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5 REASONS In SUPPORT of the WAR 'ingermjnty In A N S W E R to CONSIDERATIONS Prefent O N T H E GERMAN WAR. LONDON: the Corner of Crah\* Court, Charin^-Crofs, M.DCC.I.X. *finte(] for G. Wo o d f a l L,

6 2 K Ada.mt.Riiz

7 ( V ) ADVERTISEMENT. TTAFINQ hee?i lately in the ^ '^ country to Jpe.vd the holidays ivith my neighbours there ^ I found a total change had prevailed in the Jyjiem of their politicks^ during my ab^ fence, I left them a fe^xo months be^ fore pafjtonate admirers and zealous jriafds of the ki??g of Pruffia, and of prince Ferdinand : but in the frjl vift fiohich I received from the par Jon of our parifh^ ^joho had been one of the moft zealous among them, he asked me whether I had not readj and hozv I liked the Confiderations on the prefenc German war? / anfwered^ that I

8 ( vi ) J had re^d them^ avd did not like them. He replied by repeating the kino- ^/PruffiaV words in the author'^ M'vcrttjement 5 and concluded ^xith the quotation from Tully, contained hi the lafl page of that pamphlet^ ap^ plying it as the author does, lanj^ered^ the king of Pruflia ^was otir enemy ^johen he gave us the good advice jor our tondub then, which the author recommends to us now to follow 5 and that the Athenian mif carriage in a naval expedition againjl Sicily; when the defeat of their hope' and di/pirited troops was a con^ lefs jequenee of the dejiruhion of theirfeet which conveyed them thither^ could not be applied to a war upon the German continent. He had read Thucydides, and did 7ipt much injfji upon that inflame, Howevei'^

9 ( vii ) Ho^ever^ ile ^vjidely differed In many other particulars 5 afid as ^e could not then fni/h the contr(rverjy^ *we agreed to pojlpone it for the pre^ Jent^ and thoroughly debate the Jub' jeci at a club ^xhich meets every ^eek in the neighbourhood. He a[fured me IJhouldJind every man there opinion. of his To Jit me for this combat^ I read aver nxtith great attention the pamphlet^ and made remarks in the margin as I ^xe72t ^long. From thefe notes the fouo^x^ ing reafons are couecied 5 and if they froduce the fa?ne effeci upon my rea^ ders in London, that they had upon the members of our club^ IfhaJl have no reafon to repent of my labour. For I think it of importance to my coun* try^ that every man fhculd be con^ 'vinced of the falfhood of a ivork calculated to provey " that vjhile pro- " vidence

10 '^ ''" ( vili ) vldekce has been pleafed to put the fwhole advantage of the war into '^ our hands we are giving it to '' our enemies.'''' p N. B. The references in the following work are to the firft edition GoNSIDERATIONSi of the

11 ( I REASONS W AK in THAT In S U P i" O R T of the GER MANX. Vrance is more populous than Great-Britain and all the territories belonging to it, is an undoubted propofitiofi j ahho' deducing the ufelefs hands from the flock of each nation, the dirpi opordon is not io formi" dable as is generally apprehended by us. In all our wars upon the continent of Europe with this power, we have had one advantage, which has more than evened that difference : Our armies have been chiefly ccmpofed of foreigners. Wc have fought France with Englijh treafure, br.t not with Ejiglifi blood J ijnd while her natives were dragged from the plough and the loom to exercile the mufquet, and perifh or be difabled in the field, ours were err.ployed in the arts of B peace.

12 peace, and in fupplying the drains of war by manufadture and export. Whoever confiders the pay and other expences of a BritiJJo foldier, fighting for his country in Germany or Flandersy as the greateft lofs felt at home from his abfence, has formed a very erroneous eftimate of the value of labour in agricuhure, manufacture, and commerce. Every foreigner employed a- broad in the room of an Englifiman^ where men are neceftary to be employed, produces a faving to this country, which multiplied upon many heads, forms a balance in our favour, acquainted with political arithmetick ; and which, if turned againft us in our various continental wars, would have long fince depopulated and beggared this country. incredible to thofe who are not much Altho' therefore it is confeffrd that France exceeds us in numbers of men ; it muft be allowed, that the disproportion between us is not equal to the difference of the Britifi and French natives, which compofe the refpcdtive armies now ad:ing in Germany, Twenty thoufand Briiifi troops are the higheft complement that has been employed by us in that fervice in any year j while one hundred thoufand French muft be owned a very moderate calculation on their fide: and that a number more than equal to this has iinc«

13 (3) fince the war began, ** innocent and harmlefs" as it is reprefented in p, 78, found their graves in controverted. Germany^ is a iadt not to be In fuch proportion Britain has been more tender than France in riifking the lives of fubjeds, p. 73, 79. and tho' the killing of its men may not be the end of war, p. 73. yet, unhappily for the human fpecies, It always is one ot the principal means by which controverfies between princes are determined} whether, in the author's words, ** the great intent " of war be^ by n^iciory to conquer an etiemy^s ^* country,'' or to defend a triend's. p. y^, 74. Near foor parts in five of the allied army being natives of the country where the war is carried on, inured to the climate and habituated to its food, their lofs by licknefs has been inconfiderable, compared with that fuftained by our enemies, throughout campaigns lengthened beyond the meafure of military operations in former times. Long and painful marches to the place of adf ion, and unprovided retreats from it in difaftrous events thro' a lefs known and unfriendly countiy, are circumftances all operating to our advantage ; from which the armies of France have fuffered infinitely more in deaths and defertion, than from the fword of their eneniy : cannon and bayonets have been B 2, barmlef%.

14 (4) harmlefs implements, compared to other means of deftrudion, with which providence in this quarrel has fought on the fide of the invaded. But fuch loltes are, it feems, of no avail to us, and caufe no prejudice to France : for, important as the lives of our fellowfubjccls are to Britain^ our author fcts thofc of Frenchmen at a low rate indeed ; as near nothing as words can ftate them j p. 76. " In the prefent courfe of the war France ** can lofe nothing by a defeat. Except only " in the number of the killed and wounded, ** which in the common courfe of battles " may be fet at about the double of that of " the conquerors, what other lofs have our *' enemies to fuftain?" Magazines, artillery and baggage are fmall items that have been here omitted in this account. Yet by fuch loflcs thofe very enemies have, in different periods of their hiftory, been driven out of Germany ; and the fame fate, p, 24. attending almoll invariably, in numberlefs inftances, their unjull attempts upon other countries, prove to convidtion, if perfidious ambition could be convinced, that France, (irovger at land (within her own dominions) than England or any other power in Europe, p. 3. lofts that fuperiority when fhe ventures far from home, beyond the influence of her infinite refi)urces, p. 67. And thus

15 ( s) thus circumftanced, (he in the year 1673 became inferior to the eftorts of a few fmall provinces, halt undone by her inhuman deyaftations, and oppofed, deferted, and betrayed by unnatural and infatuated allies. The iffue of that invafion in the lad century, and of the kingdom of BoJpefuia i^ the prefent, are inftances, which oppofed to the reiiliancp made by France againft the two grand alliances, reduce the author's propofi ion in p. 3. to what I have ventured to ftate it ; and demonftrate that the inference he would draw from that ftruggle a- gainft the powers of Europe^ p. 59. is in no meafure applicable to the preient gonteft, The fucceftes which have already attended the allied army in Germany^ and the loffes fuftained by the French in their invalion of it, however they are depreciated by the author's reprefentation of them, will in the hiiiory of thefe times, whatever the final event may be, add one inftance more of the jnfufhciency of the power of France^ to overrun at will weak but diflapt ftates ; while the fcanty numbers of our allies have at the utmoft extent been only increafed by twenty thoufand Britijh troops. The

16 (6) The weaker thofe flates are reprefented, and the lefs important to the invader, p. 23, 24. the ftronger the proof will be, that the pride of power has its bounds, and innocence and weaknefs a fecurity againft it, beyond the reach of ftretched and ftrained ambition. The author complains, p. 79. that the diliinguifiijig art of this war has hithertq conpjted in the raifing IrifftJig skirmijhes into battles and vitories : and that there are who knew that they could not make their court in any method Jo effectually ^as by magnifying the *i}i lories of our German army^ and aggravating the loffes oj the French. The battle at Minden was then a triffling skirmifh 1 and indeed fo it appears to be by the author's account of it, p. 78, 129. Nay, had our horj'e charged the French, and trampled down three or jour thoufand Saxon and French /t?o/, the advantage would have been triffling : " for no fubftantial benefit would refult to England from it." p. 79. why then would it doubtlefs have been a very good thing? p. 78. *' The killing of men is not the ** end of war." />. 73. *' The only lofs would " have been of men." p 79 '* But France ** cannot be hurt by the mere lofs of men, " which were it five times greater, it could *' pre-

17 ( 7 ) " preferitly fapply by draughts from its mi- *' litia, or replace when it pleafed with re- ** cruits in Gerraajiy!' Why then was not the French army prefently recruited? and why did it remain during the reft of the campaign expoicd to all the dil^dvantages of a war of defence only? ^. 71. The French militia confifts of about fifty thoufand men, employed in garrifoning their interior fortifications, and in affifting to de-» fend their coafls. How the lofs at Minden^ had it amounted to forty thoufand men, p, 79. could have been prefently fupplied from fuch a ftock, fcarcely fufficient for the other important fervices to which they were deftined, may be very evident to the writer of the pamphlet, as well as the facility of filling up fuch a void at pleal^jre with recruits in Germany ; but it is apparent that neither feemed pradicable to the French miniftry. And the fpecimen which cur author has given of his knowledge in the French revenue, of which he confeffes ** he knows *' nothing," p. ^8. and his very imperfedl and unf\ir flaiing a certain gentleman's argument, in the Jaft feftion of parliament, joined to his real oraffedttd ignorance of the produce of our finking fund, and the unaccountable inaccuracies in his calculations ihro'^. 69 and 70, render his opinions upoa the

18 { 8 )... the ways and means of both nations fom«- what problematical. Bat " infinite refources," p. 6y. " inex- " hauflible numbers of men," p. 79. " Mil* " lions to fpare," p are bold altertions ; which, had aflertion the force of fadls, would defeat every inference that can be drawn from bankruptcy and beggary at home, and defeat and difhonour abroad. The author takes no notice of the lofs fuftained by the French previous to the battle of Crevelt. Thefe were all the confequences oi 2&2Ai% fo triflings P-7^- as not to be worthy of mention in his impartial Confiderations. He eft i mates the defeat at Minden ** under three or four thoufand men which " the French loft there," p. 79. yet in 1758 they precipitately retreated from Hanever to Crevelt, and in 1759 from Minden to Giejfem an immenfe trad: of country leaving behind them fpoils and trophies equal to the fruits of a complete victory, and fuffering all the miferies and difgrace which attend Derout and flight. Could thefe effects have been produced from llight caufes, Britain has little to fear from a power thus difpirited and diftrefs'd by inconfiderable checks; and many pages have been wrote in vain to prove the fuperiority oi France over every ftate in Europe. Were her armies, fo conftitiited, equal

19 (9) fequal in numbers to the Perjian o.r Mexican myriads, they would fly like them j and France with her injinite rcjoiirces in men and moneyy would fcarcely be a match for a Landgrave of Heffe^ or our good ally the Prince of Buckeburg for with him the author allows that we have a continental connexion, p, IQO. But our Author, intent to prove the impoffibility of reiifling France in Germany, fuppreltes or. extenuates every event that would invalidate his Argument. The lofs of a battle is confined to the numbers killed or wounded in the adion, -p, 79, leltened far below the truth, ^. 78, 129. every other article is omitted ; confeqiiential loftes never enter into his account of a defeat ; and left the memory and fagacity of his readers fliould fupply thofe defeds //?^ deftru5lion and France has of men is of no itnportance, millions oj money yet to /pare. But in defpite of our Author's aftertlons, the battles at Crevelt and Minden were great and important adlions ; ihe laft decifive of a campaign which lalled five months after the vidory was gained. The affair of Warburg was one of thofc many operations during this campaign, which have defeated the utmoft efforts of an enemy exerting every C nerve.

20 ( 10 ) nerve, and draining every vein of exhaufted power to put an end to, not to protract, as the.author abfurdly imagines, a v^^ar in a country w^here by his own confeffion, />. 129, " Fraftce can gain nothing nor Britain lofe." That all this, p. 79, has been done without the efflilion or hazard of much blood on our fide J and that the effedt of vidlories has been obtained clear from the common price at which they are often dearly purchafed in pitch'd battles, is the higheft encomium upon the abilities and humanity of two Princes, who deferve from every fubjed: of thefe kingdoms a better treatment than this author is pleafed to afford them, p, But if any doubt could be entertained o the advantages gained by us in Germany^ the balance remaining due to us upon the exchange of prifoners, and the fhifting and degrading of generals, no lefs than four commanders in chief of the French army being removed in four years, are facfts which carry conviction with them. But it feems our fuccefs in Germany^ if we have been fuccefsftd there^ *' may eafily " be accounted for," p. 68. This account feems to be contained in the following proportions, a little farther explained than the author has done, in order to elucidate hi meaning.

21 ( II meaning. P. 72. " The Fre^ich have every " year brought a fuperiority of numbers into '' the field ; as great a fuperiority as they ** ought in good policy to fend to that fer- " vice, whatever be the number of their ** forces at home." It is then, in the author's opinion, good policy in the French to fuffer themfelves to be beaten in Germany ', for the fuperiority they fent was not in every year fufficient to prevent a defeat. *' P. 83. And if they know their own " intereft, they never will fend an over- ** powerful army thither to drive us out of it " (Germany) and put us upon bethinking " ourfelves of ours." Again, p, 129. " It " is not now the bufinefs of Fra?7ce to ex- *' ert its whole force, as it did in former ** wars, with three or four armies in Ger- *' many. It is not the intereft of France " to beat us out from thence, that would *' open our eyes." The two laft paragraphs in fome degree qualify the firft. They do not aflert, that to be beaten in Germany is the intereft of Fraiiccy but merely not to beat her enemy there. Happily for us the apprehenfions of the latter event were fo ftiong upon her, as to Icffen the proportion neceffary for felfdefence. Her good policy in this inftance feems at firft glance a little to have failed in the execution pf her plan: but, in the au- C % thor's

22 ( 12 ) thors fyflem, if we confider the impoffibiliiy of proportioning the numbers of one army to another, (o exadly as neither to be beaten nor beat ; or to calculate the effedls of a vidory over a difcomfited enemy, fo as to know with precifion and certainty, as in a game at tennis, how far the force of a blow may operate j France, abounding with men and with money, chofe rather to expofe herfelf to the lefter evil, than to the hazard cf incurring a greater, by driving her enemy out of Germany. Nay had any more of the allied army periflied than have already fallen, every additional lofs on our fide would be prejudicial to her, and would haften an event, which muft defeat a fcheme planred for our de(lru6tion : we fhould, perhaps, e'er now have been driven out of Germany without a poffibility of returning thither, from the difficulty of recruiting an army, which, even fuccefsful as we have been, cannot be fupplied w/ith men, p. 67, 82. Had Clermont fucceeded at CreveJt, Confades at Minden^ or Broglio at Warburg^ they no doubt had orders to Hop a purfuit j and the French army, like a pack of welltrained hounds, would at the word of command have ftood flock flill, and fuifered their trembling and flying prey to efcape, with poffibly a flight pinch, to ferve for the fport of fucceeding days. But even this expedient

23 ( «3 ) pedicnt might have failed them : We might have fled without a purfuit, as the French did from Minden. And were our flight to be as rapid as theirs, we fliould have evacur ated Germany^ and utterly deftroyed the projetft of an infidious enemy, who, like a Iharper at play, means to take us in by voluntary loffes. It muft however be allowed, this Gallic cogger of the dice of war has ventured farther than the skilful knights of a lefs honourable profeffion are wont to do and an i<tnorant bv-ftander would without hefitation pronounce the gamefter, who loft for four years fucceffively, rather a dupe than a knave. But fuch gameders there are, who beaten at one table, court fortune at another; change their feats to improve their luck, iind impatient of fetting dawn upon the remains of a n::attered eftate, rifque the whi^le with the odds ftill againft them. The policy of France is however deeper laid, and our author's happy penetration, altho' loft on an ignorant miniflry, ** and an " obftinate nation," />. 8i, has for the inftrudion and benefit of poflerity difcovered the latent caufes of events, which would otherwife have been recorded in the memoirs of politicians and the annals of hiftorians under falfe, iho' fpecious appearances. Had

24 * ( «4) Had his pamphlet never been publi/hed, the fruitlefs attempts of France upon Germany during four fucceffive years would have been afcribed, a they univerfally have been until the day of his publication, to a want of means adequate to the enterprife. It would be remembred that during this period Ihe had loft her beft refources of wealth that her trade was captured and her manufadliircrs were ruined 3 the exigencies of government were fo preffing, that altho the iiiiferies of her people difabled them from paying their ordinary taxes, yet new ones were impofed, and edid:s from the throne were anfvvered by her parliaments in the language, tho' not the tone of rebellion. Her plate was melrcd down with a lofs to the owners of the whole workmanfhip j the bills of her colonies were protefted j the public creditors defrauded of their payments j officers civil and military, of their ftipends j purchafes under public faith cancelled ; the of her nobility and the royal (table-' left without provender from the mere pentions upon which many and gentry fjbfift were ftopt ; want of money to purchafe it. Minifters were fuccefiively difgraced on the failure of their fchemes to raife money by imports that were found impradicable, and by loans at an exceflive intereft which could not be filled. Baffled and fubdued by land and by fea

25 ( '5) iea in every part of the world, (he would be drawn planningweak and chimerical fchemes for the invafion of Britain^ while fhe fat pale and trembling for her own fafety at home, with a few ragged undifciplined troops for the defence of her coafts. Such poffibly would have been the falfe and difgraceful picture drawn of France by feme future painter to decorate the palaces of our princes, and perpetuate events which now do honour to the Britifld name in the eyes of a miftaken and uninformed world. But how will the profped: be altered, when enlightned and infpired by the author's difcoveries, fome FrcnchPhidias {hall in breathing marble carve the Gallic Jupiter, a thunderbolt in his hand, and Britannia lying proftrate before him! the fex will be of infinite importance to the ftatuary : for Lewis XV. muft not be reprefented like his predeceltor in the Place des Vidfoires trampling under foot the nations of the univerfe. This milder Jupiter muft be drawn like the God of the poet, confaming the unhappy Semele, And Ovid's defcription is foexprefllve of the author's plan, that I cannot help imagining he had in his view the beautiful lines which follow, in many pages of his matchlefs performance. In no other part does he ftand indebted to any man who ever fpoke, wrote, r thought before him. JEthera

26 ( i6 ) Mthera confcendity nutuquefequentia fraxii Nubila, que is nimbos immijiaquefulgura ven-^ its Addidit^ & toftitrusj & hievifabile fulmen. ^ua tamen ufque poteji^ viresjibi demere ten^ fat. Nee quo centimanum dejecerat igne Typhcea, Nunc armatur eo : Nimiumferitatis in illo. Eft aliud leviusjulmen^ cui dextra Cyclopum Scevific^ flammaque mi?2us, minus addidit ira: I'cela fecunda vocantfuperi, capit ilia METAM.Lib. 3, 300i The clouds in the fecond line, which the thundcrer drew after him, are admirably charaderiftic of the deep and myfterious mo- policy which has envolept the French narch's defigns, impenetrable to mortal ken until pierced and diffipated by the author* The laft line indeed contains two words not abfolutely favourable to his plan the Tela fccunda^ may in the moft claffical fenfe be interpreted, as if the arms of France^ employed as they have been in Germany^ have been rather fortunate to us. The event of the fable is alfo againft onr author ; for Semcle perifhed inftantaneoufly in the flame, ahho' Jupiter chofe his flighteft bolt : had Ihe lingered and died of a confumption, the flory would have been more applicable to the purpofe of the pamphlet. But it is evident

27 ( '7 ) d8nt frdrri hence, that the thunder of the sky cannot be (o proportioned and modified even by Jupiter^ as to dertroy by flow and i^ated degrees. No wonder then that the thunder of war {hould be as httle tradable to the will of a commander; who cannot fay to the rage of battles- /2) Jar thou Jhalt go and nojartheri Bat to be ferious, if it he poflible to be ferious in anfwering the weakeft afid mod extravagant proportion that ever entered into the head of man, as the bafis of a fyflem upon which a great nation has refled her* only hope of falvation ; does the author really think that "France intends to lengthen out the war in GerfJiafiy by the means (he has employed, and for the ends he propofes"^ p. 72. Indeed )f fhe does, her invafion ot Germany and her profecution of the waf there, is one of thofe " effeds of defperation " rather than of council," with which he has charged her in p He tells us />. 81. " the French cannot ** propofe to conquer EngLvid, by fending ** armies into Germany; their only hope is ** to exhauftand weary us out by a land-war, *' which we mufl carry on with them upon ** fuch very difadvantageous terms ; and to D " divert

28 ( i8) " divert us from their iilands by employing ' our attention in Germany^' The conquefl: of Hanover is therefore not the objedt of France. And however Britain may rate that eledlorate, even as " her " greateflftake,"/. 36. yet the entire and quiet pofleffion of it, would, far from advancing the affairs of France^ put a period to her only hope of exhatijiing and wearing us out. Has {he not meant in every adion in which her troops have been engaged with the Allies during this war, to drive them out of Germany^ or oblige them to lay down their arms? and in more than oneofthefe adtions, had fortune declared on her fide, would not either of thefe events have been the neceffary confequence of her fuccefs? Have her miniflers been fcrupulous during this war, in their orders to her generals, of any one of thofe means which have rendered her infamous to the prefent and all future ages, by her devaftations of the United Provinces, and her more than Pagan barbarities in the Palatinate f Are any traces of the author's policy to be found in BelliJJe's letters to Contades? and v»hen (lie had failed iu one year by the valour of cur troops and the conduct of our generals, did {be not attempt in every fucceeding year to.ove'power thvqi

29 them with numbers? ( 19) Has not her obftinafe perfeverance in eftablifhing winter-quarters in Heje and Gotthige?: at the end of this campaign, been with a view of ftarting in the beginning of the next nearer to the end of her labours, her loftes, her e^pence, an'd her difgrace. It is not true, that France is at lefs e^^pence than we are in Germany : The French army came from a greater diftance, than near four parts in five of the allied army did. Her magazines and hofpitals coft her more for her contradors purchafe upon credit, and their reimburfements are flow and precarious : Their extortions are therefore greater. The rate at* which her troops are paid, is lower than that of the few Brjiijh forces which form a part of the allied army ; but '^he ifre'iich troops have, other allowances v^hich at iea'd: even 'th'at ditference. And the "ll'ate is an immenfe lofer, which exercifes'a fparing Oeconomy in thefe articles : 'Men muft eat, and be clothed and covered j arid if fcantily provided, fick men coft more and do lefs fervice than the healthy. The French are more numerous than the allies In Germany^ therefore, as above explained, more expenfive. France fublidizes more powers f

30 , ifignalized ( 20 ) than we do, and in all probable conjedure ^l a much higher price. But to put an end to fuppofitions.if France meant to lengthen out the war in Germany, why was the treaty of Clofierfeven concluded? Why did not Richlien retire, rather than oblige the allies to lay down their arms? And if it be faid, for every thing extravagant may be faid, that a breach of the treaty was forefeen, why were not the French better prepared for that event? and why afterwards obliged to retire, unfufpeding and furprifed, with a greater lofs, altho' no one confiderable blow was ftruck, than what any vid:ory gained by the armies ol Europe in the Grand Alliance! When thefe fac^s are reconciled to the author's fyftcm, I fhall ask whether there be ^n inftance in the hiftory of the world, of a power fuffering lofs heaped upon loftes, and difgrace upon difhonour for four years together, merely with a view to exhaufl the adverfe power by expence? And if this propofition be not fufficiently ftrong, let another circumflance be added fuch policy has been afcribed to a bankrupt-people, ading at a.much greater expence of money and of men, againft: a nation in full credit. That

31 (21 ) That France has often," p, 9, fomented quarrels between her neighbours, and infidioufly joined, and perfidioully deferted one fide, in order to weaken both, is certain. But then fhe remained an unlofmg fpedlator, and did not ftake her whole upon the iftae of the conflift. This policy has been referved for the author of the confiderations. But if the only view of Frafice has been to exhauft B?-itai7i by a war in Gertnany^ while we are fo blindly obftinate as to mean its defence by an armed force, why has (he not attained that end without any expence to herfelf of blood or of treafure? The author has pointed out the means in p. yy, 89. and they are To obvious, that had the defigns of France been confined to his plan, they could not have efcaped her minifters. Why have not the French troops been kept at home? P.JJ. *' Will the French revenue be at all leflfened, or the ftate brought fp much nearer to bankruptcy, for their having no army to pay out of their pv/n country?" *' But «^/jws expence mufl goon. Our epernies will not tell us, that they do not intend to go into Germany j they certainly will go, if we attempt to leflen our expence, and withdraw a great part of our troops. Where then is the end of our labour?" And again

32 . " again/, ^g. 'for peace, (22 ) " Why then (hou\d France fue when at worft they have only to '{land flill, and keep their money at home, "and their troops upon their frontiers, hold- *ing the appearance of marching into Ger^ 'many? and our ruin is completed : for we inuft be at dill the fame expence -, and after having got fix and thirty millions in debt, muft go on to eight and forty." Why then has not France compleated our ruin by thefe means? keepi7ig her money at.hoj'/t"^ and her troops upon her frontiers 'Were her views only to exhauft us by length- ^ening out a war in Germa?iy, why not attain that defirable end by means infinitely more eligible? Were the comparative means and expence of both nations ftill more in favour ^of Fra?2ce than they are ftated in p. 69, 70. had France millions to fpare, while England was incurring an additional debt ofeightand forty millions, yet fure it would be worthy tlie attention of even that inexhaufi.ible power, to fave her treafure from being fquandered m Germajiy^ and let " England's expence go on,'* f," The contrary meafure of wanton and 'uncalled for extravagance, had France no other purpofe to ferve than what our author fuppofes asthe animating fpring of all her anions, would prove her defperation in one period

33 ( 22). period of the prefent war.^i 126, heightened into phrenzy in this ; or as the pamphlet terms it in us, />. 81. "a miftaken zeal of " the nation, and an eagernefs to fight aa ** (Englifiman) any where." There are certainly no fymptoms of fach enthufiaftic valour and hatred in xhtfrench nation, and: her miniftry has not even this poor excufe for their condudt, which he admits to ours. However clear in its motives and end the Fre72ch errand into Germany appears to our author, a difcovery of the inducements which lead us thither has coft him much logical pains and difquifition, even from p, 1 16 to 126. where, by the help of many accurate diftindions, he arrives at the knowledge of what " every one muft have remem-» " bered," /> and what no one ever difputed, " that the army of obfervation was " an army of defence, not of diverlion.'* And as he does not like he word diver/ion^ we will allow, that the treaty of the fixteenth of January '1756, was a treaty meant for defence only. But there are it Teems other lefs expenfive means with which we may ferve our al ies. And *' the pointing out what appears to our ** author the moft effedtual method of fe- ** curing Hanover from the prefent and fu- ** ture attacks of our enemies, makes one " prin-

34 *' (2+ ) principal end ofhis confideratiohs." p, 4^-. His method is no doubt plain, eafy, and infallible in its eifedt : for it is no more than this " let them (the Hanoveriatis) alone" ^.25. " they have nothing to do but fubmit." ibid. An excellent and fure expedient to prevent an attack. But then they will be entitled to an indemnification from us, and the author intends them an ample one indeed nothing lefs than the ^^ French iflands"/. 45, 46". " not ufelefs conquefts on the Mijjijfippiy *^ but by feizing the French iflands, and ** holding their whole Weji-India trade in ** depofite for /Z^«oi;^r." 130. Guadaloupe and Mariegalante muft then go to their old mafters. And fliould Martinico with her five millions Sterling per Ann. and the French part of Hifpaniola be conquered by us, they muft alfo be reftored for Hanover, Nay in p. 52. the indemnity is to be extended to our friends (till farther, by conquefts to be gained on the French coafts, and in the Fajl as well as the Wejt-Indies, Poftibly a queftion might arife at the conclufion of a peace, were a ceftion of any of our confiderable conquefts upon this account to be an article of the treaty,whether it would not have been better to have defended the dominions of our allies againft the French or

35 ( 2i ) or at lead to have obliged their armies to earn them at the expence of much blood and treafure, than to invite them by a faithlefs defertion of oar friends to a quiet and unoppofed poftcffion of territories, after to be purchafed back by us at fo high a rate. Should we now leave the coutinent, French politenefs would afluredly yield to fuch a courteous invitation of the French army into Hanover, " and would, without much intreaty, fuffer it to ftay there more than a twelvemonth round," p. 129, in lure expectation of an indemnity of at lead: the value of the elecflorate *. Thole who have made their court by running the nation into a greater expence for the German fifty times war, than it had the leaft idea of," p. 45, would certainly not " make their excufe to the people," ibid, by fuch a conclufion of it. And the minifler?, who flaould ^are.to fet their hands to fuch a ftipulation, would juftly expiate that treafon with their heads. The alternative which therefore the pam^ phlet propofes, as the only expedient left in any change of our meaiures, is the ftrongeil juftification of them. * In/i. 129, and in many others, Hano'ver \vo\.\[^ he o^ no value at all to "France. Indeed mp. izz, he computes it?lbout half the v/ortii of Martinko ; valued at five miliions per anvu.v:, p. 56aud 82. E But

36 ( 26) But poftibly no indemnification would be neceltary. P. 13. " We {hould leave the i^rench to themielves, to harrafs Germany as much as they pleafe, and make themfelves as. odious as we can defire,'' as the only chance we have of forming and accelerating an union in GfrWiz;?)' againfi: them. This fhould be done, p. 16. '' until the Germans Ihall fee own intereli." ** iheir Leave the French to themfelves, they will doubtlefs do as much rijifchief asthey can; but in time they may make themfelves generally hated, and the Germans wife enough to agree." P. 30. " But, in general, the French arc a fair encrny, and neither they nor we have exerciied any unneceftary cruelties to each others fubjeds. Nor could the country therefore have any futferings to fear beyond the allowed ufage of war, upon an Englifh account. Nor would a French army (lay there in all probability more than one campaign, if we would but keep out of it, and take from the French court all hope of drawing over an E?2glifi army to meet them there." P. 24. " The French^ 'tis true, would poffefs themfelves of the revenues of the country } and all the taxes, which the people now pay to their fovereign, would be paid to France!' Ibid. " A French army in the country would themfelves probably find a

37 ( 27 ) life for all the money they could rake there. Many pages are employed to juftlfy the intended radical dt^ivu&xon of the moft fruitful provinces by one commander, p. 25. (See BelHJIe's letters,. />. 70.) and to extenuate and excufe the exceltes and extortions practifed in that electorate by another. P. 28. Great pains are alfo taken to quiet compaflionate minds, and reconcile the alarmed Ha^ noverian to a return of the fame guefts, by inftances of their inoffenfive march thro' Germany during the courfe of the lad war, P. 30, And by their humanity during this, in permitting, while they were maflers of Hanover^ the fun to (lane and the rivers to flowy for the ufe of its inhabitants. P. 27. Happy for many of them they did, who defpoiled of their axl had perhaps no drink but the running ftream, canopy of heaven. and no roof but the Until the author can reconcile the features of two pidiures drawn to reprefent the fame obje^ft, but oppofitc and unlike as chriftian charity is, p. 26, to* unprovoked and favage barbarifm ; as the tendernefs of a rightful and natural fovereign, />. 24, 33, colled:ing light taxes for government and defence, to the depredations of an invader, who renders himielf uni^jerjauy odious by E 2 doing

38 ( 28 ) doi72g as viuch 'mi/chief as he can^ and wantonly harrajjlng an unrefifting people ; until our minifters can determine from our author's aflertions whether France be the angry lion feeking whom Ihe may devour, or the lamb of innocence and peace breathing love and benevolence on mankind ; until fome certainly can be obtained of cheaper terms than our author infifls on for reftitutlon at a peace j until better reafonsare given to convince us that France fufiers nothing and would fuffcr nothing for ten years to come, by marching and maintaining an army much more numerous than ours, at a greater diftance from home than near four parts in five of the allied, in a country that can* not fubfift them, and with immenfe annual lofles that muft be annually repaired j the na^ tion will obftinately and unanimoufly, our author and poffibly a few milled by him ex"- cepted, perfevere in approving and fupporting meafures, which exhauft the laft refources of a power already cut off from that main fupply, vi'hich even in our author's opinion enables France to march an armj into Germany. />. 58. What remains to be done to perfect this great work, already almoft compleated, cannot fail of fuccels j and Martinico with her millions muft be ours, while France is (o employed and lo wafted in Gtrmany^ as not 10

39 ( 29 ) to be able to fit out a few frigates, p, 5^. fome of which muft have efcaped, thro' unavoidable accidents at fea, the vigilance of even a Britifj fquadron, to fupply an ifland which produces no One neceilary for fubfil^ence or defence. It will be no objedlon to thefe meafurei' that while we purfue the great objedt of this" war J while every one part of our fyften:i fupports another, all co-operating to the completion of the whole, we preferve inviolate the faith of the public, prophanely fported with, and fophiftically quibbled away by an ill-reafoning author ; p, 44 and 46, to p. 54 ; That we protect allies, attacked merely becaufe they are our friends, ftaking their whole upon their confidence in us ; to whom defeat would be deftrud:ion, and whofe deftru6lion would involve the proteftant religion, the liberties of Europe, the trade, wealth, and freedom of thcfe countries. But in our author's opinion the afiiftance we give Hanover aggravates hei' evils ; and a ftruggle for her defence is the completion of her miferies. He founds this do6lrine upon the following principle. P. 25. " A fmall ftate invaded by the armies of one infinitely greater than

40 ( 3 ) itfelf, is doubtlefs under a great misfdrturie j all reliftance is ufelefs, and it has nothing to do but to fubmit. But there is a way of doubling this misfortune ; and that is, by having another great ftate, almoft equal to the invader, undertake the defence of it* If the country fubmit, it has but one army to maintain ; and may in the beginning yield upon terms which are tolerable : But if it be defended, it has then two armies in it, and is fure to be opprefted by them both. An army is a many-headed monfter, that mufl be fed ; and the defending army ought to have as many mouths as the attacking and each will get but all they can from the poor inhabitants." As this paragraph contains all the fubftance and marrow of others in ^. 26, 27, 30, ^j 87, calculated to apply thefe doctrines to the prefent ftate of Hanover, I have tranfcribed the whole. Yet the miferles he defcribes in a country thus invaded and defended, are fomevvhat foftened in the cafe of our allies, by having the revenues of EfJglafid and France poured into them. P* 15. and in p. 100, Hanover would become a morfel more delicious to the King of PruJJia, for our having fpent there fo many millions in defence oi: it. The inftances given in ^.30 and 31, alfo prove to thofe who ihink like the author, if there be any fuch,

41 ( 31 ) ftich, that a contefted invafion ought not tq be confidered in " fo very terrible a light.'- But I confefs that a fmall ftate invaded by a fuperior army is under a very great miffortune indeed j not to be compenlated with the money fpent by the contending powers, nor with the benefit of letting out its troops to one of them. The author therefore /». 3 1 forms a very falfe and invidious eftimate of the loffes of HeJJe, and of the motives that actuated its landgrave, by the fum received from us for the hire of his troops. The lives of foldiers are thrown into this eftimate as nothing. Were they French foldiers, fuch an omiffion would need no excufe in the author's political arithmetick. Were his principle founded, the Prince oi Orange in 1672, deferved the fate of the De Wits^ for the madnefs of his refiftance ^ And Gii/lavus Adolphtis^ in his attempt for freeing Germany, fhould have met in his relief of Stralfund, with that death which concluded his heroick atchivements at Lut' zen. It is true, fortune profpered their endeavours ; but the fortuitous event of things is no excufe for the rafhnefs of enterprizes, formed and executed againft every probability of fuccefs and infinite odds on the fide of the vanquiflied. Yet

42 (3*) Yiet :many of the Grecian heroes had no better excufe for their refiftance of a power tnfini^ly fuperigr to the ftates which they 4efer)d^d aad faccoared. Thofe who failed pnd perifhed, /hire an equal glory v/irh thofp wbp fiicce.eded ; and Leonidas a^ Thennor pyl( ^ and Miltiades at Marathon^ are recorded with the fame praife by ignorant and Mninforttied arialiftf» Had our great deliverer been pufhed back and fuffocaied in the laft canal of Holland^ his well-timed end would have faved his memory from the reproach of multiplied tranfgredions againft <5Uf auvhor'? precepts : He landed a butch ^my here, which had not as many mouths, />.25. as King James ^ forces on Salijbury- Plain^ but contributed wiih them to feed iipon poor England, If actions like thefe deferve applaufe ; ijf Jawful Princes degenerating into tyrants may and ought to be oppofed -, if it be the duty pf every honeft Man to join in the defign, altho' he perifh in the execution j (hall paffive obedience and non-refiftance to a foreign invader be preached up, as a meafure of prudence, to injured, unoffendingj and independent ftates! And fhall a power, bound by every tye, pohtical aud moral, to their aflii^ance, be branded with hard reflecflions for declaring iifelf in their caufc?!

43 (33) If fuch dodrines be admitted, where is the fccuritv for fmaller ftates? and muft not all fink neceflarily into the gulph of univerfal monarchy? The hiftorian's animadverfion upon thofe ftates/'. 4, which did not unite againft Rome^ is juft and incontrovertable : His refledion is meant upon them. But our Author tarns the cenfure of the annalill:, upon thofe who fought iingly againd i^^,*??^. There fhould have been fach a congrc^cs as he defcribf s in p,. 107, before a Iingle buckler was raifed again ft the Roman eugle. But no fuch auguft affembly attended the leaders of any of thofe ftates when invaded by armies infinitely fuperior to theirs ; they fhould then have fubmitted without rcfirtance, knowing that " all refiftance was ufelefs, and that they had nothing 10 do but fubmit." They (hould have waited until the Romans had rendered themfelves tiniverfally odious^ and then the world would have united againft them. But altho' Rome " grew to a degree did not operate of ftrength, much greater than that of any other power," yet the ftates of the world did not mutually atiift each other when they were attacked by her. P. 4. *' This univerfal maxim of politicks" during many ages. Some nations who ventured to depart from it, afferted their freedom againft thofe tyrants of mankind j and F thg

44 (34) the dates which bafely fubmitted, became provinces and flaves to Rome. Had the united provinces aded in 1672 upon the author's principle, the houfe of Aujlria would indeed not have affifted them after, nor an Englifi parliament have compelled the treacherous and paultry penfioner of France to re-aflbme the roll and policy of an Englijh King. But thefe were events improbable at the firft outfet, and by confcquence do not juftify it. And altho' a ftate defpairing of itfelf will ever be deferred by its neighbours and friends, yet better it is that it fliould be fo forlorn, left it {hould other wife " have more than one army t» maintain." Had France poured In forces to fupport the laft rebellion in Scotlajid^ faperior to the itrength of the loyal Clanrrs in that part of the united kingdom j or had Conflam landed his troops in Ireland, England fhould not have fent a man to their affiftance. And the nearer are to us, and dearer thefe parts of ourfelf than a foreign territory, the ftronger this principle fliould a(5t, even in proportion as our tendernefs for them fhould be greater. This excellent argument, in its application to Hanover receives infinite lirength, and becomes abfolutely conclufive from the author's analytical dildifiion, beginning in />, t 100.

45 (zs) loo, of thai great queflion upon continental connedlions, which in his words " has been fo long agitated," and ** has now been determined :" " all parties happily agree, that it {Britain) muft have its continental connedlions/' But " this is the firft time thefe terms have been heard of in political debate; and this great queftion never was a queflion before," p. loi. Ibid. " The terms underftood in their moft general fenfe feem to be too general to be ever agitated at all j becaufe it is impofiible for any man to fay, that there m.ay not arife fome certain occalions and circumftances of affairs" (he might have faid, it is impoffible to fay that fuch have not arifen) " which may unavoidably force us to have Many fome connefticn with the continent." fuch have arifen, in which the terms of that great queftion have been agitated incomparably oftener and more ftrenuoufly lince the ad; of fettlement than before. No one queftion has been fo much agitated ; nor was it determined then, nor more happily fettled now, but in confequence of long and repeated debate?, in which others had the merit of that difcovery, which our author would aflume to himfelf, that Englaiid fhould intrench herfelf within herfelf, and have no concern with the continent in Europe. Here our author is an errant plagiary. F 2 But

46 ( 36) But in p. 103, he launches forth into a difcovery which no man has a right to difpute with him. ** An equal conne<5lion with all the nations of Europe is to all the operating eflfe<5ls of it in war and peace, the very fame thing as the having no connedtion with any of them." Or, in other words, to have treaties of commerce in time of peace, for fuch treaties furely are connections, with all the nations of Europe^ in which we fhould be confidered as the moft fa'. cured ; or to have none at all, is the very fame thing. And a neutrality in war, i. e. an equal con-* jie<5tion of friendfhlp with all the nations of Europe all in war, is the very fame thing as a connection of enmity," p i. e. a declared war ag^inft- them all. This fmokeball of a pompous phrafe, /> 105. as lately happened at Woolwich, burfls and recoils upon the artift who contrived it. And the author's argument in this inftance, as in numberlefs others throughout his book, perfecftly correfponds with his own criterion of truth and en or in ^. i j 5, out of his own mouth [hall he be judged. This great Qucflion of continental con^ necflions being now fettled and determined by our author, fo much more happily than it ever was before,. I fliall proceed to confider the flate of Britain^ not ** chained and moored

47 (37). moored by feme connedion to the continent,'* p But as the author would have her, and Neptune was of his mind in Callimachus^ " fo deeply rooted in the fea, as to negle<5l all her connections with the continent." Thus fixed upon ourfirm and proper bafis^ " we {hall have it in our own power to put an end to the war, whether the French choofe it or not : no matter whether they will treat with us ; from that time they cannot have a (hip at fea, nor a pojjibility oj coming at us," Poffibly they may have a few fhips to fupplv MartiniCO, and to intercept our ^y? and Weji-lndia trade. They may poffibly have it more in their power to fit out privateers, by affifting adventurers with fome of the fpare millions now fpent in Germany : an evil increafing ever fince our privateers have had nothing to take worth their expence,and which our navy can alone never efiredually prevent, ImpoJJible as it is to come at us, p ** yet \.» here fo important a concern is at ftake, It becomes no man to fay, that an invafion is impoffible." p " thirty or forty thoufand men encamped or cantoned upon our fouth coafl, makes us abfolutely fecure."

48 (38.) fecure.** Yet where fo important a concern is at ftake, it alfo behoves us to take feme care of the north. Defcents, without a view to conqueft, may produce mifchiefs of a very ferious nature. P "Yet no one as a friend of his country, would be fond of giving (all) his reafons for" this affertion. Even poor Pegg would grievoully complain at being entirely negleifted. We have heard of meditated invafions from Sweden. And the Swedes will have no connedion with us, but a connebion of enmity, p In a partition of our troops whether encamped or cantoned, the eaft and weft coafts would plead fome right to prote(!sion, and would produce unvarying precedents for their claim* All thefe different calls would fwell the eftablifhrnent for guards and garrifonsin Great-Britain to fifty-thoufand men, at a very low calculation all militia, if the author pleafes ; when in adual fervice they are paid as thofe who have been called regular troops J their families are fupported by the public ; and in the great articles of ma-, nufadure and hu{bandry, the public is ftill a greater lofer by their avocation from induftry and labour. " A diverfion upon the continent of the forces of France, has ever been thought one of cur beft fecurities againft an invafion, and her

49 ( 39 ) her troops being fent into Germany now, is a fure indication,^. 121, of her having no fuch defign. ibid. *' Had fhe fuch a deiign not a battalion would be fent thither. All would be brought down upon her coaft.'* " Altho' fhe always has two. or three hundred thoufand men in her pay." But to return to our military ejlablkhment, in the author's hypothecs. While our troops in Great-Britain would be greatly more numerous than they now are, the numbers necefiary to be employed in every other part of the world fhould alfa in prudence be greater. For tho' an invafion of Britain or Ireland may not be very prafticable, yet had France no continental expences to maintain, fhe might better afford to try experiments, not fo imprai^ticable as the author makes them, />. 122, of fupplying with arms and ammuniuon thofe, who if fo well fupported as he fuppofes Cape Breton and ^ebec were, ibid, while fhe was lofing battles in Germany ^ would at leall: have rendered oar firccefs in America precarious wifely humane as our treatment of the vanquifhed has been, yet no man would wifh that gratitude for mercy and benefits received fhould be the principal fecurity for their allegiance to the crown of Great-Britain, Aj

50 ( 40 ) As our armies mufl: be greater in this hypothefis, fo mufl our fleets and for the very fame reafons. How confiderable the dedudtion would prove, by thefe increafed expences, from the faving our author wifhes of all we expend in Germany, and how the balance would ftand, is beyond his and my reach to calculate. But, two things are certain in his fyflem ; France would be at no expence beyond her common eftablifhment in profound peace, and would be fure of a refliiution of many loftes in compenfation for Hanover. Such would the comparative fituation be of both countries, even in the author's very imperfe(fl comprehenfion of his fubjedt, and of the confeqaences attending the fchcme he propofes. In fuch a flate, and it would be rendered much more delperate by other circumflances not yet explained, would it be " no matter whether the French would treat with us?" P. ^j, " Might we then give them the cffer of peace or war as long as they pleafed, and calmly look on in fecurity?" Woold they be " willing to fubmit to any terms?" p Or rather, ibid, while they are themfelves fuffering nothing, and running their enemy every year" (tho* not quite) " ;" ten millions nearer their ruin \»X from ** fuing for peace, will they not keep

51 (41) keep the war in {that) ftate for ten years to come?'* Bat France is in Germany than we are. better able to fapport a war Tn treating this queftion it is not fair to draw inferences againftanyone meafuie of thewar, merely from a view of the fum total of our expence compared with that of France. Let every operation in which we are engaged be tried fingly, and ftand or fall by its own merits. If we make conquefts in all parts of the world, we muft defray the expences of troops, of tranfports, and of fleets, p. yo. If we carry on trade during war, exceeding whatever has been known in peace, we muft pay for its proiedion. Uicl, If the value of any purchafes we have made^ in their prefent and future confequences, be not equal to the price paid for them, we have in thtfe articles made an unthrifty bargain. But they are conclulive upon no other operations of the war ; and France would I believe be charitable enough to take them off our hands. Our author prefents us with one fide of our account only : He ftates the cofts, but finks the profits. Guadaloupe, Senegal, and ur acquifitions in the Ealt-Indies^ do not appear, in his confiderations, to have enriched this kingdom with a fmgle fhilling. G The

52 (40 The revenue of Martinico would be truly immenfe, " four or five millions flerling/' />. 82. A million more or lefs is a trifling objed:. But had it been ours, 1 much doubt whether it would not greatly fall j far below the author's moft moderate calculation : For then it would not ferve to render the German war more deftrudlive, by retarding the acquifition of fo valuable a prize. The weight of millions borrowed by us receives no alleviation, p. 69, from the lownefsof our intcreft compared with what France pays; altlio' the annuity be the only charge felt by the debtor : This circumflance was befide the author's purpofe, and would tend to lellen the immenfe advantage fhe has over us in the fuperiority of her means, and the fmallnefs of het expence. Every gain with an enemy's lofs is generally conceived as a double benefit, and upon this principle every {hip taken by Hawke and "Bofcawen has been reckoned as two to the Britifi navy. But how great was our error? every lofs is a faving to France^ and every mifcr knows that every faving is a gain. She has faved the expence of a fleet, amounting with us to five millions fix hundred thoufand pounds. P. 70. and with a difference of that whole fum, from this fingle article, (he is better able than we are to carry on a war

53 (43 ) war in Germany^ expending there fome /pare millions, which grow from loftes, and fructify in defeats, P. 69. ** Her {landing revenue of twelve rnillions" proceeding in a great proportion from commerce, remains and would remain for ten years longer, p. 129, undimini(hed, in the decline of trade and manufafture ; nay llrange to think, it probably goes on augmenting. for of thefe twelve millions, fevcn were fubjedl to any dtficiencies in the other five ; yet there are now no deficiencies, and no decreafe of either. For, p. 69. ihefe feven millions with two borrowed make the French fund for carrying on the war. That this fund is a clear and neat receipt is apparent, for the author places it in contrafl, ^^. 70, with fifteen millions of ours, difpofable money ; twelve of thefe were borrowed, and a million and a half he fuppofes taken out of the finking fund, which with the land and malt-tax he computes at four millions. P. 69, The produce of thefe two taxes he therefore ftates at no more than two millions and a half, allowing two hundred and fifty thoufand pounds for deficiencies a full and ample allowance upon that head. What has become of another million included in thefe fums, /». 69, and omitted in p, 70, where Uiiey ire reduced from fixteen to fifteen mil- G z lions.

54 (44) lions, is not eafy to fay, nor worth enquiring after. A nation thu? miraculoufly circumftanccd, above the reach of all fublunary caufes, may fay with the devil in Milton, Evil be thou my good: and this (hould be the motto of the French banners, particularly in their march into Germany^ where fuffering and damntd herfelf, France means that others (hould fuffer, altho' it be not in her power to make their miferics equal to her own. But before I conclude thefe remarks upon the monyed abilities o{ France^ we muft not pafs by unnoticed the juftnefs and confiftcncy of our author's inference in ^, 123, *' Our enemies certainly have fome millions to fpare, clfe they need not fpend them in Germany.'' How admirably well introduced is this aflertion by what precedes it in p, 1 22? " It (France) does not fend its army to invade the German dominions /rd?w choice, but necejjity % becaufe they cannot get to England, and have no other ground to meet us on." They therefore need not do what was neceflary to be done ; and expence upon a nccefliiry work is a proof of fuperfluity. But p, ^y. " what is this Germany to Britain? Of what value is Hanover to us? are queilions which often recur throughout the pamphlet.

55 (45) pamphlet. Were I to anfwer, as much, and of as great value as they are to France. The author would reply they are of no value to either. And in the fenfe of prefent and immediate profit, his aflertion is true. But it is equally true in numberlefs other inftances of wars engaged in, wifely for the purpofes of both parties, with an immenfe expence to each. The war in Canada may poftibly be included in the number ; and the taking of Montreal^ for which the author is fo thankful, if rated by what it will produce to Britain, or what it produced to Frarice, would be a trifling acquifition to us, and a lofs as inconfiderable to her. But many things unimportant in themfelves, become of infinite import in their confequences ; and that the objed: of the prefent war in Germany is of this nature, feems to me plain to a demonftration. I (hall ftate as fairly and as fhortly as I can, my farther thoughts upon this fubjed:. When the prefent conteft began between us and France, we apprehended that (he would renew the war, lately put an end to in Germany, in conjund:ion with the King of Pruffia ; and therefore concluded a treaty with Rujjia merely to prevent this confequence. The Houfe oi Aujlria intent on wrefting ^ilcjia from him, piopofed to unite with

56 (46 ) with us and our ally to ferve that her darling pnrpofe. In this cafe France would undoubtedly have joined with Frujfia^ and a war in Germany would have been accelerated gnd rendered inevitable, which Britain laboured to avert. In fuch an alliance for fuch ends as Aujiria propofed, all appear^ ances of fuccefs were by recent experience proved to be againft us. Tht Dutch would not engage, and RuJJia was at too great a diftance even in the author's opinion,^, 38, to be a very effeftual ally. Thus circumftanced, we had nothing to expedt from the Auftrian proje<ft but a fure increafe of expence beyond that of the former war, and a more than probable repetition of lofles and defeats ; at the end of which we ihould be obliged to fit down under a load of addi-r tional debt, with the doubled difgrace of having unfuccefsfully broken thro* the moft folemn treaty, iirft concluded at the inftant prayer and for the immediate falvation of the houle of Auflria^ and again renewed and confirmed for the fame end and from the fame motives. In this fituation the treaty of Weftmijifler was figned in January 1756, merely with a view p. 94, 97, on our fide to keep the French out of Germany ; and on the Fruf- Jian fide to be protected from a Rujjian invafion ; without a fingle iliilling to. be paid by

57 (47 ) The fpirit by us to the Prujjian monarch. of this treaty was on our part the very fame with that which didated the Ruffian Both : were meant to keep the French out of Gerpjany. For akho' the Rufs would in cafe of a rupture adt dirt6:ly agaifift Pruffia, yet it is evident that if the apprehenfion of this event would have fo far operated upon the Prujjian monarch as ^o render him averfe from a French invafion, as he certainly would have been, p. 94, France would as certainly not have attempted one in the fyftem at that time fubfifting, without encouragement and affiftance from him. But ihe encouragement refufed by PruJJia was fupplied by the Emprefs-Queen. This unnatural conjundion of the two houfes oi Aujlriaznd Bourbon^ feemed, as it well mght, an impoffible event. And without it, the peace of Germany would have been preferved by the treaty of Wefiminjler ; whereas a compliance from us with the Au^ jirian fcheme, would render war in Ger^ many and a French invafion unavoidable. For, p. 8, no man can be fo wild as to think that France would permit the Emprefs- Queen, even unaffifted by us, to recover ^ilejia^ and weaken if not dcftroy that power whom fhe contributed to raife at the expencc of her beft blood and treafure, as a rival to the houfe of -^«/?r/^ in Germany -^ had not her

58 her { 48 ) confent been obtained, and advantages offered to her, which, in a new Jyftem induced her to depart from that policy which had direcfled her operations in Germany for more than two centuries. The houfe of Auflria could not have been mad enough to meafure her iingle force againft fuch mighty odds as France and PrziJJia united j and her revenues were not fufficient to ren. der the conteft more equal by ftrengthening her own arms with thofe of RuJ/ia^ who without pecuniary fupplies, however well difpofed, neither would nor could march to her affiftance. She therefore offered fuch advantages to France^ and gave an immediate pledge of her iincerity, which induced the court of Verjailki to become her ally againft the King of Prujia, and to enable RtiJJia and Sweden to join in the fame caufe. infeparable from it, A war in Germanyy and a French invafion were therefore the neceffary confequences of every projed: entertained by the houfe of Auflria : of that in which fhe would have had us become her accomplice, and of that which when refufed by us, fhe hasfincc attempted in concert with her hereditary enemy and the irreconcileable foe to Great-Britain. She therefore brought the French into Germany j and the miferies of

59 ( 49 ) of that unhappy country are fal/ely imputed to us, who by the treaty of Weflminfier de-* viled the only pofiible means of preventing them ; and by our glorious refiftance in conjundiioii with our heroic ally, have down to this period itopt the completion of a fcheme more formidable to the Proteftant religion, the liberties of Europe, and the fafety, inde-w pendance, and prolperity of this kingdom, than could have been executed by the houfe of Aufiria, when her power was mod dreaded, or by Lewis XIV, when he afpired Jit univerfal monarchy. In this fcheme the two great powers of Aujirla and Bourbon have unfortunately engaged another, the greateft power of the North, to fecond their defigns. The king of Prujfia is fo fituated as to be a check upon the aggrandifement of Riijfiay where alone any new acquifltion would be an addition of real ftrength to that vaft empire, and the only power that can thwart her authoritative influence over other neighbours, whom poffibly fhe does not now mean to fubdue. Other caufes have cooperated, of a more private nature, to indif- ^QkxhcRuJJjan monarch towards him. Such caufes will operate, becaufe monarchs have human paffions and frailties and nations are governed by them. The views ancf^nterefls of Auf^ria and France are not the fame. nay they are * H widely

60 ( 50) Widely feparate j fo feparate, as not to interfere in inftances of the greatefl: importance to each. From this circumftance they embrace more objcdls, and the danger becomes more univerfal ; while their vicinity is fuch as to admit a mutual affiftance equally neceffary to both. It is of little avail to the King of Truljia^ that France may have an intereft in his prefervation, if that interefl be light in the balance when oppofed to other advantages, which muft be purchafed by an acquiefcence in his ruin j or by doing ftill more, and becoming the ad:ive inftrument, as was intended at Rosbach, of his total defeat. The hopes of advantage, for gratitude is out of the queftion, which the houfe oi Au" (Iria may ftill conceive from the prefervation of Great-Britain^ yield in like manner to the attainment of another objedl more immediate, and in her conception, no matter whether thro' paffion or reafon, more im* porta nt to her. Silefia produces incomparably a greater revenue than Newport^ O- Jiend^ and liie country of Luxemburgh y nay poftibly more than the whole Anfirian Nethcrlaiids clear from the expences they create. Silefia is in our author's opinion, />. 65, "to the Aiiflrian family fo great an objed: in ilfelf, and fo very neceffary

61 (50 fary to the defence of the reft of their Turkifi frontier, that they never really will give it up." Can fo much be faid for the importance of a large diftriift upon the Flemijh coaft, with fomething more thrown into the bargain? Auftria may think a breach with the Ottoman Forte more likely to happen than with Verfailles^ and if it (hould happen, more dangerous. Viemia is fafe from France^ and our author proves in feveral parts of his work, that the French never can have any defign upon Germany, But not to go fo far as Turkey for an argument, has not Auflria feen, while her fears and attention were direcfted towards France^ a power grown up in Germany^ which having wrefted one of her bed provinces from her in the laft war, has (hewn itfelf an over-match for her fingle force in this? Can {he tremble at the clouds that may gather at Vtrfailles^ when {he has heard the thunder of Berlin rolling towards the gates of her capital.? It is in human na-f ture to be more alarmed at nearer dangers, than at greater threatening at a diftance. Even cool and difpa{rionate politicians arq too apt to provide for the prefent moment, and leave to-morrow to providence or accident. Some have fucceeded and fome have failed by this manner of acfting j but great as. the number has been of the unluccefsful, they have been followed, and to the end of time^ "Vvill be followed, by others unwarned by

62 ( 52 ) jir fate. Bat fuppofe, and I hope it fhoclcj ^_' fuppofed, that the true intereil of the Emprefs Qaeen claims another conducft. rh will be a poor comfort to us and to our pofteriiy, that the annals of Germany fhould record a woman, faved by our help from the r':iri that th'^eatened her headlong paflions, and falling after into a deeper abvfs Irom an attempt to pufh her deliverer into it. Princes and minifters may err fatally to themfelves and their countrvj but facfrs cannot lye 5 and the condudl of the Emprefs Queen fpeaks convidion againft her. Has flie not already delivered up Newport^ and OJiend, p. 39, to the Freiich? a part cf ihofe dcpoficcs purchafed from them with our blood and trcafure. And is fhe not now in ftill " a clofer union with them?" ibid. If the effeds of this union have not yet appeared, in other cellons not lefs dangerous to our neighbours and to us j is not the reafon clear and apparent? Would not the Dutch, and poffibly other powers oi Europe^ be roufed from their lethargy? an experiment too hazardous for her and her new ally, until the odds be more on their fide in the prefent conteft : Let Holland lleep on, until fhe is a- tvakened by a ftroke, which (hewing her danger fhev.s her the impoflibility of refilling it. That

63 { 53 ) That France is to have fome prize fuperior to the loftes and hazards to which fhe has expofed herfelf in Germany^ is beyond a poffibility of doabt. That prize is not to be found in Hanover, or Hejje, or Brunjwick, It is not to be found in Germany. Our author proves this to a demonftration, p. ly^ 23> 24, 30, 33, 34, 35, 36. It is not to be found in the expenditure of million?, and the lofs of thoufands of her men, facrificed to a chimerical and abfurd projcd: of exhaufting, not of beating, a more wealthy and fuccefiful enemy. The promifed land muft therefore be fiiuated fomewhere elfe : fhe muft pafs through a fea of blood to poftefs it. Hanover is her road to the FlemiJI:) coaft and to Luxembiirgh ; It is her read to Holland^ where (he will find nothing to oppofe her. The Dutch are now neuter, a part of their barrier was demolifhed during the laft war. Even the honeft and wife among her people are filent thro' fear. They fee the approaches of French power, and the breaches it has already made upon their fecurity, as they do thcfe partial inundations, which increafing every year, prcfage a total deftruction. They expedt their ruin from Germany, but they know not how to prevent it. Others there are who would enioy the deluge, and draw a private advantage from public deflation. But the greater number hope, and

64 . reus (54) ^nd are eafy and refigned in this hope, that France will command, not deftroy them fhe will encompafs them with her power, but lave them for her intereft ; their nume- veitels, numberlefs feamen, and inex- Jiauflible naval ftores will be all at her difpolal. And thus fupplled, and thus poftc/led ot the fea coaft from Hoiand to Bayonne, an inyalion of Britain which even now, our auihor thinks (hould not be flighted, will wear a more threatening afpecft ; or without threatening will be more formidable. Thus Hanover may be the road tq England, If it fhould be afked why the conquefl: of Hanover, fo unimportant as it is represented, fhould be made a condition by the houfe of Aujiria for her ceffions to France, the anfwer is obvious ; becaufe the conquefl; of Hanover by France, and the deflrudion of the King of Prujjia by Auftria and RuJ/ia^ would render the Emprefs Queen miflrefs oi Germany. The author has pointed out, p, 33, 42, ufes to which Hanover may be; applied. it may be given to Wirtember g^ or to Saxony. no matter to whom, to an old papift, or to a renegado from proteftantifm, if the protedant power be broken ; and the Pa/atinate affords zn. inflance exadlyfimilar. The Prujjian territories parcelled out, and Hanover trufled to fafe hands, the houfe of Aiijiria may then revert to her old fyftem, i«when

65 ( 55 ) when Guftavus Adolfhus wrought the wonderful deliverance of proteilant yicftims marked out for facrifice by tyranny and enthufiafm. Will Riiffia, no proteflant, interpofe in their favour? Dantzick and Prujjia are to her of greater moment than the political falvation of all the followers of Luther and Calvin^ throughout the whole extent of Gen?jany, Neither papift nor proteftant/'. 1 9, {he will remain an unconcerned fpe(5tator of the cataftrophe, when her part iscompleated and her roll finiihed. Will France interfere? and become again the defender of the' proteftant faith in Germany! p. 8. She fcconded Giiflavus Adolpbus, but hasdeferted and devoted the King of PruJJia, Her political condu<5t was fuited to her intereft in both inftances : fhe was formerly only a great power by land, in the neighbourhood of a greater ; flic has fince become a great maritime power, and has tafted the fvveets of trade ; her bell refources depend upon a naval force. She and the houfe oi Aufiria in ihtirncw fyjlem have no clafliing interefts ; the objedis of their ambition lie upon different elements : Imperial Aufiria can never hope a.id never has attempted to be powerful by fea; and France by her unfuccefsful attempts to mafler

66 (56) iiiafter Germany has been taught the madnefs of endeavouring to plan conquefts there j while England inferior to her in many rcfpcdts, has aitumed the empire of the ocean. There can be no abfolute feciirity for the duration of mortal fyflems. Paffions, thofe hurricanes of the mind, may overturn the moft folid and beft conftrudled edifices. Lewis XIV. or a Charles V. may arife in fome future age, with the fame frantic ambition that actuated thofe their A predeceftors. But human contrivance can form no better plan for duration than folidity of power ^ and the bed fecurity ofa lading amity among princes, arifes from a diverfity of uninterfering views, and fuch an equality of force as would render a breach between them perilous to the aggreflbr. Such an equality our author informs us, p. 17, would fubfift between France with her prefent polteffions, and the Empire, if thoroughly united under one direding head. I am aware that France would in time grow more powerful by trade, than the houfe of Aujiria could by conquefts. But were flie miftrefs of the wealth of the univerfc, it would not be for her intereft to conquer in Germany. This

67 ( 57 ) This hypothefis in its utmofl: extent may appear wild and extravagant to many, and poftibly is fo. But does it appear fuch to the Emprefs Queen? for this is the only queftion which concerns Britain. Francs would certainly find her advantage in it, whofe prefent condud: in any other fuppofition would be abfurdly mad, ruining herfelf in Germany to ftrengthen her only rival and to weaken and undo the on- upon land, ly ally fhe could truft to againft her. If we mufl fuppofe either of the monarchs fitter for Bedlam than a throne, Lewis or Thereja, can we hefitate in our preference? A woman fired with injuries and lulling for revenge, who feels with indignation that while her anceftors were contending againfl which neither was a Prance in a conflid: by gainer, a fubordinate Prince, in the eyes of pride her fubjecftand vaftal, rofe to a height which mated her power, and with a facrilegious hand tore from her diadem one of its brighteft and mod precious jewels. I {^y a woman thus agitated, may when denied by her friends the means of vengeance, be tranfported by a double re/entmcnt to throw herfcif even into the arms of an old enemy, now more compliart v/ith her call and cd-operating with her paitions: fo probably was this union produced. By the treatv of Verfailks each power renoup«;"d I ihat

68 them. If ( 58 ) that old fyftem which had for ages been the fource of enmity between their houfes. The fincerity of their profefliona was proved by ad;ions that could not be equivocal 5 a mutual implicit confidence was demonllirated by their Ipurning away every other means of fupport, and the league was fandlified and coi firmed by a facrifice on each fide worthy the importance of the occdfion ; tv/o monarchs, their fi icnds and allies were feverally devoted to deftrudion. Does the hiilory of thofe times which immediately preceded the treaty of Wejlphalia down to the fignature of the treaty of Ver-^ Jallles, contain any ftronger proofs of the fyfiem then purfued by the two contending powers, than what has pafited fince affords of a total change in that fyfiem? It one fet of meafures invariably followed during one period proves the intention of tl^e purfnit, an abfolute reverfe of thefe in another demonilrates the intention altered, p. 8, 9, 12. Yet the whole of onr author's argument, and his flrongefl: objcdlions to our condu<5l, are derived from the old French and Aiijlrian fyfhm ; from a fyftem which no longer exifis at tlie courts of Vien^in or Verfailies^ and which by confcquence CAnno: be a rule for our adions with refpedt 10 either of

69 ^59 ) If fads fuch as we have feen, do not prove the purport of hidden confpiracies againft faith and juftice j if the written document mufl be produced, to render defen- Hve meafures neceitary ; then indeed Great- Britain had fewer motives for aftembhng an army in Germany ^ and can only plead in her excufe for fuch an expence of treafure and of men, the regard due to the faith of treaties, to the confidence of her allies, and to her own intereft in obviating the neceffity of an equivalent at the conclufion of the war, which, were our author to dictate the treaty, would ftrip her of all her moft important acquifitions durjng the courfe of it. But if a confederacy againft all that is valuable to men and to chriftians, be as clear as adtion can indicate defign ; and uniform cooperation, not refolveable into any other cfiufe, can dcmonftrate concert and mutual obligations, then an allied army in Germany became neceitary to defeat thofe defigns, and aloiic can, if any thing can, fever the confederacy, by rendering its terms impracfticable, and loofe Aujtria frorn her compacft with Trance. But whatever the event may be, Britain and her allies have done as became fee, brave, and religious men : They have refifted the extirpation of freedom and religion, by the only means with which God

70 (6d) God and nature have armed them for their defence. Altho' venal Swedes have fold their God for a bribe 3 altho' unhappy Saxons revenge upon Brandenburgers the miferies of an invafion rendered neceffary by the weak perfidy of their own Prince ; yet the pro* teftant caufe muft be defended. Ahho' proteftant Palatines, Bohemians^ and Hunga* rians come armed under the ftandards of their tyrants, the univerfal fate of an inflaved people ; altho* driven and compelled Wirtemburghers aim their weapons at the breafts of their brethren, to avoid the death that awaits them behind ; p. 22. yet the veffel muft be faved, even with the deftrudion of our captived friends tugging at a Pirate's oar* P I N 1 S.

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