The Epistemology of the Cyrenaic School Voula Tsouna Cambridge University Press, Cambridge pp.

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1 The Epistemology of the Cyrenaic School Voula Tsouna Cambridge University Press, Cambridge pp. David C. Bellusci Concordia University, Montreal Tsouna s study focuses on the philosophical doctrine of the Cyrenaic School of 400 B.C. Cyrenaic philosophy shares elements with both Socratic movements and Greek Skepticism. The founder of the School is Aristippus of Cyrene, but by Aristippus death, the Cyrenaic sects started splitting up. The objective of the author is to identify the teachings of the Cyrenaics, in the midst of various interpretations of the Cyrenaic school, to better understand their philosophical doctrine. By reconstructing the Cyrenaic school of epistemology, Tsouna shows how the skeptical epistemology is built on hedonist ethics. Tsouna maintains that her interest is in Epistemology, and approaches the Cyrenaic school within the framework of epistemic discourse, and not ethics. Part of Tsouna s strategy to understand the Cyrenaic School is to ask questions that the Cyrenaics might have asked; and to raise certain issues that the Cyrenaics might have raised. In other words, Tsouna s task is not only to identify Cyrenaic philosophy, but also to interpret the philosophy on the basis of such questions and answers. The philosophical work also has historical scope since Tsouna examines philosophical figures evolving from the Cyrenaic School. The work is divided into three parts: Part I, Subjectivism, Part II, Skepticism; and Part III Subjectivism Empiricism, Relativism: Cyrenaics, Epicureans, Protagoreans. In Chapter 1 Tsouna immediately takes up the question of the good life on the basis of the Cyrenaic School of epistemology. The epistemic discourse reveals that for the Cyrenaics we have knowledge of our own pathe, while to have knowledge of things in this world is not possible. Tsouna raises the following questions: (i) if there is no real interest in epistemic issues, why consider questions concerning our pathe; and (ii) why is (i) even developed; and (iii) what is the reason for stopping where they stop? (p. 2). Tsouna proceeds to answer these questions to which Chapter 1 is devoted. The claim is made that Cyrenaics espoused a hedonistic philosophy believing that pleasure represents the good for humans. For the Cyrenaics pleasure does not accumulate over a life-time, but the 1

2 pleasure experienced at a given moment. The same holds true for pain: pain is avoided at a given moment, and does not consist of an accumulation over a life-time. This means that the pathe, pleasure or pain, are the only things accessible to human knowledge. Tsouna shows in this introductory chapter the nature of the pathe has two-fold implications: (i) we seek pleasure and avoid pain; and (ii) pursuing pleasure represents a moral good. The moral discourse according to Tsouna represents the Cyrenaics as ethicists, since their epistemic views are not concerned with the activities in themselves but as means to an end. While the Cyrenaics focused on Socratic philosophy, as well as that of Aristocles, and Antisthenes and the Cynics, they disapproved of more intellectual disciplines such as mathematics, physics and logic. Tsouna begins the section on subjectivism by first examining the physiological nature of pathe, and how the this term relates to the Greek word paschein. We are informed that for the Cyrenaics pathe has physicalist overtones because basic descriptions such as smooth and rough are employed in reference to motions of pleasure and pain found in the flesh or in the soul (p. 9). Tsouna argues that given the Cyrenaic description of these sensations, the sensations are identified with the body, and not what the perceiver feels. To determine Aristippus of Cyrene s philosophy in this matter, Tsouna draws from sources familiar with the Cyrenaic school such as Diogenes Laertius and Clement of Alexandria: both sources identify pleasure as a smooth and gentle motion followed by some kind of aesthesis, that is, a consciousness of this pleasure (p. 10). Aristippus of Cyrene valued aesthesis as the supreme good and our moral purpose. Tsouna points out that Aristippus the Younger (Cyrene s grandson) introduced a third category of intermediaries. Texts are given from the Younger s writings where the three kinds of pathe are analogically provided: a smooth sea, a stormy sea, and a calm sea. The intermediary is expressed by neither pleasure nor pain. Tsouna considers other positions and their significance such as Anniceris and his disciples. Differences between the Annicerians and the Cyrenaics are identified, such as intermediaries and mental pleasure. Given the implications of intermediaries Tsouna responds by giving an analysis of affective states representative of pathe, such as seeing white and tasting sweet, and being cut and the awareness that one is cut (pp ). Tsouna argues that the term monochronos, appears inadequately translated as shortlived or momentary ; the translation Tsouna gives should is unitemporal. The manner in which this is interpreted is significant because the notion of pleasure implies temporality (pp. 2

3 16ff.). However, in English saying unitemporal does not conveys the marked notion of time, which is commonly understood by momentary or short-lived. This is an example of where Tsouna does her own interpreting; this work represents not only a study of Greek philosophy, but also an exercise in hermeneutics. The observation is made that pleasure is what one desires at that moment, and whatever the desire is, constitutes the maximum pleasure, perhaps a glass of wine today, or a glass of water tomorrow. Differences between the Epicurean and Cyrenaic notions of pleasure are examined. For the Epicureans we are put in touch with something external when we experience pleasure, but for the Cyrenaics our senses put us in touch with a qualitative state of our body which has epistemic implications: our senses put us in touch with the internal states of our body, the only thing we can grasp. Other points that Tsouna develops include memory, touch and vision (p. 19ff.). The second section on the nature of pathe examines ontological questions. Given the epistemic orientation of the Cyrenaic School, the Cyrenaics were not concerned about metaphysical questions. Tsouna observes that the experience of sensible states are encoded in the language of Cyrenaics, as in I am whitened or I am made affected whitely (p. 22). The matter is approached on the basis of the mental or physical nature of pathe. Tsouna argues that for the Cyrenaics the pathe moves beyond the mind-body dualism, and is regarded in subjective terms. However, Tsouna finds such claims misleading arguing that some experiences of pleasure or pain can employ either physicalist or mentalist language, thus, both subjective and objective explanations of pathe. To present the Cyrenaic position, Tsouna cites a number of texts and claims that unlike Descartes, the Cyrenaics did not make an ontological distinction of mind and body (p. 23). Chapter 3 examines the vocabulary of pathe, and a lexical inventory associated with pathe concepts is given. Tsouna classifies the terms into two categories, verbal and adverbial. An examination of Greek present-tense passive verbs is given to illustrate how these constructions are employed; for example, they are being horsed, and for people are affected yellowly, showing verbal and adverbial constructions, respectively (pp ). Both pleasure or pain are referred to by ordinary verbs, verbal phrases or nouns. Tsouna maintains that verbs and adverbial forms are used differently explaining that the Cyrenaics used pathe type verbs and adverbs in the case of individual perception. 3

4 Tsouna considers how the pathe is apprehended in Chapter 4, and maintains that the central doctrine of the Cyrenaic School was the subjectivist thesis that only pathe can be known. The argument is examined, whether the pathe are katalepta apprehensible. Tsouna points out, however, that if Zeno (344 B.C.) first used the term, it cannot be attributed to the Cyrenaics because he was born about one century after Aristippus of Cyrene. Tsouna does not exclude the possibility that the early Cyrenaics may have had verbs expressing perception, apprehension and judgment. A related problem arises where the pathe are considered the criteria for truth. Tsouna then explores the possibility of the claim by examining the term kriterion and how the word is used in relation to Cyrenaics by looking at Epicurean empiricism and Stoic theory of knowledge and contrasting them to the Skeptics (pp. 32ff.). The section attempts to understand pathe in relation to apprehension, and as a criterion for truth. The criteria for truth, Tsouna observes, is established by the epistemic feature of the sentences describing the pathe (p. 38): (i) not deceitful, (ii) not undeceitful; (iii) infallible; and (iv) incorrigible. Tsouna examines all four of these points by giving an analysis of four epistemic uses of pathe. These features constitute the basis of pathe which is something private, concluding that we do not have access to the pathe of others. In Section III of Chapter 4, Tsouna develops self-evident states and self-evident propositions (pp. 42ff.). For both the Epicureans and the Stoics the criterion is identified by its reference to the real world: the criterion is immediate, self-evident and relates to an object external to the perceiver (p. 42). Tsouna examines in this section Roderick Chisholm s work on Sextus, and what Chisholm refers to as autonomous propositions for basic propositions and analytics epistemology of the1960s and 1970s. The section is followed by the objectal and the adverbial models of sensory perception which represent two interpretations of the Cyrenaic school: the sense-data theories of perception (objectal model); and the adverbial analysis of appearances (adverbial model). Tsouna argues against the objectal model interpretation, and shows similarities between the adverbial analysis model, and Cyrenaic epistemology. Tsouna makes three observations in this section: (i) Cyrenaic theory does not make ontological distinctions between pathe and external objects, (ii) nor between mental and physical objects; and (iii) pathe does not have extensional properties for the Cyrenaics (pp ). Tsouna points out that the adverbial model emerged out of the tension between objects of awareness, and the act of awareness itself giving a grammatical reanalysis based on Chisholm s work (p. 48) 4

5 observing that substantiatival talk is avoided by replacing the active form of the verb to appear with the passive, as in I am appeared to, and then reasoning the other terms of the sentence according to the traditional role of grammar and syntax (ibid). In Section V Tsouna treats the restriction of the criterion. When truth and cognition are applied to pathe the grammar of Greek epistemology was modified by the Cyrenaics. For the Greeks the criteria are self-evident and true propositions about objects or states of affairs in the world, and knowledge achieved through the application of the criteria is objective knowledge (p. 54). The Epicureans and Stoics share these views, as Tsouna affirms that truth and knowledge are to be found external to the perceiver. Tsouna responds to the mainstream Hellenistic position, by developing a case based on Sextus where pathe replaces phainomena, the latter term associated with Pyrrhonian Skepticism (pp ). Tsouna then considers whether Sextus reformulation of the text represents Cyrenaic views on epistemology. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to these two terms, pathe and phainomena, and how they are understood in Cyrenaic theory. Tsouna concludes that the Cyrenaics can be considered the forerunners of modern subjectivism, on the grounds that the only significant truths for the Cyrenaics are those of internal states and not those of external objects (p. 60). Chapter 5 looks at Aristocles of Messene, a Peripatetic philosopher of 200 A.D. who criticizes the Cyrenaic School, as reported by Eusebius (c A.D.). Aristocles criticism concerns the restrictive nature of pathe as being the only thing apprehensible. By invoking Sextus, Tsouna responds by: (i) an inductive-analogical counter-argument; and (ii) categorical or conceptual response. Section I treats awareness of the pathe and awareness of oneself : since pathe are momentary events or as Tsouna translates unitemporal, awareness of the pathe is during the time in which the event occurs. Aristocles argues that pathe involving cognitive awareness is beyond the individual pathe. In the defense of the Cyrenaics, Tsouna makes a rather weak claim stating that a Cyrenaic can respond by saying at the present moment I am aware myself as a human being, not a stone (p. 68). In Section 3 of Chapter 5, Tsouna examines the awareness of pathe and apprehension of objects: the pathe as guides to conduct. Tsouna presents Aristocles claims, and refutes them according to what is believed to be the Cyrenaic position. Aristocles arguments tackles Cyrenaic claims, what we choose or avoid is in the world, and not private feeling ; thus, Aristocles attacks the central thesis of Cyrenaic hedonism, the pleasure brought upon by external objects 5

6 which cause the pleasure. However, for the Cyrenaics these objects cannot be apprehended, and therefore, individual choice is motivated by pleasure. Tsouna responds to these difficulties outlined by Aristocles and responds to them as follows: (i) we do not have knowledge of people, streets, towns, but beliefs about them; and (ii) possessing skills is not knowledge, we have no certainty. Instead, we can be mistaken about such things. Tsouna admits that the Cyrenaics would probably not take such a position because in Cyrenaic epistemology no distinction is made between knowledge and belief. For the Cyrenaics, Tsouna points out, we must reorganize our everyday experiences on the basis of our pathe; we have in an internal world and can manage as best as we can (p. 70). The cause of pathe are discussed in Chapter 6, which begins with the assumption that the existence of the external world; this sounds familiar to those who are familiar with skepticism. This section examines the parameters of Cyrenaic skepticism; we can only know pathe, while external objects are unknowable. To determine the degree of the skepticism, Tsouna queries whether this refers to our knowledge of these objects or the existence of the objects. Tsouna argues that for the Cyrenaics the pathe is the result of a logical construction in one s mind, and possibly unrelated to the external world. The Cyrenaics formulated the problem of the heart of modern skepticism, the problem of the outside world. In this section, Tsouna continues in a Socratic style to present sources as arguments and counter-arguments in favour of the existence of an external world. Evidence that does not favour such a position derives directly from a linguistic analysis: common names, expressions of external causality, objects denoting effects on the percipient. Counter-evidence includes texts from Sextus and from Saint Augustine. Tsouna takes each of the arguments and interprets them in favour of a Cyrenaic reading that does not conflict with the Cyrenaic School. Tsouna observes that the counter-arguments against the Cyrenaic philosophy represent: (i) a misleading skeptical interpretation of Cyrenaic doctrine; (ii) Sextus text is inconsistent with the Cyrenaic School; and (iii) St. Augustine includes Cyrenaics among the philosophers defending the reliability of Sextus. In Section III Tsouna also examines the claim of Plutarch against Colotes an Epicurean philosopher. The text reveals that the Cyrenaics adhered to a radical teaching concerning the perceived objects. In Chapter 7, Our ignorance of other minds, Tsouna points out that the Cyrenaic subjectivism is due to the way they regard the pathe and other people. Tsouna approaches the matter through a linguistic analysis based on Sextus. The difficulty arising from Cartesian 6

7 philosophy is raised, with a brief description of problems at both ontological and epistemic levels (p. 91). Tsouna asserts, however, that for the Cyrenaics the subjectivity of pathe is emphasised, but they are still understood as ontological derivations of an internal state. The point Tsouna expresses is that the Cyrenaic position goes beyond the mind-body distinction. The pathe of another person belongs to experience which are not known and therefore private. In language the Cyrenaics believe it is impossible to establish a one to one relationship between linguistic terms and the things these terms are supposed to denote (p. 95). Chapter 8 covers points relevant to language: (i) the private nature of pathe; (ii) the incommunicable nature of pathe; (iii) no common criterion for interpretation entails that while no propositions are not evidently true, one cannot be sure about shared experiences; (iv) the onomata names that one uses are in koina common ; and (v) the disparity between the absence of common criteria and the exercise of a common anomata (p. 105). These interpretations are based on Sextus which Tsouna gives at the beginning of Chapter 7. Tsouna expands on the notion of common name observing that the Cyrenaics had difficulty with empirical descriptions such as X is F because of the external quality attached to these expressions. For the Cyrenaics, the pathe admits only private criterion and not shared ones. Tsouna points out that some of the problems with constructions such as, I am affected X_ly represent the inconsistency between language, and the epistemic and ontological beliefs of the Cyrenaics. Tsouna draws from the John Locke, and points out that thought is communicated by language and language is private for the perceiver. Communication occurs when the idea in the mind of the speaker communicates the same idea in the listener. In Chapter 9 Tsouna examines two positions: Cyrenaic subjectivism and the Epicurean view on perception as found on the basis of a text from Plutarch. The analysis is based on Epicurus and Protagoras in Plato s Thaetetus. The analysis reveals that Cyrenaics as empiricists and relativists while at the same time deviating from these positions. Plutarch s text looks at the relation between Cyrenaics, Epicureans and Empiricists. Tsouna reaches the conclusion that Plutarch fails to show that the Skeptics of the Cyrenaics and the Empiricists of the Epicureans have a common view regarding the truth of sense-impression, and that this doctrine is more concerned with the Cyrenaics then with the Epicureans (p. 123). In Chapter 10 Tsouna examines Cyrenaic epistemology and Protagorean relativism. As Tsouna points out, the parallel is considered in both ancient and modern philosophy. Tsouna s 7

8 solution to the problem involves constructing a case where a group of individuals who appear in Plato s Theatetus trying to determine the relationship between Protagoras s relativism and Cyrenaic epistemology. Tsouna constructs an argument where Socrates could not have known this group, and then criticises it. The question is what is knowledge, and the response attaches knowledge to sense-perception, the Protagorean position of relativity through appearances, or the Heracletian belief of eternal flux. This appeals to the explanation of sense-perception where everything is in motion (p.126). Tsouna points out that even if the pathe are identified with the motion of the flesh or soul this does not warrant interpretation that the Cyrenaics maintained a metaphysical doctrine of perpetual flux (p. 130). Another difference is the Heracletian position where no stability is found with the perceiver over time. Tsouna argues that the Cyrenaics view perceiving as relatively stable entities (p. 132). Towards the end of the chapter the relation between eudaemonism and hedonism in Cyrenaic ethics is examined and identified where pleasure is the moral end in the unitemporal experience. Here, Tsouna admits that unitemporal pleasure can last a long time but does not last a life time. Tsouna concludes that the Cyrenaics have reason for not maintaining the metaphysical belief of constant flux (non-identity): it is counter-intuitive and incompatible with Cyrenaic ethics. In the last chapter, the Socratic Connection is treated: Tsouna maintains that understanding epistemology is central to the Hedonists and this is how the Cyrenaics have understood Socrates (p. 138). Ethics is the only study to be pursued leading us to the good life. To show the Socratic affiliation Tsouna draws from Sextus tracing the Socratic origins of the Cyrenaic philosophy. Tsouna examines the claim that Socrates is the founder of Skepticism since Socrates claims that he knows he does not know ; this suggests a disavowal of knowledge. The Cyrenaics, argues Tsouna, would not have suspended judgment, but instead maintained that objective truth is not possible. Nevertheless, the Cyrenaics claimed to be the true descendents of Socrates, but with a tradition separate from other Socratic schools. In the appendix sources are made available from Colotes (a contemporary of Epicurus d. 271 B.C.) The earliest Cyrenaic source in the works Colotes attacks Parmenides, Empedocles, Socrates, Melissus, Plato and Stilpo, as well as two unnamed schools identified as Cyrenaics. Colotes' text describes and ridicules the Cyrenaics theory of knowledge. As a rebuttal Plutarch (200 A.D.) responds to show that inaccuracy of Colotes claims. Aristocles of Messene (200 A.D.) 8

9 is quoted in a text by Eusibeus. Sources from Sextus Empiricus (a Skeptic and Empiricist, c. 200 A.D.) functions as Tsouna s primary reference since Sextus is the best source for Cyrenaic epistemology. A feature of Tsouna s work is the numerous texts made available permitting the reader s own interpretation of the material present. Greek terms are given in the original Greek, normally in Roman script. Ambiguous texts which Tsouna attempts to interpret are disambiguated by referring to other sources which shed further light on the Cyrenaic School (for example, Sextus clarifies a text of Aristippus the Younger p. 10). Extensive footnotes are provided to clarify the text, point out controversial interpretations, or elements present in modern philosophy with references to Descartes, Hume, Locke, Malebranche and Wittgenstein. Tsouna s research provides more than arguments concerning the nature of Cyrenaic epistemology. The study of Cyrenaic epistemology includes not only Ethics, but extends to Skepticism and Hedonism giving the modern sources of subjectivism and relativism. 9