Moral Pluralism in Smith and his Contemporaries Michael B. Gill

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1 Moral Pluralism in Smith and his Contemporaries Michael B. Gill What role do general principles play in our moral judgment? This question has been much contested among moral theorists of the last fifteen years. 1 When we turn to the British moralists of the eighteenth century, we find that similar issues were equally pressing. In this paper I will try to show that while many of the British moralists thought that general principles could conclusively determine our moral duties, Hume and Smith were ambivalent about the role of principles, not only giving expression to the common view of principles power but also exploring the possibility that principles could not fill the justificatory space typically allotted them. Hume and Smith, I will try to show, constitute fascinating transitional figures in our thinking about the role of general moral principles. 1. Prioritarianism vs. pluralism In his 1993 paper, Moral Pluralism, Berys Gaut gives a very helpful account of a crucial distinction between moral theories. The distinction is between what Gaut calls prioritarianism and moral pluralism. Prioritarianism, in Gaut s words, is the claim that for any action there is a rule or rules which entail that just one of the following possibilities is true of that action: that it is required, or forbidden, or permitted. We can distinguish three ways in which a theory may be prioritist. Firstly, if a theory has only one principle which can be applied to any set of actions, such as utilitarianism, it is prioritist. Secondly, a theory can be prioritist if it incorporates a multitude of principles which are ranked in such a way that for any circumstance one knows which takes precedence over the other. Rawls theory of justice incorporates two principles, but it is prioritest since he gives a priority rules that lexically orders one over the other. Finally, a theory can be prioritist because, though it lacks a comprehensive ranking method, it claims that the principles never clash (19). 2 Pluralist views, in contrast, hold that there are multiple fundamental principles, that these principles can require incompatible actions, and that there is no comprehensive ranking method for resolving such conflict. As Rawls puts it, [Pluralist] theories, then, have two features: first, they consist of a plurality of first principles which may conflict to give contrary directives in particular cases; and second, they include no explicit method, no 1

2 priority rules, for weighing these principles against one another: we are simply to strike a balance by intuition, by what seems to us most nearly right. Or if there are priority rules, these are thought to be more or less trivial and of no substantial assistance in reaching a judgment (34; quoted by Gaut [18]). The difference between prioritarianism and moral pluralism for the first-person, deliberative life of a moral agent is profound. If prioritarianism is true, then every moral question you will ever have to face will have a principled answer. You will, of course, have to execute judgment to correctly apply the moral principles. But if you know what the principles are and how they apply to a particular situation, the right answer will be clear. You ll always be able to fully justify a moral judgment by showing that it follows from (the correct application of) general moral rules. Most importantly, it will always be appropriate for you to aspire to completely principled moral justification. If pluralism is true, in contrast, you may find yourself in a situation in which two principles require conflicting actions, and you may not be able to rely on any other principle for resolving the conflict. In a morally fraught situation the final judgment that you come to may outstrip principled support. You may have to confront an unfillable justificatory gap between general principles and a particular judgment. 3 Because pluralism cannot completely close the justificatory gap between principles and particular judgments, some have assumed that the correct moral theory must be prioritarian (Gaut 20). For it is only prioritarianism (according to this way of thinking) that is able to fulfill moral theory s practical aim of delivering determinate verdicts about what to do. One way to be prioritarian, as we ve seen Gaut explain, is to allow there to be one and only one ultimate moral principle: that s how the grand monistic theories of Kant and Bentham did it. But many of the most prominent 18 th century Scottish and English philosophers Butler, Hume, Smith, and Reid among them resolutely rejected monism, resoundingly affirming the existence of a multiplicity of ultimate moral principles. At the same time, these four also felt the grip of the prioritarian idea that full moral understanding would provide principled and determinate verdicts to all our moral questions that morality does not harbor justificatory gaps between principles and judgments. Each of these four, consequently, endorsed the idea either that the multiplicity of moral principles never come 2

3 into conflict with each other, or, if such conflicts do occur, that there is a strict hierarchical ordering for resolving them. 4 Hume and Smith, however, were also drawn to the opposing, pluralist idea that moral principles can come into conflict in ways that do not admit of principled resolution. Indeed, Hume and Smith s sentimentalist-empiricist accounts of morality, combined with their attention to certain phenomena of commonsense moral thinking, made this antiprioritarian view almost irresistible to them. The result is that Hume and Smith struggled to find their footing along the border between prioritarianism and pluralism. In the end, however, it was the pluralist view that fit best with the deepest aspects of Hume s and Smith s accounts of morality or so I will try to show. To bring the prioritarian-pluralist issue into focus, I will first describe the monistic view of Francis Hutcheson. I will next describe the arguments against Hutcheson s view put forward by Butler, Hume, Smith, and Reid. I will then look in more detail at the prioritarian and pluralist strands in the thought of Hume and Smith. Elucidating these 18 th century positions on moral principles has more than just historical interest, I believe. For the ambivalence Hume and Smith evince between prioritarianism and pluralism mirrors a tension that exists in the everyday moral thinking of many of us. I will not delve into those ahistorical matters here, but I hope what I say will shed light on our continuing discussion of them. 2. The monism of Hutcheson In eighteenth century Britain, the moral philosopher most often taken to be a clear representative of the monistic view of the view that there is only one ultimate moral principle was Francis Hutcheson. Hutcheson, on most common interpretations, held that the single moral goal was to promote the happiness of humans, that one is virtuous to the extent that one is benevolent. And there is ample textual support for such interpretations. 5 All of our moral judgments, Hutcheson tells us, have one general Foundation, and that is our approval of the motive to promote the welfare of humanity in general (Hutcheson 1726, 116). [T]hat we may see how Love, or Benevolence, is the Foundation of all apprehended Excellence in social Virtues, let us only observe, That amidst the diversity of Sentiments on this Head among various Sects, this is still allow d to be the only way of 3

4 deciding the Controversy about any disputed Practice, viz. to enquire whether this Conduct, or the contrary, will most effectually promote the publick Good. The morality is immediately adjusted, when the natural Tendency, or Influence of the Action upon the universal natural Good of Mankind is agreed upon. That which produces more Good than Evil in the Whole, is acknowledg d Good; and what does not, is counted Evil (Hutcheson 1726, 118). According to Hutcheson, a careful observation of our moral responses reveals that we approve of people just to the extent that we think they are motivated to promote human welfare (Hutcheson 1726, ). Hutcheson is thus rightly taken to be an early Utilitarian. But he would be a motiveutilitarian, not an act- or rule-utilitarian. That is to say, his view implies that our moral judgments are attuned to the motives we think people act on, and that we approve of a motive to the extent that we think the motive is generally benevolent. Darwall [1994] argues that Hutcheson is not a meta-ethical Utilitarian in that he doesn t think that moral ideas can be reduced to ideas about non-moral states of affairs. Darwall is right about this, but Hutcheson is still fairly thought of as a normatively monistic Utilitarian (i.e., a motive- Utilitarian about the content of morality) insofar as he thinks morality is based on approval only of one kind of motive namely, motives to promote happiness. All our approvals, according to Hutcheson, are responsive to the same benevolent quality. 6 Hutcheson does acknowledge that we often approve of a person when she intends to promote the welfare of only a few people and not humanity as a whole. We approve of parents love for their children, of friends mutual concern for each other, of patriots commitment to their country. But what makes these cases of partial benevolence virtuous is their goal of promoting human welfare, and it is always morally better to promote more human welfare rather than less. Partial benevolence is a morally lesser version of general benevolence. [O]ur moral Sense would most recommend to our Election, as the most perfectly Virtuous [those actions that] appear to have the most universal unlimited Tendency to the greatest and most extensive Happiness of all the rational Agents, to whom our Influence can reach. All Benevolence, even toward a Part, is amiable, when not inconsistent with the Good of the Whole: But this is a smaller Degree of Virtue (Hutcheson 1726, 126-7; see also Hutcheson 1726, and Hutcheson 1728, 8). According to Hutcheson, we recognize different Degrees of Moral Beauty (Hutcheson 1726, 231), and the highest degree is a benevolence toward all humans that controuls our kind particular Passions or 4

5 counteracts them (Hutcheson 1726, 231). The morally best thing is to try to promote the welfare of all, even in those cases in which it means sacrificing the Happiness of certain smaller Systems of Individuals, such as those composed of one s countrymen, one s friends, and one s children (Hutcheson 1726, 231) The non-monism of Butler, Hume, Smith, and Reid Butler, Hume, Smith, and Reid all argued against the benevolence-monism of Hutcheson. All four of them explicitly affirmed a multiplicity of moral principles. 8 Butler s most extended account of the non-monistic nature of morality comes in his Dissertation upon the Nature of Virtue. There, he warns against the idea of imagining the whole of virtue to consist in singly aiming, according to the best of [one s] judgment, at promoting the happiness of mankind in the present state; and the whole of vice, in doing what [one] forsee[s], or might foresee, is likely to produce an overbalance of unhappiness in it: than which mistakes, none can be conceived more terrible (Butler 74). Taking general benevolence to be the entirety of virtue is a terrible mistake, Butler explains, because it leads us to ignore other principles that are rightly taken to be ultimate moral ends. These other principles include veracity and justice, as well as the gratitude and friendship that motivate us to benefit those near and dear to us (our benefactors and friends) rather than promote the welfare of people in general (Butler 72-4). As Butler writes, The fact then appears to be, that we are constituted so as to condemn falsehood, unprovoked violence, injustice, and to approve of benevolence to some preferably to others, abstracted from all consideration, which conduct is likeliest to produce an overbalance of happiness or misery [S]ince this is our constitution; falsehood, violence, injustice, must be vice in us, and benevolence to some preferably to others, virtue; abstracted from all consideration of the overbalance of evil or good, which they may appear likely to produce (Butler 73-4). Butler thinks we should take there to be a multiplicity of independent ultimate moral ends justice, veracity, and the partial benevolence of friendship and gratitude among them. We ought to be morally concerned with each of these for its own sake, as an independent reason for action, and not take their normative force to be reducible to or derivable from a single principle of general benevolence. Hume endorsed this Butlerian criticism of Hutcheson s benevolence-monism. In a letter to Hutcheson, Hume wrote, I always thought you limited too much your Ideas of 5

6 Virtue (Letters 47), and in the Treatise and Second Enquiry he developed an account that is obviously intended to show that virtue extends beyond Hutchesonian benevolence. Hume does think that some of the qualities we approve of are virtues because of their tendency to promote the happiness of humanity in general (E 2.6-8). But he also takes special care to make it clear that we approve of some virtues for reasons other than that they promote the happiness of humanity as a whole. Our approbation of certain tender sentiments, he writes, seems to me a proof, that our approbation has, in those cases, an origin different from the prospect of utility and advantage, either to ourselves or others (T ). Other qualities are virtues only because they are immediately agreeable to others, abstracted from any consideration of utility or beneficial tendencies (E 8.2). And again: As some qualities acquire their merit from their being immediately agreeable to others, without any tendency to public interest; so some are denominated virtuous from their being immediately agreeable to the person himself, who possesses them (T ). In another letter to Hutcheson, Hume maintained that since on Hutcheson s monistic view a person s moral status would be a function only of how benevolent he was, that view implied that no Characters could be mixt (Letters 34). According to Hume, however, The character of most men, if not of all men, was mixed (History 5.542). Like Butler and Hume, Smith takes Hutcheson to be the best representative of the monistic view that virtue consists entirely of benevolence ( ). Smith acknowledges that this view is supported by many appearances in human nature (301) and that it has a peculiar tendency to nourish and support in the human heart the noblest and the most agreeable of all affections (303). Also like Butler and Hume, however, Smith goes on to argue that Hutcheson was wrong to hold that benevolence is the only ultimate moral end. Hutcheson s view implies that virtue concerns only the effects of character traits on human happiness, but in fact (according to Smith) we also judge traits based on the different matter of their propriety and impropriety, their suitableness and unsuitableness, to the cause which excites them (305). In the chapter specifically concerned with Hutcheson s benevolence-monism, Smith points to our approbation of the virtues of prudence, vigilance, circumspection, temperance, constancy, firmness (304). We approve of these self-oriented traits not because they have beneficial effects on the public good, Smith tells us, but because we think it is proper and suitable that a person possess them, which propriety and suitability 6

7 Hutcheson s benevolence-monism disregarded altogether. The view Smith advances here shares with Hume the idea that a significant subset of what we take to be virtuous are traits that are beneficial to the agent herself, and that we do not think those traits gain their virtue from their effects on society as a whole. Proper and suitable concern for one s own welfare, independent of thoughts about its effect on the public, is virtuous, and the lack of this concern in a person is a failing [which would] somewhat diminish the dignity and respectableness of his character. Carelessness and want of oeconomy are universally disapproved of, not, however, as a proceeding from a want of benevolence, but from a want of the proper attention to the objects of self-interest (304). Smith s multiplism about morality is also evident in his distinguishing between the amiable and respectable virtues (23). Both of these sets of virtues are grounded in a person s desire to be in sentimental accord with others. But the amiable virtues come from her ramping up her emotional reaction to the plight of others, so that her feelings are more akin to their first-hand experiences; while the respectable virtues comes from her dampening down her emotional reaction to her own circumstances, so that her feelings are more akin to the experiences of the people who are observing her. These two sets of virtues, based though they are in a single sympathetic mental mechanism, are distinct sources of moral judgment. Our approval of the person whose sympathetic heart seems to re-echo all the sentiments of those with whom he converses, who grieves for their calamities, who resents their injuries, and who rejoices at their good fortune [exclamation point!] is different from our approval of the reserved person whose own misfortune occasions a silent and majestic sorrow, which discovers itself only in the swelling of the eyes, in the quivering of the lips and cheeks, and in the distant, but affecting, coldness of the whole behaviour (24). Yet another indication and perhaps the most important one of Smith s rejection of Hutcheson s benevolence-monism is Smith s account of justice, wherein he maintains that our approval of some just acts is based on our positive response to something distinct from benevolence. 9 As Smith explains, But though it commonly requires no great discernment to see the destructive tendency of all licentious practices to the welfare of society, it is seldom this consideration which first animates us against them. All men, even the most stupid and unthinking, abhor fraud, perfidy, and injustice, and delight to see them punished. But few men have reflected upon the necessity of justice to the existence of society, how obvious soever that necessity may appear to be. That it is not a regard to the 7

8 preservation of society, which originally interests us in the punishment of crimes committed against individuals, may be demonstrated by many obvious considerations (Smith ). Smith then goes on to present evidence that we approve of some just acts on grounds distinct from their tendency to promote the general happiness. We may approve of the punishment of a sentinel who falls asleep on his watch only because we think such punishment promotes the general happiness, but we approve of the punishment of detestable crimes such as murder and parricide on different, non-benevolence-based grounds independently of their tendency to promote the safety of numbers or the interest of the many (Smith 11). As Smith puts it, The very different sentiments with which the spectator views those different punishments, is a proof that his approbation of the one is far from being founded upon the same principles with that of the other. In a different context, Smith reiterates the point that different moral judgments are based on quite different approvals of quite different features. He writes, If we attend to what we really feel when upon different occasions we either approve or disapprove, we shall find that our emotion in one case is often totally different from that in another, and that no common feaures can possibly be discovered between tem. Thus the approbation with which we view a tender, delicate, and humane sentiment, is quite different from that with which we are struck by one that appears great, daring, and magnanimous (324-5). Smith s discussion of Hutcheson s benevolence-monism, moreover, comes after his discussion of two other monistic views: the ancient systems which hold that virtue consists entirely in propriety, and the Epicurean system which holds that virtues consists entirely in prudence (306-7). Smith thinks that all three of these views get something importantly right all three do correctly identify crucial aspects of morality. The problem with these three views is that each identifies as essential to morality only one thing, while ignoring the other two. And by failing to recognize the importance of a multiplicity of moral ends, they tend, in some measure, to break the balance of the affections, and to give the mind a particular bias to some principles of action, beyond the proportion that is due to them (306). The propriety views, for instance, while they rightly affirm the virtues of selfgovernment and self-command, fail to affirm the gentle virtues of compassion. The beneficence system captures well the virtues of compassion but fails to appreciate the virtuousness of the awful and respectable qualities of the mind and of due prudence. The 8

9 prudence views rightly praise prudence but go wrong by not acknowledging the distinct virtues of amiability and respectability. Reid eschews Hutchesonian benevolence-monism as well, contending that there are multiple self-evident, first moral principles (321, 351). He says that an example or two will serve to illustrate this, and then mentions justice and benevolence, both of which are fundamental to moral reasoning in that to reason about justice with a man who sees nothing to be just or unjust [about], or about benevolence with a man who sees nothing in benevolence preferable to malice, is like reasoning with a blind man about colour, or with a deaf man about sound (321-2). Justice is an utterly basic principle, on that we could never arrive at through the consideration of other principles (just as a blind man could never have ideas of color). And benevolence is an utterly basic principle in the same way. Later Reid gives a fuller list of first principles or morals, a list which consists of eleven items divided into the three categories (352 ff.). We will return to this list below, but for now the important point is merely that Reid claims that there is more than just one item at the base of our moral thinking. 10 So Butler, Hume, Smith, and Reid all reject moral monism. They all explicitly maintain that there is a multiplicity of ultimate moral principles. But that does not yet settle whether they are prioritarians or pluralists, which is the more pressing first-person, justificatory, deliberative question. For holding that there is a multiplicity of moral principles is consistent with the prioritarian view that those principles never conflict or that there is an ordering principle for resolving any such conflict, as well as with the pluralist view that the principles come into conflict and there is no principle for resolving it. Let us turn now to the question of where these four stand on this matter, first looking briefly at the relatively straightforward views of Butler and Reid and then at the more complicated positions of Hume and Smith. 4. The prioritarianism of Butler and Reid All indications are that Butler was a prioritarian. This is probably most apparent in a long footnote to the sermon, Upon the Love of our Neighbor, in which Butler gives a theological account of the multiplicity of fundamental principles that suggests that they would never come into conflict. He writes, [A]s we are not competent judges, what is upon the whole for the good of the world; there may be other immediate ends appointed us to 9

10 pursue, besides that one of doing good or producing happiness. Though the good of the creation be the only end of the Author of it, yet he may have laid us under particular obligations, which we may discern and feel ourselves under, quite distinct from a perception, that the observance or violation of them is for the happiness or misery of our fellowcreatures. And this is in fact the case. For there are certain dispositions of mind, and certain actions, which are in themselves approved or disapproved by mankind, abstracted from the consideration of their tendency to the happiness or misery of the world; approved or disapproved by reflection, by that principle within, which is the guide of life, the judge of right and wrong. Numberless instances of this kind might be mentioned [of things that] are approved or disapproved by mankind in general, in quite another view than as conducive to the happiness or misery of the world (Butler 66). God is a monist, having as His single ultimate end the good or happiness of all. But God realizes that humans are incapable of accurately discerning what promotes the good or happiness of all both because of our straightforwardly epistemic limitations (we cannot see what all the long-term consequences of an act will be) and because of our susceptibility to deceive ourselves into thinking that what best promotes our own part is for the best for humanity as a whole. 11 So He has given us a multiplicity of moral ends, putting us under several different obligations, while at the same time structuring the world so that when we fulfill those obligations we will serve His larger purpose. He has given us a moral faculty that approves of certain action-types directly, a faculty that leads us to approve of the action-types for their own sakes and not merely as means to some single ultimate end. 12 It is thus crucial for us to take our moral job to be to live in accord with the principles of veracity, justice, friendship, gratitude, and the like. We could say that Butler s view is that the ultimate structure of morality is monistic but that human morality (because of human limitations) includes a multiplicity of moral ends. Or that there is really only one criterion of morality but that (limited) humans should use a multiplist moral decision-making procedure. 13 On this view, our ultimate moral ends will come into conflict only if God makes a mistake. For God intends for us to live by a multiplicity of different ultimate moral ends. He intends for us to take each of these ends to be an independent and inviolable reason for action. He does not intend for us to calculate when it would be right to act in accord with one moral end rather than another and that s because He realizes that our epistemic limitations and tendency to self-deceptive rationalizations will often lead us to calculate 10

11 incorrectly. But of course God does not make mistakes. God has successfully arranged things so that we need only always follow our moral ends in order to act as we ought, and so that we are never required to calculate when it is right to act contrary to a moral end. God has seen to it that our moral ends will never come into conflict. What appears to a person to be the most benevolent action can sometimes conflict with what is required by veracity and justice (385). In such cases, Butler makes clear, one ought to give priority to veracity and justice. We ought, that is, to endeavor to promote the good of mankind [only] in any ways not contrary to veracity and justice. The correct human response to any perceived conflict between benevolence, on the one hand, and justice or veracity, on the other, is to give strict priority to the latter. From our limited perspective, thus, morality is prioritarian not in the sense of there never occurring any conflict between moral principles but rather in the sense of there being a strict ranking for resolving such conflict. (Butler never considers what we should do when justice conflicts with veracity, but he may have reasonably thought that a proper understanding of those two principles will show that they never conflict.) Butler also seems to think, however, that in fact actions contrary to veracity and justice never really promote the good of mankind. When people think such actions do promote the good, it s almost always because their thoughts are clouded by ambition, the spirit of party, or some indirect principled, concealed perhaps in great measure from persons themselves i.e., by the tendency to self-deceptive rationalizations which I mentioned above. So, actually, the principles do not come into conflict with each other after all. But our judgments of justice and veracity turn out to be more accurate gauges of what all the principles truly converge on than our (all-too-easily distorted) beliefs about what will promote the general good. Reid, in contrast, does believe that different fundamental moral principles may require incompatible actions. The principles themselves, considered in the abstract, are consistent with each other, but the actual world is such that sometimes it is impossible to live in accord with all of them. As Reid writes, Between the several virtues, as they are dispositions of mind, or determinations of will, to act according to a certain general rule, there can be no opposition. They dwell together most amicably, and give mutual aid and ornament, without the possibility of hostility or opposition, and, taken altogether, make one uniform and consistent rule of conduct. But, between particular external actions, which 11

12 different virtues would lead to, there may be an opposition [I]t may happen, that an external action which generosity or gratitude solicits, justice may forbid (Reid 357-8). So Reid believes there is a multiplicity of moral principles and that they can come into conflict with each other. But, as we have seen, that does not yet make him an antiprioritarian. For he could hold that there is a strict hierarchical ordering of principles that will resolve all conflict, allowing us to achieve complete justificatory closure in every case. And in fact, Reid affirms an ordering of just that sort. As I mentioned earlier, Reid says there are three types of moral fundamental moral principles. The principles of the first type relate to virtue in general, the principles of the second type relate to the different particular branches of virtue, and (crucially for our purposes) the principles of the third type relate to the comparison of virtues where they seem to interfere (Reid 352). Reid s examples of this third type make it clear that he takes them to describe the ordering that resolves conflicts between the other fundamental moral principles. He writes, that unmerited generosity should yield to gratitude, and both to justice, is self-evident. Nor is it less so, that unmerited beneficence to those who are at ease should yield to compassion to the miserable, and external acts of piety to works of mercy, because God loves mercy more than sacrifice (Reid 358). And while Reid does not provide a complete ordering of all the other moral principles, it seems pretty clear that he thought such an ordering did exist. So while Butler and Reid reject Hutchesonian monism in favor of a multiplicity of moral principles, they are also clearly prioritarian. When we turn to Hume and Smith, however, matters become more complicated. Hume and Smith are both clear in holding that there is a multiplicity of fundamental moral principles that can come into conflict, but they vacillate on whether there is a strict ranking for resolving such conflict. 5. Prioritarianism, pluralism, and Hume Hume states unabashedly that the four basic moral considerations of usefulness and agreeability to self and others can come into conflict with each other. He tells us, for instance, that pride is immediately agreeable and useful to its possessor (T ; ) but also that it is disagreeable and disadvantageous to others (T ). Anger is disagreeable to its possessor and to others, but it is useful to its possessor (T ). Heroism, or military glory is disadvantageous to others and perhaps even to its possessor, but it is immediately agreeable to its possessor and perhaps to others (T ). Or as he 12

13 puts it in A Dialogue, It is needless to dissemble We must sacrifice somewhat of the useful, if we be very anxious to obtain all of the agreeable qualities; and cannot pretend to reach alike every kind of advantage (D 47). Perhaps the most siginificant cases of moral conflict Hume describes are between the artificial virtue of justice and other, natural virtues. Justice, he points out, can demand that we give money to someone even if he is a vicious man, and deserves the hatred of all mankind, or a miser who can make no use of it or a profligate debauchee who wou d rather receive harm than benefit from it (T ; 11 and 14; see also T and App. 3.6). Meanwhile, there may be other people who are wonderful in every way and who have urgent needs that can only be met if they receive the money instead. It may even be the case that the matter has been conducted in secret so that the public will not be harmed by the example set by giving the money to those in great need rather than to the vicious, miserly, or debauched (T ). In such situations, to do what is just will be incompatible with doing what is agreeable and useful; in such situations, the demands of justice will conflict with natural virtue. But although Hume is clear that different basic moral considerations can come into conflict, he is ambivalent about whether there is a strict prioritarian ordering for resolving such conflict. There are passages that seem to imply that usefulness to others has priority over all other moral principles. But there are also trenchant aspects of his view that fit better with a denial of any invariable prioritarian ordering. Here is a passage that suggests that Hume thought, as a descriptive matter, that commonsense morality takes usefulness to others to have lexical priority over the other kinds of natural virtue: In all determinations of morality, this circumstance of public utility is ever principally in view; and wherever disputes arise, either in philosophy or common life, concerning the bounds of duty, the question cannot, by any means, be decided with greater certainty, than by ascertaining, on any side, the true interests of mankind. If any false opinion, embraced from appearances, has been found to prevail; as soon as farther experience and sounder reasoning have given us juster notions of human affairs; we retract our first sentiment and adjust anew the boundaries of moral good and evil (E 81; see also 78, 82). It seems here that Hume is saying that public utility is morally dominant in commonsense moral judgments that whenever any vexing moral questions arise, people generally think the answer boils down to what will best promote the true interests of 13

14 mankind. Hume seems to make a similar point about the priority of usefulness to others when he says that he is of the opinion that reflections on the tendency [of an action] to the happiness of mankind have by far the greatest influence, and determine all the great lines of our duty (T ). It is also possible to interpret Hume s statements about military glory as giving priority to what is useful to humanity as a whole, as he says there that men of cool reflexion do not approve of military glory as much as most people do because, despite its agreeability, they realize the damage it has done to human society (T ). None of these passages constitutes conclusive evidence that Hume thinks that in each and every case in which usefulness to others conflicts with any other moral ends we do or should take the former to have exceptionless normative trumping power. But they do suggest that Hume was sometimes drawn to the idea that usefulness has some kind of priority over agreeability. (These passages are also historically important in the development of monistic moral theorizing, as they played a crucial role in Bentham and Mill s development of Utilitarianism.) A different picture emerges, however, when we turn to one of Hume s most explicit statements about conflict between usefulness and agreeability. As we ve seen, Hume says in A Dialogue: It is needless to dissemble We must sacrifice somewhat of the useful, if we be very anxious to obtain all of the agreeable qualities; and cannot pretend to reach alike every kind of advantage (D 47). But he certainly doesn t imply that, as a descriptive matter, commonsense morality always sides with the useful in such cases. Indeed, the entire point of A Dialogue is that different cultures take to be correct different resolutions of this type of conflict. Now that point is on its own compatible with the prescriptive claim that we ought to resolve conflicts between agreeability and usefulness in favor of usefulness. But the structure of A Dialogue resists that prescriptive claim. Hume argues that the moral differences between cultures can be explained by showing that virtually everyone s moral judgments are based on the same principles of morality; almost everyone has the same values at his or her moral justificatory base. But he never claims that the differences between the relative priorities different cultures give to the same set of moral principles always admit of principled adjudication. Hume s discussions of the relationship between justice and usefulness also resist a strict lexical reading. As we ve seen, Humean justice can demand that money or property go to someone even if it would be more useful for it go to someone else. Hume makes it clear 14

15 that in some of these circumstances justice ought to be followed even though it is disadvantageous even though the just act is productive of pernicious consequences (App 3.3; see also T ). But he also says that there are some circumstances in which the usefulness of injustice makes it right to do the unjust thing. It is acceptable, for instance, to violate property law after a shipwreck or when a besieged city is perishing with hunger (E 3.8). 14 We thus find Hume telling us that when justice and usefulness conflict, justice will sometimes override usefulness and usefulness will sometimes override justice. But such a view implies non-lexical pluralism, not lexical. Additional evidence for this non-lexical interpretation comes from the section of the Treatise entitled Of the Laws of Nation. In that section, Hume contends that the laws of justice ( the three fundamental rules of justice, the stability of possession, its transference by consent, and the performance of promises ) do apply to princes (T ). But he also maintains that it is sometimes legitimate for princes to violate the rules of justice indeed, that it is legitimate for princes to violate the laws of justice more often than it is for a private person to do so. We are, Hume writes, more easily reconciled to any transgression of justice among princes and republics, than in the private commerce of one subject with another (T ). We give a greater indulgence to a prince or minister, who deceives another, than to a private gentleman, who breaks his word (T ). Hume does believe that the laws of justice have force on princes. There truly is, Hume says, a moral obligation for princes to be just (T ). But when considerations of state are strong enough, it is legitimate for the prince to breach justice. In the prince s case, the obligations of justice may lawfully be transgress d from a more trivial motive (T ). This, then, is a clear instance in which Hume expresses the idea that justice may sometimes be overridden. He is not saying here that the laws of justice do not apply in these cases; he is saying that they apply but that it is legitimate for the prince to transgress them. And while his point is that such lawful transgressions of justice are more common in the case of princes than private people, he puts the point in a way that strongly suggests that a private person can at times lawfully transgress justice, although that it requires a less trivial motive for him to do so. In the final paragraph of Of the Laws of Nations, moreover, Hume makes comments that fit very well with the non-lexical idea that conflicts between different moral ends must be decided on a case-by-case basis and not on an invariable lexical ordering. He writes, Shou d it be ask d, what proportion these two species of morality bear to each other? I wou d 15

16 answer, that this is a question, to which we can never give any precise answer; nor is it possible to reduce to numbers the proportion, which we ought to fix betwixt them (T ). It should be noted that Hume is not here discussing the relationship between two different ultimate moral ends, such as justice and benevolence, which has been our topic. He is, rather, comparing the morality of a prince to the morality of a private person. Nonetheless, this passage does reveal his anti-prioritarian view of our moral thinking his view that our moral thinking does not include any strict prioritizing of our different moral ends. Hume does certainly believe that justice and the other artificial virtues would never have developed as they have if they hadn t been useful to society (T ; E 3). The virtue of justice as a whole can only be explained by referring to its societal usefulness. But the fact that societal usefulness plays an essential role in the genetic development of the virtue of justice does not mean that we approve of each and every just act because we think it is socially useful. Indeed, as we ve seen, Hume is perfectly clear that we approve of some instances of justice even while thinking they are not socially useful. But that does not mean that we will necessarily not approve of all socially useful acts that are unjust. We may feel approval toward an act that is socially useful while at the same time feel disapproval toward it because it is unjust. And Hume does not think there is any invariable lexical ordering that will tell us that one of those sorts of approvals always overrides the other. There are, as well, elements deep within Hume s sentimentalist pluralism that militate against joining his view to a lexical ordering of ultimate moral ends. The Humean view will not be able to fund a lexical ordering by reason alone. Reason provides information that enables us to see in particular situations what a moral end requires and what failing to fulfill the moral end will lead to (T and 3.1.1; E 1.9; App 1.2). Reason may show us how we can bring moral ends that initially seemed in conflict into harmony. But conflict between Humean moral ends will sometimes be unavoidable even after reason has done everything it can do. In such cases of sentimental conflict conflict between sentimentally-grounded ultimate ends reason alone cannot gain traction. Hume explains, [U]ltimate ends of human actions can never be accounted for by reason, but recommend themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections of mankind, without any dependence on the intellectual faculties (App 1.18). We have a plurality of ultimate ends. And if reason cannot justify one ultimate end, neither will it be able to justify giving one ultimate end invariable normative 16

17 priority over another. If reason can t tell me to prefer the scratching of my finger to the destruction of the whole world, it certainly won t be able to tell me to prefer, say, agreeability to others to usefulness to self, or usefulness to others to justice. So if the Humean view were to include a comprehensive invariable moral lexical ordering, it would have to be funded by sentiment. But what sentiment could fill this bill? Humean moral considerations are based on approvals and disapprovals we feel when we consider matters from general points of view. 15 There are situations in which we can feel for one and the same thing both Humean approval and Humean disapproval. So there can be Humean moral considerations both for and against the same thing. If there were an invariable comprehensive ordering of such considerations, that ordering itself would be a kind of über-moral consideration a moral consideration that tells us how to rank other moral considerations, a second-order moral consideration. Such a consideration would have to be based on a special sentiment, a sentiment that is moral and yet differs from all the other moral sentiments in that it possesses a ranking authority the others lack. But Hume himself doesn t include such a lexically ordering meta-moral sentiment in his account, and it s very difficult to see how he could. If all of our ultimate moral ends aimed at the very same goal, then we could rank them based on how effective they are at achieving it. But to say that they are distinct ultimate ends is just to say that they do not aim at the same goal. We care about agreeability to self not because we think agreeability to self is a little bit of usefulness to humanity in general. We care about agreeability to self for its own sake. We disapprove of individual instantiations of promise-breaking not because we think each of them on its own detracts from the public good. We disapprove of individual instantiations of promise-breaking in and of themselves. Our sentimental make-up leads us to experience the production of immediately agreeable experiences as intrinsically worthy and to experience promisebreaking as intrinsically unworthy just as it leads us to experience the promotion of the public good as intrinsically worthy and the detraction from the public good as intrinsically unworthy. 16 Each of these things serves a different end. We thus find in Hume an ambivalence between prioritarian ordering of moral principles and an anti-prioritarian non-ordering, although his deepest commitments seem to accord best with the latter. 17 Let us turn now to Smith, where, I think, we find something similar. 17

18 6. Prioritarianism, pluralism, and Smith There are strands in TMS that fit with the theological prioritarianism of Butler, according to which all of our moral ends are arranged by God to promote the happiness of all. When elucidating our judgment that it is just to punish wrongdoers, for instance, Smith points out that such judgments are independent of our beliefs about what will best promote the happiness of humanity. Our moral judgments about punishment look backward to what the wrongdoer did, not forward to the consequences of punishing. But Smith then goes on to maintain that our instinct to punish has been implanted in us by God (or Nature) because it serves the ultimate purpose of promoting the good. He writes, We are not at present examining upon what principles a perfect being would approve of the punishment of bad actions; but upon what principles so weak and imperfect a creature as man actually and in fact approves of it. The principles which I have just now mentioned, it is evident, have a very great effect upon his sentiments; and it seems wisely ordered that it should be so. The very existence of society requires that unmerited and unprovoked malice should be restrained by proper punishments; and consequently, that to inflict those punishments should be regarded as a proper and laudable action. Though man, therefore, be naturally endowed with a desire of the welfare and preservation of society, yet the Author of nature has not entrusted it to his reason to find out that certain application of punishments is the proper means of attaining this end; but has endowed him with an immediate and instinctive approbation of that very application which is most proper to attain it. (Smith 77) Smith says here that what explains our desire to punish in a way that does not involve thoughts about promoting the good of humanity is that such a desire in fact best serves the purpose of promoting the good of humanity. And this explanation echoes Butler s account of morality and his criticism of Hutcheson in his Dissertation and Love of Neighbors. The same echo can be heard in Smith s discussion of our sense of duty or conscience. Our sense of duty or conscience, Smith holds, leads us to have moral concern for things other than merely benevolence or the promotion of the good of humanity. But it is God s concern for the good of humanity that is the ultimate explanation of our moral concerns. 18

19 The happiness of mankind, as well as of all other rational creatures, seems to have been the original purpose intended by the Author of nature, when he brought them into existence. No other end seems worthy of that supreme wisdom and divine benignity which we necessarily ascribe to him; and this opinion, which we are led to by the abstract consideration of his infinite perfections, is still more confirmed by the examination of the works of nature, which seem all intended to promote happiness, and to guard against misery. But by acting according to the dictates of our moral faculties, we necessarily pursue the most effectual means for promoting the happiness of mankind, and may therefore be said, in some sense to co-operate with the Deity, and to advance as far as in our power the plan of Providence. By acting otherways, on the contrary, we seem to obstruct, in some measure, the scheme which the Author of nature has established for the happiness and perfection of the world, to declare ourselves, if I may say so, in some measure the enemies of God. (166; cf. 168 and 188) Our conscience does not always represent the right action to us as that which promotes happiness. But promoting happiness is nevertheless what conscience has been designed to do. While developing this view of conscience, Smith also affirms the existence of general rules of morality that, it seems, a virtuous agent takes to be inviolable. He extols, for instance, the sacred regard to general rules that constitutes the essential difference between a man of principle and honour and a worthless fellow. The one adheres, on all occasions, steadily and resolutely to his maxims, and preserves through the whole of his life one even tenour of conduct. The other, acts variously and accidentally (163). He maintains, as well, that these rules of morality are justly regarded as the Laws of the Deity (161) that the belief that a strict obedience to those rules will be rewarded by God and transgressions will be punished is confirmed by reasoning and philosophy (167). The moral rules are to be regarded as the commands and laws of the Deity, promulgated by those vicegerents which he has thus set up within us Those vicegerents of God within us, never fail to punish the violation of them, by the torments of inward shame, and selfcondemnation; and on the contrary, always reward obedience with tranquility of mind, with contentment, and self-satisfaction (165-6). Smith seems here to be endorsing a view that takes the moral rules to be akin to commands that ought always, without exception, to be 19