A-level Philosophy. Unit 1 (PHIL1): An Introduction to Philosophy 1 Mark scheme June Version: Version 1.0: Final

Transcription

1 A-level Philosophy Unit 1 (PHIL1): An Introduction to Philosophy 1 Mark scheme 2170 June 2015 Version: Version 1.0: Final

2 Mark schemes are prepared by the Lead Assessment Writer and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all associates participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students responses to questions and that every associate understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each associate analyses a number of students scripts: alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, associates encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Lead Assessment Writer. It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year s document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper. Further copies of this Mark Scheme are available from aqa.org.uk Copyright 2015 AQA and its licensors. All rights reserved. AQA retains the copyright on all its publications. However, registered schools/colleges for AQA are permitted to copy material from this booklet for their own internal use, with the following important exception: AQA cannot give permission to schools/colleges to photocopy any material that is acknowledged to a third party even for internal use within the centre.

3 A-level Philosophy Unit 1 An Introduction to Philosophy 1 General Guidance for Examiners Deciding on a level and the award of marks within a level It is of vital importance that examiners familiarise themselves with the generic mark scheme and apply it consistently, as directed by the Principal Examiner, in order to facilitate comparability across options. The generic mark scheme must be used consistently across all questions. The question-specific mark scheme will indicate a variety of material and approaches that a student is likely to use. It is not, however, prescriptive. Alternative responses are possible and should be credited if appropriate. It will be found that when applying the generic mark scheme, many responses will display features of different levels. Examiners must exercise their judgement. In locating the appropriate band, examiners must look to the best-fit or dominant descriptors. Marks should then be adjusted within that band according to the following criteria: understanding of philosophical positions accuracy and detail of arguments quality of illustrative material grasp of technical vocabulary where appropriate quality of written communication It must be noted that quality of written communication should only determine a level in cases where the meaning of a response is obscured. In most cases it will determine adjustments within a level. It must also be emphasised that, although the question-specific mark scheme is not prescriptive, examiners must familiarise themselves with its content. Examiners must recognise creditworthy material and the subject-specific mark scheme is an important tool for achieving this. 3 of 22

4 Generic mark scheme for questions with a total of 15 marks AO1: Knowledge and understanding Level marks At the top end of the level there will be a clear, detailed and precise understanding of the relevant philosophical issues. Lower down the level, responses will be accurate and focused but may lack balance. At the bottom end there may be some blurring of distinctions, but one issue will be clearly explained. Level marks The explanation will lack detail, or the detail may be narrow and/or only partially addresses the question. Blurring or conflation of issues may result in some lack of clarity. There may be significant omissions. At the bottom end of the level responses may be vague, unfocused or fragmentary. 0 marks Nothing worthy of credit AO2: Interpretation, analysis and application Level marks At the top end of the level, the illustration(s) or example(s) will be clear and have a precise bearing on the issues being explained. Relevance will be apparent. At the lower end of the level, one illustration may be treated precisely with another illustration treated briefly, with only a partial grasp in evidence. Level marks Where two illustrations are required, one may be clear and precise but the second confused or absent. Alternatively, there may be a blurring of points and their relevance to the explanation is not apparent. At the lower end of the level, examples will lack detail and clarity and may fail to serve their purpose. If only one illustration is required it will be vague or only partially succeed in achieving its purpose. 0 marks Nothing worthy of credit 4 of 22

5 Generic mark scheme for questions with a total of 30 marks Level marks Relevant philosophical issues will be analysed and positions clearly and precisely explained. The analysis and use of examples will proceed from a secure knowledge base. Evaluation must be present and will show sophistication and direct engagement of the issues. The relation between argument and conclusion will be clear. The response is written in a fluent and sophisticated style with minimal, if any errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar. The response will read as a coherent whole. Level marks Relevant philosophical issues will be analysed and explained but there may be some imprecision. Examples will be deployed effectively but their implications may not be made fully apparent. Evaluation must be present but may lack philosophical impact, or it may be penetrating over a limited range of material. Knowledge and understanding of the issues will be apparent but not always fully exploited. The response is legible, employing technical language accurately and appropriately, with few, if any errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar. The response reads as a coherent and integrated whole. Level marks The response will explain and analyse some relevant material but positions might be juxtaposed rather than critically compared. Relevance will generally be sustained, though there may be occasional tangents at the lower end of the level. Knowledge of issues will be present but may lack depth and/or precision. Evaluative points are likely to be underdeveloped or applied to a limited range of material and may not be convincing. Examples are likely to be used descriptively rather than critically. The response is legible, employing technical language accurately and appropriately, with few, if any errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar. Level marks Responses in this level may be short or of limited scope. There may be narrow focus on one aspect or a range of issues may be referred to with limited understanding or analysis. Evaluation may be replaced by assertion or counter-suggestion. Sporadic insights may be present but they would lack development. Some knowledge will be present but it is likely to either lack detail and precision, or will not be analysed or evaluated. This is likely to feature at the lower end of the level. The response is legible, employing some technical language accurately, with possibly some errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar. Level marks There may be a basic or philosophically unsophisticated grasp of some issues. Analysis may be predominantly simple and/or lack clarity in places. There may be errors of reasoning and understanding. Evaluation, if present, will lack penetration or be very narrowly confined. The response may lack overall purpose and may fail to directly address the relevant issues. At the lower end of the level, the response may be disjointed. Technical language is limited in its employment or used inappropriately. The response may not be legible and errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar may be intrusive. Level marks There may be an extremely basic awareness of one relevant point without development or analysis. The response may be tangential with an accidental reference to a relevant point. Errors of understanding are likely to be intrusive. Fragments of knowledge will feature in this level. Technical language is not employed or is employed inappropriately. The response may not be legible and errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar are intrusive. 0 marks Nothing worthy of credit 5 of 22

6 0 1 Explain and illustrate the difference between necessary truths and contingent truths. Necessary truths [15 marks] A necessarily true proposition must be true: it expresses a necessary relationship of some kind, eg a logical necessity, so that its opposite, or negation, implies a contradiction. The grounds of necessity might be expressed in different ways a proposition is necessarily true solely because of its logical form a proposition is necessarily true because it is analytic a proposition is necessarily true because it is true in all possible worlds a proposition is necessarily true because it expresses something that could not be otherwise. Contingent truths A contingent proposition may be true or false: if it is true it need not have been true, it could have been and/or could be otherwise if a proposition is contingently true neither it nor its negation is necessarily the case: the proposition can be negated without contradiction the opposite of a contingently true proposition is possible there is a possible world in which it is not true that It is likely that there will be some attempt to link contingent truths to empiricism, experience, a posteriori knowledge, synthetic statements and uncertainty: similarly, necessary truths may be linked to rationalism, reason or logic, a priori knowledge, analytic statements and certainty. Some of these linkages are contested but students shouldn t be penalised if they are unaware of this. However, it is important to focus on the question so that responses do not turn into an account of the difference between, eg analytic and synthetic propositions or a priori and a posteriori knowledge. Illustrations are likely to be brief, rather than developed, but should be employed to clarify the point being made. For example illustrations of necessary truths should clarify the definition of necessity provided. Either it will snow or it will not snow ; all As are B; C is an A so C is a B, etc (necessarily true because of their logical form or because of the laws of logic). All bachelors are unmarried (analytic). Versions of the ontological argument claiming that God exists is true in all possible worlds (modal). There may be references to Hume s examples of relations of ideas (3 x 5 is half of 30, if injustice is a violation of property then where there is no property there can be no injustice). I can t forge my own signature (necessarily true because it couldn t be otherwise). illustrations of contingent truths may play around with some of the examples of necessity given, for example bachelors are less healthy than married men, or draw from the literature, for example Hume, or use current experience, for example I am wearing a blue cardigan to illustrate statements that can be negated without contradiction or which could have been otherwise. No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts focused, for example, on the triviality of necessary truths although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded. 6 of 22

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8 0 2 How convincing is the claim that we possess innate knowledge? [30 marks] While the question refers to knowledge this should be interpreted broadly to reward responses that refer to a wider content (ideas, knowledge, skills and capacities). Thus, the question may be approached in different ways but knowledge and understanding should include at least one account of what innateness might refer to ideas, principles or knowledge present in the mind at birth this might be linked (in different ways) to Locke, Descartes and Plato. concepts not given in experience and which must exist prior to experience this might be linked to Leibniz or Kant. capacities or abilities that are genetically inherited or programmed into us and which allow us to learn this might be linked to Leibniz, Chomsky, Fodor, Pinker or Carruthers. Discussion is likely to be approached in different ways: The claim isn t convincing the view that there is nothing in the mind that isn t first in the senses; or that at birth the mind is a tabula rasa (Locke). Innate knowledge requires there to be innate ideas or principles but no idea is innate: all of our ideas derive from sensory experience and reflection on sensory experience. Locke s arguments include the view that, if a proposition is innate, its component elements must be innate but there are no such innate elements. Nobody is born knowing that 3+4 = 7 because this requires five ideas to be in the mind. Similarly, universal assent doesn t imply innateness because it doesn t exist; whatever is, is is unknown to children and idiots; neither is innate knowledge dormant until discovered by reason one doesn t discover what is already known and reason is present long before the laws of logic are appreciated or formulated in the mind. examples of where sensory impairment and/or an inability to reflect deprive us (allegedly) of knowledge or ideas might also be given and linked to either Locke or Hume. Similarly, examples of where the addition or restoration of senses provides knowledge where there was none before, eg Condillac s statue. other Lockean applications might also feature: moral principles and rules; God and substance. Alternatively, Humean accounts of how we obtain the idea of causation/necessary connection or God through experience might be given. The claim has some appeal an appeal to innateness supports the existence of propositional knowledge without an experiential grounding. There might be references to God (trademark argument), the propositions of logic, identity, morality, causation, infinity, etc. some may refer specifically to the Platonic world of the Forms, or universals, and to examples of a priori knowledge latent within us at birth which is eventually recollected or perceived through the intellect. Some may refer to ideas, concepts or knowledge being triggered by experience. This might be related to mathematics and / or to notions of beauty or justice (some may counter with the problem of infinite regress). More likely, perhaps, are references to the slave boy and possible counters (such as Socrates was teaching the slave boy). 8 of 22

9 references to an innate conceptual scheme under which our experience of the world is subsumed (Kant) are likely to feature. The mind structures experience which is not possible unless certain concepts are in place: the most likely to feature are, perhaps, unity, substance, causality, space, time and the self. There may also be references to Leibniz s block of marble and or to his principles of reason eg nothing can come from nothing. References to nativism the view that certain abilities are hard-wired into the brain may also be developed via Chomsky (language acquisition) or via our possession of moral intuitions or folk psychology. Good discussions may contrast both views and focus on one or two issues to do so, eg God, morality, causation, the self. Argumentation may lead to a number of different conclusions there is no such thing as innate knowledge. experience is necessary. Most formulations of the innate knowledge thesis seem to require a correspondent knowledge base given in experience to draw out that which is allegedly latent within. the claims of innatism and/or nativism are frequently vague and not obviously falsifiable some of it is speculative metaphysics, some of it is pseudoscience. it might be claimed that innate ideas/knowledge is a default position, explaining what can t be explained in other ways or that better explanations are beginning to emerge. it might also be claimed that while the innate knowledge thesis isn t especially convincing, or isn t especially far-reaching, we do have either innate concepts or innate capacities without which it would be impossible to gain knowledge. Also, that the alternative of a tabula rasa is naïve and unconvincing there might also be references to intuitions without concepts as blind and/or to blooming, buzzing confusions. 9 of 22

10 0 3 Outline and illustrate two justifications for civil disobedience. [15 marks] Students may offer a definition of civil disobedience as public, unlawful but non-violent political conduct designed to change a law (or policies) without rejecting the rule of law generally. However, this isn t essential, full marks can be obtained without doing so. Two justifications for civil disobedience are likely to be selected from a law fails to connect to widely accepted moral and political values dissent produces a better outcome than consent. a law violates natural moral law which is above actual law. We are moral agents first and subjects second: autonomy and individual conscience are more important than obedience. a law serves sectional interests and fails to promote the good of the social whole or the common good or fails to extend rights to certain groups. a law disrupts social unity, order and cohesion because it discriminates against certain groups and/or individuals or because it undermines tradition. a law emanates from a source which is not regarded as legitimate. (This may be implicit in accounts of Hobbes or Locke s versions of the social contract). a law attempts to regulate an area of life which is not regarded as the legitimate concern of lawmakers it violates the freedoms of individuals. a law is not applied fairly or consistently. Some of the above may be linked to the obverse of when civil disobedience would not be justified. That is civil disobedience is designed to appeal to a sense of justice in the majority and there is a good chance that (on this occasion) it will do so. it could be justifiable if lawful attempts to redress an unjust law or policy have been made, ie when disobedience is employed as a last resort. it could be justifiable if the scale of action does not threaten serious disorder or promote a crisis of legitimacy (civil disobedience is not revolution). it may be justifiable if violent protest is avoided; there is a good chance of winning hearts and minds because fidelity to the law in general is maintained. it may be justifiable if the group or groups involved are willing to accept punishment for infringements of the law. Illustrations, or a single illustration covering two justifications, might draw from specific laws or acts which have drawn dissent, eg the poll tax, the ban on hunting, interference in parenting, smoking bans, discriminating against fathers, the use of speed cameras, increased tuition fees, environmental issues, etc. Some may employ historical examples. Illustrations don t have to be from the UK. No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts denying that dissent is justifiable although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded. 10 of 22

11 0 4 How convincing is the claim that we have consented to be governed? [30 marks] The focus of the question is on whether, and if so how, we can be said to have expressed consent but it is likely that students will begin by addressing why we consent to be governed. This is likely to involve accounts of life in a state of nature, eg Hobbes views that there would be a war of all against all and that life would be nasty, brutish and short. Students should then address one or more versions of how we might express consent, eg through an explicit (historical) act of consent or whether consent is given hypothetically or tacitly. Discussion is likely to focus on some of the following points acts of explicit consent are rare in political life some that do occur, eg schoolchildren pledging allegiance to the flag, are not undertaken by informed or qualified participants and there is no evidence that the greatest part of the nation have ever explicitly consented to be governed. if this is so, the idea that our political obligations to the state are founded on a social contract seems to be spurious. consequently, some have attempted to preserve a generally liberal theory of political obligation through consent in the absence of explicit consent. The concepts of hypothetical consent and tacit consent have been offered as solutions. The question concerns whether any of these solutions are convincing. hypothetical consent typically refers to the idea of a social contract that would be formed by imaginary, yet rational, individuals negotiating with one another in an artificial context such as a state of nature or an original position. tacit consent typically refers to the idea that a social contract is implicit through our engagement in certain acts: eg accepting benefits, staying in the country, participating in political practices such as voting, obeying the law, etc. both are ways of thinking about why, and to what extent, rational individuals submit to political authority and both also emphasise that political authority is a human invention and it may be useful to see authority in this way. The idea of a social contract is, then, a device for revealing how systems that have been created by humans are rational creations that work for all of us. on some accounts (eg Hobbes) the contract works for all of us because it is based upon what we as rational beings actually want, desire or prefer so that rational action is action that gives us what we want. What we want are peaceful, co-operative conditions that allow us to pursue and further other interests. This is likely to be linked to an account of human nature, selfinterest and/or to a state of nature that lies beneath civil society. on other accounts (eg Kant, Rawls) the idea of a social contract works to determine certain principles and policies that rational individuals should accept as being just. What is just and what is moral can be rationally determined there may be references to a kingdom of ends or to what we would commit to given a veil of ignorance. 11 of 22

12 Critical points depend on which accounts of consent are selected for discussion but may include even if it were the case that a prior generation were signatories to a contract it isn t clear why that should be binding for future generations. A hypothetical contract is no contract at all (Dworkin). It isn t worth the paper it is not written on. how do we know what principles rational individuals would choose from behind a veil of ignorance? Would individuals in an original position be individuals if there is nothing to individuate them? there is no neutral, morally pure, Archimedean Point from which we can decide what rational individuals would consent to. there are difficulties determining what counts as tacit consent and how far consenting tacitly obliges us. Are we obliged if we accept benefits we haven t asked for? Can we be called up for military service if we ve attended primary school, used a motorway or benefited from street lighting? tacit consent may not involve putting much in to political society (there may be references to free-riding and explicit examples of it, eg Rawls tax dodgers). also, while it may be rational for everyone to express consent this doesn t mean that they will act in accordance with social norms or laws if they can get away with not doing so (Gyges). some may feel restrained by convention and not wish to consent at all (Nietzsche). it may not be clear how dissent can be expressed: is not voting a sign of dissent? Some may be in a position to leave the country but most can t. Are emigrants necessarily consenting to all the laws of the State they re migrating to? if self-interest turns out to be the reason why we consent it is difficult to account for the range of social, moral and political obligations we seem to have in relation to those who can t express consent (citizens of other states, animals, those who are mentally impaired etc). It could be argued that the notion of consent is convincing: the insistence that the authority of the state, and of a legal system, is the creation of the people who constitute the state forces rational reflection about what we have created and what we could create. The individual is at the heart of political theorising. Consent carries with it a guaranteed moral right of dissent. Consequently, one way in which the expression of consent has been theorised must be plausible. the concept is not convincing: explicit consent has not been given and nothing else will do to secure the legitimacy and authority of the state that liberal thinkers want. Notions of hypothetical and tacit consent are unconvincing. We were born into obedience and the sources of power and authority can t be found in the consent of individuals. Some may offer an alternative account anarchist, socialist or conservative. 12 of 22

13 0 5 Explain and illustrate two criticisms of the view that morality is the product of a social contract. [15 marks] A version of the social contract may be briefly described although full marks can be obtained without doing so. The general idea in relation to ethics is that there is no rift between enlightened or rational self-interest and moral values. Two criticisms of this view are likely to be drawn from: we haven t actually made a conventional agreement with others and/or even if we argue hypothetically (ie that we would agree to accept moral conventions if given the opportunity to do so) this may not generate the obligations that actually exist. is this really what morality amounts to? Is it the case that morality can be described purely in terms of self-interest and mutual advantage? Do all contract theories do this? can morality be the product of a contract? Don t we need some moral principles in order to even think in terms of a contract? What we (would be prepared to) contract to must be the product of some pre-existing beliefs and values about what constitutes a worthwhile life. if morality is perceived as resulting from a conventional agreement, how do we explain dissent on moral grounds? If some moral values are higher than others and trump conventional agreements then morality can t simply be seen as a matter of conventional agreement. some contractual positions suggest that a conventional agreement is made to secure moral principles (eg natural rights) which, therefore, cannot be the product of a contract. others might be said to licence a tyranny of the majority. This point might be linked to the abuse of minorities or relatively powerless groups. given differences in the contractual approach (concerning why we make a contract and/or what we contract to), this approach leaves the question of what is moral open. are moral principles captured in the idea of a relativistic convention? do outsiders, or those who cannot express consent, have no moral rights? does the fact if it were a fact that we ve agreed mean that we ought to honour our agreement? The is-ought gap. the view may be a more plausible account of public morality then it is of private morality. Illustrations are likely to draw from the literature. For example, the view of man, and the subsequent nature of the contract, presented by Hobbes, Locke or Rousseau; Rawls promotion of the values of a western, liberal tradition favouring the autonomy and rights of the individual as well as a welfare ethic; examples of dissent on moral grounds; references to natural or human rights and/or to examples of how rights are possessed by, eg animals or any other reasonable illustration. Note care should be exercised when marking to ensure that two points are being made. References to Kant and Aristotle, for example, may be two versions of the same point that this isn t what morality amounts to or two different points: morality concerns living well and flourishing rather than rule-following (Aristotle) and reason determines the moral principles we should commit to (Kant). 13 of 22

14 0 6 We can only be moral if our motivation is to act in accordance with universal imperatives. Discuss. [30 marks] Most will recognise this as a reference to Kantian, or deontological, ethics. Certain themes, incorporating some of the following, should be emphasised the only thing good in itself is a good will. a moral action is one performed through a sense of duty. reason determines what our duties are. our duties are universal imperatives. various formulations of the categorical imperative (act in accordance with those maxims that can be universalised; respect and treat persons as ends in themselves and never merely as a means to an end; legislate for others as part of a kingdom of ends). Beyond this some may develop the contrast between duty and desire or inclination in order to explain the link between moral agency and moral motivation: we are accountable for what we will, what we freely assent to, not for our physical or psychological constitution or temperament (or stress the significance of autonomy, motive and intention). some issues may be selected to show which actions may count as right actions and why. This might focus on duties to self and duties to others or on perfect and imperfect duties in relation to self and others: the examples of suicide, falsely promising, developing talents and helping others. some may contrast duties with examples of maxims that can t be universalised. Alternatively, even though utilitarian positions are not clearly specified for study, some may argue that always act to maximise pleasure or happiness (positive utilitarianism) or always act to minimise pain or suffering (negative utilitarianism) are universal imperatives. Critical discussion may focus on an internal critique of deontology whether Kantian ethics is too formal and / or abstract to be useful as a guide to action there is a limited account of which actions are right and / or, eg treat others as ends in themselves seems compatible with a wide range of actions. whether it is too rigid and insensitive to feelings, circumstances or interests whether emotions or personal attachments should be disregarded in moral decision making or, perhaps, whether they can be disregarded. Kant s own example (the would-be axe-murderer) may be used against him. when two actions seem equally right how do we choose between them? The problem of conflicting duties or grounds of obligation. This may be illustrated with an example, eg Sartre s student. whether inclinations or desires have no moral value including altruistic inclinations and desires and/or whether we could tell whether someone was acting out of a sense of duty or out of inclination. (Again, this might be applied to an example frequently used in support of Kant the honest shopkeeper.) the problem that good intentions can produce bad consequences (and vice versa). 14 of 22

15 the development of moral thinking may be seen as a posteriori rather than a priori. Those finding a hint of utilitarianism in the question may develop a critical discussion of utilitarian positions could rule utilitarianism serve as a universal imperative? Wouldn t rules be relative to time and place? Could the rules established in unjust societies/states be genuinely moral motivations? What if following a rule developed in a just society did not promote happiness or minimise suffering on a specific occasion? Would following the rule still be morally correct? could act utilitarianism serve as a universal imperative? Any specific action, as well as its opposite, could be equally right on different occasions. The difficulties involved in determining whether it is right or not, eg difficulties of measurement, the presence of utility monsters, the time period in which to assess consequences, preferences in racist or sexist societies etc. Could it ever be moral to punish the innocent or torture those suspected of being guilty? Alternatively, an external critique could be developed: alternative theoretical approaches to normative ethics also provide genuinely moral motivations could a moral community be founded on reason, autonomy and good intentions alone (Kant) or on the desires or preferences of individuals? Do we not also need certain conventions? Rational agents will recognise that co-operation with others typically produces the best outcome and social norms and conventions provide a basis for co-operation. (Some contractual theories). shouldn t we also feel for others? There may be references to Hume (sympathy) or to Aristotle (feeling and acting in the right way). In relation to deontological ethics it could be argued that the view in question continues to be an important contribution to moral thinking, one that connects with many aspects of our moral experience. For example, respect for persons may be connected to the concept of rights and/or to the idea that we do think that it is always wrong to or never right to We do consider intentions when we blame or praise someone; the law treats motive and intention seriously (for example, when distinguishing between murder and manslaughter). Morality is a constraint on self-interest, inclination and desire etc. More importantly, perhaps, because it is right is an answer to the question why should I perform this action? it could also be argued that the approach is too strict, demanding and unemotional to be applied consistently (that we do consider circumstances, consequences and attachments before acting); or that it is too vague or formal to be of much practical use (eg we know that we should treat others as ends in themselves but what, exactly, might this involve?) If an answer is based on a utilitarian approach or approaches it might be argued that there is one overarching imperative but no others and that is a good thing. What s wrong with promoting happiness or minimising suffering? What s wrong with the view that a certain action while usually right is occasionally wrong (and vice versa)? Alternatively, it could also be argued that utilitarian positions fail to establish certain moral principles that are universal eg human rights. 15 of 22

16 0 7 Outline an argument for the claim that the idea of God is innate within all of us. Students will probably recognise the claim as Descartes trademark argument. [15 marks] There may be some explanation/illustration of the term trademark. Just as a craftsman stamps his mark on his work so God stamps the idea of God in all of us. There may be some background on the origins of ideas: these may be adventitious, fictitious or innate. Both adventitious and fictitious ideas may originate in us. The idea of God is neither adventitious nor fictitious so must be innate. There should be some reference to degrees of reality: the idea of God has the highest degree and could not therefore originate in a substance with a lesser degree of reality. (Ideas of modes, number, extension, could originate in a cause which does not possess them, ie a thinking thing.) The main steps of the argument are there must be at least as much reality in the efficient and total cause as in the effect of that cause. (Some may phrase this as the cause of my idea of God must contain as much perfection as is present in my idea of God). The causal adequacy principle. my ideas must be caused by something. I am a finite and imperfect being. I have the idea of God: my idea of God is that of an infinite substance, supremely intelligent, supremely powerful, and the creator of everything that exists. I cannot be the cause of my idea of God as an imperfect being I cannot be the cause of my idea of perfection. only God contains as much reality (or perfection) as is present in my idea of God so only God could be the cause of my idea of God. God exists. Some may view the claim as only God could be the cause of beings who possess the idea of God. Descartes does provide illustrative examples to support his reasoning but it would be unfair to expect AS-level students to know these (hence the question doesn t require students to illustrate). However, some may know and add references to a stone cannot come into existence unless it is produced by something which has all the properties as those found in the stone or others superior to them. (This might make more sense if we say its properties inhere in the cause rather than literally being in it as this avoids problems like the stone being smooth whereas the grains of sand of which it is composed are not.) something cannot be made hot unless caused to become so by something which is of an order, degree or kind, at least as perfect as heat. Although it is not required some may include an illustration in a criticism of the claim eg via references to the sponginess of sponge cakes, although most examples like this do not describe total and efficient causes (eg they leave out references to heat). No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts of, eg the causal adequacy principle or the view that there are whole nations without the idea. Relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded. 16 of 22

17 0 8 Assess whether the idea of God is coherent. [30 marks] It is likely that students will begin by listing a range of God s attributes: God is omnipotent, omniscient, supremely good etc. The issue is whether these attributes are mutually, or singularly, coherent. Whether we can make sense of the idea of God? (Beyond this, if the idea is not deemed to be coherent, some may question how the idea originates and whether or not we should reject the idea of God completely.) Some of the following or equivalent points will be raised and developed in relation to whether the idea is coherent: a focus on the interpretation of specific attributes can we make sense of omnipotence? Can God create an object that is so heavy that He cannot lift it? Whichever answer is given limits His omnipotence. Does the problem disappear if God is incorporeal? Omnipotence is traditionally understood as being able to do anything not contrary to the laws of logic. Can we describe His limitations if we cannot describe what He can t do? can we make sense of omniscience? A range of issues may be connected to omniscience. Is God s knowledge limited to propositional knowledge? Does He also possess practical knowledge (know-how)? If God s knowledge is propositional then in what language does He possess such knowledge? There seems to be a further limit due to the idea that certain propositions can only be known by certain people: Jenny can know that I feel anxious about this exam, God can know that Jenny feels anxious about this exam. Also, regarding knowhow, while God may know everything there is to physically know about riding a bike but, if physical knowledge is not exhaustive, does He know what it is like to ride a bike? can we make sense of supreme goodness? Is x good because God commands it or does God command x because it is good? Can God be infinitely just and infinitely merciful? It is likely that the main focus will be on whether His attributes are mutually coherent if He is omnipotent, omniscient and supremely good why does evil exist? If He knows about it and doesn t stop it then either He is not good or He is not able to stop it. Is there a convincing solution to the problem of evil? (It might be noted that the issue extends beyond a discussion of God s attributes it involves God s attributes plus something else). Can God will evil? If He can t is this not a limit to His omnipotence? if (moral) evil exists because we have free will does this raise questions concerning omniscience: if God is omniscient then He knows what we will do and we could not have acted differently; if we have free will then we could have acted differently. if God exists outside of time (and is eternal) can he be omniscient? Some propositions can only be known at certain times. God can only know which of two statements eg the UK will experience severe weather conditions in December 2013 and the UK did experience severe is true if God knows what time it is now. If He is transcendent and sees all events simultaneously does He know every possible future outcome of events (how things could have been otherwise) or every actual outcome of events? If God knows what future choices we will make then it is hard to see how we could have acted differently and, consequently, whether we were free to choose: if we are not free to do otherwise and God knows that some of us commit evil actions it is difficult to reconcile this with His benevolence. If we are free to choose and it is not logically possible for God to know what we will choose then God is not omniscient. (Note there is a distinction between necessarily (if God knows that p then p) and if God knows that p then necessarily (p). God could know everything without what he knows being logically necessary.) on the other hand, does God s knowledge of how we will act cause us to act? Does it imply that we are not free? 17 of 22

18 if God exists in time (and is everlasting) He knows what time it is now but is not eternal and transcendent; if He doesn t know what time it is now, or what the future holds, He is not omniscient. can God be both immanent and transcendent? Can God be both beyond or outside of the physical world (and beyond human sensibility) and present within all things? Immanence is difficult to reconcile with benevolence: if God is in the world then He is aware of the evil, pain, suffering, etc that exists in the world (some may refer to omnipresence and claim that God is in such things). If He acts in the world, is responsive, loving and benevolent then why is there so much suffering? If God suffers with us, with each new evil that we experience then He is not immutable. If God is immutable is there any point in prayer? Can He respond to the way I feel? Students may discuss the issue by developing a range of the above points or by concentrating on one or two points in depth. Various positions might be argued some may argue that the way we conceptualise God is mistaken: either it is a mistake to attempt to conceptualise what is beyond our understanding or we need to rid God of some of these attributes or not multiply attributes to infinity. some may argue that our idea of God is precisely that our idea and that it isn t at all surprising that as imperfect beings we don t possess an accurate idea of God. If our idea is a fiction this has no consequence at all for religious faith or belief (or for the question of whether God exists). Eg we may not have a clear idea of what creative thinking is but that doesn t mean that creative thinking doesn t exist. some will argue that there are convincing theistic responses to at least some of these issues. Expect to see references to Swinburne, Hick, etc. Some may adopt the view that faith should prevail where reason will not and/or that experience should prevail where reason will not. it may be suggested that making sense of a supreme being is not a case of making sense of the God of the philosophers and/or that the process of making sense of is not any kind of metaphysical, ontological or epistemological enquiry rather it s a way of seeing or form of life. some may argue that, following reflection, our idea of God is incoherent and while this doesn t prove anything faith or trust in a supreme being is, effectively, a form of belief without warrant and, possibly, a suicide of reason. some may argue that we should be led to atheism rather than theism. This view may be linked to various accounts of how we acquire or employ the idea of God, eg man dreams about superman in the fantastic reality of the heavens and finds nothing there but the semblance of himself. 18 of 22

19 0 9 Outline and illustrate two reasons why personal identity through time does not only depend on physical continuity. [15 marks] Some students may clarify the view in question prior to identifying reasons: thus, a person is the same person at T1 and T2 if their body is spatially and temporally continuous throughout T1 T2. There may also be some discussion of how, while we all lose skin cells, brain cells and some of us have organ transplants, implants and other modifications, we don t suppose that such changes, especially if gradual and continuous, amount to a different body. We retain the same form and underlying structure (the same DNA, fingerprints, blood type, etc.) So, physical continuity shouldn t be taken to mean immutability although there is, perhaps, a question concerning how much physical change is possible without any change in personal identity. Two reasons are likely to draw from physical continuity isn t a necessary condition of identity. We can conceive of attributing identity through time in cases where physical continuity isn t satisfied. the claim that we could retain our personal identity in a disembodied existence and so bodily continuity cannot be necessary. physical continuity isn t a sufficient condition of identity. We can conceive of refusing to attribute identity through time where this condition is satisfied. the continued existence of the whole body isn t required for identity through time, only the continued existence of the brain: but is the continued existence of the whole brain necessary or sufficient for identity? The continued existence of the brain (or part of it) won t give identity through time if mentality isn t reducible to the functioning of the brain and mentality is what matters. the claim that bodily continuity is necessary but not sufficient and so personal identity over time involves more than mere bodily continuity. For example psychological continuity, the ability to view oneself as the same self in different times and places. (This may possibly be viewed as a high-level property of the brain.) the claim that personal identity over time is not dependent on continuity (bodily or otherwise). I can exist intermittently and still be one and the same. the claim that survival through time is a more useful concept. the claim that personal identity is what it is and cannot be analysed into or reduced to anything else. Illustrations are likely to draw from the literature, eg thought experiments such as Shoemaker s brain transplant (Brownson) or Parfit s teletransporter (possibly in the form of Star Trek) and/or case studies where, although bodily continuity is present, we would hesitate to ascribe identity eg amnesia, dementia, personality disorders and/or fictional illustrations Freaky Friday, It s a Boy Girl Thing, etc. Care should be taken when marking to ensure that references to necessary and sufficient conditions are accurate. Responses focused on physical change so that one loses identity following cosmetic surgery should not be highly rewarded. 19 of 22

20 1 0 Assess the claim that not all persons are human and not all humans are persons. [30 marks] Human may be seen as an essentially biological concept: one either is or is not a member of the species or genus human. Persons may be complex or simple, diminished, some humans may be ex-persons or potential persons. Thus, the concept of a person could be distinguished from that of a human through being a matter of degree rather than kind. This may be developed via ethical implications with regard to, eg whether diminished persons are seen as having diminished responsibilities and as being less accountable, and punishable, for their actions. Whether they have fewer legal rights and/or are less able to exercise some natural rights. Conversely, some may deny the claim that non-humans are not persons and suggest that some non-human animals or machines should, or could, be accepted onto the scale of personhood. It is likely that such a claim would follow from an account of some proposed characteristics of personhood, such as: self-awareness and continued self-awareness through time; self-control or self-creation, autonomy and responsibility; the ability to reason, reflect and employ higher-order reflective skills; sociability and the requisite communication and language skills that underpin sociability. Expect analysis to focus on potential and ex-persons: a foetus is human, as is someone in a vegetative state but either not yet or not still a person. diminution refers to a lessening (rather than a complete loss) of personhood, so that in certain important respects one becomes less complex, weakened or reduced in some way. Again, the point is that diminished persons are no less human than they were before (biographical diminution seems more important than a grasp of any biological changes that may have occurred). some animals and/or some machines may be seen as sufficiently complex in certain relevant respects to be on the scale of personhood. Comparisons may be drawn between some great apes and human infants. Discussion of any of the above could be developed through illustrative examples (either factual or fictional) but may also be further developed through: eg ethical implications with regard to whether diminished persons are seen as having diminished responsibilities and as being less accountable, and punishable, for their actions; they may be regarded as having fewer legal rights and/or as less able to exercise natural rights. Conversely, if some non-humans were accepted onto the scale of personhood they may be seen to possess some rights: this point is likely to be linked to animal rights. there may be some discussion of speciesism and whether this is or is not like racism or sexism. This is most likely to be applied to animals but could be stretched to cover artificial systems if an automaton were sufficiently sophisticated, in terms of the relevant attributes, would it have the right not to be dismantled? some may detect a whiff of elitism and identify moral and/or political positions which may be regarded as unattractive (although some might regard them as attractive), eg whether we should be governed by an intellectual oligarchy, or by those with iron wills; whether anyone is beyond conventional morality; whether ageism, racism or sexism could be justifiable. 20 of 22