The hidden Kantian stance in psychology as the discipline of interiority
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1 The hidden Kantian stance in psychology as the discipline of interiority Marco Heleno Barreto In 1998 Wolfgang Giegerich published in Harvest Journal for Jungian Studies one of his fundamental critical texts on Jung s psychology: Jung s betrayal of his truth. The adoption of a Kantian-based empiricism and the rejection of Hegel s speculative thought (now in CEP VI). There he showed how Jung s so-called empiricism was at odds with the speculative nature of psychological phenomena. Furthermore, Giegerich convincingly demonstrates, through the many brilliant psychological interpretations in his writings, that dialectics is the only appropriate way to deal with soul phenomena, as it is consubstantial to these phenomena themselves. As Jung rejected Hegel, he lost the opportunity of learning the dialectical kind of thinking which would enable him to be loyal to his truth (as a psychologist). Kant s theory of knowledge was not in keeping with the intrinsic speculative nature of soul phenomena. That s why the adoption of a Kantian-based empiricism by Jung was a psychologically fatal mistake (CEP VI, p. 312). Jung tried to give analytical psychology the status of science. That s the source of his betrayal of his truth : psychology is not simply a continuation of science (in the ordinary sense), the scientific mind s turning to a new subject matter, the interiority of man ( ) It cannot simply be the science of the internal, but has to be the inward science, the science that has become internal in its logical form (CEP VI, p. 311). Psychology as the discipline of interiority accomplishes this logical revolution: it effectively sublates science. Jung himself had already understood that psychology should sublate itself as a science (see CW 8, 429), but he was not able to give a satisfactory theoretical form to psychology in keeping with his own understanding. Psychology as the discipline of interiority is this satisfactory theoretical form required by a truly modern psychology. On the other hand, there is a kinship between psychology and metaphysics. This kinship does not mean that the former is just a simple branch of the latter. Psychology as the discipline of interiority also sublates metaphysics, and thus achieves the logical status of an island, within the modern world, which gives asylum to the ancient 1
2 metaphysical logic, especially Hegel s logic of the syzygial unity of the unity and difference of the opposites, but only as its (psychology s) special methodological approach (see WIS, p , 307). What does this reduction of the metaphysical Hegelian dialectics to a mere methodological approach in psychology mean? Simply that the metaphysical claim to true knowing is left aside in psychology, so that psychology is not a simple continuation of metaphysics, but rather sublated metaphysics. The sublatedness here shows itself exactly in the metamorphosis (or reduction) of metaphysics to methodological approach. Now, in the above-mentioned essay of 1998, Giegerich also criticized Jung for establishing a duplicity in the field of psychology (CEP VI, p. 314), so that psychology as a discipline was immunized against soul. Let me quote in length the crucial passage: [Psychology] was expressly not metaphysics, not philosophy, it did not imply an ultimate truth. [Its truth] was only psychologically true. In other words, psychology invented a new species of truth just for itself as if truth was something that occurred in a variety of species. And having this additional, private, self-contained truth is what defines psychology as we have known it. ( ) The idea of a special psychological truth is the compromise formation that (a) provided the mediation, or rather allowed for the commuting, between [psychology as a discipline and soul] while at the same time (b) keeping them absolutely separate. It was this concept of psychology s own species of truth that made the impossible possible for Jung: to maintain that he was an empirical scientist and yet to do his psychological work without having to close his eyes to the full phenomenology of the soul, including its mysteries and speculative thoughts. The splitting of truth into two was the trick that allowed Jung to hold on to Kant s barrier and yet to indulge, as it were, in his kind of Dreams of a Spirit-Seer. (Only) psychological truth : this guaranteed that the conflict with the public truth, the truth of science, philosophy and religion, was avoided. (CEP VI, p. 314) After reading this passage, one would expect that the notion of a psychological truth would be either abandoned or substantially (that is, logically) transformed in psychology as the discipline of interiority. However, what we actually find in our discipline is neither one nor the other of these options. After criticizing Jung s invention of a particular psychological truth, Giegerich adopts the same notion in his further essays, and explicitly states that psychology s truth is merely internal to it as a methodological guiding principle and aim. Its validity remains enclosed within itself. It does not extend out beyond itself (WIS, p. 288). In other words: it is (only) psychological truth. After being relentlessly expelled as an illegitimate invention of Jung s psychology through the front door, the notion of psychological truth returns to psychology as the discipline of interiority through the back door. The fact that this self- 2
3 contained truth is achieved not through the spurious adoption of a Kantian epistemological barrier, but through a dialectical procedere which cannot be found in Jung, does not erase the other fact that logically, syntactically, it is equally a special kind of truth valid only within psychology s own bubble. Thus, the 1998 relentless critical accusation of Jung s invention of psychological truth seems to be sheer theoretical rant when seen in the light of the further unfolding of Giegerich s thought. The logical constitution of psychology starts with Jung s empiricist adoption of Kant s theory of knowledge (based on the logical form subject-object); this Kantian base is negated, and as a result we have Hegel s uroboric metaphysical dialectical stance; finally, the negation of the negation is performed, so that the result is psychology as sublated metaphysics. Note that the Kantian element which is interiorized and preserved on a higher level in this process is the initial metaphysical skepticism, which is integrated in psychology s identity, in its self-definition as sublated metaphysics, so that this sublatedness necessarily means and implies the giving up of any claim to metaphysical true knowing. The element which is preserved from Hegel is dialectics as method, as the form of psychology s methodological approach. We could say that the final result consists of a Hegelian dialectical methodological approach performed within the boundaries of a sublated Kantian-like metaphysical skepticism, which defines the epistemological status of psychology as the discipline of interiority and hinders it from extending out beyond itself. Its realm is that of psychological truths (neither metaphysical, nor scientific truths). When psychology negates and interiorizes the so-called epistemological barrier (see CEP VI, p. 208), in this very same moment it leaves behind philosophical epistemological concerns. This means that, psychologically, the question of epistemological validity is a non issue. It is irrelevant to the psychological procedere. It is left for philosophy. Psychology is not and must not be concerned neither with the quarrel around true knowing on epistemological grounds, nor with its own epistemological status in relation to this issue otherwise it would abandon its own logical place and become philosophy. Psychology s key presupposition is the notion of soul; it has as a corollary the presupposition of psychological truths as what it achieves through its specific form of knowing. 3
4 On the other hand, however, as psychology takes the historical opus magnum of soul as its undisputable reference for what is psychologically true today, and as at this level the soul has already experienced, and definitively knows, that the times of metaphysic ( ) are once and for all over (WIS, p. 331), psychology inevitably assumes this objective obsolescence of metaphysics as its own truth, in fact as the very condition of its constitution as a discipline on its own. In so doing, it is not only the methodological and self-definitional epoché of the epistemological concerns that is at work: the obsolescence of metaphysics is taken as a normative and undisputable soul truth ruling not only psychology, but the logic of the real as a whole, informing the modern mode of being-in-the-world. This has a strong consequence upon psychology itself: it has to assume the logical status of a hobby, a pastime, and not of a truly valid form of knowledge in this time and age. If the only reason of leaving the claim of being or striving for true knowing was the sublation of metaphysics into psychology s particular methodological approach, there would be no need of assuming this logical hobby-status: a psychological truth would be valid as long as it is representative of a given valid psychological perspective (just as a scientific truth is valid as long as it represents the valid scientific perspective). But once psychology s methodological approach is informed by a metaphysical logic, it can only give rise to metaphysical-like psychological truths; and as any form of thinking related to the times of metaphysics is not objectively valid anymore, once and for all, then it is unavoidable for psychology to assume the status of a hobby. Whereas a scientific truth is valid on the public arena of the valid forms of knowledge, a psychological truth is forced to shrink into psychology s private bubble. No objective epistemic relevance in the public forum of validated knowledge: just a pastime, a harmless way of seeing things, just like one can playfully see in clouds dragons, animals, human forms etc. - with the difference that, once one has chosen the psychological pastime, one must become the slave of its presuppositions, accepting them unconditionally: the psychologist is not free to see things the way it pleases him/her, but is committed to the objective soul methodology. Like a game, which is constituted by a delimited set of rules, and these rules must be followed whenever the game takes place otherwise there is no way of playing that game. A private hobby is an ego trip (one chooses a hobby if one is inclined to do so, if one wants to do so, if one finds it fun) (cf. CEP VI, p. 301); thus, psychology as the 4
5 discipline of interiority, having the logical status of a hobby, is offered as a possible choice to an ego trip, and in this too it does not truly escape the fate of Jung s position (see CEP VI, p. 311): it is the habitual ego who is allowed or chooses to do psychology. Once the ego choice is made, then the psychological I comes to the fore as that position of consciousness which is rigorously tied-up to the presuppositions of a psychological approach, stripping itself of any ego s concerns. The psychological I is the player of the psychological game. But this does not cancel the fact that psychology-as-hobby is inevitably reduced to sheer matter for an ego-trip, if it does not have a public up-to-date epistemic relevance on its own, regardless of our egoic choice of psychology. Pastimes, as such, do not truly respond to the pressures of modern life but on the contrary support them by providing safety-valves, being themselves part of the very system that they are to provide relief from (CEP VI, p. 302). A pastime is logically proposed as a form of leisure, relief: an absolutely harmless undertaking, self-contained and without any pang (CEP VI, p. 302). So is psychology as the discipline of interiority, if it accepts its logical hobby-status, if its truth does not extend out beyond itself (WIS, p. 288), if it does not claim to be a legitimate organ of objective soul knowledge in this time and age, because without this claim it does not touch the psychological situation of our modern existence (CEP VI, p. 302). But if it does claim this non-hobby status, then it is entrapped in the question of true knowing, insofar as its methodological approach is quasi-metaphysical. A dead end. For in this case, psychological truth would not be (only) psychological truth but psychological truth, simply. A truth established from a particular standpoint, no doubt, as any truth is, but which would claim objective acknowledgement, instead of giving up this confrontation, avoiding the conflict with the public truth, the truth of science, philosophy and religion, and isolating itself in its immunized epistemic bubble. Giegerich s remark that psychology is merely one of the things one can do if one is so inclined (WIS, p. 288), in this context, is neither here nor there, for it begs the question: what is at stake is not people s inclinations and choices, but the inner logical constitution and presuppositions of psychology as the discipline of interiority, regardless of its being chosen or not by anyone. The same applies to any discipline. For instance: at the pragmatic level of ego s choices and inclinations, physics too is one of the things one can do if one is so inclined. However, at the logical level, physics does not have the status of a hobby, whereas psychology has. What is the difference? Physics 5
6 is logically up-to-date with regards to the positivistic logic underlying the modern sciences and technology (CEP VI, p. 303), the logic which is the soul truth of the real today, at the level of soul s opus magnum. Physics is an updated expression of this logic. On its turn, psychology has the logical status of a hobby because its logic is not compatible with the logic ruling at the level of soul s opus magnum. Its logic is metaphysical, or rather quasi-metaphysical: it has a fundamental structural closeness to the uroboric stance of Hegel s philosophy (WIS, p. 288, my italic). Psychology is metaphysics reduced to the status of a methodological approach: it is sublated metaphysics. But psychology is also the discipline whose structuring logic is of the same nature as Hegel s dialectics ( uroboric stance ): it is sublated metaphysics. As such, it is definitely at odds with the prevailing logic of modernity, with modernity s soul truth of the age. Hence, its only thinkable logical status is that of a hobby, a pastime. Now, the positivistic logic of the real today is the logic that was cemented by Kant s philosophy (CEP VI, p. 303). The core of this logic is in Kant s dissociation of the determinable self, which is accessible to empirical study, from the determining self, the subject as the transcendental unity of apperception, which remains absolutely inaccessible to our knowing (CEP VI, p. 303). It is easy to recognize here the kinship of Kant s logic to the notion of unbridgeable difference, which historically is ascribed to Schopenhauer. But, as this very kinship shows us, logically speaking, the bulk of the logic of the unbridgeable difference is not really post-hegelian: it is pre-hegelian. It is Kantian (Schopenhauer refused Hegel and inspired himself in Kant). And this logic is acknowledged as the real logic of modernity. The dismissal of metaphysical true knowing is precisely reminiscent of Kant s impugnation of any epistemological legitimacy to metaphysics; this impugnation is imported (or silently smuggled) into psychology as the discipline of interiority, disguised under the humble claim of its being nothing but a methodological procedere. All what that particular methodological approach can offer is psychological truths. Psychology does not (and cannot) claim to be or to strive for true knowing, as this kind of knowing is eminently metaphysical, and in order to constitute itself as a modern discipline, psychology must from the outset negate metaphysics (and conserve it on a different level: sublated metaphysics). After negating the Kantian epistemological barrier, thus making room for the speculative kind of thinking that we learn from 6
7 Hegel, psychology as the discipline of interiority aligns itself with the soul truth of the real, the truth that rules soul s opus magnum, and this truth is precisely that positivistic logic underlying the modern sciences and technology, which is the logic that was cemented by Kant s philosophy. (CEP VI, p. 303) This means that actually Kant returns to psychology as the discipline of interiority as its all-encompassing logical framework, in the form of the logic of the unbridgeable difference. It is this antimetaphysical logic that demands the sublation of metaphysics in and through psychology. It is a logic that absolutely precludes a connection between ( ) the phenomenal and the noumenal worlds (CEP VI, p. 303). In brief: it precludes true knowing. It does not accept any inner infinity in any phenomena whatsoever. This is the reason why the truly psychological sight is from the outset logically obsolete, and again psychology cannot have a logical status other than that of a pastime. Psychological knowing is not truly a serious knowing: just a hobby, a game. Therefore, despite the overcoming of Kant s theory of knowledge in psychology, of its replacement by a Hegelian dialectical methodology, the epistemological barrier of which Jung spoke is not simply cancelled in psychology as the discipline of interiority: it is displaced, and determines psychology s logical status within the wider horizon of soul s opus magnum. Despite not having been explicitly acknowledged, the spectre of Kant has always been there, as what makes the particular notion of a psychological truth intelligible. It is this Kantian-like post-metaphysical stance ruling at the level of soul s opus magnum in modernity which forbids psychological truth to extend out beyond itself, keeping its validity enclosed within psychology itself (WIS, p. 288): (only) psychological truth. Wolfgang Giegerich closed his 1998 critical paper with a surprisingly inflated idea. Making reference to Jung s intention of expiating Faust s crime through his (Jung s) psychology, and after having criticized the mock atonement performed by Jung in this regard, Giegerich states: It is for us to build psychology into a real shrine of Filemon, truly expiating for Faust s crime (CEP VI, p. 322). Our Faust, says Giegerich, is the positivistic logic underlying the modern sciences and technology. It is the logic that was cemented by Kant s philosophy (CEP VI, p. 303). True: at the level of psychology s methodological approach, Kant was definitively overcome. But, as I have shown in this paper, a Kantian barrier commands psychology s self-definition as no more than a hobby, a pastime. This is the hidden Kantian stance in our field. Hence, 7
8 in the last analysis, we can say that this Faust, this logic remains absolutely undisturbed and unanswered by our psychology (see CEP VI, p. 303). And how could it be otherwise? A pastime is a ridiculous candidate to that expiation. And, moreover, the very same idea of such an expiation is sheer nonsense, not in keeping with our decided assumption of our condition as moderns. Therefore I take this passage as being nothing but a romantic-jungian slip on the part of Giegerich. I will close this reflection, by way of a summary of what I have presented here, asking the reader to apply to psychology as the discipline of interiority what, in the article of 1998, Giegerich says of Jung s psychological stance: But it is not enough for the soul and each of its expressions to be observed, experienced, deeply felt, understood, beautifully expressed. It is not enough for them to be said to be psychologically true. This is only a token acknowledgment, a consolation prize. In general, what a disaster for a discipline if it claims for itself its own variety of truth! Thereby it has logically disconnected itself from public truth (a black raven: truth is public by definition) ( ) With the idea of psychological truth psychology has unwittingly but objectively (namely logically) shelved the manifestations of the soul in a special fencedin asylum, a protected and insular space like a museum or nature reserve, or, for that matter, like a nursery, ipso facto, but unwittingly and unadmittedly, turning soul phenomena into something that does not really count and to which the laws that generally are in effect are not applied. What a humiliation and disparagement for the soul! Psychologically true : Present-day psychology is no more than mock psychology. Logically it does not take the soul seriously ( ) Psychology does not own up to what it is about. It does not have the logical means to own up to it. (CEP VI, p ; the emphases in bold are mine) References CEP VI - Collected English Papers, Volume VI. Dreaming the Myth Onwards. C.G.Jung on Christianity and on Hegel. Part 2 of The Flight into the Unconscious. New Orleans: Spring Journal Books, WIS What is Soul? New Orleans: Spring Journal Books,
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