I. Dialogue between Confucianism and Christianity

Transcription

1 Conflict and Dialogue between Confucianism and Christianity An Analysis of the Tianzhu shiyi by Matteo Ricci Song Young-bae I. Dialogue between Confucianism and Christianity and the Significance of the Tianzhu shiyi The first significant dialogue between Confucianism and Christianity to take place in the Confucian world 1 was initiated by the writings of Matteo Ricci ( ), who had provoked a response amongst the Chinese literati since he had arrived in the city of Zhaoqing in Guangdong province, China, at the age of 30. In particular, the Tianzhu shiyi (The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven), 2 which was based on his discussions with Chinese intellectuals whose philosophical * Song Young-bae (Song, Y ng-bae) is Professor of Philosophy at Seoul National University and the Vice-President of the Korean Society of Eastern Philosophy. He received his Ph.D. in Philosophy at Frankfurt University in His articles include Relativism and Iconoclasm in the late Chos n Dynasty: Hong Tae-yong s Arguement for Reform (1994). 1. It was the year of 635 (Tang dynasty) that Christianity was for the first time transmitted to China with the introduction of Nestorianism which was influential up until the Sung dynasty. During the Yuan dynasty the franciscan missionaries were active in Beijing. However, they completely lost their influence with the decline of the Yuan. For a study of the missionary activity before Matteo Ricci, see A. C. Moule, Christians in China before the Year 1550 (London, 1930); Christopher Dawson, ed., The Mongol Mission: Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in Mongolia and China in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries (New York, 1955). 2. As for detailed expositions and the meaning of the Tianzhu shiyi, see Song Y ngbae (Song Young-bae), Ch nju shir i- i naeyong-gwa imi, Ch lhak sasang 5: pp

2 Conflict and Dialogue between Confucianism and Christianity 225 background at that time was Neo-Confucianism, has exerted a decisive influence on interaction between East Asian and Western philosophical thought, that is between Confucianism and Christianity, within the Confucian world since the seventeenth century. The influence and meaning of the Tianzhu shiyi can be seen in two ways. 1) The Tianzhu shiyi was the first specialized publication to introduce Western philosophical thought, particularly Aristotle s philosophy and its offspring, Thomism, systematically into Chinese culture as early as 400 years ago. 2) The Tianzhu shiyi takes the form of answers from a Western scholar [Matteo Ricci] to questions by Chinese scholars. Whereas most of the questions posed by the Chinese scholars can not be understood outside of the philosophical paradigms of Neo-Confucianism, the philosophical/theological interpretations offered by Matteo Ricci in response develop in accordance with Aristotle s philosophical system and the theology of Thomas Aquinas. Therefore, textual analysis of the Tianzhu shiyi is indispensable when trying to understand the conflicting world views of East Asian and Western metaphysics, and when searching for a base on which to build a new horizon where Confucian and Christian thought could be harmonized. When compiling the Tianzhu shiyi, Matteo Ricci made some basic presuppositions identifying important Christian concepts with Confucian concepts, for example equating the Christian God with tian or shangdi from the Chinese classics. By saying, therefore, that the original Chinese Confucian thought, which involved sacrificial service and worship of tian or shangdi, understood as a human god, was not fundamentally different from the Christian thought in which God is worshiped, Matteo Ricci resolutely attempted to affirm Chinese Confucian cultural traditions. 3 However, he relied on the fundamental philosophical conceptual framework of Aristotle and Thomist theological thought to severely criticize later Confucian thought, especial- 3. The missionary endeavours of the Jesuit Order of the sixteenth century were sympathetic to cultural adaptation, which overcame the eurocentrism preserved since ancient times, and affirmed the significance of Chinese culture. On this, see George H. Dunne, Generation of Giants.

3 226 KOREA JOURNAL / SPRING 1999 ly the atheism of Neo-Confucianism and the Neo-Confucian cosmology based on the doctrine of li and qi. The latter was, he claimed, caused by the bad influence of Buddhist and Taoist idol worship. 4 In short, Matteo Ricci stresses the basic similarities of Confucianism and Christianity, but also uncompromisingly denies the metaphysical framework of Neo-Confucianism. This interpretation of Confucianism and Christianity, along with his criticism of Neo-Confucianism, had a profound influence in many parts of North-east Asia after the publication of the Tianzhu shiyi. 5 To those intellectuals, who were critical of Neo-Confucianism, the Tianzhu shiyi gave fresh inspiration, but to those traditional Neo-Confucianists, who wanted to hold fast to the Neo-Confucian metaphysical system, it became a target for criticism. Through an analysis of the Tianzhu shiyi this paper will first consider what the structural differences in the basic thinking of Confucianism and Christianity are, in other words, the different metaphysical premises of East Asian and Western philosophies. Secondly, it will examine how, despite these differences, Matteo Ricci managed to present Christianity to the Chinese people in such a way that they were fascinated and wanted to know more. Finally, the conclusion will look again at the conflicts in an attempt to cautiously offer a new horizon for mutual dialogue. II. Matteo Ricci s Excessive Emphasis on Soul-Body Dualism and Neglect of the Value of Life in This World According to Matteo Ricci, human beings are a living combination of body and soul. However, he believes that human nature lies in spirituality, and that soul-body dualism has been over-exaggerated. Based on this assumption, he encourages people to seek eternal bliss for their spirits in the next world. Consequently, the value of life in this world is absurdly negated: 4. See the Tianzhu shiyi, chs. 2, 4, and The Tianzhu shiyi was translated into Japanese, Mongolian, Manchurian, Vietnamese, and Korean in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

4 Conflict and Dialogue between Confucianism and Christianity 227 Thus, the present world is our place of sojourn and not a place of continued residence. Our home is not in this world, but in the life to come; not among men, but in Heaven. We ought to establish our inheritance in that place. This world is the world of birds and beasts and therefore the bodies of each incline earthwards. Man is born to be a citizen of Heaven and therefore his head is lifted heavenwards. It is the birds and beasts which treat this world as their own dwelling place; it should not surprise us, then, that the Lord of Heaven should treat people with greater severity [than he treats the birds and beasts]. 6 The value of life stressed by Matteo Ricci does not lie in life in this world. This world is no more than a transient resting place in the search for the eternal bliss of the next world. This is because true human nature lies in spirituality, and the soul or spirit, which is bound up with the flesh, can perfect itself in the next world, when it is freed from the fetters of the flesh after death. This kind of thinking, which is oriented towards the next world, stressing the duality of and flesh and negating this world, would be hard to understand and accept in a Confucian cultural setting. Because Confucius spent his whole life worrying about the problem of humans and life in this world. 7 Zilu asked Confucius how one should serve ghosts and spirits. Confucius said, Till you have learnt to serve men, how can you serve ghosts? Zilu then ventured upon a question about the dead. Confucius said, Till you know about the living, how are you to know about the dead? 8 6. Matteo Ricci, The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven (Hereafter, The True Meaning) trans. D. Lancashire and Peter Hu Kuo-chen (Taipei: The Ricci Institute, 1985); originally published as Tianzhu shiyi. All citations from the Tianzhu shiyi are from this English version. 7. Song Y ng-bae, Chungguk sahoe sasangsa (Seoul: Sahoe P y ngnon, 1998), p Xianjin, in Lunyu (11:12).

5 228 KOREA JOURNAL / SPRING 1999 The primary interest in the Confucian tradition is interaction between human beings in this life, through the practice of what might be called a mature practical will. The question of spirits after death could only be considered a secondary problem. Confucius said the following: He, who by respect for the spirits keeps them at a distance, may be termed wise. 9 Thus this negation of this world could not have been very persuasive for Chinese literati, who were strongly rooted in humanistic beliefs centered on this world. III. The Distinction between Substance and Attribute and the Claim that Taiji (i.e., li) is not the Onthological Basis of Things but an Attribute of the Mind or of Things In the ethical metaphysical system of Neo-Confucianism, which is based on tianli (Heavenly Principle), taiji (Supreme Ultimate) or li is the origin of all things in the universe. Consequently, in Neo-Confucian culture it is not easy to accept the concept of a personified God who created the universe, as is seen in Europe. Zhu Xi ( ) explicitly denies the rule of a personified God over all things in the universe, as follows: The blue sky is in incessant motion. Now if it is claimed that there is a human-like existence in that sky, which judges man s sins, I would say that is simply nonsense. Nonetheless, if it is claimed that there is nothing presiding over us, that would also be nonsense. 10 Zhu Xi denies the existence of a personified God who judges human sins. However, he also says that a cow can not beget a foal, and a 9. Yongye, in Lunyu (6:22). 10. Zhuzi yulei ( ), vol. 1.

6 Conflict and Dialogue between Confucianism and Christianity 229 peach tree can not produce plum blossoms. If we consider the principle that a cow begets a calf, a horse begets a foal, and a peach tree produces only peach blossoms, then there must be some transcendental principle, li or tianli, which is also called dao or taiji, presiding over the infinite flux of myriad things in the universe. Once a thing exists, the principles which make that exist as a thing each possess laws appropriate to its being, and can not stop these on their own. These principles are endowed by heaven (tian), or nature, and can not be created by human beings. 11 The concept of li posited by Zhu Xi contains three different aspects: 1) the ontological basis of things (pattern by which something is so), 2) their appropriate laws of being (pattern by which something should be so), and 3) their innate necessity, excluding each thing s arbitrary nature. Zhu Xi distinguishes in the abstract between empirical objects in the actual world, and their ontological basis and appropriate laws the laws of being for all living creatures, including man. He then defines this ontological basic principle, i.e. li, as the raison d être of all things, and gives it primary philosophical significance. As a result, the li of Zhu Xi s system may be understood as the philosophical category of ideal reality, ideelle Realität, similar to the Platonic concept of idea. Li can not possess the subjective, sensual, empirical content of objects, since it is the transcendental, ontological basis of all things. Although li, which exists transcendentally in heaven, has no sound or odor, it is the core of all change and the root of every current. 12 In this way, li, which is separated from concrete history, society, and natural phenomena, and only has meaning as the transcendental, ontological basis of them, appears as an eternal and trans-historical 11. Daixue huowen ( ). 12. Taiji tushuojie ( ).

7 230 KOREA JOURNAL / SPRING 1999 valid existence presiding over the myriad things of the universe. However, for Matteo Ricci, who was accustomed only to the Aristotelian and Thomist world view, this metaphysical system of Neo-Confucianism was not at all properly comprehensible. As he believed in only one God who had created the universe, he could not accept the Neo-Confucian metaphysical system, which declares that taiji is the origin of all things. First of all, he invoked the Aristotelian categorical distinction between substance and attribute, and declared that taiji could not be the origin of all things as follows: When we come to the Supreme Ultimate we find that it is only explained in terms of principle. It can not therefore be the source of heaven, earth, and all things because principle also falls into the category of accidents. Since it is not substance how can it establish other things? When men of letters and learned men of China discuss principle they only speak of it in two ways: they either say that principle resides in the minds of men, or else they say it is to be found in things. They only say that things are real when their mode of being harmonizes with the principles in men s minds. When the human mind is able to study, penetrate and completely understand the principles inherent in things this is called the investigation of things. It is clear, on the basis of these two ways of speaking about principle, that principle is dependent and can not be the source of things. Principles, whether in the human mind or in things, are all subsequent to those things; and how can that which is subsequent be the source of that which exists prior to it? Further, in the beginning, before anything existed, who said that there had to be principles? Where were those principles located and on what did they depend? Accidents can not stand by themselves; if there are no substances for them to rely on, then the accidents are void and non-existent. If you say that they rely on voidness and emptiness, I am afraid I can only say that voidness and emptiness are not adequate to serve as their supports. Thus, one can come to no other conclusion than that principle must fall. Let me ask you: If principle existed prior to P an Ku [the legendary creator of the universe in China], why did it remain at leisure and not move to produce things? Who later stimulated it into activity? If, as

8 Conflict and Dialogue between Confucianism and Christianity 231 has been said, principle originally was neither active nor inactive, how could it possibly move of its own accord? If you say that principle at first did not produce anything but that later it wished to produce things, is this not tantamount to saying that principle possesses will? Why is it that at times it desires to produce things, and at other times it does not desire to produce things? 13 Here Matteo Ricci understands the li of which Neo-Confucianists talk in his own way and gives three reasons why li can not be the source of the creation of the universe. In doing this, he relies on 1) the distinction between substance and attribute, and 2) the law of cause and effect based on the temporal sequence of the production of things, both of which derive from Aristotle s thought. First, as he understands it li only exists in the following two cases. He writes, li resides in the minds of men, or else in things. So in Matteo Ricci s view li is not a real independent entity which exists in the empirical world, in other words a substance, but is no more than the formal cause of each individual object, existing within the substance and giving a name to (or defining) it as an existence. It follows, therefore, that li is not an individual object, or a substance, but is none other than an attribute dependent on such an object. 14 Matteo Ricci then asks where this li exists and on what kind of existence it depends, this li which is no more than an attribute belonging to a substance. By saying that, If you say that they rely on voidness and emptiness, I am afraid I can only say that voidness and emptiness are not adequate to serve as their supporters. Thus, one can come to no other conclusion than that li must fall, he elucidates that li can not be the source of all things. Second, Matteo Ricci criticizes li from the viewpoint of the law of cause and effect governing the production of things, by which an effect can not temporally precede its cause. As li is dependent on 13. The True Meaning, p. 111 (Vol. 1, ch. 2, 16a-c). 14. It is noteworthy that this assertion of Matteo Ricci, who regards the formal cause that is immanent in things as an attribute of the thing, is not applicable to Aristotle s nine categories of attribute.

9 232 KOREA JOURNAL / SPRING 1999 substances, such as the human mind or things (outside the mind), and, as what comes after in temporal terms can not be the cause of existence for what temporally precedes it, then li can not be the source of all things. Third, according to Matteo Ricci s understanding of Neo-Confucian li, it has neither motion nor will. Therefore, he says, that as li does not have the will to begin to move by itself and to create all the things in the universe, li can not be the origin of the creation of the universe, in the way that the Christian God is. Here we can not help but notice that Matteo Ricci s criticisms of li originate from the basic structure of Aristotelian metaphysics, which is completely different from that of Chinese metaphysics. According to Aristotle s Doctrine of Four Causes and Law of Cause and Effect, which explain the ontological basis of all things, the universe (Welt) which we confront is ultimately an object, and so it can not move by itself. The trigger of motion must come in principle from an efficient cause outside of the thing. Furthermore, this presupposes fundamentally a teleological view of the world, according to which the universe does not operate without purpose but is moving in a rational and regulated fashion following the objectives of a transcendent being who provokes such movement. According to such a metaphysics, all things in the universe are no more than lifeless existences, dead objects without soul (anima) or consciousness. 15 If it were not for the transcendent outside existence leading them along, they would not have the active strength, that is, efficient cause, to move by themselves subjectively and to transform and develop themselves. When we trace back to the very beginning of the efficient cause of things, which are now self-generating, and changing, we can not help but hypothesize the existence of a first efficient cause which creates all things and makes them move, and a final cause which determines the purpose of motion. Such efficient and final causes are not internal to individual objects, but belong to the external being, i.e., God, who transcends those objects. From this perspective, the 15. Matteo Ricci, Tianzhu shiyi, vol. 1, ch. 2, p. 3c:

10 Conflict and Dialogue between Confucianism and Christianity 233 absolute transcendent God, who creates and presides over the world, belongs to a completely different ontological category to those things created by Him, and so Matteo Ricci strongly rejects the assertion of the Chinese that all things are one and same. 16 From the perspective of the Chinese traditional Confucian world view, which is very different from the Aristotelian metaphysical tradition, all things in the universe are by no means inanimate, dead objects. The universe is full of life force, and is itself a living entity in which life continues incessantly and uninterrupted. The Confucian cosmology, which regards the universe as a living entity, can be found everywhere in the Chinese classics, from The Book of Changes and The Doctrine of the Mean onwards. 17 If, in this way, we understand all things in the universe to be living organisms, in which life continues incessantly and uninterrupted, then there is no need for the first efficient cause, a transcendent God, to put things into motion. Chinese people understood the mountains, rivers, grasses, and trees in the natural world, and even the changing seasons to move spontaneously by themselves. In Neo-Confucianism, especially, they named the ontological cause of the infinite living development of all things li. In this sense, if we try to force a comparison between the Neo-Confucian concept of li and Aristotle s Doctrine of Four Causes, it would certainly bear some similarity to Aristotle s formal cause. However, I would like to view this li not simply as the formal cause, which gives a name to each individual object, but also as the efficient cause internal to those objects and causing them to move, and at the same time, as the final cause, prescribing the pur- 16. As to Matteo Ricci s refutation to this dictum, see vol. 1, ch Consult the following passages: : (The Book of Changes),,, (The Book of Changes), (The Book of Changes)!,,,, (The Book of Changes) :,. :. (The Doctrine of the Mean),,,,,,. (The Doctrine of the Mean).

11 234 KOREA JOURNAL / SPRING 1999 pose of their motion and the appropriate laws of their being. 18 Here, we need to briefly examine Zhu Xi s expositions of li: All things in the universe each have their reasons for being as such, and laws governing how they should be. This is called li. 19 There is nothing, either in the essence of body and mind, or emotional virtues, or in the norms of people s everyday life, or in the natural world, or in the changes of the spirits, or the proper form of the beasts, grasses, or trees, that does not have, internal to each object, a proper way to be, an appropriate principle of what it should be, and does not reveal an [ontological] reason, for why it is that way and can not change to be otherwise. 20 Only li is constant in the universe. Heaven receives it and becomes heaven, and earth receives it and becomes earth. In general everything produced between heaven and earth also receives it and makes it its true nature. When it unfolds, it becomes the Three Fundamental Ethical Principles and when it is made into law, it becomes the Five Moral Disciplines. Li is common to all those things; there is no place it can not be found. [All these changes and motions through li] decay and prosper, wax and wane, and repeat these cycles endlessly. This began before things had even come into being, and will end when all things and human beings have disappeared, only to begin and end again, and this will continue without even momentary rest. 21 We can surmise from its meaning that the movement of qi depends on li. If qi is gathered together, li must be there, too. 22 We can summarise Zhu Xi s words as follows: li is the ontological base (raison d être) of individual entities, and a kind of ideal reality (ideelle Realität). Li exists in each entity, it is the ontological base 18. See Mou Zongsan ( ), p. 5: 19. Jingwen, in Daixue huowen. 20. Ibid., ch Zhuzi wenji, in Doudaiji ( ), ch Zhuzi yulei, vol. 1.

12 Conflict and Dialogue between Confucianism and Christianity 235 which constitutes entities as objects, and simultaneously the appropriate nature of their existence. In other words, it is a formal cause and also the final cause. But it is also the life force, the efficient cause, which makes those objects move and develop. Therefore, the concept of an external efficient cause, that transcends things and initiates their motions, was not conceivable to Chinese intellectuals, who were familiar with the above kind of metaphysical structure. Accordingly, it must have been difficult for Chinese literati to understand Matteo Ricci s criticism, based upon the Aristotelian and Thomist structures of thought with which he was familiar, that li was no more than an attribute and could not exist independently. IV. The Moral Idealism of Confucianism and the Moral Utilitarianism of Christianity Neo-Confucianism is a moral metaphysics based on tianli (Heavenly Principle). According to this, every individual thing in the universe has within it its own ideal perfection, which is tianli (equivalent to li or xing). Therefore, from the Neo-Confucian moral point of view, everything in the universe is in principle good and beautiful. However, whether human or non-human, each entity fuses with qi, the physical material that constitutes entities, in order to exist in the empirical, real world. As a result, the ideal perfection, li, which exists inside each entity, is more or less covered by qi. The main concern, therefore, is how to restore this li which has been covered by qi, and this depends on the pure moral volition and practical cultivation of human beings. People are encouraged to protect the Heavenly Principle and eliminate desire! The highest goal for people to pursue is the restoration of their ideal perfection, their human nature granted by Heavenly Principle, by eliminating human desire. Whether people resolve to try to restore their ideal perfection, their hidden nature, is entirely a question of moral practice. In this purely moral problem, there is no room for pragmatic calculation of reward for good behavior or avoiding punishment for evil doing. Therefore it was certainly

13 236 KOREA JOURNAL / SPRING 1999 not easy for Chinese literati to agree with the Christian moral utilitarianism by which people were induced to behave well and prohibited from doing evil, according to God s reward of good and punishment of evil. One Chinese literatus wrote as follows: But surely talk of Heaven and Hell has no place in the teachings of the Lord of Heaven. To persuade people to do good or to prohibit them from doing evil because of the gain or loss that will accrue from such conduct is to try to profit from good deeds and to avoid harm by refraining from evil; it is not to delight in goodness or to hate evil, [which should be man s] true ambition. Our ancient sages and worthiest taught men not to discuss profit, but only humanity and righteousness. The superior man does good without any ulterior motive, and certainly without any thought of gain and loss. 23 From Matteo Ricci s standpoint, however, the Neo-Confucian notion of original goodness based on Heavenly Principle is completely insufficient for encouraging good and prohibiting evil. This is because Neo-Confucianism only emphasizes self-enlightenment or awareness of one s true nature. With this emphasis on the inborn goodness of human beings one can not discuss their responsibility for their own behaviour being good or bad. This is in contrast to Western morality, where people s choice of good and bad behaviour, according to rational judgement and free will, and the responsibility which follows from that, can be questioned (God s reward or punishment). According to Ricci, the premise in the Confucian moral system that human nature is good refers to none other than the innate wisdom or innate capability that is granted to the human mind by the Lord of Heaven. Ricci believes that as this does no more than propose the latent potentiality for human good, it is not appropriate as an efficient scheme to promote good and punish evil, that is to punish actual evil behaviour. Therefore, he stresses the necessity of the accumulation of continuous good behaviour, in other words, the concrete 23. The True Meaning, p. 285 (Vol. 2, ch. 6, p. 16c).

14 Conflict and Dialogue between Confucianism and Christianity 237 practice of good, from the viewpoint of the development of one s natural goodness practical determination and behaviour, which can develop latent good nature, through the realization of our rational will. This process of practicing good is not inherently given, but, according to Matteo Ricci, depends on the choice of certain behaviour according to free will, which is an innate gift. Matteo Ricci sets forth the moral utilitarianism of Christianity as follows: Everything in the world which has a will can allow the will to achieve its end or can restrain it, and a distinction is thereby made between virtue and vice, good and evil. The will issues from the mind. Metal, stone and vegetation are devoid of mind and therefore of will. Thus, if a man is injured by a sword, his avenger will not break the sword in two. If a tile falls and injures a man s head, the man who is harmed will not bear a grudge against the tile. One does not impute merit to a sword because it can sever things. Tiles keep wind and rain out of a house, but men do not offer them thanks. Because they have no mind and no will they are devoid of virtue and vice, goodness and evil, and one can not reward or punish them. As to animals, we can say that they have the minds and wills of animals, but that they have no intelligent mind with which to distinguish between right and wrong. They follow their senses, and are unable to regulate their reactions with reason. Everything they do, whether it be fitting or not, is done without their being able to be masters of their actions and without any self-awareness; how, then, can one begin to speak of good and evil? Thus, of the laws enacted in the countries of the world, there is not one which punishes an animal for wrong-doing, or which rewards an animal for its virtue. But man s conduct is quite otherwise. His actions are external, but his reasoning mind lies within him. Not only is he aware that his actions are right or wrong, correct or otherwise, but he is also capable of allowing them to run riot or of bringing them to a halt. Although he possesses desires proper to the minds of animals, if he can use his rational faculty to exercise control over them, his animal mind will not be able to disobey the commands of the master

15 238 KOREA JOURNAL / SPRING 1999 of his mind. Consequently, if I determine to follow what is right and rational, I am a superior man in my moral conduct and will obtain the protection and support of the Lord of Heaven. If, instead, I am dissolute, and determine to obey my animal mind, I am an inferior man who transgresses the law and will be renounced by the Lord of Heaven. (.) Thus, it is clear that the source of good and evil is the will. (.) Because people probably emphasize the gains and losses of reputation more than anything else, and take less heed of the gains and losses which affect their bodies and wealth, it was said: Confucius completed the Spring and Autumn, and rebellious ministers and villainous sons were struck with terror. 24 And why were the rebellious ministers and villainous sons struck with terror? Were they not fearful of the harm that would be done to them as a result of their reputations being damaged? Mencius took humanity and righteousness as his theme. Later, each time he paid an official call on the ruler of a state he would plead with him to practice humane government and even argued that everyone who had done this had succeeded in ruling the world. 25 Do you mean to say that the exercise of kingship over the world does not represent gain? What person is not happy when his friends or relatives benefit in some way? If gain is something we should not be concerned with, why do we wish our friends and relatives to enjoy it? The method of cultivating humanity is as follows: Never do to others what you would not like them to do to you. 26 Though one ought not to look for personal gain, one ought, nevertheless, to extend benefits to others. One should realize from this that the gain [discussed above] is not harmful to virtue. The gain one may not speak of is false gain, and gain which flouts righteousness. In the Book of Changes we read: What is called the advantageous is the harmony of all that is right. 27 And, When that application becomes the quickest and readiest all 24. Tengwengong, in Mengzi (6:9). 25. Lianghuiwang, in Mengzi (1:5). 26. Weilinggoung, in Lunyu (15:23). 27. The Book of Changes:

16 Conflict and Dialogue between Confucianism and Christianity 239 personal restfulness is secured, our virtue is thereby exalted. 28 (.) People who emphasize the benefits of the world to come are bound to look with disdain on the benefits provided in this world. I have never heard of people who look with disdain on the benefits to be gained in this world, and who, at the same time, enjoy defying authority, struggling for power and gain, and murdering and assassinating fathers and rulers. If one can make all the people look forward to the benefits of the next life, one will have no difficulty in ruling the state. 29 Matteo Ricci believed that what distinguishes human beings from other creatures is the human capacity for rational inference, and that people s good and bad behaviour derives from their free will which determines their behaviour according to their judgement of right and wrong, good and evil. From this view of man and ethics, the Confucian doctrine of restoration of pure moral nature must have seemed insufficient for the promotion of virtue and reproval of vice. As God s reward or punishment of the results of people s choices according to their free will is absolutely central to Ricci s view, he can argue that it is justifiable to pursue benefit in the form of achieving happiness in the next life. Nonetheless, for the Chinese intellectuals influenced by pure moral idealism, this moral utilitarianism of Christianity seemed quite doubtful. Matteo Ricci, in his other work, Jiren shipian, introduces the doctrine of Confucian moral cultivation of a chancellor Gong who disapproves of the utilitarianism by which God judges man s good and evil actions after death. Gong emphasizes the conscientious judgements of people actually living in this world, and encourages the study of good behavior complying with conscience in this world. He sets forth his view against Matteo Ricci s standpoint in the following manner: You have discussed retribution with respect to human behavior. 28. The Book of Changes: 29. The True Meaning, pp (Vol. 2, ch. 6, pp. 18c-22c).

17 240 KOREA JOURNAL / SPRING 1999 [The difference in] people s good and evil deeds and suffering and pleasure, is so tiny that it is difficult to match them. Among these tiny things are some that can not be scrutinized by laws. Nevertheless, conscience, the lord of our small hearts, perceives right and wrong and thoroughly repays them, even when they are so minute that they are beyond the reach of other people[ s eyes]. This retribution works on oneself immediately. It does not wait until we are dead. A virtuous person possesses the kingdom of heaven, that is, the original mind. The original mind is the land of peace, or paradise. The mind is satisfied and pleased of itself, and so rewarded. If you have once shown a virtuous mind, then you have increased your happiness. When you possess all virtues, then you possess complete happiness. The humane person, it is said, has attained great spiritual bliss. If a bad thought arises in your mind, then your mind becomes a sea of suffering. When a sin arises in your mind, then hundreds and thousands of opportunities for disaster will appear freely at all times. And so an evil mind will bring about its own frustration and punishment. To disobey a precept is to bring disaster to oneself. A willful misdeed is itself a severe punishment from hell. Why? If I violate the heavenly order, I feel disgrace, accuse and pass judgement on myself, so how can I excuse myself? When my mind, afraid of myself, convicts me of a sin and puts me in prison, can I escape this? When my deeds are punished by the Heavenly Principle of original nature, then can I pay a bribe and be free? Can I hope for a merciful pardon from the lord? Then, when various emotions such as grief, repentance, and misery attack me inside from every quarter, and when disaster and venom attack from any direction, how can I escape? He who covers others eyes can not cover his own, and he who escapes others [eyes] can not escape his own. Thus, in the face of disaster, the wise and fools are little different, pleasure and hardship are generally alike. So do not look only at people s skin, but look inside them! Do not look at their faces but look inside their hearts! The superior man should not change his pleasure [at cultivating himself] because of difficult situations, and the ordinary man should not give up his concern for himself [that he is not a superior man] because of superficial brilliance. After all, the rewards for my virtuous or vicious deeds are

18 Conflict and Dialogue between Confucianism and Christianity 241 inside my body [my conscience] and do not come from outside. How could you not believe this? 30 V. Matteo Ricci s Renovation of Confucian Ethics and Christian Ethical Ideals: The Perfection of Self through Christian Humanity (Love for the Lord of Heaven and for Human Beings) For Thomas Aquinas, if the function of intellect lies in a cognitive faculty which distinguishes right and wrong, good and evil of things and events through inference, then the role of intellectual appetite, i.e., volition or will, is the realization of moral goodness. Matteo Ricci, who modified Thomist idea in the Chinese way, persuades the Chinese scholars: The supreme task of the intellect is the clarification of what is right, and the greatest foundation of the will is humanity; therefore, the constant concern of the superior man is for humanity and righteousness. These two things are related to each other, and neither the one nor the other can be neglected. But it is only after the intellect has made it clear that humanity is good that the will is able to develop a will for it and to preserve it; and it is only after the will has formed a volition for righteousness that the intellect will examine it and seek after it. But humanity is the essence of righteousness, so that a man who is rich in humanity is bound to have an intellect capable of even greater understanding. Thus, the education of a superior man is principally concerned with humanity. 31 Ricci therefore asserts that human intellect pursues social and objective righteousness, and that intellectual volition pursues moral humanity. Accordingly, he says, Christian human ethics are fundamentally no different from the Chinese ethical ideal, that is, the pur- 30. Jiren shipian, vol. 2, ch. 8, pp The True Meaning, pp (Vol. 2, ch. 7, p. 43ac). Here the Lancashire and Hu translation has been amended slightly.

19 242 KOREA JOURNAL / SPRING 1999 suit of humanity and righteousness. Of these two, he insists, it is humanity, that is, the practice of human love, which properly joins people in human relationships, and which is more important than righteousness, and so the ethical ideals of Christianity are fundamentally identical to those of Confucianism. What, then, is the central message of humanity of which Ricci writes? There are, of course, many grades of virtue, and I can not enumerate them all here. I shall therefore provide you with a number of examples of which humanity is the most important. When you have been provided with these major examples, you will find that the remainder simply follow on. Thus, the Book of Changes states: What is called the great and originating is (in man) the first and chief quality of goodness The superior man, embodying benevolence, is fit to preside over men. The definition of humanity can be summed up in the following two sentences: Love the Lord of Heaven, for He is supreme; and love others as you love yourself for the sake of the Lord of Heaven. 32 If you carry out these two commands, everything you do will be perfect. But these two commands are, after all, only one command. If one loves a person passionately one will love what that person loves. The Lord of Heaven loves people; if I genuinely love the Lord of Heaven can I fail to love the people He loves? 33 The humanity of which Ricci speaks ultimately means love for the Lord of Heaven, the creator of the universe, and he says it is no different from Christian human love for other people the Lord of Heaven loves. This love for God, that is, Christian humanity, lies in the practice of substantial love for human beings who are suffering in concrete circumstances. He says this as follows: Sincere love for men is the greatest result of a love for the Lord of Heaven. This is what is meant [in the Analects] by the expression, 32. The Bible, Matt. 22:34-40, Mark 12:28-34, Luke 10: The True Meaning, p. 375 (Vol. 2, ch. 7, p. 46a-c).

20 Conflict and Dialogue between Confucianism and Christianity 243 Humanity is the love of man. If a man does not love his fellowmen, how can one tell that he sincerely respects the Lord on High? The love of man is no feigned love since it must result in the feeding of the hungry, in the giving of drink to the thirsty, in the clothing of those without clothes, and in the provision of places to live for the homeless. Love has compassion for and comforts those who experience disaster; it instructs the ignorant, corrects the wrongdoers, forgives those who humiliate me, buries the dead, and dares not forget to pray the Sovereign on High for all men, living or dead. 34 Upon hearing such statements by Ricci on the love of the Christian Lord of Heaven and the way of human love, Chinese scholars must have been curious and interested in the new ethical ideals, which seemed to be more comprehensive than the Confucian ethical ideals. The latter encourage the cultivation of morality in family ethics and viewing the state and other human beings according to those family ethics. VI. Conclusion: A New Horizon for Dialogue between Confucianism and Christianity Of the many philosophical issues raised by the Tianzhu shiyi, this article has focused on the following two. First, I introduced Matteo Ricci s explanations of 1) the ultimate duality of soul and body, 2) the negation of li, the key term of Neo- Confucianism, as the origin of all things, and 3) the moral utilitarianism of Christianity. Ricci s explanations opposed Neo-Confucianism, which was a kind of moral metaphysics, based on tianli, as an ideellee Realität, in order to elucidate the creation and dominance of the universe by God and the idea of reward and punishment of the human soul in the next life, which are central to Christian teachings. 34. The True Meaning, pp (Vol. 2, ch. 7, p. 48c).

21 244 KOREA JOURNAL / SPRING 1999 For each point, I attempted a critical comparison from the standpoint of the Neo-Confucian world view. Second, I discussed the interesting development of debate by Matteo Ricci, who, aware of the creed of the restoration of true human nature or the self-cultivation of morality which was a central message of Neo-Confucianism, proposed (what he believed to be the better idea of) the doctrine of human cultivation based in Christian belief, or Christian ethical idealism. On the first issue, Matteo Ricci made a remarkable, earnest effort to argue the case for Christian theology, developing his argument based in the philosophical and theological concepts of Thomas Aquinas, which were completely unfamiliar to contemporary Chinese intellectuals, while also persuasively connecting them to the Confucian classics from time to time. Nevertheless, we can not help but reflect critically on whether his arguments could really harmonize well with the traditional ways of thinking of Chinese literati at the time, or even of us today. Therefore, as was seen from comparison of the structural differences between the metaphysics of East Asia and the West in sections II, III and IV, I do not believe that Ricci s oneway criticism of the theoretical framework of Neo-Confucianism, which relied on Aristotle s Four Cause Doctrine and teleological world view, could have been accepted persuasively by Neo-Confucian intellectuals at that time. The second issue of the moral idealism of Christianity over that of Confucianism shows much originality. Even though it develops on the premise of excessive opposition and dualism of the spiritual and material, or the spirit and the flesh, the sincerity and true meaning of Christian morality derived from Western metaphysics is persuasively presented to Confucian intellectuals through Ricci s amalgamation of Confucian ethical concepts and Christian content. The originality of Ricci s amalgamation of East Asian and Western thought has great significance and provides very important suggestions with regard to the indigenization of Christianity in Confucian culture. However, as we saw in the above statement by chancellor Gong, the most problematic issue in the Neo-Confucian world view is the judgement by an interiorized (to human beings) conscience and the

22 Conflict and Dialogue between Confucianism and Christianity 245 revelation of tianli understood by that conscience. We see clearly here that, Confucian moral metaphysics highlights a humanist morality based on the human conscience. From this humanistic viewpoint, the God of Christianity is no more than the conscience immanent to our minds. Thus Chinese scholars in the Tianzhu shiyi emphasize the important role of conscience in the human mind, which is analogous to the virtue or capacity of God. According to them, the innate conscience granted to human beings is nothing but God, the Lord of Heaven. Within the Confucian world view, God is not an external, transcendental being but the Lord of Heaven of the inner mind. 35 The virtue of the Sovereign on High is undoubtedly profound, but we men are possessed of supreme virtue too. The Sovereign on High is assuredly imbued with immeasurable capabilities, but men s minds are also able to deal with all things in the world. Just look at the sages of ancient times: they regulated the vital energies, opened up all things, established teachings, expounded ethics, invented the tilling of the land and the weaving of cloth for the nurture of the people, and they built boats and vehicles, amassed wealth, and transported goods for the benefit of the people. They laid a good foundation, winning eternal ease with one supreme effort, and handing down a great unchanging plan to ten thousand successive generations so that the world might long enjoy peace and tranquility. I have never heard it said that the Sovereign on High neglected these sages of the past and that he established everything by Himself to the point where He exercised supreme control. Since this is the case, even the Sovereign on High has no way of transcending man s virtue and ability. Who said that the creation of heaven and earth is the work of the Lord of Heaven alone? Because people in this world do not understand the extraordinary functions of their own minds ( ). Only the mind is free to go wherever it wishes; to ascend to any height; to embrace everything no matter what its size; to penetrate anything, no matter how small, and to cross anything, no matter how substantial. Thus, any- 35. Tianzhu shiyi, vol. 1, ch. 4, pp. 46c-47a.

23 246 KOREA JOURNAL / SPRING 1999 one with a foundation of knowledge ought to know that the mind, no greater than a square inch in size, is indwelt by the Lord of Heaven. If it were not the Lord of Heaven, how could it be as it is? 36 In Neo-Confucianism in which tianli is the foundation of a moral metaphysics, God can finally not be thought of apart from the reflection and insight of human conscience in this world. For them, God is not an external, transcendental being but tianli itself, which is immanent to every individual being. Specifically in the case of human beings, conscience is the Lord of Heaven. On the contrary, the central theme of Christianity is the transcendent God who transcends and governs the phenomenal world, and according to whose intention and purpose all things in the universe are created, and evolve to realize their purpose. The essence of Christianity, therefore, may be defined as the pursuit of teleology according to a transcendent God (die ausserweltliche Teleologie des Christentums). Even so, we should not overlook the fact that, in the Christian tradition since the time of Saint Augustine ( ) too, proof of God s existence is found in the conscience given to humans. Matteo Ricci also tried to verify the existence of God in the human conscience: I assert, then, that there is nothing under heaven which is more evident than the truth of His existence. Is there anyone who has not raised his eyes and gazed at the sky and who has not silently sighed to himself, while gazing at the sky, and said: There must surely be Someone in the midst of it who exercises control over it. (.) The first [of these arguments has to do with] our untutored ability that is innate capability. Now [men] of all nations under heaven possess, each of them, a natural capacity by which, without any communication between them, all venerate One who is regarded as worthy of supreme honor. Those in distress call upon Him for pity 36. The True Meaning, pp (Vol. 1, ch. 4, pp. 47c-48a).

24 Conflict and Dialogue between Confucianism and Christianity 247 and look to Him for salvation as to a compassionate father and mother. 37 I believe, therefore, that a new horizon for a deeper dialogue between Confucianism and Christianity should be sought again in a profound reflection on the voice of the human conscience, which appears both in Confucianism and in Christianity. REFERENCES [1603] (1855) ) Campbell, Thomas J The Jesuits Boston: Milford House. Dawson, C., ed The Mongol Mission: Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in Mongolia and China in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries. New York. Dunne, George H Generation of Giants. Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. Haas, Hans Geschichte des Christentums in Japan, 1. Bd. Tokyo. Kenny, Anthony Aquinas on Mind. New York: Routledge. Lancashire, D., and Hu Kuo-chen, tr The True Meaning of the Lord of 37. The True Meaning, pp (Vol. 1, ch. 1, p. 3a).