Chapter-IV. Biocentrism gives us an account of environmental ethics, according to which our

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1 Chapter-IV Ecocentrism Biocentrism gives us an account of environmental ethics, according to which our moral obligation should extend also to individual living beings. But the so-called non-living part of nature and the abiotic features of the non-human world are equally vital for the sustenance and well-being of living beings. But they are not recognized as intrinsically or inherently valuable, since to have moral significance in their own right in such an environmental philosophy requires to be an individual living organism. The claim that only living individuals are morally significant is said to be underpinned by a view of the world as populated by diverse, discrete individuals, whose relations are contingent and external. This world-view is unfavourably contrasted with another view that focuses upon the various relationships of interdependence as the science of ecology demonstrates. Contemporary ecological investigations have clearly illustrated that the dichotomy of the biotic and the abiotic is merely an abstraction. Moral standing of the whole nature, both the animate and the inanimate parts, is to be recognized. This recognition has finally led us to the position of Ecocentrism, which is another alternative to speciesist anthropocentrism. 102

2 Ecocentrism is that holistic environmental theory, according to which not only living beings, but the whole ecosystem, including the abiotic part of nature, is worthy of moral consideration. This way of understanding nature develops from the conviction that ecology plays a primary role in our understanding and valuing of nature. Contemporary science of ecology emphasizes the importance, not of individual organisms, but of the relationships between organisms, and between organisms and the environment. In compliance with it, ecocentrism maintains that an adequate eco-ethics must include our relations with ecological systems, processes, along with non-living natural objects. The environmentalists who subscribe to this ecocentrism contend that these things have inherent value and not mere instrumental value. And so they owe a direct moral obligation to us. The justification for ecocentrism thus consists in an ontological belief and subsequent ethical claim. The ontological belief denies that there are any existential divisions between human and non-human nature sufficient to claim that humans are either the sole bearers of intrinsic value or possess greater intrinsic value than non-human nature. Thus the subsequent ethical claim is for an equality of intrinsic/inherent value across human and non-human nature. Anyhow, the first version of modern ecocentric world-view is found in Aldo Leopold s Land Ethic. Leopold s holistic nature view, however, reminds us 103

3 of Lovelock s Gaia theory, and so we like to take here a brief note of it also. Arne Naess s Deep Ecology is perhaps the most popular form of ecocentrism now-adays. It is a radical and holistic environmental theory that brings thinking, feeling, spirituality and action together in order to diffuse imminent eco-catastrophe. It is also necessary to make a cursory journey through the view of Holmes Rolston III. Rolston explicitly argues for greater weight to collective entities, like species, ecosystem, etc. In this chapter we like to discuss the views of these four environmental thinkers with special emphasis on Naess. The Land Ethic The early version of modern ecocentrism is found in Aldo Leopold s Land Ethic. Aldo Leopold is an American forester who has been regarded as the single most influential figure in the development of an ecocentric environmental philosophy. He felt as early as in 1949 the need for a new ethic, an ethic dealing with man s relation to the land and to the animals and plants. 1 He calls it as the Land Ethic, which aims at the boundaries of the community to include in its fold soil, water, plants, and animals, or collectively, the Land. 2 This view effects a rethinking of ethics in the light of the new science of ecology. In his A Sand County Almanac Leopold argues for an extension of ethics: not only that ethics would deal with the relation between individuals and between the individual and society, but also would deal with man s relation to the Land and to 104

4 the animals and plants. Accordingly, the Land should be respected as a biological community to which we all belong. This extension of ethics, according to Leopold, is actually a process in ecological evolution. Its sequences may be described in ecological as well as in philosophical terms. An ethic, ecologically, is a limitation of freedom of action in the struggle for existence. An ethic, philosophically, is a differentiation of the social from anti-social conducts. These are the two definitions of the same thing. This has its origin in the tendency of interdependent individuals or groups to evolve modes of co-operation. J. Baird Callicott, the most dedicated exponent of Leopold s Land Ethic, argues that Leopold s attempt for an extension of ethic may be traced back even to the traditional moral philosophy, classically articulated in the eighteenth century by David Hume and Adam Smith, in which ethics are shown to be rooted precisely in altruistic feelings, like benevolence, sympathy, and loyalty. 3 The chronology of this development of ethics from Hume and Smith to the Land Ethic is explored by Callicott. According to him, Leopold just takes over Darwin s recipe for the origin and development of ethics, and adds, following Elton, an ecological ingredient, namely, a community concept. Darwin, in turn, might have taken over a sentiment-based theory of ethics from Hume and Smith. We, however, do not find any clue to affirm that Leopold have studied Hume or Smith. But he surely did 105

5 read Darwin and allude in the Land Ethic to Darwin s account of the origin and development of ethics, and thus the theoretical foundations and pedigree of his Land Ethic are traceable though Darwin to the sentiment-based ethical theories of Hume and Smith. 4 So the Land Ethic, on Callicott s interpretation, is, of course, a value theory, but it does not seem to accept the notion of inherent value as it is presently understood, since Leopold s value has its source in human feelings. Callicott suggest that Leopold here follows David Hume (may be unknowingly), for whom morality is grounded in our feelings and sentiments, not merely in reason. Leopold thus concludes that collective entities, such as ecosystems, are appropriate objects of moral value. He criticizes the individualistic approach in general, as it fails to accommodate conservation concerns for ecological wholes. Anyhow, Leopold held the view that the earth s linked communities of life can actuate the moral sentiments of affection, respect, love, sympathy, etc. Leopold then, develops a concept of community, following Elton, 5 to summarise Darwin s natural history of ethics. All ethics so far evolved rest upon a single premise, and that is, the individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts. This community concept of Land Ethic, in addition to changing our perception of Land as having only instrumental value to something with value in itself, changes the 106

6 role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land community to plain member and citizen of it. 6 It implies respect for his fellow-members, and also respect for the community as such. Leopold tends to depict the Land community as a living thing. The characteristics of the Land determine this fact quite as potently as the characteristics of the man who lived on it. So it would be deemed unethical rather wrong to regard the nature as our slave, just as some hundred years ago we came to regard as wrong to treat other human beings as slaves. For Leopold, the perception of Land and the life it sustains as constituting a large and complex entity functioning through interactions of its components is the outstanding discovery of the twentieth century. Mankind s technological capacity has caused it to lose sight of this discovery, with the result that some entire species has been, and are still being extirpated. This would continue, and ecological disharmony would gain momentum, unless a change in our attitude could be effected. 10 He, therefore, summarized his moral prescription in this way: A thing is right when he tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise

7 Obviously, the focus of Leopold s Land Ethic is upon ecosystemic integrity. And this focus upon larger interdependencies rather than individual life units thus results in behavioral prescriptions that differ from those advanced by sentientists, like Singer and Regan. For Leopold, the passing of a complex ecosystem or an entire species is more deplorable than the passing of an individual organism, and as such ethical injunctions should be so shaped. This focus is gradually sharpened. The insights of scientific ecology supply a capacity to view the natural environment as a community, and with this, we have an eco-centric environmental ethics. Much emphasis is placed upon the communal implications of the Land community. All contemporary forms of life are represented to be kin, relatives, members of one extended family. All are equal members in good standing of one society or community, the biotic community or global ecosystem. 9 An ethic to supplement and guide us to see the Land community as a living thing, or what Leopold calls a biotic mechanism is the need of the day. He first sketches the pyramid as a symbol of Land, and later develops some of its implications in terms of Land-use. The energy flows through a circuit which represented by a pyramid consisting of layers. The bottom layer is the soil, then a plant layer that rests on the soil, insect layer on the plants, a bird and rodent layer on the insects, and so on up through various higher animal groups. Each 108

8 successive layer depends upon those below it for food. This line of dependency for food and other services are called food-chain. The pyramid of this food-chain is very complex, so as to seem disorderly, yet the stability of the system proves it to be a highly organized structure. Its functioning depends on the co-operations and competitions of its diverse parts. 10 This sketch of Land as an energy circuit conveys three basic ideas: i) The Land is not merely soil. It is the fountain of energy flowing through a circuit of soils, plants, and animals. Food chains are the living channels which help moving energy upward; death and decay return it to the soil. ii) The native plants and animals keep the energy circuit open; other may or may not. iii) That man-made changes are of a different order than evolutionary changes, and thus they have effects more comprehensive than is intended or foreseen. 11 Nevertheless, some biota seem to differ in their capacity to sustain violent conversion. Leopold takes an example in Western Europe that some large animals are lost, swampy forests have become meadows or plough-land, many new plants and animals are introduced, some of which escape as pests, the remaining natives are greatly changed in distribution and abundance. The Land Ethic, then, reflects the existence of an ecological conscience, and this, in turn, reflects a conviction of individual responsibility for the health of the 109

9 Land. Health is the capacity of the Land for self-renewal. According to Leopold, conservation is our effort to understand and preserve this capacity. But what does it mean for the health of the land sometimes makes us confused. Leopold differentiates two groups of people from the point of view of how they see the Land, this is what he calls as the A-B cleavage. 12 One group A regards the Land as soil, and its function as commodity-production. Another group B regards the Land as a biota, and its function as something broader. Group A sees the Land as agronomy or in economic sense, while group B, on the other hand, prefer natural reproduction. Group B is worried about the biotic as well as the economic grounds about the loss of species. Leopold said that group B feels the stirrings of an ecological conscience. This version of Land-ethical holism would be the supreme deontological principle. In this theory, the earth's biotic community per se is the sole locus of intrinsic/inherent value, whereas the value of its individual members is merely instrumental and dependent on their contribution to the integrity, stability, and beauty of the larger eco-community. A straightforward implication of this version of the Land Ethic is that an individual member of the biotic community ought to be sacrificed whenever that is needed for the protection of the holistic good of the eco-community. 13 But, to be consistent, the same point also applies to human 110

10 individuals because they are also members of the biotic community. Not surprisingly, this imminent misanthropy implied by land-ethical holism has been widely criticized and regarded as a reductio of the position. As a matter of fact, a group of moral philosophers have strongly criticized Leopold s Land Ethic. Sentientist Tom Regan, for example, has condemned the holistic Land Ethic's disregard of the rights of individuals as environmental fascism. Australian Philosopher H.J. McCloskey said that there is a real problem in attributing a coherent meaning to Leopold s statement, one that exhibits his Land Ethic as representing a major advance in ethics rather than a retrogression to a primitive morality. Echoing McCloskey, Attfield went out of his way to deny the philosophical respectability of Land Ethic. And Canadian Philosopher L.W. Sumner has called it dangerous nonsense. Frederick Ferré echoes the same concern in much more clear terms: Anything we could do to exterminate excess people would be morally right! To refrain from such extermination would be wrong!...taken as a guide for human culture, the Land Ethic despite the best intentions of its supporters would lead toward classical fascism, the submergence of the individual person in the glorification of the collectivity, race, tribe, or nation

11 Obviously, if the Land Ethic implies such a monstrous consequence, it should be summarily rejected. But we think that this is hardly true an apprehension. A comprehensive reflection on it would reveal that those critics who make such allegation are more interested to read and quote Leopold piecemeal than to explore and see its theoretical framework, i.e., foundational principles and premises which lead, by compelling argument, to the moral precepts of Land Ethic. They fail to see that Leopold does not put forward the Land Ethic as the only alternative to traditional human ethics. He refers to different stages of the development of ethics as accretions, that means, increase by external additions or accumulations. It is true that he somehow bases his ethic on the theoretical foundations that he found in Darwin, who speaks of evolutionary social ethics. But it should as well be borne in mind that with the advent of a new stage in the process of accretions, the older stages are not erased or totally rejected. We should understand that the duties to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community do not cancel or replace the duties, e.g., to respect human rights, attendant on us as members of the human community. Anyhow, eco-feminist Karen J. Warren holds in his essay The Philosophical Foundation of a New Land Ethic that Leopold s Land Ethic is an ethic that makes the land itself and not just its instrumental, useful, utilitarian, 112

12 efficient value to humans valuable in its own right. She presumes four radical truths in Leopold s Land Ethic: First, humans are co-members of the ecological community. She thinks humans as ecological beings and not merely rational selfinterested persons. Second, an ethical relation to the Land requires both rational and emotional ingredients. We can be ethical only in relation to something we can see, feel, understand, love or have faith in. The evolution of a Land Ethic is an intellectual as well as an emotional process. Third, an ethical relationship to the land cannot exist without the development of an ecological conscience. Obligations have no meaning without conscience, and the problem we face is the extension of the social conscience from people to the Land. Fostering a Land Ethic is intimately interconnected with changing people s loyalties, affections, and convictions to love and respect the Land. Fourthly, Leopold articulates as moral a maxim the ethical principle most often associated with him his definition of a Land Ethic. 15 Anyhow, it is no gain denying that Leopold himself hardly provides us a systematic moral theory to support his ethical ideas concerning the environment. But, nevertheless, his views presented a challenge and an opportunity as well for moral theorists to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biosphere. This holism of Land Ethic has come out as the first paradigm of contemporary 113

13 environmental ethics. But with a paradigm shift of ecology from the notion of static equilibrium to the notion of nature as dynamic flux, 16 Leopold s proposal seems to become invalid. But commentators, like Callicott, hold that recent development of paradigm shift from the balance of nature to the flux of nature may necessitate some revision, but this fact does not make it outdated. The moral prescription of the Land Ethic is to be made dynamic in the light of development of ecology. Here also we should keep in mind that Leopold did acknowledge the change in the natural environment, but he thought of it as very slow. He thought of it primarily on a very slow evolutionary temporal scale. According to Callicott, we may thus make some revision of Leopold s famous formula in the following way: A thing is right when it tends to disturb the biotic community only at normal spatial and temporal scales. It is wrong when it tends otherwise. 17 The Gaia Theory The traditional holistic idea of the Earth as an integrated whole, a living being, has found an expression in the Gaia theory. The mythical Gaia was the primal Greek goddess personifying the Earth, the Greek version of Mother Nature, or the Earth Mother. James Lovelock gave this name to his hypothesis after a suggestion from the novelist William Golding. According to the Gaia theory, all organisms and their inorganic surroundings on this planet are closely interrelated to form a single and self-regulating complex 114

14 system, maintaining favourable conditions for life on the Earth. The scientific investigation of the Gaia hypothesis (as initially formulated by Lovelock) focuses on the modalities of the biosphere and the evolution of life forms contributing to the stability of global temperature, ocean salinity, oxygen in the atmosphere and other factors of habitability in a better homeostasis. The Gaia hypothesis was co-developed by the microbiologist Lynn Margulis in the 1970s. Lovelock formulated the Gaia hypothesis in a journal article in the 1970s, followed by a book titled Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth published in1979. Until 1975 the hypothesis was not given importance by the scientific community. An article in the New Scientist of February 15, 1975, and a popular book length version of the hypothesis, published in 1979 entitled The Quest for Gaia, began to attract scientific and critical attention. Although the proposal was not well received by the scientific community, it is now studied in the different disciplines like geophysiology and earth system science, and some of its principles have been accepted in fields like biogeochemistry and systems ecology. This holistic proposal has also inspired analogies and diverse interpretations in social sciences, politics, philosophy and literature under an enchanting mythical-theoretical clout. The Gaia theory reiterates that the earth's atmospheric condition is kept at a dynamically steady state by the presence of life. Presently the Gaian homeostatic 115

15 balance is being disturbed by high increase of human population and the impact of their activities to the environment. The multiplication of greenhouse gases may cause an opposite turn of the Gaia's negative feedbacks into homeostatic positive feedback. Lovelock holds that this could bring an accelerated global warming and mass animal mortality, including humans. In fine, the Gaia hypothesis accords that the temperature, oxidation state, acidity, and certain aspects of the rocks and waters are kept constant, and that this homeostasis is maintained by active feedback processes operated automatically and unconsciously by the biota in general. As already stated, Lovelock called his first proposal the Gaia hypothesis, but the term established now-a-days is the Gaia theory. Lovelock explains that the initial formulation was based on general observations, and so lacked a scientific explanation. It is interesting to note that the initial Gaia hypothesis has now been supported by various scientific experiments and provided a number of useful predictions, and hence is properly referred to as the Gaia theory. But it should also be mentioned that wider research proves the original hypothesis somewhat wrong, in the sense that it is not life alone but the whole earth system that does the regulating functions. Anyhow, it is possible to regard the earth's ingredients soil, mountains, rivers, atmosphere, etc. as organs or parts of organs of a coordinated whole, each part with its definite function. And if we could see this whole, as a whole, through 116

16 a great period of time, we might perceive not only organs with coordinated functions, but possibly also that process of consumption as replacement which is, in the language of biology, called metabolism. In such a case we would have all the visible attributes of a living thing, which we do not realize to be such as it is too big, and its life processes passing so slowly. Some contemporary environmental philosophers have argued for a pantheistic version of the Gaia hypothesis, which in its extreme form holds that not only is the earth a self-regulating Superorganism, but it is capable of deliberation in terms of its own ideals. 18 Although no philosopher is seen to develop normative theory directly on the basis of the Gaia theory, it is, and will remain, in the background of any form of ecocentric thought. Systemic Holism Although Holmes Rolston-III is sometimes projected as a supporter of biocentrism, he argues for greater weight to collective entities, like species, ecosystem, etc. For this some environmentalists call his theory Systemic Holism, while Taylorian biocentrism and animal liberationists sentientism are individualistic. Rolston contends that an ecological consciousness requires an unprecedented mix of science and conscience, of biology and ethics. According to him, there is moral value in all parts of nature, and so we have no escape from moral responsibilities. 117

17 Not only animals, but all trees and plants, species, ecosystems, etc. have moral worth, and so attract our moral consideration. Rolston strongly upholds that ecological wholes, like species, merit moral respect, in addition to that owed to the individual members of the species. He introduces the notion of objective good : all living things as having objective good-of-their-own-kind. Plants do not have a subjective life, he contends, like a higher animal or a human being. But they have objective lives, and when we utter Let flowers live! we indirectly refer to an evaluative system that conserves good of its own kind and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is really good. He writes: An organism is a spontaneous, self-maintaining system, sustaining and reproducing itself, executing its programme, making a way through the world.[dna-coded information] gives the organism a telos, end a kind of (non-felt) goal.the DNA is thus a logical set, not less than a biological set, informed as well as formed. 19 He, of course, admits that all organisms are not moral agents like us, but that fact does not free us from moral responsibility towards them. In defense of our obligation to species, he reiterates, although species exists only as instantiated in individuals, they are as real as individual members. That there are specific forms of life historically maintained in their environments over time is almost as certain as anything else we believe about our mundane world. Similarly, ecosystems generate and support life forms, enhance situated fitness, and allow congruent beings to evolve in their 118

18 places with sufficient containment. In this sense, an ecosystem is the fundamental unit of any survival, and so we must give it a moral thought. He explains that some values are anthropogenic, some are biogenic, and again, some are in the natural systems. Value is there across the whole continuum, though it increases in the emergent climax. It should be kept in mind that human evaluators are among its products. Values may, accordingly, be objective, as are subjective. A little thought will reveal that any ecological system is a value-transformer, where form and being, process and reality, fact and value are inseparably conjoined. Rolston upholds that ecosystems, as the generators and perpetuator of life, have a kind of value which he describes as systemic value. Such value is not any instrumental value, which uses something as a means to an end. Neither is it inherent/intrinsic, which is worthwhile in itself. E.g., a warbler does not survive to be eaten by a falcon it defends its own life as an end in itself. A life is thus important intrinsically or inherently, without further contributory reference. As a matter of fact, neither terminology is satisfactory in a genuine environmental discourse, and so says Rolston. An ecosystem has value in itself, it does not have any value for itself. It is value-producer, but not a value-owner. Different ecological systems, though instrumentally valuable as fountains of life, are equally valuable in themselves. This value can neither be explained as intrinsic, 119

19 as though the system defend some unified form of life. And so Rolston calls this systemic value. 20 Some critics, like Ned Hettinger and Bill Throop, take Rolston s view as a form of ecocentrism, and contend that although Rolston s environmental theory relies on a number of values that systemically make nature valuable, ecosystem integrity and stability are central among them. 21 What Hettinger and Throop mean to say is that as the theory of stability and integrity has been rejected by majority of contemporary ecologists, who take instead an ecology of instability to be true, the foundation of ecocentric ethics, like that of Leopold, seem to be very shaky. They explain, an eco-ethic based on the balance of nature does not corroborate with the most of the insights of recent ecologists. As we note in Notes and Reference (no.16) below, contemporary ecology supports an ecology of instability, which accords, disturbance is the norm for many ecosystems and that some systems of nature do not tend towards the so called stable and integrate states. The ecology of instability, on the other hand, argues that disturbance is the norm for many ecosystems, and that natural systems typically do not tend toward mature, stable, and integrated states. Contemporary ecologists no longer assume a tight correlation between stability and diversity. They take nature as in a continuous change, in a flux. With flux taken to be the norm on a variety of levels, it becomes more 120

20 difficult to interpret natural systems as well-integrated. Michael Soulé, for example, thinks it positively dangerous to emphasize the equilibrial, selfregulating, stability producing tendency of ecosystems. 22 Deep Ecology Although Leopold s Land Ethic is the first paradigm of contemporary environmental philosophy and ethics, although we speak of Rolson s Systemaic Holism and of James Lovelock s Gaia theory, Arne Naess s Deep Ecology is perhaps the most influential environmental ethics and philosophy of nature in contemporary times. Deep Ecology is a radical and holistic environmental theory that brings thinking, feeling, spirituality and action together in tackling the imminent eco-catastrophe. As the name suggests, Deep Ecology goes beyond the (western) tradition of speciesist anthropocentrism, and also individualist biocentrism, in so far as it takes into consideration the abiotic part of the environment as well, along with the biotic. It places intrinsic/ inherent value on non-human species, ecosystems and processes in nature Anyhow, Arne Naess in his article The Shallow and The Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary published in Inquiry in 1973 (which is based on a talk he gave at a Third World Future Research Conference held in Bucharest in 121

21 1972), Naess first makes a distinction between shallow ecology and Deep Ecology, and at the same time, formulates, though summarily, the basic ideas and principles of his Deep Ecology. Deep Ecology comes out as the form of ecology movement which raises deeper questions concerning environmental matters. Here the adjective 'Deep' signifies the fact that this environmentalism asks why and how questions in a more comprehensive fashion, while other environmental theories fall short of it. If we make a survey of Deep Ecology environmentalism, we would find that it signifies at least three things. First, it leads into deeper questioning about environmental issues. It probes into the roots of environmental problems and the underlying world-views. The real solutions of these problems must involve a change at the fundamental level of our thought and action. It may here be mentioned that historian Lynn White, Jr. argued as early as in 1967 that the basic (theoretical) cause of environmental problems is rooted in our traditional worldviews. He writes: What people do about their ecology depends on what they think about themselves in relation to things around them. 23 Deep Ecology follows this orientation and reflects critically on the fundamental assumptions of these worldviews. It thoroughly examines our deep-seated assumptions and views on nature, and proposes, at the same time, a radical alternative. Secondly, Deep Ecology 122

22 refers, in addition, to a platform Deep Ecology Platform for collective activities worldwide based on some minimum fundamental principles. The third and most common meaning of Deep Ecology is a philosophy of nature that goes in line with this Platform, but is more specific in exploring views and values. As a matter of fact, Deep Ecology refers to the notions, views and principles in a word, a distinct philosophy of nature and environment, first integrated by Arne Naess, and then followed by a number of environmentalists, like Bill Deval, George Sessions, Warwick Fox and others. Shallow Ecology and Deep Ecology Naess identifies two different strands in contemporary environmental thought and movement. One he calls shallow ecology and the other Deep Ecology. He described shallow ecology as a short-term reform-approach engaged only with prevention of pollution and resource depletion. One of the pillars of shallow ecology view-point is the belief that the environmental crisis can all be technologically resolved. Thus shallow approach keeps faith in technological optimism, economic growth, and scientific management and the continuation of existing industrial societies, and so it is limited to the traditional, more or less anthropocentric, moral frame-work. It also presupposes that men would not accept any significant change of their traditional life-styles. Actually, the supporters of 123

23 shallow ecology think that reforming human relations towards nature can be done within the existing structure of society. It does not challenge the philosophical presuppositions and fundamental validity of the industrial social paradigm of reality. According to Naess, its concerns are relatively local and selective, only for the health and affluence in the developed countries. 24 Deep Ecology, on the other hand, proposes a major reshuffling of our philosophy and world-views, cultures, life-styles consistent with the new ecological perspective. It aims at preserving the integrity of nature for its own sake, irrespective of its benefits to any privileged species, like humans. It is based on this conviction that the Earth does not belong to humans. 25 Rather we have to change of our life-styles, if required. Deep Ecology is thus concerned with deeper, more basic questions upon our interactions with the nature, rather than with a narrow view of ecology as a branch of biological science. Deep Ecology thus transcends the limit of any particular science of today, including systems theory and scientific ecology. Deepness of normative and descriptive premises characterises the movement. Deep environmentalism attempts to avoid traditional utilitarian approach to environmental issues, which is concerned with resource management of the environment for human purposes. For the shallow thinkers, the resources of Earth belong exclusively to the human beings who have the technology to exploit 124

24 them. Accordingly, the resources should not be depleted, as they would get rarer, and a high market price may be required to conserve them. But they are convinced that substitutes for them would be found through technological progress. Thus natural objects are valuable only as resources for humans, but for the supporters of Deep Ecology no natural object should be conceived as mere resource for humans. Naess s Deep Ecology initiates an ecocentric approach in contemporary environmentalism, rather than a platform for consideration merely of isolated lifeforms or local situations. The supporters of shallow ecology may, for instance, be concerned about (human) over-population in developing and under-developed countries, but may not be worried about over-population in an industrially developed country. Deep Ecology moves forward with a definite universal goal: it puts emphasis not only on stabilizing human population but also of reducing it to a sustainable minimum by humane means, which do not require violence or dictatorship. In shallow approach one may condone, or even may applaud, population increase in one s own (developed) country for short-sighted economic, military, or for other purposes. An increase in number of humans may be considered as valuable in itself or as economically profitable. Deep Ecology recognises that excessive pressure on planetary life stems from the human population explosion. And so population 125

25 reduction should be given the highest priority in all societies, be it developed, developing or underdeveloped. It may also call for a redistribution of excess population across low-populated nations. Similarly, the shallow approach toward pollution seeks higher technology to purify air and water. In Deep approach pollution is evaluated from a total biospheric point of view. Its supporters do not focus exclusively on its effects on human life and health, but rather on planetary life as a whole. It also reminds us that technology is not an all-bliss matter. Change in technology implies change in culture. The degree of self-reliance and local autonomy diminishes in proportion with the nature and extension of technology. Men gradually lose his spiritual eye, and get swayed by the passivity and unnecessary dependence on technocracy. A deep analysis would show that shallow ecological movement tends to repair only some of the worst consequences of our lifestyles and social structures, but fails to address the fundamental root-questions embedded in them. By contrast, the supporters of Deep Ecology are committed to the view that it is our responsibility to save the nature for both present and future generations, be they human or non-human. As Naess puts it, the aim is not a slight reform of our present society, but a substantial reorientation of our whole civilization

26 Deep Ecology is actually founded on two basic principles: one is a scientific insight into the interrelatedness of various systems of life on the earth, together with the rejection of anthropocentrism as a misguided way of seeing things. According to Deep Ecology, the ecocentric attitude is more consistent with the truth about the nature of life on earth. Instead of regarding humans as some beings completely unique, or as chosen by God, it sees all things and beings as integral threads in the fabric of planetary life. Arne Naess, the proponent of Deep Ecology, believes that we need to develop a caring rather than dominating and aggressive attitude towards the Earth, if the planet, including humans, is to survive. The second basic idea of Deep Ecology is the need for Self-realisation. Instead of identifying with our small individual egos or merely with our immediate families, we should learn to identify ourselves with all animals, trees and plants to say, ultimately with the whole ecosphere. This may require a pretty radical change in our consciousness, but it would make our behavior more consistent with what science tells us and is necessary for the well-being of life on Earth. From these two principles of Deep Ecology we have two basic normative principles. 27 One is that every life form has, at least in principle, a right to live and blossom. Naess holds that in some compelling situations we may not find better option than to kill some living beings in order to survive, but it is a basic intuition 127

27 that we have no right to destroy them without sufficient reason. The second norm of Deep Ecology is that with maturity, human beings would experience joy when other life forms experience joy, and sorrow when other life forms experience sorrow. Basic Principles of Deep Ecology To integrate his Deep Ecology Naess formulates the following seven basic principles Rejection of the man-in-environment image in favour of the relational, total-field image According to Naess s Deep Ecology, organisms are knots in the biospherical net or fields of intrinsic relations. An intrinsic relation is defined here as relation between two things A and B such that the relation belongs to the basic constituents of A and B, and as such, without the relation, A and B are no longer the same things. The total-field approach dissolves the man-inenvironment concept. Instead, it draws a relational, total-field image based on metaphysical interrelatedness of things and beings. All organisms are seen as knots in a field of intrinsic relations and mutualities. Obviously this 128

28 total-field model dissolves not merely human chauvinism, but also the concept of pure, absolutely autonomous individual. 2. Biospherical egalitarianism in principle Deep Ecology believes in biospheric egalitarianism: all biotic communities, including the abiotic nature, have equal right to live and blossom. The ecological field-worker acquires a deep-seated respect, or even veneration, for ways and forms of life. To the ecological field-worker, according to Naess, the equal right to live and blossom is an intuitively clear and obvious value axiom. Its restriction to humans is an anthropocentrism with detrimental effects on the life quality, even of humans themselves. The quality of life depends in part upon the deep pleasure and satisfaction we receive from close partnership with other forms of life. The attempt to ignore our dependence and to establish a master-slave role has contributed to the alienation of man from himself. Anyhow, the in principle clause is later inserted, as it was felt that any realistic praxis necessitates some killing, exploitation, and suppression. We have no right to destroy other living beings without sufficient reason. 129

29 3. Diversity and symbiosis It upholds the interrelated principles of diversity and symbiosis. Diversity increases the level and potentiality of survival, thereby enhancing novelty and richness of life forms. According to Naess, To maximise selfrealisation we need maximum diversity and maximum symbiosis. 29 It also favours diversity of human ways of life and culture, of occupations, of economies. Accordingly, we should subscribe to the cause against economic and cultural domination as well as against annihilation of seals and whales. Symbiosis means living in harmony with other fellow members. We should remember that live and let live is more powerful ecological policy than either you or me. The so-called Darwinian theory of struggle for life and survival of the fittest implies mutual co-existence as well. Anyhow, we may interpret it in the sense of ability to coexist and cooperate in complex relationships, rather than the ability to kill, exploit, and suppress. The principle either you or me tends to reduce and destroy the multiplicity of kinds of forms of life. Ecologically inspired attitude is live and let live, which favours as well diversity of human ways of life. 130

30 4. Anti-class posture It is sometimes thought that the enhancement of life-quality of humans depends on suppression and exploitation of other life forms. But contemporary ecological investigations demonstrate that this mode of thinking is wrong; rather, symbiosis enhances the potentialities of survival, the chances of new modes of life, and the richness of forms. In contrast, the class posture adversely affects their potentialities of Self-realisation. The principle of diversity does not favour differences due merely to certain attitudes or behaviours forcibly blocked or restrained. The principles of ecological egalitarianism and of symbiosis support the anti-class posture. The ecological attitude favours the extension of all three principles to any group conflicts, including those of today between developing and developed nations. These principles also favour extreme caution toward any over-all plans for the future, except those consistent with wide and widening classless diversity. 5. Fight against pollution and resource depletion In the fight against pollution and resource-depletion shallow ecologists find a lot of supporters. But their endeavours do not comply with the total stand 131

31 when they focus on pollution and resource depletion of a country or of a locality in isolation, without taking other related matters seriously. When projects are implemented to reduce pollution, the project-managers do not take other associated problems into account that might surface. For example, they sometimes install some anti-pollution devices popular pressure, but do not take into account its effects in distant future. Naess rejects such shallow ecological stand, and advocates for sustainable policies of Deep Ecology. Again, if prices of essential commodities of life increase because of the installation of anti-pollution devices, class differences may increase too. An ethic of responsibility implies that ecologists should not follow the shallow path, but follow the Deep Ecology Platform. 6. Complexity, not complication Deep Ecology makes a distinction between what is really complicated without any unifying principle and what is merely complex. Multiple factors may be operative to form a unity. But when we fail to find the unifying principle then it seems to us to be complicated. In ecological matters, due to our gigantic ignorance of the biospheric interrelationships, we often mistake the complex as complication, and try to get rid of the complex. 132

32 The theory of ecosystems contains an important distinction between what is complicated without any Gestalt or unifying principle and what is complex. A multiplicity of, more or less, lawful, interacting factors may operate together to form a unity, a system. Organisms, ways of life, and interactions in the biosphere in general exhibit complexity of such an astoundingly high level as to colour the general outlook of ecologists. Such complexity makes thinking in terms of vast systems inevitable. It also makes for a keen, steady perception of the profound human ignorance of biospherical relationships and therefore of the effect of disturbances. 7. Local autonomy and decentralisation The vulnerability of a form of life is roughly proportional to the weight of influences from outside the local region in which that form has obtained an ecological equilibrium. But the efforts to strengthen local autonomy presuppose an impetus towards decentralisation. Pollution problems, including those of thermal pollution and recirculation of materials, also lead us in this direction, because increased local autonomy, if we are able to keep other factors constant, reduces energy consumption. Local autonomy, in socio-political life, is strengthened by a reduction in the number of links in the hierarchical chains of decision. Even if a decision follows majority rule 133

33 at each step, many local interests may be dropped along the line, if it is too long. Anyhow, the norms and tendencies of Deep Ecology movement are not derived from ecology of facts by logic or by induction. Ecological knowledge and the life-style of the ecological field-workers have suggested, inspired, and fortified the perspectives of the Deep Ecology movement. Many of the formulations in the seven-point survey are rather vague generalisations, only tenable if made more precise in certain directions. But all over the world the inspiration from ecology has shown remarkable convergences. The survey does not pretend to be more than one of the possible condensed codifications of these convergences. 30 The significant tenets of the Deep Ecology movement are clearly and forcefully normative. They express a value priority system only in part based on results of scientific research. There are political potentials in this movement which should not be overlooked and which have much to do with pollution and resource depletion. As to the approach of Deep Ecology, Naess holds, The direction is revolutionary, the steps are reformatory 32. Insofar as Deep Ecology movement deserves our attention, they are ecophilosophical ( or ecosophical) rather than ecological. Ecology is a limited science 134

34 which makes use of scientific methods, and gives us some information. Philosophy, as we know, is the most general forum of debate on fundamentals, descriptive as well as prescriptive. In a sense, philosophy means one s own personal code of values and view of the world which guides our own decisions. 32 When applied to questions about ourselves and nature, we may then call it ecosophy. Thus eco-philosophy, like Deep Ecology, or an ecosophy, includes norms, rules, postulates, value priority announcements and hypotheses concerning the state of affairs in the universe 33, and, along with it, a direct practical orientation to act accordingly. Along with George Sessions and others, Arne Naess has set up a Deep Ecology Platform, which is based on the perception that some philosophers alone cannot make a significant change in this planet, and as such, we have to organise people from all walks of life and take into our fold scientists, activists, scholars, artists and other lay people. This umbrella Platform is based on eight point programme of environmentalism. If we can largely agree with the Platform statements, we fall within the umbrella of Deep Ecology movement and we can place ourselves within the ranks of its supporters. The Platform is not meant to be a rigid set of doctrinaire statements, but rather a set of discussion points, open to modification by people who broadly accept them. Some Deep Ecology supporters 135

35 regard the Platform as the outline of a comprehensive ecosophy in its own right. Here first level statements of wide identification (points 1 3) are represented by the first three points, which incorporate the ultimate norm of intrinsic value. Points 4 to 7 are seen as a bridge between the ultimate norm and personal lifestyles, with Point 8 relating specifically to concrete actions in the world. These eight points are: 1. The well-being and flourishing of human and nonhuman life on Earth have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent value). These values are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes. 2. Richness and diversity of life forms 34 contribute to the realization of these values and are also values in themselves. 3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs. 4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human population. 35 The flourishing of non-human life requires such a decrease. 5. Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening. 136

36 6. Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic, technological, and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be deeply different from the present. 7. The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between big and great. 8. Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement the necessary changes. 36 These eight principles are endorsed by people from a diversity of backgrounds who share common concerns for the planet earth, its various lifeforms and ecological communities. The supporters of this Platform may come from different religious and philosophical backgrounds. Even their political affiliations may differ considerably. What unites them is a long-range vision of what is necessary to protect the integrity of the earth s ecological communities and values. To say, the supporters may have a diversity of ultimate beliefs, i.e., with regard to their values, life-styles and actions. Different people with their distinct cultures have different ways of life, mythologies and social and religious practices. Nonetheless, they can broadly support the Platform-principles and work for 137