each other where either is helping some other country, or to ally themselves to any group of which another country - which is their enemy - may be a

Transcription

1 Diary Entry by Prime Minister William L. Mackenzie King Recording Cabinet Discussions about the Possibility of War with Germany Thursday, August 24, 1939 Kingsmere and Ottawa. I slept fairly well through the night though I wakened about Did not sleep too soundly thereafter until 8, when McLeod [one of King's domestic employees] called me. Felt refreshed for the long night sleep. I saw very clearly in my sleep a hill-top on which I thought I was to build a house. It seemed like an old farm property. Commended views of sweeping valleys and its many trees on the rising upland. There was also a small lake of clear level water. I was showing it to someone; it seems to me it was possibly J[oan Patteson, a friend and confidante of King's] pointing out what a lovely place it was, and what joy there would be in building a house there. Curiously when I wakened, the little hymn which I have seldom thought of for many years but one I used to sing for the children at the Sick Children's Hospital, came to my mind: "There is a green hill far away beyond the city wall Where the dear Lord was crucified and died to save us all. O dearly, dearly did He love, and we must love Him too, Trust to His redeeming love and try our work to do." It seemed to me that the hymn might have its significance in relation to the happenings in the world today. As it had been raining during the night, I did not walk out to the Sanctuary, but had breakfast in the sunroom. After eating, went over to the Farm, and made revision of what I had revised last night. Listened to the beginning of the broadcast from England, describing the scene in the British House of Commons, and [British Prime Minister Neville] Chamberlain's declaration that England would fight for the integrity of Poland. I was struck by the fact that the emphasis was laid on the integrity of Poland rather than upon Danzig, as opening a possible way of escape in the present appalling situation, Poland being saved its integrity at the expense, however, of Danzig and on the best terms it could make with Germany. This and the reference in the German press, the day before, to a possible conference seems to afford the only slight hope there is of avoiding a terrible war. I was at the office by 11. On the way in, thought a good deal of the steps to be immediately taken by way of preparation for war. At the office, I indicated anew to [Arnold] Heeney [Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister] and [Oscar D.] S[kelton] [Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs] the importance of our getting a proper staff to handle matters day by day, each being specially assigned to some duty. I was appalled to learn from S[kelton] that the Agreement which has been made between Russia and Germany has no "escape" clauses in it such as have been in other nonaggression pacts. It goes the length of binding Germany and Russia alike not to attack

2 each other where either is helping some other country, or to ally themselves to any group of which another country - which is their enemy - may be a member. Thus it is proved beyond all question that Russia has completely deceived the British. The Russian Ambassador in London has been lying, and the negotiators in Moscow, doing the same; playing the most treacherous game that has every [sic, ever] been played, I believe, by any nation. It bears out pretty much what I gave as my opinion as to what would happen, at the time I spoke to Skelton, the G[overnor] G[eneral, Lord Tweedsmuir], and Sir Gerald Campbell [British High Commissioner in Ottawa]. I did not go into Council [Cabinet] till about 11.30; then went through a large volume of orders, waiting for [Ernest] Lapointe [Minister of Justice and Acting Secretary of State of Canada] to arrive on the noon train. Shortly after twelve, began to outline to the Cabinet happenings of the last two days. Began with my interview with the G[overnor] G[eneral], subsequent word with S[kelton] over the 'phone, cancellation of the trip to Toronto; reasons which prompted me to issue the statement which I did in the morning. Asked the members to be critical of it if any of them felt I had assumed too much in making it without conferring with others. No one took any exception. When I pointed out how much greater the effect was, coming yesterday, to what possibly would have been the case today, revealing, as it did, that we had anticipated the action of the British Parliament instead of following it, [Ian A.] Mackenzie [Minister of National Defence] and one or two others nodded approval. There was not, however, the outspoken approval that I would have liked to have had. Everyone, being so afraid of the situation seems to be unable to utter a word. I then read the despatches that have come within the last three days, and concluding by stating the position as being that of England having pledged her word to Poland to fight, though it is now clear that she will not have Russia as an ally, and may even have her as an enemy in a conflict. It is by [no] means clear that Italy will remain neutral but will probably fight both France and England. I then read the summary we received of the proceedings in the Commons in England, of Chamberlain's speech, and a despatch which indicates that in all probability the zero-hour might come tonight. It was then half past one when I suggested Council should adjourn till three. I was kept a little time at the office. Came to Laurier House [King's Ottawa residence]; had 20 minutes' rest, and then lunch, and left at 3.30 for the Cabinet. At the Council table, I said that while we were still in a calm frame of mind, it was advisable we should decide upon our policy in the event of war breaking out. That I had a clear idea in my own mind as to what it should be, but would like my colleagues to express their views first of all. I then began going around the Council table and asked Lapointe first of all if he would express his views. He said he would prefer to hear what others had to say first. I told Council I thought that, being the oldest members, we were entitled to that privilege. I then asked [Joseph-Enoil] Michaud [Minister of Fisheries] his views, which were that there should not be participation outside of Canada; that we should stand by the statement I had

3 made in Parliament. Abide by that, at all events, until we see what the situation further might demand. [Norman McLeod] Rogers [Minister of Labour] thought that we should take all measures to meet the situation, as it develops, from hour to hour, and to be prepared to meet every eventuality. That, if Britain became involved, there was no question as to what our position would be. All our resources, man power, etc., should immediately be brought to assist Britain. He agreed that the important thing was to keep the country united meanwhile. Personally, he would like an announcement made immediately, that Canada was prepared to give support to Britain in every effort she was making for peace; that, if these efforts were not effective, we would immediately go into the war on Britain's behalf. [Charles Gavan] Power [Minister of Pensions and National Health] was not prepared to go as far as Rogers in issuing a blank cheque to Great Britain. He agreed that we would have to go into war but, meanwhile, should be careful not to state that view before the meeting of Parliament. [Pierre Joseph Arthur] Cardin [Minister of Public Works] said he agreed with the view expressed by Power, that we should prepare, above everything else, for the safety of our own people and not enlarge on the declaration of yesterday. [James Lorimer] Ilsley [Minister of National Revenue and Acting Minister of Finance] did not see how we could avoid a statement of our policy as to what we would do if war were declared; that we would stand with Great Britain. Would like to see a statement issued at once that Canada would participate if Great Britain found it necessary to go to war with [sic, over] Poland. He thought it was apparent that, under those circumstances, there could be only one policy, and that was to participate in the defence of Europe in the name of decency, etc. That the people wanted the government to say now what the country would do. Mackenzie said he agreed with Ilsley, that Democracy was at stake, and that there should be an immediate declaration of policy. It was not the fact of participation that there could be any question about, but the extent of participation. These were matters which the government and Parliament would have to decide, e.g., the nature of co-operation, assistance to be given by air-pilots, supplies, munitions, financial support. He thought steps should be taken at once to safeguard vulnerable points in Canada and the coast, bridges, railway centres, etc. That this should be voluntary and not compulsory. Lapointe broke in at the time Ilsley was speaking and said that he saw no purpose in making any preliminary statement as to our participation in the event of war. He disagreed with the view expressed by Rogers and Ilsley in that regard. [William Daum] Euler [Minister of Trade and Commerce] said that he agreed with Lapointe's view, that there was no purpose in issuing any preliminary statement; that it would not prevent war. He would be prepared to do anything for the defence of Canada. Did not feel it was our business to be too much concerned about what was taking place in Europe. He honestly held that view. He thought we should make clear there would be no conscription; that he detested war. Thought Danzig was a bad issue and that if there was

4 no greater issue he would oppose sacrificing life for that purpose. He did not think there should be any public statement today. [Norman Alexander] McLarty [Postmaster General] was of the view that we were going to participate. He felt, however, that if we would come out with that statement today it would put sections of Canada into a bad position. [Clarence Decatur] Howe [Minister of Transport] was of the view that Canada would have to participate and that we should have everything in readiness. As Lapointe had indicated, in replying to Ilsley, that he felt we should certainly go to the assistance of England and France if they became engaged in war, and that we would have to do so to the limit of our resources, but that, meanwhile, we should say and do nothing that would divide the country. I did not ask him further as to his views, but said, in summing up the situation, that I was immensely relieved to find that on the all-important matter of Canada's participation in the event of Britain being drawn into war, we were of one mind and united. I said there appeared to be a difference of view as to the time at which we should state our policy. Some were for stating it immediately; others to await developments. I have been criticized for saying that Parliament would decide, impression having gained ground that I meant by that we would leave it to a sort of general discussion in Parliament, when Parliament was assembled, to see what the majority felt. That I had not meant anything of the kind, as they knew; that I thought the position to take lay between these two extremes and it was that we would not wait until Parliament assembled to announce our policy, but would, when summoning Parliament, let the country know what the policy was on the matter of participation, leaving to Parliament to decide the details of nature, extent of, etc. etc. Our views on these would be given to Parliament immediately it assembled and the government would stand or fall by its policy as stated. I got general agreement and unanimity on this position. In the event of war we had now decided that Canada would participate. We had further decided that we would summon Parliament at the moment war was declared, or that it appeared that efforts for peace were certain to fail. At the same time, we would announce our policy with respect to Canada being at war; that Parliament could be brought together in at least a week, possibly less. If war was declared on Saturday, we would try to have Parliament meet at least the next Friday; if not on Saturday or Sunday, then on Monday week [sic, the week after next week]. Parliament would decide details. The most difficult of the questions was what should now be said to the press. I thought it was well to let the public know that the Cabinet was united as to how we should proceed. Also, that we were proceeding with caution and taking every precaution to meet any and every eventuality. That the important thing in our minds was to keep Canada united and to trust the government, in the matter of seeing that all possible precautionary measures were being taken, and that we were pursuing the wisest and the best course in the light of the information we were receiving. In the meantime, Departments concerned were taking all necessary precautionary steps; that, beyond this, I did not wish to enlarge on yesterday's statement.

5 When I went to my office after the meeting of the Cabinet, I wrote out the following as summing up the position: "The Cabinet is of one mind. It is united in its view of the present European situation and the procedure to be followed in giving expression to what we believe to be the will of the Canadian people with respect to whatever situation may develop. We regard it of supreme importance at this critical hour that the country should remain united and this end can best be met by proceeding with caution with respect to every step to be taken as the situation might develop. At the same time, that we were taking all possible precautionary measures to meet any and every eventuality. That I need not enlarge on the statement issued yesterday." If questioned, I thought I would say, as I said in Council, that the government's position had been fully stated in parliament last session by Mr. Lapointe and myself. I had taken into the Cabinet the statements we made, with a view of pointing out to colleagues what our position was, should there be any diversity of view. In Cabinet, I mentioned to my colleagues that it would be necessary for them to take over most of the work; that I thought committees should be formed to deal with particular matters, e.g., a committee, as Power had suggested, to supervise all orders-in-council passed under the War Measures Act. Another committee to be concerned with economic questions, such as supplies, wheat, food, fuel, etc. That I would have to keep myself free for viewing the situation as a whole and thinking out the line to be taken in important decisions. I felt the important thing to emphasize to the press was the unanimity of the government in the matter of its policy. That this, on the face of it, would indicate to the country what our position was with respect to participation, as the views of members of the Council was already publicly known. Also that, in this way, we ought to satisfy reasonable-minded men, though not satisfying jingoists; and, in another, not occasion divisions in the country which would be prejudicial to action once Parliament was called. We drafted a brief statement, which I handed to the press. There was a large number of journalists waiting in the ante-room. I did not call them into my office, but went into the room where they were, and read the statement over to them, and said I hoped I might be excused from waiting to answer questions. They were very decent in the way in which they received the suggestion. I, later, mentioned to [Thomas] Wayling [journalist and member of the parliamentary press gallery], to tell them and lay emphasis on the unity of the Cabinet in its view with regard to policy. I had accepted an invitation from the Chief Justice [Sir Lyman P. Duff] to dine at the Country Club at 7.30 to meet the Lord Chancellor and Lady Maugham. It was 6.45 before I left the office. The dinner was at 7.30, which allowed no time for rest. It was quite a large party. When Lord [Frederic Herbert] Maugham [Lord Chancellor of the United Kingdom] arrived, and I was presented to him, I apologized for not having found it possible to call on either Lady Maugham or himself and explained what the day had been. It seemed to me he

6 had rather felt (and rightly so) that I should have called and had a chance to talk over matters with him. He asked if he might immediately speak to me about what he had thought of saying at the [Canadian National] Exhibition [in Toronto] tomorrow. Drew from his pockets a little paper, on which he had written the part that he thought was important. Said he would like to get my views upon it. I read it through and, to my amazement, found it contained the statement that he had been pleased to have assurances that Canada would be at the side of Britain in the event of war, and that we were prepared to repeat what we had done twenty-five years ago. I told him a statement of that kind would do irreparable harm; that I did not know where he had received the assurances, and that I was not in a position to give them to him, though I could tell him privately that the Cabinet was united with respect to its policy, and what we must avoid, above everything else in Canada, is the impression getting around that we might be in any way acting at the instance of Britain or that we were departing from our position of having Parliament given a chance to decide the extent to which there would be participation in war and the nature of it. He then scored out the paragraph to which I took exception and asked me about the next one in which he said that, in the Exhibition, he saw a symbol of a united Empire, and asked me about that. I told him that I saw no reason why he should alter that particular sentence. I could not help thinking how desperately stupid some Englishmen are in appreciating any attitude other than their own. The superior way some of them have of assuming to know everything fills one with both exasperation and dismay. I was seated to the right of Miss [Annie] Duff [sister of Chief Justice Lyman Duff] at dinner and had Mrs. A. K. Maclean to my left. Mrs. Maclean talked incessantly against Hitler and the Italians in a babbling childish way, full of hatred, etc. With Miss Duff I had a very pleasant talk. Later, with the Lord Chancellor, I had a pleasant talk. He opened up a bit in a friendly way. I said I would like to know from him why England had given Poland the assurances she did at the time she did, without knowing what should could count upon with Russia. His reply was that the Cabinet had the best of information that Germany expected to make a sudden coup by the seizure of the Netherlands. That the government know she would hesitate to fight if she had an enemy on both flanks, but would not otherwise. For this reason, they had to give Poland immediate assurances. I did not say, but I recalled, in one of the despatches, it was mentioned that the Dutch themselves had said they had no reason to believe that any such step was contemplated. He went on to say that, if the Germans had got the Netherlands, of course that would have been the end of Britain. I then asked him what he thought of Russia's attitude in making the pact they had with Germany. He said he thought it was a bad as it could be. I told him I had said to Lord Tweedsmuir, the previous night, and to others, that I felt that Russia might be doublecrossing England and that she might have been doing this right along. That, he had thought, was impossible. Lord Maugham said: "Did you say that? You were right." I said I

7 thought they had been stringing out England so as to get her plans, and to be able to show wherein she might be prepared to allow certain movements of troops which Poland, etc., would come to resent. He told me that the reason that England had not been able to come to an Agreement with Russia was that Russia was trying to get her to agree to allow her armies to go into Latvia, Finland, and other Northern countries which would have meant that once the Russian Armies were there, they would settle down and seize the country. That England could not think of taking a step which would mean her sacrificing other countries in that way. I felt very relieved and pleased to hear this. I then asked him how England and France expected to be able to win with Russia liable to come in and help Germany in the destruction of Poland. He answered that he thought Russia would be glad to keep out of things as she was now secure but that England knew pretty well what Germany's strength was. That she would do a good deal of damage perhaps at the beginning but could not hold out as England would be able to. That they figured they would destroy ten per cent of the planes each time a raid was made over London. That, at that rate, the air force of Germany would soon be depleted. He said a year ago, if they had had war, Germany would have defeated them as England strength was not at all what it is today, and France's condition was absolutely hopeless, showing they had hardly any planes; were not in shape at all. Today, they were efficient. I was astounded to hear him talk of war as if it were something to be worked out on mathematical lines, not considering the value of individual lives; that it was just a matter of results in the end. He thought the Russian-German pact had been a salutary lesson to Japan who now realizes she was in a perilous position vis- -vis Russia. The Chief Justice was very nice in the way in which he gave me time to talk with Lord Maugham, and brought up the different members of the Government to meet him. They left at 10.30, and I left immediately after for Kingsmere [King's country residence in the Gatineau hills on the Québec side of the Ottawa river]. I was pretty tired when I got to the country. Dropped in at Shady Hill for a minute, and over to Moorside [part of King's Kingsmere estate], and to be at about a.m. I have been interested in observing that both S[kelton] and Lapointe feel that participation by Canada should be simply to help England and France as the countries that are standing for the defence of freedom. To my mind, the reason for participation is rather that of Canada recognizing the need o adjustment of international relations by conciliation, mediation, and other methods based upon reasons [sic, reason] rather than attempted domination by force. Source: National Archives of Canada, papers of William L. Mackenzie King, series 13: Diary: 1939, pp (entry for August 24, 1939).