BOOK REVIEW. Susan Love Brown

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1 BOOK REVIEW Susan Love Brown Florida Atlantic University Wolfgang Fikentscher. Modes of Thought: A Study in the Anthropology of Law and Religion. J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tubingen, pages. Much of the turmoil that haunts academia in this day and age centers around the changing nature of its constituencies: the increasingly multicultural nature of the professoriate and student congregations. The expansion of literacy, not only across racial, ethnic, and cultural terrains, but across classes means that more and different kinds of people than ever have access to knowledge and produce knowledge. This situation is a blessing, an opportunity, and a problem that calls for new levels of reconciliation of diverse experiences and perspectives that can only lead to greater understanding of ourselves and others. It is a heady time to be a scholar. But within disciplines these times underscore long-standing epistemological and methodological problems, and anthropology is no exception. Anthropologists, who are exceedingly modest and even self-deprecating when it comes to their own achievements, have grappled with "multiculturalism" since day one, their arena being the world rather than the classroom. For more than a hundred years, anthropologists have exposed themselves and, therefore, their own cultures to knowledge about others. They have done so with unavoidable ethnocentricity, which they have consistently studied and tried to remedy. As such, anthropologists are the experts on both culture and the pitfalls of crossing cultural boundaries, though they seldom take such credit in the world of academia. Rather they continue to chip away at their own epistemological and methodological shortcomings, avoiding grand theory in favor of middle range theory tied securely to particular ethnographic data. This approach is productive but far too safe. Wolfgang Fikentscher's new book takes a greater risk. Modes of Thought, Fikentscher's magnum opus, sets out to acknowledge the different modes of thought in societies around the world, presenting us with a way to reconcile them in the form of a new epistemology called synepeics and establishing a basis for cultural equality an equality generally acknowledged in the holistic and relativistic approach of anthropologists. Fikentscher states three goals of this work: (1) to present a culture-dependent epistemology, (2) to present a new theory of comparative culture, and (3) to present modes of thought as a viable analytic approach. Modes of Thought covers so much territory that no single reader or evaluation can hope to do justice to it. Whether or not Fikentscher succeeds or fails in his endeavor we can leave to the future, for new approaches must always be assessed over time after much deliberation by a variety of minds. In the meantime, he has offered his colleagues a challenge, and the details of that challenge form the basis of this review. Anthropologists have always recognized though more often lately that theory and analysis are culture-bound that extricating ourselves from the presuppositions of our own cultures, both general and academic, is difficult. "Ethnocentrism is the most pervasive problem in anthropology," writes Fikentscher, although most of it "occurs inadvertently." A modes of thought focus is a step toward solving the problem.

2 May, 1997] Page 143 In Part One of Modes of Thought, Fikentscher lays the groundwork for his approach. He defines a mode of thought as "a mind-set that connects human data perception with mentally reflected behavior in a culture-shaping way that is predominantly covert" (21). He elaborates: Different modes of thought retain different attitudes towards cultural universals such as space and time perception; the treatment of risks (risk awareness and risk shifting) and the ensuing ethical attitudes; generalization and particularization in the forming of concepts ("unit-building"; as opposed to the topical serials such as mnemotechnic rhymes, check-lists, or the alphabet ); and, as a consequence of concept forming attribution of properties. Space, time, risk, and concepts (including the attribution of properties) mean different things to a Hinayana-Buddhist, a Muslim and a Marxist. Consequently, these individuals' choices in relating to space and time, risk-avoidance strategies (if there are any), and thinking in concepts and properties are different too (17). It is important to note, Fikentscher tells us, that modes of thought are cultural in nature, but there are far more cultures than modes of thought. "Thus, one mode of thought may enter into one or more cultures" (21). Syncretism, then, can occur when a culture "is influenced by more than one mode of thought"(22). Fikentscher then reviews both the social science context and the anthropological context within which modes of thought can be viewed, ending with a survey of analytic approaches within anthropology (ethnocentric analysis, emic-etic analysis, componential analysis, correlational analysis) and demonstrating how these approaches are embedded in the western mode of thought. He then introduces synepeical analysis as an approach that acknowledges different modes of thought, while providing a basis in metatheory for overcoming ethnocentricity and acknowledging the equal validity of cultures. Synepeics is a "culture-dependent epistemology," as well as the basis of a theory of culture comparison that Fikentscher introduces to us in detail in this book. Synepeics means consequence, and synepeics call for consequential reasoning in any given mode of thought. To illustrate, it is un-synepeical for a Marxist to claim human rights as rights directed against the state; for a rule-of-law democrat to call for an economy of use values, because they are beyond dialogue; for a Muslim to get organized in the true (Greek) sense of organization as a system of reliance and responsibilities between the members of an assembly, and between the assembly and its appointed "organs"; for a Buddhist to be a socialist; for an American Indian child to play "show and tell"; etc. Since comparison of modes of thought is possible through analysis, synepeics lead to a meta-reasoning and provide for concepts on a meta-level (such as space, time, causality, risk, personhood, and human dignity) ( ). Synepeics involve "three levels of thinking." The theoretical, or "consequential reasoning within a specific mode of thought" (Synepeics I), involves analyzing the particular mental reactions or "folkconcepts" characteristic of it. Dual thinking (Synepeics II) is "a cross-thought-modal discovery procedure," which, upon discovery of a new and different mode of thought, results in thinking that might neglect differences in the two modes of thought, encourage intolerance for the newly discovered alternative way of thinking, change behavior to take the new mode of thought into consideration, or attempt to explain differences in the two modes of thought in naive ways. The metatheoretical level

3 Page 144 [PoLAR. Vol. 20, No. 1 (Synepeics III) involves a "systematic treatment of the similarities and dissimilarities of the modes of thought" and "requires common denominators of comparison." In addition to understanding individual modes of thought, thinkers must always be aware of what level they are operating on when using mode of thought analysis: Synepeics require the thinker to stay consequentially on a chosen level, and to be aware of the changing of levels if he wants to do that. When a Buddhist monk in a debate with Western friends says: "Hinayana Buddhism is the ideal environment for the development of human rights," this can have two very different, even opposite, meanings. On the level of synepeics I where theoretical statements within a given mode of thought are made, it means: "Getting detached from other persons and things of this world, as recommended by the Buddha, creates a state of non-interference and non-caring that conforms with the true meaning of human rights as we Hi nay an Buddhists see them." If said on the meta-level of comparison (synepeics III), it means: "If a foreigner comes to our country, he or she will be delighted to see how every possible interpretation of what 'human rights' can mean is acceptable for us, and our tolerance will provide for fruitful discussions." Spoken on levels I or III of synepeics, the same words imply either near-intolerance, or tolerance (131). A fourth level that Fikentscher calls "synepeical strategies" (Synepeics IV) boils down to applied anthropology, involving the real-world application of the analysis of modes of thought for the purpose of addressing such problems as common legal systems, development and conservation, and tolerance between East and West on a world-wide level by acknowledging the equal status of different cultures and eliminating the ethnocentrism that all cultures impose on others. In fact, at the end of Part One of Modes of Thought, Fikentscher calls for cultural justice: "if there is a moral obligation to do justice to cultures, this cultural justice is no threat to governability but rather one of its main prerequisites" (153). Part Two of Modes of Thought identifies and discusses some of the actual modes of thought that exist in the world today, acknowledging a difference between those modes of thought that existed before the axial age (the 6th and 5th centuries B.C.) and those that emerged after. Pre-axial age modes of thought are broadly animistic and include totemism, eternal dream time, cult of the dead, ancestor worship, animism, witchcraft, animatism, idolatry, polydaemonism and polytheism. These modes are generally characterized by an aspective orientation in space and time, weakly developed risk awareness, and little developed conceptual unit building. So, "the societies in which these modes of thought still prevail deserve a particularly high degree of cultural protection because these 'marginal' cultures are actually the world from which every other society on this planet has been derived" (293). According to Fikentscher, "it is the axial age which took away from animism its monopoly over the mind of man, and since the axial-age phenomenon has been given little attention consistently pre-axialage modes of thought as a concept are just as poorly understood" (294). A problem has been the failure of anthropologists to study in equal measure large-scale societies and religions and even western cultures to the degree they have concentrated on primitive ones, a problem that is being rectified at present. The radical change that took place around 500 B.C. marginalized the primal religions, replacing them territorially with religions that spread out across geographical and political space. Fikentscher points

4 Page 145 out that "all five great world religions: Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Judaism, and Christianity, originated in Asia" (300) and spread out from there. Fikentscher provides us with an example of the mode of thought in traditional China and its implications for law: The dominant mode of thought is a sceptic, detaching view of worldly things. This view gives rise to an attitude towards risk and suffering which can be characterized as "risk assessment as to the origin." Whoever suffers should suffer because it is karma; his or her due endeavors to quit thefozrouz-bondagesof this world have apparently not led far enough. There is no elaborate mechanism of shifting risk to somebody else because this would interfere with the karma of two persons: the one who is aided, and the one who is burdened by the risk transfer. This is of special significance for legal concepts such as contract, negotiorum gestio, private autonomy and subjective rights and organization... ( ). In a chapter on Western modes of thought, Fikentscher examines the Greek Tragic Mind as a mode of thought, Jewish Apocalyptic Mode of thought, and mainstream Christianity as a mode of thought. He follows these with chapters "Islam as a Mode of Thought" and "Marxism and National Socialism as Modes of Thought." Within these chapters Fikentscher compares these modes with pre-axial modes of thought, delineates some of the key features of these modes of thought, and relates them to other postaxial modes of thought. It is hard in one sense to credit Fikentscher with originality in his enterprise, because anthropologists working in both legal anthropology and the anthropology of religion have noted the distinctions of different bodies of law and different religions and their implications for cultural understanding. It is, in fact, much of this ethnography that he draws upon to build his theoretical case. However, in attempting to build a common epistemology from which all cultures and their modes of thought can be thought of as equals and dealt with and analyzed accordingly, Fikentscher has raised the ethnological enterprise to that of grand theory something that scares most of us and which others of us regard as illegitimate. This is unfortunate, for anthropologists are sitting on treasure troves of data and know, because they have worked across cultures and with ethnocentrism for more than a hundred years, more about the human condition in their collective wisdom than people in any other discipline. While it is clear that Fikentscher's book is meant primarily for German anthropologists (for whom the anthropology of law has fallen into decline and for whom the modes of thought approach is meant to match materialistic and ecological approaches), it is also such a massive undertaking that assessing its claims and approach can only move the discipline of anthropology forward, especially in view of reconciling small-scale societies with state societies an enterprise anthropology has only recently begun. The individual reader will look at the massive size ofmodes of Thought, its exhaustive review of familiar materials, and small print as an obstacle in a world in which time is short. However, for this same reader, Part Two is a fascinating compendium of facts about the world's major religions and philosophies and the way associated modes of thought affect the interpretations of justice. Constituting the better part of the book, these chapters alone would be worth reading. Fikentscher also pays close attention to the applied possibilities of his theory, which should be of interest to those who are involved in development work.

5 Page 146 [PoLAR: Vol. 20, No. 1 "The task is to find a way how individuals of different cultural mind-sets can live with each other without committing injustice. The abolishment of the differences in mind-sets is not an acceptable permanent solution," says Fikentscher (502). He grants: "Much of what has been said may prove to be untenable in light of better research or harder thinking. But this is the time when nothing is more needed than proposals, models, brainstorming, imagination" (502). Thus, he presents his challenge. It awaits our response.