Ordinary Experience as Evidence in Joseph Butler s Moral Theory. Heather Ann Mills. Chapel Hill 2008

Transcription

1 Ordinary Experience as Evidence in Joseph Butler s Moral Theory Heather Ann Mills A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Philosophy. Chapel Hill 2008 Approved by: Thomas Hill, Jr. Susan Wolf Joshua Knobe

2 Abstract Heather Mills: Ordinary Evidence as Experience in Joseph Butler s Moral Theory (Under the direction of Thomas Hill, Jr.) Given Joseph Butler s tripartite view of human psychology, some philosophers argue that he faces three objections: circularity, vacuity and normativity. Sahar Akhtar argues that if we interpret Butler to hold reason and conscience as two different mental capacities, he can answer these objections. Amelie Rorty argues, in contrast, that he can do so while maintaining that reason and conscience are the same mental capacity. I agree with Rorty s conclusion and argue that: 1) Part of the reason the disagreement arises in the secondary literature is due the fact that Butler presents his philosophical position in colloquial English. 2) I conclude that if we take Butler at his word that the evidence of his philosophical position comes from our very experiences of making moral decisions then he does not in fact face the three objections. ii

3 TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter I. INTRODUCTION II. BUTLER S MORAL THEORY A. Bulter s Platonic Psychological Picture B. Circularity, Normativity and Vacuity....7 C. Fitness and Harmony...17 D. Summary of Chapter One III. AKHTAR: REASON AND CONSCIENCE ARE DIFFERENT MENTAL CAPACITIES FOR BUTLER. 22 A. Reason and Conscience Issue Two Different Kinds of Moral Judgment...23 B. Making the Case that Conscience is Passive and Reason is Active and Normative.. 25 C. Back to the Passage in Subsection A...30 D. Summary of Chapter Three. 31 IV. RORTY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL HARMONY IN BUTLER S ETHICS A. Rorty s Argument B. The Three Objections, Psychological Harmony and Fitness C. Motivation for Action in Light of Conscience D. Concluding Remarks on the Previous Three Sections iii

4 V. EVERYDAY EXPERIENCE AS EVIDENCE FOR BUTLER S ETHICAL THEORY A. The Source of the Disagreements B. A Return to the Problems C. Two Problems to Highlight.. 54 VI. CONCLUSION BIBLIOGRAPHY.. 57 iv

5 I. Introduction The purpose of this essay is to discuss a disagreement in the secondary literature concerning Butler s notion of conscience and how it pertains to his moral theory. One argument is that conscience, and our ability to reason, amount to the same mental capacity on Butler s view. The second argument is that reason and conscience are different mental capacities. I argue here that reason and conscience are indeed the same mental capacity for Butler. In the last section I offer an explanation of why I believe that this disagreement arises. These two explanations are offered as ways to answer three types of objections that philosophers raise against Butler s moral theory. Some philosophers argue that if Butler holds conscience and reason to be the same mental capacity, then he faces objections that his explanation of human psychology is 1) circular, 2) vacuous and/or 3) fails to give a clear account of why the judgments of conscience are normative. On this last point, Sahar Akhtar argues that for Butler, reason and conscience are in fact separate mental capacities. This interesting proposal does provide a solution to the three problems I mention above and it does seem to have some textual support. However, upon analysis, I disagree with her interpretation for reasons I will discuss below. Amelie Rorty, in contrast, argues that reason and conscience are in fact the same mental capacity and Butler can avoid the circularity, vacuity and normativity objections due to the explanation he gives us concerning our own deep psychological structures. I agree with

6 Rorty s conclusion and the explanation she gives that for Butler, one ought to perform the act that best maintains psychological harmony. What I add is this: Butler believes that we have good reason to conclude that we are naturally constructed to act morally and he has what he takes to be empirical evidence to back up his philosophical claim. His project when giving the Sermons was to convey this philosophical material to an audience of non-academics (though it is a substantial piece of ethical philosophy meant to advance a serious philosophical position and by the time he went on to publish the material, he no doubt knew that philosophers would read the material). In order convince his audience that they are so constructed to act morally, he often speaks in colloquial language. As proof of his philosophical theory he prompts them and us to reference their everyday experiences as proof of his philosophical point. Doing so is the most informative way to convey his particular moral theory, given that his takes his philosophical position to be the conclusion of the empirical findings of our experiences in everyday life. It is here that I argue that is a source of the confusion in the secondary literature. One of Butler s methodological tactics is to walk his audience through situations in which they need to make moral decisions. According do Butler, when one is in a situation in which one must make a moral decision, she does not experience reason and conscience to be different moral capacities. Neither does one experience the circularity, vacuity or normativity problems when actually in the situation of having to decide how to act. For Butler, this is the evidence that proves his philosophical argument. It is for this reason that I argue Rorty is correct. If we lose sight of the do it yourself method that Butler uses in order to convince his audience that humans are naturally constructed to act morally, then we may think that Butler faces the objections I cite above and we may disagree on Butler s philosophy of mind. 2

7 For the rest of this essay I will argue that the position I hold above is in fact the case. First I will present a clear layout of Butler s moral theory as it relates to his philosophy of mind. Then I will briefly go through Akhtar s argument and highlight what I find to be the major weaknesses. In section IV, I will explain Rorty s argument. Finally, in section V, I will argue that my addition to Rorty s interpretation illustrates that if we lose track of Butler s specific purpose in the Sermons and the particular empirical manner which he uses as proof of his philosophy in order to convince his audience that humans are naturally constructed to act morally, we may disagree on our understanding of Butler s human psychological picture. 3

8 II. Butler s Moral Theory This section breaks down into three main subparts. I will give an overall description of Butler s platonic psychological picture. In the second and largest part I will describe and elucidate the three objections circularity, vacuity and normativity and explain why the pose a threat to Butler s theory. In the third part I explain how Butler s discussion of fitness in the Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue relates to Butler s platonic picture in the Sermons. With a picture of Butler s moral theory at hand, we will then be able to move on to the two interpretations I entertain in sections III and IV. A. Butler s Platonic Psychological Picture To start, Butler has a teleological picture of human nature in the tradition of the ancient philosophers. That is, he has an idea that humans have a natural end to be the best humans that they can be. Just as there is an ideal pine tree or an ideal car tire, there is an ideal model of being human. In the Preface to the Sermons, Butler explains that we can understand human nature by the analogy of how a watch works. Just as there are component parts to a watch that make it work properly, there are component parts to a human that make a human work properly. We need to keep this in mind when we think of his psychological picture because he thinks that if all of our component parts are properly running that is, if we are thinking and acting correctly we will by our very nature be acting virtuously.

9 In his Five Lectures on Joseph Butler 1, John Rawls explains that Butler s goal is to show us how we are moral creatures endowed to live harmoniously in society, if we listen to our conscience. He states: Our nature is adapted to virtue, and virtue in turn is those principles and forms of action and conduct which adapt us to our life in society; that is which make us fit to conduct ourselves as members of society concerned as we must be with our own interests and concern for others. 2 This, I believe, can help elucidate Butler s project. Butler provides us with an explanation on the kinds of creatures that we are by giving us a picture of our own psychology. We are the kinds of creatures that live in society and if we only look around, we will see that we are adapted to do so. Butler wants to explain this picture in such a way so as to convince us that our psychology is such that we are constructed to be moral creatures that ideally live harmoniously in society. His explanation is supposed to illustrate how following conscience is in fact acting according to our nature. Butler holds a platonic picture of human psychology in the sense that there is a tripartite division of psychological parts. At the first level we have particular desires for external things say, for a peanut butter and jelly sandwich, to watch science fiction movies, to go running, that the Boston Red Sox beat the New York Yankees (as well they should). These desires are for specific things and they pull us to pursue their ends without regard to the negative consequences of going after them. Presiding over these particular desires are two more general motivations. These are what are often taken to be the competing demands of self-love and benevolence. Self-love and benevolence comprise the second level of the three-part hierarchy. Part of what is at 1 John Rawls, Five Lectures on Joseph Butler, in Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007). 2 Rawls,

10 issue is whether these two principles vie with each other or conflict. Butler believes that this question is answered empirically. What we find is that when we reason about the course of action we ought to take, it is the case that sometimes we find the correct action is motivated by self-love and that at other times it is motivated by benevolence. The course of action we ought to take is highly dependent on the particular circumstance of the situation, along with our motivations and desires. At the third level is conscience or reason. The second level general motivations and the primary level particular desires for external objects are under the rule of conscience. Conscience is what makes the decision as to what course one ought to take in a given circumstance. As Butler states: The mind can take a view of what passes within itself, its propensions, aversions, affection, as respecting such objects and in such degrees and of the several actions consequent thereupon. In this survey it approves of one, disapproves of another, and toward a third is affected in neither of these ways but is quite different. 3 What is clear here is that on Butler s moral theory, conscience takes in a variety of psychological and given certain facts about a situation decides what course of action one ought to take. The contention between the two philosophers I discuss in this paper is whether or not reason and conscience are in fact the same mental capacity or if they are different from each other. If we take reason and conscience to be the same mental capacity, then conscience comes in and reasons about the first-order principles in light of the demands of self-love and benevolence. The outcome of this deliberation is supposed to determine the course of action one ought to take. What is at stake in this argument between the two interpretations is the ability to defend Butler against the three objections. If he cannot defend these, it will result in 3 Sermon 1, paragraph 8. 6

11 major metaphysical problems for Butler s ethical picture. In order to understand why this is the case, I will discuss the three objections in more detail below. B. Circularity, Vacuity and Normativity If we answer to the affirmative that reason and conscience are the same mental capacity, then one can argue that Butler is open to (at least) three kinds of objections. They illustrate weaknesses in his metaphysical and psychological picture. They are: i. A circularity problem: Conscience tells us if what we are motivated to do is good or vicious. It tells us that we ought to act on the good action. This judgment is supposed to be a judgment about what is natural. But, what is natural is the action on which conscience decides to act. ii. iii. A vacuity problem: There is no substantive content on which conscience can make its decision because it must appeal to the very motivations selflove and benevolence on which it is trying to decide. In other words, we must decide whether to take an act for which self-love is the motivation or which benevolence is the motivation. But, it looks as if conscience tells us to do what either self-love or benevolence tells us to do without respect to any other concerns. A normativity problem: There is nothing that seems to justify a normative ought of the decision of conscience. First, let us look at the circularity problem. Let us keep in mind that Butler explains how conscience, as the ultimate authority, figures into the psychological picture he presents with what seem to be the competing demands of self-love and benevolence. Butler has an explanation about what it means to act according to one s nature. When we act according to our nature this does not mean that we act out of either self-love or benevolence with conscience determining the most appropriate psychological state on which to act. On Butler s view, the judgment about how one ought to act is a judgment about which act is natural. As Akhtar explains, this point in Butler s view gives rise a to a circularity objection: we are left with the position that conscience does not approve of any action unless it is natural, yet an act 7

12 is natural if it is done in accordance with ones conscience. 4 Here the normativity problem connects to the circularity problem: If what makes an action normative, what generates the force of the ought, is that it is the particular act that is the most natural to us, but the act that is natural is the one of which conscience approves, then Butler s argument is circular. If we are to respond to the heed of conscience follow the normative ought we should act on what our consciences determine is the most virtuous act that which is makes natural. If we are going to be able to explain Butler s view in a way that is non-circular, we need to find a way to interpret his work in such a way that he avoids the circularity problem, and find a way to do so that also address the normativity problem, else we must admit that Butler makes a mistake in this part of his theory. Second, let us flesh out the normativity problem a bit. We cannot conclude that one s normative judgment that we have an obligation to conscience is in fact itself a judgment of conscience. Some other endorsement and normativity-generating psychological trait must issue the command to follow the dictates of conscience. In Sermon III, paragraph 2, a paragraph I will return to in Akhtar s section, Butler explains that it is the job of conscience to rule over the lower faculties. In this paragraph Butler s intent is to show us that though we feel the normative force of the judgment of conscience, we do not always take the action that conscience judges we ought to take. We are not our consciences, though we have good reason to listen to it as our moral and normative guide. Butler s point is that we do have conscience in us the rule of right and if we want to live well and virtuous lives, we will listen to it. Having a conscience does not at all entail that we do not act on other principles: say on certain desires. Or that we are never mistaken about what is in our self-interest or 4 Sahar Akhtar, Restoring Joseph Butler s Conscience, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 14, no. 6 (2006): 588, EBSCOHost (27 January, 2008). 8

13 what is benevolent. Rather, he is explaining explicitly what should be clear to us if we just consider what is apparent in our everyday lives. When we consider certain motives for action, some will be met with approval or disapproval. Our consciences tell us which actions are the right ones, where right is doing what is natural. The judgment that an action is natural generates a normative claim to follow its dictates because conscience carries with it its own authority. What this means for Butler is that conscience, as a feature of one s psychology, is in part constitutive of one s nature. One is able to weigh and judge different courses of action and determine which is the most natural that is, what one ought to do. The authority of this judgment that it is an ought in part constitutes what makes conscience the very capacity that it is. One experiences its authority but its authority of judgment comes not from one s experience of its authority (a point that I will further discuss in sections IV and V) but that part of what constitutes the capacity we call conscience is that it is authoritative. What gives it its authority is beyond the scope of this paper and it is not an issue that Butler addresses. What he does do is make it clear through his various examples and arguments that nothing external needs to verify the authority of conscience, the capacity that determines what we ought to do. According to Butler, this should be obvious to anyone who honestly thinks about and considers her everyday life and moral experience. The evidence of its authority is in our very experience of feeling conscience s authority when we deliberate on what course of action we ought to take. The problem, however, is it does not seem that explaining what makes conscience authoritative is beyond the scope of Butler s project. If he is giving us guidelines about what ought to motivate us to act and on what grounds these judgments are authoritative, then he 9

14 must explain the demand of conscience s normativity. Akhtar, as we will see, believes that we can explain this by treating reason and conscience as two separate mental capacities. Rorty, in contrast, argues that Butler does not do so, nor that it is necessary that he do so. I believe he does not have to answer the question for the reason I give above the fact that we experience its authority is evidence that it has authority and it may be the case that given our epistemic position this is all that we can hope for. Butler, at least, thinks that our experience of its authority is all that we need as evidence to prove his theory that we are naturally constructed so as to act morally. But suffice it to say that there is debate concerning whether or not Butler actually achieves doing so and if he does, how his theory can answer the normativity objection. I will come to this point again in section V. Important to answering this objection is Butler s discussion of human nature and what it means for one s conscience to have the substantive content needed in order to deliberate which course of action one ought to take. Important to note is that for Butler, acting according to what we think will give us pleasure is not necessarily acting according to our nature. Butler states: reason, several appetites, passions, and affections, prevailing in different degrees of strength, is not that idea or notion of human nature; but that nature consists in these several principles considered as having a natural respect to each other, in the several passions being naturally subordinate to the one superior principles of reflection or conscience. 5 In this passage we get a clear description of Butler s teleological picture that illustrates the natural order of our psychological states. However, this philosophical explanation is not how our nature appears to us when we are reasoning. Rather, certain motives and desires pull on us to take one course of action or another and we experience the 5 Sermon III, paragraph 2. 10

15 pull of conscience telling us which course of action we ought to take. It is experiences such as these that Butler takes as evidence for his philosophical point. Earlier in the paragraph Butler explains what it means for us to have this disposition to act according to conscience in a way that makes us a law unto ourselves. He states of this capacity that it is: [T]hat part of the nature of man, treated in the foregoing discourse, which with very little reflection and of course leads him to society, and by means of which he naturally acts a just and good part in it unless other passions or interest lead him astray. Yet since other passions and regards to private interest, which lead us (though indirectly, yet they lead us) astray, are themselves in a degree equally natural and often most prevalent; and since we have no method of seeing the particular degrees in which one or the other is placed in us by nature, it is plain the former, considered merely as natural, good and right as they are, can no more be a law to us than the latter. 6 Butler continues on in the paragraph to explain that the principle of reflection or conscience 7 must come to fore and decide which action we ought to take and which we ought not. At first then it must seem that the judgment of naturalness and that of the normative ought that conscience or reflection makes are distinct. However, this passage continues with use of the word natural in reference to conscience. Butler states with respect to the judgment of conscience: [It] distinguishes between the internal principles of his heart as well as his external actions, which passes judgment upon himself and them, pronounces determinately some actions to be in themselves just, right, good; others to be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust, which without being consulted, without being advised with, magisterially exerts itself, and approves or condemns him to doer of them accordingly; and which if not forcibly stopped, naturally [my italics] and always of course goes on to anticipate a higher and more effectual sentence which shall hereafter second and affirm its own. 8 6 Sermon II, paragraph 8. 7 Sermon II, paragraph 8. 8 Sermon II, paragraph 8. 11

16 Following this section is the sentence it is by this faculty, natural to man, that he is a moral agent, that he is a law to himself. 9 Here, Butler states that our faculty to decide on which judgment we ought to act is natural to us. Butler s use of the words natural or naturalness leads us once again to the circularity problem and so we can see here the interconnectedness of the circularity and normativity objections. Finally for this section, I elucidate the vacuity objection. Butler needs to explain the substantive content on which reason deliberates in order to decide which action one ought to take. There is a trick though because Butler cannot do so by appeal the lower level faculties especially given that he states: the constitution of man is broken in upon and violated by the lower faculties or principles within prevailing over that which is in its nature supreme over them all. 10 What this means is that if any of the lower level faculties takes over the proper role of conscience, or if we act on one of these passions instead of the judgments of conscience, it is a violation of our natural human constitution. What makes the vacuity objection so problematic is that Butler presents conscience as a formal capacity to reason about what course of action we ought to take. However, it is not clear on what grounds we should base this decision other than making an appeal to both selflove and benevolence where, as stated in section A, conscience tells us to act as self-love and benevolence alone advise. But, then we end up with our vacuity problem because we still have no substantive way in which to decide between acting out of reasonable self-love and/or reasonable benevolence and to what degree we should allot each of these motivations. Additionally, Butler s position also does not entail that we must weigh each consideration in 9 Sermon II, paragraph Sermon III, paragraph 2. 12

17 every particular circumstance. Sometimes we may but often when one makes a decision upon which course of action to take, the decision is immediate. So in attempting to solve the vacuity problem by an appeal to conscience, we end up back at our original problem of having no substantive, nor, for that matter, normative way in which to decide how much weight we give either self-love or benevolence in order to decide how we ought to act. Selflove and benevolence appeal to conscience for guidance, but conscience seems itself to appeal to self-love and benevolence for guidance. This leaves us without any power to substantively produce a moral ought. I present below a passage from the Sermons that illustrates the ambiguity in Butler s discussion of the second level motivation benevolence and reason/conscience. I do so in order to illustrate why the vacuity problems shows up in the secondary literature. This excerpt is not the only place in which we find troublesome passages, but it does provide a clear illustration of the relation between the second and top level mental tiers in Butler s hierarchical platonic picture. This is a passage from Sermon XII. I have inserted letters to break the passage into sections that I will consider in turn below. Butler states: [A] [W]hen benevolence is said to be the sum of virtue, it is not spoke of as a blind propension, but as a principle in reasonable creatures, and so to be directed by their reason; for reason and reflection comes into our notion of a moral agent [B] Reason, considered merely as subservient to benevolence, as assisting to produce the greatest good, will teach us to have particular regard to these relations and circumstances; because it is plainly for the good of the world that they should be regarded. [C] And as there are numberless cases in which, notwithstanding appearances, we are not competent judges, whether a particular action will upon the whole do good or harm, reason in the same way will teach us to be cautious how we act in these cases of uncertainity. It will suggest to our consideration which is the safer side, how liable we are to be led wrong by passion and private interest, and what regard is due to laws and the judgment of mankind. [D] All these things must come into consideration were it only in order to determine which way of acting is likely to produce the greatest good. 13

18 Thus, upon supposition that it were in the strictest sense true, without limitation, that benevolence includes in it all virtues, yet reason must come in as its guide and director in order to attain its own end, the end of benevolence, the greatest public good. 11 This quotation clearly lays a picture of the relation between a second-order desire, various other concerns, and conscience. Though it only addresses benevolence, a similar analogy can be made for self-love. I will consider each section in turn. Section [A] makes it clear that reason is our guide, not benevolence. That is, the proper authoritative guide for a moral agent is benevolence directed by reason, not distinct from reason. Moreover, it is also the case that in any particular circumstance, self-love may also be motivating us as well, again directed by reason, not distinct from reason. Benevolence is not necessarily a trump card for determining how we should act. That benevolence does motivate us to act is a fact of our humanity, but it cannot be the sole principle of actions. Conscience, as the guiding mental capacity for reasonable creatures, comes in and determines what course of action one ought to take. Section [B] is interesting because it is not entirely clear in this passage what has authority over action: reason or benevolence. Butler states here that reason is merely subservient to benevolence. However, he also makes it clear in other passages, some of which appear in the above excerpt, that conscience is the ultimate authority. But, if conscience is subservient to benevolence, it raises the question of what is determining the course of action one ought to take, especially if we consider here the relationship benevolence may have to self-love. Taking Butler s overall argument into account, in light of what he says in other sections, what I surmise here is that benevolence provides some but not all substantive content for which reason or conscience will issue a judgment about what 11 Sermon XII, paragraph

19 course of action we ought to take in a given circumstance. That is, reason will tell you how to be reasonably benevolent, and will take several variables of our lives and circumstances into account when deciding how one ought to act. This is the assistance it provides to producing the greatest good. This still leaves us to problem figuring out how Butler thinks conscience or reason determines the weight of benevolence and self-love have in influencing a course of action, as Rorty rightly points out. For now, I flag this as a problem in Butler s theory that I will address later. Section [C] is informative because it gives us a hint of some places to which reason will appeal when determining how much benevolence should influence our course of action. It is often the case that often we are not entirely certain how to act and thus conscience does not always seem to have a full grasp on its own of all the factors that can and should influence a course of action we ought to take. In this case, conscience will appeal to external standards such as particular laws, or to the judgment of mankind in general. It will also admonish us to play it safe in order to avoid causing more harm than good. In section [D] Butler makes it clear that the preceding discussion has only to do with situations in which were are considering merely benevolence as the motivation for action. It does not necessarily consider self-love in these situations, though it seems true that in many circumstances, self-love will also be a factor conscience takes into account when making a decision. We may think that self-love or benevolence will in part guide us in an all things considered decision. Or we will still want to question whether or not if what seems to be our intuitive disposition to act on behalf of either benevolence or self-love will be the natural (a notion which I will further discuss in section C below) disposition for us. Butler states in this passage that reason must come in to help show us how benevolence moves us 15

20 and in what respect it may move us to act the same way self-love will. How and to what degree either of these second-order motivations influences us is still, as Rorty points out, a point of contention in the secondary literature. Overall, Butler does not think that reasonable self-love and reasonable benevolence will usually conflict; both will lead us to take the same course of action. 12 From this passage we get a clear layout of how Butler thinks benevolence provides a motivation for action with respect to our deliberative process. It is also clear here that our motivation to act from benevolence comes not from the positive feelings we have from the positive results of acting benevolently. Rather, benevolence, or analogously self-love, provides the motivation to take certain courses of action. Though we may act out of benevolence, we do not and cannot know whether our actions will produce a positive outcome. The positive feelings we have from the favorable outcomes of benevolent acts or from acts out of self-love generally, when we are acting morally and engaging in the deliberative process, will not be the motivation for us to act, or at least not the primary motivation. It is important to be clear on the reasons why Rorty thinks Butler needs to answer the vacuity problem, especially in light of the above passage. One of the problems Butler is trying to overcome is the objection that many people act out of conscience in ways that we find morally abhorrent. People acting out of conscience engage in murder, thievery, and moral and religious condemnation. We can easily imagine someone justifying torturing another by appeal to acting out of good conscience to protect one s own people or humanity at large. Butler realizes that in making conscience autonomous and thus distinct from selflove and benevolence, he runs the risk of this kind of objection. Thus, he needs to find a way 12 Sermon IV, paragraphs

21 to make sure that self-love is taken to be reasonable and that benevolence acts as a stop-gap in preventing people from using the demands of conscience as an excuse to cause unjustified and unjustifiable harm to others. So Butler s attempt to solve this problem is to introduce an autonomous deliberative capacity we are all familiar with in the common course of our moral lives conscience that must somehow be sensitive to the fellow feeling those of us with normally developed moral capacities have for other human beings. There is also a meta-level source of what may be taken to be normative authority. This is a judgment about the fitness or congruence of an action to an agent. It is this point in Butler s psychological picture that provides much of the material Akhtar needs to argue that reason and conscience are different mental capacities for Butler. This is the focus of the third and next part of this section. C. Fitness and Harmony Important to Rorty s argument is how for Butler, a decision about what act is most fit is in essence a decision about which action maintains harmony of ones s psychological states. Butler takes virtue to consist in maintaining this harmony and vice in deviating from it. If we are to act according to our nature, we must keep both self-love and benevolence in check. Conscience deliberates in order to determine which actions we ought to take with respect to self-love and benevolence in light of various particular external desires and the content of our own psychology. Whether or not we act on this decision is, of course, a separate matter. However, the substantive component on which conscience deliberates comes from the need to maintain the overall balance of the various levels of our psychology and the need to harmonize them. 17

22 The action that maintains this balance is the action that is most fit. So here it is important to get clear what Butler means by fitness or congruence (I will use the terms interchangeably as Butler does). Doing so will: 1) illustrate that according to Butler, we make judgments about whether or not to hold another person morally responsible for her actions by making judgments about the fitness of the action to the agent and 2) make it clear that for Butler, our reflection on fitness or congruence is not something we experience in our everyday lives, but rather a conclusion that we draw about certain actions from our everyday experiences. Notice here that this kind of judgment of conscience serves two purposes for Butler. It allows us to evaluate whether or not another person is morally blameworthy for her actions and lets us determine what course of action we or any other rational agent ought to take. The aim of this section is not to engage in a lengthy discussion concerning Butler s views of moral responsibility. Rather, the purpose is to illustrate the colloquial style of Butler as a means to show why it is the case that his particular manner of conveying to his audience his philosophical arguments leads to confusion in the secondary literature over what he takes conscience to be and what powers or abilities it has. I take this here to be a preview of what I will conclude in the final section. The following discussion fleshes out important metaphysical and epistemological problems. What motivates some of the discussion of an action s fitness to the nature of the agent as discussed in the secondary literature comes primarily from a passage in Butler s Dissertation. In paragraph 5 Butler discusses the difference in judgment we have toward children and the mentally ill versus fully rational adults when those who lack full rational capacities act in ways that are considered highly inappropriate, or even vicious. Butler explains that: our perception of vice and ill desert arises from, and is the result of, a 18

23 comparison of actions with the nature and capacities of the agent. 13 Our moral condemnation of a person s action is contingent upon the mental and psychological capacities of that person. If one is not capable of responding to or being aware of the demands of conscience and/or the appropriate social norms necessary to live in society, we do not and should not hold these people morally responsible for their actions. This is where the talk of fitness comes in as the way in which we make the distinction between those who should be held morally responsible for their actions and those who should not. Butler explains that: Now this difference must arise from somewhat discerned in the nature or capacities of one, which renders the action vicious; and the want of which, in the other, renders the same action innocent or less vicious; and this plainly supposes a comparison, whether reflected upon or not, between the action and capacities of the agent, previous to our determining an action to be vicious. And hence arises a proper application of the epithets incongruous, unsuitable, disproportionate, unfit to actions which our moral faculty determines to be vicious. 14 Moral evaluation of acts presupposes that there are agents with certain moral capacities. Outcomes of actions may be more or less favorable, but whether or not we hold a particular person responsible for her actions is dependent upon her capacities whether or not she is a person with the capacities to engage in moral reflection and discernment. Butler s position on moral blame follows directly from his picture of human psychology. That is, we cannot hold children, the mentally disabled or anyone else who may be in similar circumstances morally responsible for their actions on Butler s account because moral responsibility depends on the human psychology necessary to choose to act wrongly or rightly. 13 Dissertation, paragraph Dissertation, paragraph 5. 19

24 In the spirit of a folk psychological approach Butler pulls on our intuitions to support his claim. He says: every one has a different sense of harm done by an idiot, madman, or child, and by one of mature and common understanding, though the action of both, including the intention, which is part of the action, be the same; as it may be, since idiots and madmen, as well as children, are capable not only of doing mischief, but also of intending it. 15 The thought is this: if we just reflect on how we place moral blame on other humans, we will easily note that we do not hold the mentally ill or children to the same standard as we do fully rational adults. We can recognize that a madman intends to kill someone or that a child intends to punch someone, but they both lack the moral capacities available to others in conscience. Their psychological state is such that they may not have an emotive response to the thought of purposely taking an action with the intent of causing harm either to themselves or others. Or, and perhaps also, they may lack the capacity for engaging in the deliberative process necessary to weigh and consider various courses of action and outcomes before they do take action. They, essentially, have no conscience (or a limited conscience), and conscience is the basis of normative judgment for our own actions, and our moral evaluations of others. What I argue is of vital importance here is the fact that Butler takes our own experiences of making the distinction between who should and should not be held morally responsible for her actions as evidence for his philosophical argument concerning moral responsibility. This data for Butler is empirical evidence and is what supports his ethical theory. The fact that Butler s method of conveying his philosophical point by using our own experiences as evidence to confirm his philosophical argument is important to understanding why I argue that he can overcome the three objections. I will return to this point in section V. 15 Dissertation, paragraph 5. 20

25 D. Summary of Chapter Two As mentioned above, Akhtar argues that Butler s discussion of fitness is strong evidence for the argument that Butler takes reason and conscience to be different mental capacities. Rorty does not. We can see that if Butler does think that they are the same mental capacities, we must contend with the circularity, normativity and vacuity problems. Given the material in the Dissertation, Sermons and the explanatory power of interpreting Butler to hold reason and conscience as two different and distinct mental capacities, it is understandable that Akhtar interprets him this way. However, as I argue in the next section, this cannot be the case given the evidence to the contrary. Nonetheless, Butler can still answer the three objections. I argue that given Butler s aim of persuading his audience that they are so constituted to act morally, we better understand his theory if we approach it from the perspective of someone actually following along with him and engaging in his colloquial style. In doing so, we can answer his three objections and in this case, and do so from within the scope and intent of his project. I leave the rest of this argument to section V. 21

26 III. Akhtar: Reason and Conscience are Different Mental Capacities for Butler Akhtar contends that in order for Butler to be able to answer the circularity and normativity objections, we need to interpret his view in such a way that conscience and reason are two different mental capacities. What she argues is that conscience is an immediate, emotive response and reason is a calm, reflective and deliberate response. Thus, conscience properly understood is an instant response we have when we judge whether or not an act is in itself right. Reason, however, is what Butler refers to as reflection in a cool hour and, taking various factors into account makes a moral judgment about whether or not we are acting according to our internal principles. Here, internal principles are those which are our nature. To act virtuously is to base one s actions on the dictates of reason in light of one s internal principles. Aktar concludes that her interpretation answers the normativity problem in this way: Reason makes the meta-judgment of the fitness of an action. This action is what is most natural. This may or may not coincide with the response of conscience. However, the decision that one ought to the follow the dictates of conscience is what makes the judgment of conscience normative. She believes her distinction between reason and conscience also answers the circularity objection. She Akhtar states: The approval of conscience, or one of the higher principles of self-love or benevolence, is required before and action is natural, but conscience

27 does not approve an action on grounds of naturalness. 16 So it is the judgment that an action is natural, that makes the action natural on her view. Reason comes in and decides whether or not that judgment is normative. In the following sections I will argue that her interpretation of Butler is incorrect. A. Reason and Conscience Issue Two Different Kinds of Moral Judgment Let us first look at the judgment of reason. According to Akhtar, this judgment must be one about naturalness whether or not an action is in accord with our nature and she argues that Butler s theory does in fact avoid circularity and normativity objections. She cites Butler from the Sermons where he states in various places that to be virtuous is to follow one s nature and vice is deviating from it. 17 She also references a passage in the Dissertation in which Butler explains that virtue consists in the fitness of an action to the agent. 18 As stated above, in this section of the Dissertation Butler is making clear to us under what conditions we may hold someone responsible for her actions. For example, we do not hold children or the mentally impaired to the same standard as rational adults. Insofar as we are rational adults, however, to act according to our nature, on Akhtar s interpretation, is to follow the judgment of reason with respect to the fitness of an action to our nature. The act that best fits our nature is one that appropriately meets the demands of self-love and benevolence. Let us flesh out her point a bit. Akhtar argues that for Butler, a judgment from conscience and a judgment from reason are two different kinds of moral judgments. 16 Akhtar, Akhtar, Akhtar,

28 According to Akhtar, the main distinction between the two is that conscience judgment is an immediate response that is not a product of a reasoning process. Judgments about naturalness, however, are the product of methodical deliberation and are thus not an immediate response. It is by making this distinction that Akhtar attempts to solve the circularity problem. Our judgment that we should follow the dictates of conscience is a judgment about naturalness: when we act according to the dictates of conscience, we are acting according to our nature and our reason issues this normative judgment. Akhtar argues that we can think about this in terms of thinking about the difference between judging actions in themselves and judging actions with respect to grounds of naturalness. 19 Let us review and earlier quotation. Here Akhtar is referencing a passage from Sermon II in which Butler states: There is a superior principle of refection or conscience in every man which distinguishes between the internal principles of his heart as well as his external actions, which passes judgment upon himself and them, pronounces determinately some actions to be in themselves just, right, good; others to be in themselves, evil, wrong, unjust, which without being consulted, without being advised with, magisterially exerts itself, and approves or condemns him, the doer of them accordingly. 20 According to Aktar, this is a place in which Butler makes it clear that conscience, here referred to as the principle of reflection, does not make judgments about the fitness of an action to us as moral agents, but rather considers the actions simpliciter. She emphasizes here that conscience evaluates actions in themselves. The judgment of conscience is not the product of a reasoning process that generates a normative notion of naturalness. Rather, it 19 Akhtar, Sermons, II 8 24

29 evaluates only what actions are right and wrong and does so without engaging in a reflective process. Before I address this passage, however, I want first to systematically address the four places Akhtar primarily relies on to argue that Butler thinks conscience is passive. In so doing, I will be able to address the paragraph above and show how Akhtar s interpretation is misguided. Akhtar cites part of this passage in her support for interpreting Butler to hold the view that conscience is passive. It will become clear as I continue, however, that this is not correct. B. Making the Case that Conscience is Passive and Reason is Active and Normative Akhtar argues that in the following four passages Butler makes it clear that conscience judgment is immediate and passive. 21 I will consider each of these in turn: 1. From the Preface, paragraph 13: regarding the judgment of conscience there are several perceptions daily felt and spoken of, which yet it may not be very easy at first view to explicate, to distinguish from all others, and ascertain exactly what the idea or perception is. 22 Akhtar argues that this passage illustrates the fact that conscience is passive and as she takes it, a mere response to the input of external stimuli. According to Akhtar, a passive judgment is one that is immediate and does not take any mental action on our part they just happen to us. Some present themselves to us whether or not we actively seek them. That is, some action may just strike us as right or wrong whether or not we are trying to determine if this is indeed the case. These kinds of judgments, as mentioned above, are immediate and not the product of a reasoning process or reasoning in a cool hour. 21 These are located in the Preface, paragraph 13; Sermon II, paragraphs 8 and 13; Sermon III, paragraph Akhtar,

30 However, it is not clear how this passage rules out the deliberative process of conscience. While it is true that we have immediate emotive responses to different perceptions, this fact does not entail that this is all of what conscience does. In fact, in this paragraph, Butler contends that we do need to get clear on these reactions we have in order to be at least somewhat certain as to what kind of action we should take in light of them. When making this point, Butler is explaining how various philosophers and moralists in the past have tried to argue that virtue consists in following one s nature. They do so by explaining our reactions to various passions. Butler s mission in this section is to show that they have gone wrong in the past and that part of his project is to make sense of the idea that: [t]here seems no ground to doubt but that the generality of mankind have the inward perception expressed so commonly in that manner by the ancient moralists, more than to doubt whether they have those passions; yet it appeared of use to unfold that inward conviction, and lay it open in a more explicit manner than I had seen done; especially when there were not wanting persons who manifestly mistook the whole thing 23 Butler s point here is not to make some positive argument about the passive nature of conscience, but to show that those who have adopted the ancient arguments for normativity based on naturalness without delving further into how the various psychological aspects of how human beings relate to one another are seriously mistaken. Part of his project is to rectify that mistake. This passage does not illustrate that Butler believes conscience to be passive. 2. From Sermon II paragraph eight: A superior principle of reflection or conscience pronounces determinately some actions to be in themselves just, right, good which, without being consulted, without being advised with, magisterially exerts itself, and approves or condemns him the doer of them accordingly; and which, 23 Sermons, Preface, paragraph