MENGZI AND THE ARCHIMEDEAN POINT FOR MORAL LIFE

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1 bs_bs_banner MENGZI AND THE ARCHIMEDEAN POINT FOR MORAL LIFE Abstract The Archimedean point for moral life discussed in this article refers to the starting point of one s moral reasoning and what ultimately makes moral life possible. The article intends to show that Mengzi s doctrine of the Four Beginnings may throw some light on our search for such an Archimedean point. More specifically, it argues for the following: (1) Mengzi s doctrine of the Four Beginnings actually takes moral sentiments as the Archimedean point for moral life; (2) Mengzi s view of the starting point of moral reasoning and the ultimate ground for moral life not only can be empirically supported to a great extent, but also logically plausible. The Archimedean point for moral life discussed in this article refers to the starting point of one s moral reasoning and what ultimately makes moral life possible. In other words, the Archimedean point for moral life is the most basic and minimum necessary condition for being able to be moral without which no moral reasoning and moral action can start off. Therefore, to argue for the possibility of moral life, one must explain such an Archimedean point. 1 In Chinese philosophy, there is no explicit and systematic discussion of the Archimedean point. But, it does not mean that Chinese philosophers have never deliberated on the issue and do not have insights on the actual starting point of moral reasoning and the ultimate grounds for moral life. Therefore, to investigate Chinese philosophers views on the Archimedean point for moral life is not to force Chinese philosophy fit the framework of Western philosophy, but only to make use of Western philosophical terminology to reveal the hidden treasure in Chinese philosophy and promote worldwide philosophical conversation. The article is intended to show that Mengzi s doctrine of the Four Beginnings (siduan 四端 ) may throw some light on our search for the Archimedean point for moral life. More specifically, it argues for the, Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Redlands. Specialties: Chinese philosophy, comparative philosophy, ethics. xinyan_jiang@redlands. edu Journal of Chinese Philosophy 41:1-2 (March June 2014) VC 2015 Journal of Chinese Philosophy

2 MENGZI AND THE ARCHIMEDEAN POINT FOR MORAL LIFE 75 following: (1) Mengzi s doctrine of Four Beginnings actually takes moral sentiments as the Archimedean point for moral life; (2) Mengzi s view of the starting point of moral reasoning and the ultimate ground for moral life not only can be empirically supported to a great extent, but also logically plausible. As a matter of fact, many people do take shared moral sentiments as a presupposition in moral debate and moral education. Furthermore, taking something beyond moral sentiments as the starting point of moral reasoning, not only often disagrees with the actual process of moral reasoning of those who are virtuous or morally good, but also encounters logical difficulty to explain the initial motivation for morality. I Before proceeding to discuss the relationship between Mengzi s Four Beginnings and moral life, it is necessary to make it clear that the word moral or morality used in this article refers to the total of socially desirable conduct and traits, but not merely right actions that are connected with individual autonomy, rights, and duties, as narrowly defined by some modern Western moral philosophers. The concept of morality used in the article is approximately an equivalent of virtue (de 德 ) as the opposite of vice and good (shan 善 ) as the opposite of evil in common Chinese language. Morality defined in a boarder sense as such is required for any society. Social life cannot be maintained, if there is no moral norm and people s behaviors and emotions are not morally regulated and elevated. Therefore, although Mengzi has never used the word moral or morality, it does not mean that his philosophy does not concern moral issues. Once we understand the term morality in a broad sense defined above, we may clearly see that Mengzi not only has discussed morality but also built his entire philosophy around morality. 2 As is well known, Mengzi believes that human nature is good. By human nature, Mengzi refers to unique human qualities that differentiate humans from animals but not what humans share with other species. 3 For him, all human beings originally have the feeling of commiseration, the feeling of shame and dislike, the feeling of deference and compliance, and the feeling of right and wrong. 4 Mencius refers these four feelings as the Four Beginnings. More specifically, for him, the four feelings are the beginnings of benevolence (ren 仁 ), rightness (yi 义 ), propriety (li 礼 ), and wisdom (zhi 智 )(Mengzi 2A:6). Benevolence, rightness, propriety, and wisdom are four cardinal Confucian virtues. 5 To argue that for Mengzi the four beginnings are the Archimedean point for moral life the starting point of one s moral

3 76 reasoning and what ultimately makes moral life possible, we must first show the essential importance of the concept of the four beginnings in his theory of human nature. Given the current debates on the relationship between the four beginnings and the four virtues and the relationship between the four beginnings and human nature, 6 it is necessary to briefly defend the view that for Mengzi the four virtues are the outgrowths of the four beginnings but not vice versa and that the four beginnings constitute human nature itself but not the manifestation of metaphysical and perfect human nature. However, it should be noted that the view that I will argue to support is not new, 7 but seems to be overwhelmed by the opposite opinion in recent years in mainland China. What I intend to provide here are merely some new arguments for an existing view of the relationship between the four beginnings and the four virtues and the relationship between four beginnings and human nature. 8 To truly find out how the four beginnings are related to the four virtues and human nature and evaluate conflicting interpretations, we first need to look for evidence in the text of the Mengzi. In 2A:6, Mengzi says the following: The feeling of commiseration is the beginning of benevolence, the feeling of shame and dislike is the beginning of rightness, the feeling of deference and compliance is the beginning of propriety, the feeling of right and wrong is the beginning of wisdom. Human beings have these four beginnings just as they have their four limbs.... Anyone with the four beginnings knows that if the four beginnings are fully expanded and developed they will be like flames starting to burn or a spring beginning to burst. (2A: 6) 9 From these words, we can see that Mencius obviously is saying that the four beginnings are the starting point of the four virtues, but not the manifestation of the four virtues. In other words, the four virtues are not the source of the four beginnings but the outcomes of the development of the four beginnings. Some may object to such a conclusion by arguing that beginning is not a right translation of the word duan 端 in siduan 四端. But, there is strong etymological evidence for taking duan as beginning (shi 始 ). As Meng Peiyuan has pointed out, 端 was originally 耑. According to Shuowen Jiezi 说文解字, 耑 is what a plant looks like when it just starts growing: upper part looks like its shape, while lower part looks like its root. Philologically, 端 is sprout (ya 芽 ), meaning grow. 10 In short, 端 is beginning but not manifestation. Perhaps, someone may say that even if 端 is indeed beginning, it is still possible to regard the four beginnings as the beginnings of the manifestation of the four virtues. But, such an interpretation is problematic.

4 MENGZI AND THE ARCHIMEDEAN POINT FOR MORAL LIFE 77 First, linguistically, it does not fit Mengzi s text. The beginning of X is not the same as the beginning of the manifestation of X. Mengzi s expression is the former when he talks about the four feelings as the four beginnings of the four virtues. Second, logically, it makes Mengzi s view inconsistent in the context. There are two reasons for this: (1) if the four beginnings are merely the manifestation of the four virtues, they will not be as essential as the four virtues, and then Mengzi should not have said Human beings have these four beginnings just as they have their four limbs a statement that clearly indicates the four beginnings but not the four virtues are most fundamental; (2) Mengzi has spoken of expanding the four beginnings to the fullest degree, but it will be absurd to expand them if they are merely the manifestation of the four virtues. Manifestations are determined by the substances underlying them, so, their expansion depends on the expansion of their substances. If Mengzi indeed thinks that the four beginnings are the manifestation of the four virtues, he would have talked about expanding the four virtues but not the four beginnings. Those who insist that Mengzi holds that four beginnings are derived from the four virtues may argue for their view by quoting another passage in Mengzi: The feeling of commiseration is benevolence, the feeling of shame and dislike is rightness, the feeling of deference and compliance is propriety, and the feeling of right and wrong is wisdom (6A: 6). 11 Literally, here Mengzi merely equates the four beginnings to the four virtues, but does not indicate that the four virtues are the source of the four beginnings. However, the way Mengzi talks about the four feelings here is not the same as when he states that the four feelings are the four beginnings of the four virtues. To this, Yang Zebo responds as follows: here Mengzi s words are very brief, and he simply omits beginning, but he still means that the four feelings are the four beginnings of the four virtues. 12 Meng Peiyuan offers a different interpretation. According to him, here Mengzi speaks from a different angle. The feeling of commiseration is the beginning of benevolence and etc. are said as far as the origin and development are concerned; the feeling of commiseration is benevolence and etc. are asserted as far as the content is concerned without feelings, there will be no nature. 13 Of course, logically, it is not really inconsistent to equate the four beginnings to the four virtues, because the beginnings of the four virtues themselves are part of the four virtues, just as the beginning of a life is part of that life. However, the more fundamental question that is involved in the discussion of the relationship between the four beginnings and the four virtues concerns the relationship between the four beginnings and metaphysical human nature in Mengzi s philosophy. Those who think that the four feelings are the beginnings of the four virtues do not

5 78 believe that Mengzi assumes a metaphysical human nature (perfect benevolence, rightness, propriety, and wisdom) underlying the four beginnings, while those who insist that the four feelings are the manifestation of the four virtues believe otherwise. However, it seems that the claim that Mengzi believes in metaphysical human nature is not well supported by textual evidence or historical context of Mengzi s philosophy. First of all, in the entire book Mengzi, Mengzi has never said that moral development means to have perfect virtues in human nature manifested. On the contrary, he often emphasizes that the four beginnings need to be nurtured and developed and that the four beginnings are what make human beings human beings. Meng Peiyuan has argued that Mengzi pays great attention to the role of feeling (qing 情 ). The four beginnings are the four feelings. For Mengzi, nature and feeling are the one. It is not the case that behind feelings there is a nature which is manifested as feeling. Therefore, Mengzi takes feeling as the source of good (shan 善 ), but does not think that feelings are manifestations of good....namely, let feeling naturally develop without being obstructed, damaged, and destroyed, it will become good. 14 In this aspect, Tu Weiming s view is similar. He said: A defining characteristic of Mencian [Mengzi s] thought is the belief that human beings are perfectible through self-effort. He appeals neither to the existence of God nor to the immortality of the soul, but sees the spontaneous feelings of the heart as sufficient for the task. It seems that there is a moral deep structure inherent in human nature that can be fully developed, without forcing, as a natural process of growth. 15 Furthermore, according to Li Zehou, Mengzi takes the sentiment such as the feeling of commiseration as something fundamental or the starting point. 16 No matter whether feeling in Mengzi s philosophy really occupies such a significant place, at least Mengzi does not assume that there is a nature as a substance underlying feelings and as the source of the four beginnings. Someone may argue against this by saying that the existence of the four beginnings cannot be explained if there is no metaphysical human nature as the source of the four beginnings. But, there is no textual evidence to indicate that Mengzi has ever attempted to explain the original of the four beginnings by abstract and general human nature. Even if he was not able to explain the origin of the four beginnings consistently and systematically, we should not impose what he does not say on him. Moreover, not explaining the origin of the four beginnings by abstract and general human nature does not make Mengzi s view inconsistent and incomplete. As long as the four beginnings are regarded as human nature itself, they can certainly directly come from heaven (tian 天 ).

6 MENGZI AND THE ARCHIMEDEAN POINT FOR MORAL LIFE 79 They may simply be regarded as heavenly born feelings that can serve as the beginnings of human morality. Second, as far as historical background in which Mengzi s philosophy occurred is concerned, there was no reason for Mengzi to assume a metaphysical human nature behind the four beginnings. An occurrence of a philosophical theory cannot be explained outside its historical context. On the one hand, Mengzi inherited and developed Confucius s ideas; and on the other, he created and elaborated his own philosophy in his debates with Gaozi, Moists, and Agriculturalists (nongjia 农家 ). As far as the issue of human nature is concerned, his main competitor was Gaozi. What Gaozi insists are as follows: (1) inborn human instincts are human nature, and (2) human nature is indifferent to good or evil, that is, totally neutral. To refute Gaozi s view, Mengzi does not need to establish a metaphysical concept of human nature, but only needs to argue for (1) human nature is what differentiates human beings from other animals, and (2) in human nature there are some dispositions that include human beings toward good, therefore human nature is good. For Mengzi, it will be sufficient to refute Gaozi s view of human nature if he demonstrates the existence of the feeling of commiseration, the feeling of shame and dislike, the feeling of deference and compliance, and the feeling of right and wrong. Although Mengzi s theory of human nature is not merely aimed at refuting Gaozi s view, to a certain degree it was built up around such a critique. Therefore, Mengzi s theory of human nature would not take the relationship between metaphysical human nature and specific human feelings as an important issue to solve. Although Greek philosopher Plato who even lived in an earlier period than Mengzi s indeed divided two worlds (metaphysically real and unreal worlds), the context of his philosophy was totally different from that of Mengzi. In Mengzi s time in China, there would not be Platonic philosophy, while in Plato s time in Greece, there would not be any philosophy like Mengzi s either. Looking back to the history of Chinese philosophy, after Mengzi, Xunzi was the first who explicitly criticized Mengzi s theory of human nature. Xunzi s critique is done mainly through his argument for the claim that there are strong self-regarding feelings and desires in human nature. Xunzi neither mentioned that Mengzi regarded the four beginnings as manifestation of more general and perfect human nature, nor attempted to establish a metaphysical theory to justify his view that human nature is evil. Although Xunzi does not totally understand Mengzi s theory of human nature right, he could not totally miss a very important aspect of Mengzi s theory of human nature. If Mengzi really had a metaphysical concept of human nature, Xunzi would not miss it and fail to notice it. It was later on that Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism started interpreting Mengzi s theory of

7 80 human nature in a metaphysical manner. For example, Zhu Xi regards the feeling of commiseration as an emotion that is derived from human nature, but it itself is not human nature. 17 According to such an understanding of Mengzi s theory of human nature, there must be a substance underlying the four beginnings, which is nonempirical human nature. Song-Ming Neo-Confucians need to establish an ethical metaphysics in order to meet the challenges from both Buddhism and Neo-Daoism. That was why they give some new interpretations of Mengzi s theory of human nature. Their reinterpretation of Mengz s ideas is their attempt to create a new system in the name of Mengzi s philosophy rather than faithful expression of Mengzi s theory. It seems that some contemporary Neo-Confucians have done something similar. It is admirable to make an effort to establish a more speculative and more sophisticated theoretical system of Chinese ethical theory, but it is not appropriate to attribute such a system to Mengzi. At most, one may say that the new system is the reformed and revised philosophy of Mengzi but not Mengzi s original philosophy itself. In the West, in each historical period, there were often philosophers who were known for their unique philosophical systems. They definitely inherited something from their philosophical predecessors, but they were not shy in claiming what were their own inventions. For example, Aristotle as a studentofplatonotonlydidnothing to label his own philosophy as Platonic, but also openly criticized Plato s ideas; Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz all belonged to a rationalist tradition, but each of them claimed his own system; Locke, Berkeley, and Hume were all empiricists, but none of them hid their theoretical uniqueness that made themselves different from each other. If Chinese philosophers no longer elaborate their own thought mainly by appealing to ancient authorities, and therefore spend much less energy and time on reinterpreting philosophies of ancients than before, today we will have more new philosophies and less controversial on interpretations of ancient texts. Although, in Chinese historical context, appealing to ancients may be necessary for new ideas to be spread and accepted, today we may no longer need to do so as much as before. Back to our interpretation of Mengzi s theory of human nature, if we do not expect that Mengzi needed moral metaphysics as Song-Ming Neo-Confucians did and that he intended to establish absolute universal laws as Kant did, we would have felt more easily to find the meaning and role of the concept of the Four beginnings in Mengzi s philosophy. II Merely showing that for Mengzi the four beginnings are the source of the four virtues and that the four beginnings are what make human

8 MENGZI AND THE ARCHIMEDEAN POINT FOR MORAL LIFE 81 nature good is not sufficient to conclude that the four beginnings are the Archimedean point for moral life in Mengzi s philosophy. To argue for the latter, we must also show that Mengzi uses the four beginnings to explain why human beings can be moral and takes the four beginnings as the starting point for everyone s moral reasoning. To regard the four beginnings as the ultimate ground for the possibility of morality means to take natural sentiments as the initial motivation for moral actions; to take the four beginnings as the starting point for moral reasoning means to assume that the first step of moral reasoning is not about why one should be moral but how one can be moral. Actually, reading through the Mengzi, we can indeed find some clear evidence that Mengzi takes natural sentiments as the initial motivation for moral acts and assumes that moral reasoning starts with the question of how one can be moral. When Mengzi asserts that human nature is good, he means that human nature is disposed to morality or virtue; as long as human nature is developed naturally without obstruction, human beings will become morally good. 18 What makes human beings incline toward morality are the four beginnings. Since human beings possess the four beginnings and are always disposed to moral life, they usually do not need to ask why they should be moral but only how they can be moral. Their four beginnings provide them with the starting point for moral reasoning, and give them initial motivation for moral life. 19 This means that Mengzi is taking the four beginnings as what I call the Archimedean point for moral life. It is because Mengzi takes the four beginnings as the Archimedean point for moral life that in the entire Mengzi we do not see he does much to persuade others about why they should be moral but only why they are able to be moral. In the Mengzi, an important theme is that everyone can be a sage. Although we cannot say that Mengzi absolutely never talked about why one should be moral, in his conversations with others what he argues most is why one should believe in his own and others ability to be moral. Mengzi repeatedly emphasizes that if one is not morally good it is not due to incapability but failure in preserving and expanding one s four beginnings. If we look at those conversations between Mengzi and others in the Mengzi, we will find that people whom Mengzi confronted are not moral skeptics who question the desirability of moral life but characters who lack confidence in their ability to live a moral life. For example, in a dialogue between Mengzi and King Xuan (1A: 7), King Xuan claimed that it was not that he did not want to be a true King (truly good king) but that he was not able to be one. Mengzi madethekingrealizethathehadthefeelingofcommiserationbyanalyzing the king s act of sparing a cow. Mengzi shows the king that he will be a true king if he extends his feeling of commiseration for the

9 82 animal to his people. Mengzi wants to convince the king that he is able to be a true King but he just does not try. Here is part of this conversation: How virtuous must a man be before he can become a true King? He becomes a true King by bringing peace to the people. This is something no one can stop. Can someone like myself bring peace to the people? Yes. How do you know that I can? I heard the following from Hu He: The King was sitting in the upper part of the hall and someone led an ox through the lower part. The king noticed this and said, Where is the ox going? The blood of the ox is to be used for consecrating a new bell. Spare it. I cannot bear to see it shrinking with fear, like an innocent man going to the place of execution. In that case, should the ceremony be abandoned? That is out of the question. Use a lamb instead. I wonder if this is true. It is. The heart behind your action is sufficient to enable you to become a true king. The people all thought that you grudged the expense, but for my part, I have no doubt that you were moved by pity for the animal. (1A: 7) 20 When Mengzi explains the reason why the king s sparing the ox and using a sheep instead was his commiseration not his grudge, he said to the king, You saw the ox but not the lamb. The attitude of a gentleman toward animals is this: once having seen them alive, he cannot bear to see them die, and once having heard their cry, he cannot bear to eat their flesh (1A: 7). 21 After Mengzi made the king realize that he indeed had the feeling of commiseration, the king asked Mengzi how his feeling of commiseration is relevant to his ability to be a true King. Mengzi replied: Your bounty is sufficient to reach the animals, yet the benefits of your government fail to reach the people. That a feather is not lifted is because one fails to make the effort; that a cartload of firewood is not seen is because one fails to use one s eyes. Similarly, that peace is not brought to the people is because you fail to practice kindness. Hence your failure to become a true King is due to a refusal to act, not to an inability to act. (1A: 7) 22 Obviously, King Xuan took it for granted that being a true King is desirable but he was not sure whether he had the ability to be a true King. 23 What Mengzi was aimed at in his conversation was to convince King Xuan that he was indeed able to be a true King. For Mengzi, the feeling of commiseration the first of the four beginnings is the ground for King Xuan s being able to become a true King. In some other passages Mencius also spoke of the four beginnings for similar

10 MENGZI AND THE ARCHIMEDEAN POINT FOR MORAL LIFE 83 argument. For example, in 2A: 6, he says that every one has the mind which cannot bear to see the suffering of others. Because of such a mind, the ancient kings could not bear to see the suffering of their people and therefore they had benevolent governments. Since every person has the four beginnings, everyone can be moral; since every ruler has these four beginnings, every ruler is able to be a true King. In the same passage, after talking about the four feelings, he says: Having these Four Beginnings, but saying that they cannot develop them is destroying themselves. When they say that their ruler cannot develop them, they are destroying their ruler. 24 In 6A: 6, Mengzi also emphasizes that the four beginnings are what make morality possible. As far as their true nature is concerned (nai ruo qi qing 乃若其情 ), human beings are able to be good (keyi weishan 可以为善 ).That is what I mean by human nature is good. If one is not good, that is not the fault of his or her natural ability. Every person has the feeling of commiseration, every person has the feeling of shame and dislike, every person has the feeling of deference and compliance, and every person has the feeling of right and wrong. That is why there is a saying like this: if you seek it, you will find it; and if you don t hold it, you will lose it. There are people who are twice, five times, or countless times better than others, it is because the latter fails in fully exercising their natural ability. 25 Although there are different interpretations of nai ruo qi qing, and keyi weishan, 26 it is indubitable that the entire passage 6A: 6 is intended to say that the four beginnings enable human beings to be morally good. Since the four feelings as the beginnings of the four virtues have already existed in human hearts, human beings are able to be moral as long as their four beginnings are followed and developed. One cannot be morally good without the four beginnings; with the four beginnings one must be able to be morally good, although one will not necessarily become morally good. Although Xunzi who holds that human nature is evil also believes that human beings are able to be good, for him the reason for being so is that human beings are able to overcome their nature. Therefore, in his philosophy, the starting point of morality is not natural sentiments but inference and calculation by reason. 27 By contrast, what Mengzi s theory of human nature implies is not merely that human beings are able to be good, but also human beings by nature are disposed to be good, because some of natural human feelings are moral sentiments which are the grounds and the starting point for morality. 28 III To evaluate whether Mengzi is right in believing that the four beginnings is the Archimedean point for moral life, the first step is to

11 84 investigate whether the four beginnings as moral sentiments indeed universally exist among human beings. Mengzi believes that every person possesses the four beginnings. As mentioned earlier on, he said Human beings have these four beginnings just as they have their four limbs (2A: 6). If we take what he said as a claim that every member of the human species in a descriptive sense is born with these four beginnings, it is very hard to be verified or falsified. On the one hand, the fact that some human beings in society are morally bad and seem not to have the four beginnings in their current mental state does not falsify Mencius claim, since there is a possibility that these human beings had the four beginnings at first and lost them later. As Mencius argues in 6A: 8 by the Ox mountain analogy, the goodness of human nature can be lost due to various reasons, just as the mountain can lose its beauty due to external forces. On the other hand, one cannot prove that the four beginnings indeed exist in every human being, since there cannot be sufficient empirical evidence for it and various explanations of why there are morally good people in society can be valid. But, if we understand Mencius term human beings as a normative concept but not a purely biological category and take Mengzi s claim that all human beings have the four beginnings as the one which says that all human beings in a normative sense have the four beginnings, we might find that we have already agreed with him to a great degree. By a human being in a normative sense I refer to the person who meets the norm for what a human being is. More specifically, a human being in a normative sense is a person who has those qualities that differentiate him/her from other species. Such a human being is a normal, ordinary, and typical human being. This concept of a normal human being does not exclude those who are physically deformed or disable. As long as one is able to have thoughts and emotions that are distinctively human, one is a normal human. When human being is so interpreted, we may take Mengzi s claim that all human beings have the four beginnings as saying that all normal and typical human beings have the four beginnings. Such a claim about human beings is not far from our common sense. We actually often assume that ordinary people share something close to Mengzi s four beginnings. In our daily language, we sometimes do use human being in a normative sense. For instance, in China, the expression he is not a human as an evaluative remark means he is evil or he has no compassion and conscience. This implies that to be a human being entails to be good in some fundamental ways. In the West, the assumption that human beings prefer right over wrong and love virtues over vices is also underlined all moral discussions. It is not the question why should we be moral but what is morally right that occupies people s minds in moral conversations. Logically, the

12 MENGZI AND THE ARCHIMEDEAN POINT FOR MORAL LIFE 85 reason why people concern the latter not the former is that they have taken it for granted that we all agree that we should do what is right. Such a consensus demonstrates people s universal disposition to good and common preference to moral life over immoral life. Such a disposition and preference to a certain degree is similar to what Mengzi calls the feeling of right and wrong. Let us illustrate the point further by looking at contemporary Western debates on abortion. The focus of contemporary Western debates on abortion usually is whether the abortion is morally wrong. More specifically, what is debated most is whether abortion is killing and whether women s right should overweigh fetus s right even if abortion is killing. For those who firmly believe that abortion should not be permitted, they believe that abortion is killing and therefore morally wrong; for those who are pro-choice, abortion is not killing (because a fetus is not a human) and therefore not morally wrong; and for those who permit abortion in some case such as in the case of rape, the mother has more right than the fetus even if they are both human and therefore in such cases abortion is not morally wrong. All parties in the debate concentrate on the rightness or wrongness of abortion but not the desirability of the rightness. It seems that all parties in the debate believe that once people agree about whether abortion is right or wrong in general or in some cases, they will have an agreement on whether they ought to permit abortion in general or in some cases. Underlying such a belief is the assumption that ordinary people all have dispositions toward morality and all prefer to be morally right over to be morally wrong. All moral debates seem to be based on such an optimistic assumption of human nature. If we assume that people in general do not care about wrong or right and do not prefer good over evil, we would not bother to debate with them on those moral issues at all. Moral education usually also presupposes people s disposition to good. When we educate children to be morally good, what we focus on is teaching children what actions are morally right and what character traits are good but not why people should be moral and why we should have those good traits. For example, when we educate children to be honest, we usually tell them that telling lies is wrong and that good children do not lie. We actually believe that children usually prefer to do what is right and to be good kids. The belief in the goodness of original human nature obviously plays a very important role in our practice of moral education. Although the fact that in moral debate and moral education people usually presuppose universal existence of moral sentiments itself does not prove that moral sentiments constitute human nature as Mengzi has assumed, at least it shows that

13 86 people indeed often take moral sentiments as actual starting point for moral reasoning. In addition, if we closely examine the moral reason of virtuous or morally good people, we can find more support to the claim that moral sentiments are the Archimedean point for moral life. As a matter of fact, there are many morally good people but they usually cannot answer the question of why humans ought to be moral. This proves that moral reasoning does not start from the investigation on why be moral but something else. It implies that morally good persons take it for granted that humans ought to be moral without further justification. When we investigate moral reasoning of a morally good person for a moral action, we may see the ultimate reason of such a person for her moral action is actually moral sentiment, but not theoretical justification for such moral sentiment. 29 For example, when a benevolent person acts to help someone in suffering, he/she acts out of the feeling of commiseration or compassion. Compassion has both cognitive and affective function. The actual reason why he or she so acts is that others are suffering and they need help, as David Wong has argued. 30 It is sincere concern for others and deep compassion to others that make the agent to act benevolently. Certainly, reason in this context is not the same as the one related to deductive demonstration. As Wong has explained: Such a reason may not be conscious or explicit. But I claim that compassion typically involves at least implicit recognition of a reason to act in certain way, in the sense that if the compassionate person seeks to explain and to justify what he does, he would identify his perception of the actual or possible suffering of another as the cause and as a justifying reason for what he does. 31 The benevolent agent does not ask why he/she should follow his/her compassion and be benevolent since he/she has assumed that he/she ought to be so. Any justification other than compassion will not accord with actual reasoning of the agent. As Kwong-loi Shun has pointed out, other than compassion itself, no matter what kind of reflective justification we make for being disposed toward morality, it is inconsistent with the real reasoning of a truly benevolent person. 32 For instance, no matter whether we consider the reason for one s compassion is social benefits or self-interest, it cannot be what he/she actually believes, because when he/she acts benevolently he/she is directly motivated by his/her compassion but not the justification for his/her compassion. His or her compassion is simple without any theoretical inference. Otherwise, he/she is no longer a benevolent person with genuine compassion. This shows that the further moral reason that

14 MENGZI AND THE ARCHIMEDEAN POINT FOR MORAL LIFE 87 goes beyond moral sentiments does not match up with actual process of moral reasoning of a moral person. Logically, it is also hard to explain the possibility of morality by anything beyond moral sentiments. Pure theoretical argumentation cannot make a person accept moral life if he/she does not have moral sentiments, since no theoretical justification can convincingly show that each person should be moral. If we use a non-moral reason such as self-interest to convince a person to choose a moral life, even if he/ she can act in accordance with moral requirements, he/she is not really moral since his/her motivation is not moral. If we use a moral reason such as we ought to be moral to persuade a person to be moral, we beg the question without showing why we ought to be moral in the first place. As Bernard Williams has pointed out in his analysis of Kantian ethics, neither a moral reason nor a non-moral reason can show why we should be moral. Moral justification can only work for those who are largely already within the moral world. 33 For Mengzi, every normal person has entered the moral world and is able to be moral, because he/she possesses the four beginnings. Given the significance of the four beginnings, for Mengzi, nurturing and developing moral sentiments are crucial to producing morally good human beings. In conclusion, Mengzi s theory of human nature implies that natural sentiments such as the Four Beginnings are the Archimedean point for moral life. Such a view of the starting point of moral reasoning and the ultimate ground for moral life is both empirically valuable and logically plausible. Therefore, studying Mengzi s theory of human nature still has significant and profound implications for development of moral philosophy today. UNIVERSITY OF REDLANDS Redlands, California Endnotes Acknowledgment of Legal Copyrights and Intellectual Credentials: An earlier version of this article was presented at the conference, Communication and Innovation: Dialogues between Chinese and Western philosophy, on June 10, 2012 in Hangzhou, China. I would like to express my appreciation to the commentator of my article, Professor Wang Xinchun and the audience at the conference for their helpful questions and suggestions. My thanks also go to Jiyuan Yu and James Giles for their valuable comments on a much earlier version of some parts of this article in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. In addition, two of different earlier versions of some parts of this article were presented respectively at two conferences (the Pacific Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Berkeley, April 2, 1999 and the 13th International Conference on Chinese Philosophy, Vasteras, Sweden, August 16, 2003). I would also like to thank the audience at these two conferences for their helpful discussion. My special appreciation goes to Professor

15 88 Chung-ying Cheng, Dr. Linyu Gu, and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions on the latest draft of this article. 1. To a certain degree, here I have adopted Bernard Williams s conception of the Archimedean point used in his Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985). However, my conception of the Archimedean point for moral life is significantly different from his, since his refers to the starting point for justifying moral life and constructing ethical theories (see Williams, 1985, chapter 2). For him, all ethical theories in the past have their Archimedean point, but all their Archimedean points have serious problems, therefore none of them has succeeded in justifying why human beings should live morally (see Williams, 1985, chapters 3 and 4). It is true that the original meaning of the Archimedean point implies something external to the agent, as pointed out by Professor Chung-ying Cheng, but the phrase also refers to the ultimate starting point. The Archimedean point, perhaps, is not a perfect analogy for the starting point of moral reasoning and what ultimately makes moral life possible, but I have not found a better alternative. That is why I use it in this article in the way I do. 2. Some ideas in this paragraph are inspired by and partly overlapped with some of Kwong-loi Shun s views in his Moral Reason in Confucian Ethics, Journal of Chinese Philosophy 16:3 4 (1989): See Yu-lan Fung, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), 69; Zhang Dainian 张岱年, Zhongguo Zhexue Dagang 中国哲学大纲 (An Outline of Chinese Philosophy) (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1982), 185. However, this point has now been widely accepted by scholars in Chinese philosophy. 4. Here, I follow Chan Wing-tsit in translating xin 心 as feeling. However, I do believe that each xin is more than an ordinary feeling. It is something that combines emotion with judgment. For example, xiuwu zhi xin 羞恶之心 (the feeling of shame and dislike) is similar to conscience (liang xin 良心 ). For Chan s translation, see Chan Wingtsit, ed., A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), According to Kwong-loi Shun, it is unclear whether in Mengzi s time de (virtue) already was used to refer to specific desirable qualities. Therefore, he chooses to categorize benevolence, rightness, propriety, and wisdom as ethical attributes but not virtues. For his view, see his Mencius and Early Chinese Thought (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 48. For the sake of convenience and brevity, in this article I will still use four virtues to refer to benevolence, rightness, propriety, and wisdom. 6. As far as I know, in the English-speaking world, it is widely accepted that the four virtues are the outcomes of the development of the four beginnings. Also, it has been a consensus that the four beginnings are human nature itself but not the manifestation of human nature, per se. One may find such a view in A. C. Graham s Disputers of Tao (La Salle: Open Court 1989, 12 26) or Kwong-loi s Shun s Mencius and Early Chinese Thought (336 39), among others. However, a conversation with Professor Chen Lai on June 10, 2012, made me aware of how intense the debates on these issues have been in the Chinese speaking world. Thanks to Professor Chen Lai, here I am adding some argument to support the view that I endorse on the relationship between the four beginnings and the four virtues and the relationship between the four beginnings and human nature. 7. Such a view is held by many scholars, for example, Zhang Dainian, Meng Peiyuan 蒙培元, Kwong-loi Shun, Yang Zebo 杨泽波, etc. To a certain extent, Yu-lan Fung also has a similar idea. For Zhang s view, see his Zhongguo Zhexue Dagang, 183 4; for Meng s view, see his Meng Meiyuan Jiang Mengzi 蒙培元讲孟子 (Meng Peiyuan Talks about Mengzi) (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2006), ; for Shun s view, see his Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 138, and 210 1; for Yang s view, see his Mengzi Xingshan Lun Yanjiu 孟子性善论研究 (A Study of Mengzi s View that Human Nature Is Good) (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1995), One of the most recent articles that defends such a view is written by Zheng Chen, titled Mengzi Xingshan Lun Chuyi 孟子性善论刍议 (My Opinion on Mengzi s

16 MENGZI AND THE ARCHIMEDEAN POINT FOR MORAL LIFE 89 View that Human Nature Is Good), Zhedong Xueshu 浙东学术 2 (November 2011): When Fung talked about Mengzi s ideas, he clearly stated: All men in their original nature possess these four beginnings, which, if fully developed, become the four constant virtues, so greatly emphasized in Confucianism (Fung, 1948, 70). But, in the same book, he also said:...mencius [Mengzi] maintained that in human nature there are four constant virtues which manifest themselves as the four beginnings (303). His views seem not consistent unless the four constant virtues in the two places in his book does not mean the same thing. 8. Due to the fact that there are almost countless works on Mengzi in Chinese or other languages and what I have and can read are limited, the new arguments I propose here are new only relative to all relevant literature that I have studied. 9. My translation, but Chan Wing-tsit s translation is consulted. For Chan s translation, see Chan Wing-tsit, ed., A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, All my translations are made from the Mengzi, in Zhu Xi, ed., Sishu Jizhu 四书集注 (Variorum Edition of Four Books) (Changsha: Yuelu Press, 1985). 10. Meng Peiyuan, Meng Peiyuan Jiang Mengzi 蒙培元讲孟子, The similar etymological investigation is also made by Kwong-loi Shun (see Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 138). 11. My translation. 12. Yang Zebo, Mengzi Xingshanlun Yanjiu 孟子性善论研究, Meng Peiyuan, Meng Peiyuan Jiang Mengzi 蒙培元讲孟子, Ibid., Tu Wei-ming, Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), Li Zehou 李泽厚, Shiyong Lixing Yu Legan Wenhua 实用理性与乐感文化 (Practical Rationality and a Culture of Optimism) (Li s own translation of the book title) (Beijing: Sanlian Shudian 2005), For a brief discussion on it, see Li Zehou, Shiyong Lixing Yu Legan Wenhua, For such an interpretation of Mengzi s view that human nature is good, see Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, My view here partly overlap with Guo Qiyong s, although the latter does not connect the four beginnings with the Archimedean point for moral life. For Quo s view, see his Zhongguo Ruxue Zhi Jingshen 中国儒学之精神 (The Spirit of Chinese Confucianism) (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2009), D. C. Lau s translation. See Lau, trans., Mencius (London: Penguin Books, 1970), Ibid., Ibid. 23. At least in his conversation with Mengzi, King Xuan was presented as such, although, historically, he might not be so. 24. Chan s translation. See Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, My translation. 26. For the three different interpretations of qing, see Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 214; for different readings of keyi, see Shun, 260, n.77; Shun interprets keyi ( ko yi ) as neng 能 (able) (see Shun, 216 8). 27. For a more detailed discussion of Xunzi s view, see my Rationality and Moral Agency A Study of Xunzi s Philosophy, The Journal of East and West Thought 2:2 (2012): Professor Chung-ying Cheng has pointed out that one s moral sentiments such as the four feelings discussed by Mengzi can t be aroused without one s first perceiving certain situations. For example, without seeing a child about to fall into a well, one s feeling of commiseration will not occur at a given moment. Therefore, seeing a child about to fall into a well is a condition for moral feeling and moral motivation toward a particular moral action. I agree with him. Furthermore, it seems to me that Mengzi must have taken such a condition into account when he talks about the four feelings as the four beginnings. It is because human beings can experience the four feelings when they perceive certain situations that their nature is good. Perceiving certain situations activates the four feelings inside a human mind, but it does not determine whether a

17 90 person has the four feelings. For example, if human beings don t have a feeling of commiseration, seeing a child about to fall into a well will not make them feel distressed. Although perceiving a situation properly and therefore arousing a moral feeling properly often are necessary for moral motivation toward a particular moral action, it is not as fundamental as the four feelings in human nature, as far as the starting point of moral reasoning is concerned. That is why in this article I focus my discussion on Mengzi s view of the four feelings. 29. I fully realize that my claim here is in accordance with Hume s view, especially contemporary Neo-Humean position, but opposes Kantian theory of practical reason. In this article, I will not involve the debate between the two, but I do not deny that Mengzi s theory of the four beginnings actually supports the Humean position. 30. David Wong, Is There a Distinction between Reason and Emotion in Mencius? Philosophy East and West 41:1 (1991): Ibid. 32. Kwong-loi Shun, Moral Reason in Confucian Ethics, Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 54.