local power, tied to tribes or the lords of war gangs. Everything revolves around expressions in the form of local government. For example, the external circle around Mogadishu is divided in the south by the Low Shabeellaha and the Medium Shabeellaha. Each of these two areas has its own administration. The Low Shabeellaha, the richer and more populated region, has its own governor that elected himself: Yussuf Mohammad Siad, a Habr Ghedir. The Medium Shabeellaha is instead governed by another governor who also elected himself, Mohammed Omar Abeb. Both of them have their own militia and manage their territory in a somewhat authoritarian way, but they have also succeeded in guaranteeing some stability and, above all, a relative peace. In the north there is the region of Hiiraan that also has its own administration, nominated by the Prime Minister Ghedi but rejected by the population that kicked him out of power. Somalia is therefore completely composed of the above mentioned local units of administration, resulting in a mosaic. How are the members of the Islamic courts elected? They are formed by members that are mutually elected among themselves. Some of them do not have any competence from a religious point of view. A minimum amount of force and organization is necessary in order to kick them out, but it is not difficult. For example, when the previous government of Gibuti was formed, I remember perfectly that, together with another general, we went to Mogadishu in order to see how these Islamic courts functioned. I could count on a bit of financial availability, thanks to the 15 million dollars aid that Saudi Arabia had donated. I remember that I offered the money to the militia men of the courts, a wage with the commitment that they would have had to follow me in the ranks of the new government. All of them followed me, every one of them. So where does the main financing for these courts come from? The main sponsors are Arab private donors, especially Saudis and Kuwaitis. Not the governments, at least that it what they say, but the Sheiks. The funds are distributed in the form of donations and charity. 140

7 Mohammed Nur Galal Does a pyramid of power exist within the religious structure? Yes, there is a hierarchy. At the lowest level we find Al Tabliq. These are groups of propaganda and proselytism. They go around the cities and the towns and try to increase the list of religious followers. They also act as informers. Then there is the Al Aslah, the group that controls the schools. It is a real threat because it is targeting young people, the new generations. They want to create a new well-educated and radicalized generation. They do not have competitors in their field, and the youth follow them, often because of a lack of alternative models. After Al Aslah is the religious movement of Ali Tahad. A unitarian movement presided by Sheik Hassan Dar Haweis, a former colonel of the Presidential Guards - an educated man, a theorist with a solid religious preparation attained at a Muslim university in Saudi Arabia. Ali Tahad is the decisional power, and also the operational sector, those that organize the militia. Finally, at the top is Al Qaeda. Are there any problems among the courts, and more in general among the clergy? Are there any clashes? No. To the best of my knowledge there are no reasons for clashes. Is today s Somali society based on and modelled according to Islam? Or it is dictated by lay doctrines? In the last ten years, religion has increased its role in society, for economic reasons, desperation and jobs. Whichever the reason, people have begun to give greater space to religion. And the clergy take advantage of the circumstances in order to proselytize. They say: you are punished by God because you have abandoned religion and disobeyed its laws. Have new Muslim schools emerged? Are they shaping the new generations? There is a society called Al Aslah. It is religious, and by now it controls a majority of the schools in Mogadishu. It has transformed nearly all of them into Muslim schools. Moreover, they are able to guarantee also an outlet to those who intend to continue their studies, allowing them to be accepted in Arab schools. The students pay very little; all of their expenses are guaranteed by the Arab donors, and also by the Saudi and Kuwaiti banks. We estimate that by 2010, all of the new Somali ruling class will be shaped according to a traditional Muslim model. 141

8 Journal of Middle Eastern Geopolitics Is the issue of the independent Somaliland still an open question? Yes. The population in the rest of Somalia has never accepted this independence. It is like a mutilation of the State. Instead, the Somalis in the northern region have preferred to detach themselves from the rest of the country. But it is a question of security and survival. I think that if it were possible for Mogadishu to find a formula of political agreement, we could once again try to engage the Somalis of Somaliland within a unitary State. I am sure that everyone would want to return to a single Somalia. Resources are lacking in Somaliland, there is misery. Only a unitarian State can deal with misery. Which are the reasons for today s political impasse? Where is the Parliament based? This is the problem. The Parliament is based in Mogadishu, but the deputies are dispersed throughout the territory. They are never able to gather in order to deliberate with the necessary quorum. There are a total of 275 deputies, and the quorum is composed of 139. This is the real problem for this government, to reach the quorum. In adition the President and the Prime Minister are debating on the nature of their respectuive poiwers, with the result of a total impasse. The latter has withdrawn to his city, Johar, without governing. And the members of parliament are dispersed throughout the whole territory, without ever being able to deliberate. 80 deputies are in Johar, 20 in Mogadishu, 10 in Baidoa, 80 in the Puntland, 30 in Nairobi, Kenya, and about 50 others are dispersed in other smaller regions. And also the Ministers are all in various places, without being able to do anything. In conclusion, what can the foreign countries do in order to help Somalia? They could favour the development of a solution that engages the Somalis, not an imposition from the foreign countries, and no foreign troops. Just support to the country through modest economic aid. For example, they could grant a salary to the members of parliament that would allow them to once again formulate policies, and allow them all to gather in Mogadishu. They could restart the economy, this is the secret, in order to remove labour from the hands of the courts. Then you would need to create a guarantor agency for the Constitution, and here the foreign countries could be present for a sort of Constitutional Court through which to re-establish the supremacy of the Constitution and to allow the officials to do their own jobs. This is exactly the opposite of what the situation is today. 142

February 02, Third African Department, Soviet Foreign Ministry, Information Report on Somali-Ethiopian Territorial. Disputes

February 02, Third African Department, Soviet Foreign Ministry, Information Report on Somali-Ethiopian Territorial. Disputes Digital Archive International History Declassified digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org February 02, 1977 Third African Department, Soviet Foreign Ministry, Information Report on Somali-Ethiopian Territorial